Taiwan Arms Sales: Temporary Hold or Freeze?

Today's Taipei Times covered an interesting Washington Times editorial penned by Randy Schriver. Randy is former Senior Country Director for China and Taiwan for the Secretary of Defense, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for China/Taiwan affairs during the Bush administration. He currently presides over the Project 2049 Institute and is an associate with Armitage International.

The editorial and Taipei Times' reporter William Lowther's summary, coming in the wake of the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), is a useful reminder of an often ignored fact. Despite expanding cross-Strait economic links, China still relies on implicit or explicit threats of military force to resolve political differences with the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan).

Taiwan Link commentary is in blue (NOTE: Image courtesy of the Washington Times)

US may be considering Asia-Pacific policy shift

BY WILLIAM LOWTHER

STAFF REPORTER IN WASHINGTON

Wednesday, Jul 14, 2010, Page 1

Former US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia Randy Schriver said that US President Barack Obama's administration may be “on the verge” of changing its policies toward Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

COMMENT: Guided by a coherent strategy and US legal statutes, policies should shift along with the dynamic nature of cross-Strait relations, China, Taiwan, and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. However, a policy that is grounded upon the so-called "status quo" is doomed to be reactive in nature. The lack of a coherent Obama administration strategy, juxtaposed against well-defined Chinese goals, exacerbates the problem. Instead of actively advancing positive foreign policy goals, such as a Chinese renunciation of use of force, a "status quo" policy emphasizes negatives. Setting the bar as low as possible, success is defined by no PRC use of force. However, real success is Chinese abandonment of the military instrument as a means to resolve an inherently political problem.

While not spelling out the possible change in detail, Schriver strongly hinted that it could result in a Taiwan arms sale freeze.

COMMENT: One could argue that a freeze on release of new systems has been in place since the Obama administration assumed control of the Executive Branch in January 2009. The Congressional notification package submitted in January 2010 was a final step in a long process that began with Bush administration policy decisions made years ago. The Bush administration committed to release the systems. The January 2010 Congressional notifications constituted the remaining second half of a package that the Bush administration should have forwarded in October 2008. President Barack Obama and his small group of political advisers have yet to approve and notify Congress of any new sale of major defense articles to Taiwan.

There may be a belief that a freeze on any new arms sales to Taiwan will reap benefits from Beijing, such as cooperation on North Korea, exchange rate adjustment, war on terrorism, Iran, etc. Or that the political costs of freezing new arms sales to Taiwan are and will be minimal, at least compared to the political pain that Obama's political advisers perceive China could dish out. And having committed to a "no trouble making" policy, the Ma administration is unlikely to push too hard on any US policy issue, economic, military, or otherwise. However, in bowing to Chinese pressure without any sign of direct reciprocation in the form of a substantive missile pull-back, the Obama administration is implicitly giving credence to China's reliance on military coercion as an instrument of national policy.

And furthermore, the Obama administration has reversed a policy decision made by President Bush in April 2001: diesel electric submarines. However, in fairness, there's plenty of responsibility to go around for failure to execute the submarine program. The ROC Navy earns low marks for creativity for placing the program in the hands of a conservative US Navy that never wanted to manage the program in the first place. The ROC Navy could have easily assumed programmatic responsibility and entrusted Taiwan's own shipbuilding industry.

Presidents Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou could have directed the ROC Navy to pursue alternative acquisition paths. However, sources close to both the Bush and Obama White House allege thatWhite House officials strongly suggested that the new Ma administration abandon Taiwan's 40-year quest for a fleet of 10 submarines. The Obama White House allegedly has repeated the suggestion. As a result, the Ma administration appears to have shelved the ROC Navy's long standing requirement.

In an article published on Monday in the conservative Washington Times, Schriver said that following the signing of the Economic Cooperative Framework Agreement (ECFA) by Taiwan and China, there was further evidence of cross-strait rapprochement.

“Curiously,” he wrote, the Chinese military buildup opposite Taiwan continues, with analysts saying that about 1,500 ballistic missiles are pointed at Taiwan.

COMMENT: This is where one should exercise caution. Bean counting of ballistic missiles has long been a metric of Chinese intent. Detractors could argue that there is little hard evidence that the 1500 number is valid, and that the growth has leveled off. But one has to define what class of ballistic missile one is referring to and elaborate upon the estimate's basis.

The ballistic missiles that are unambiguously dedicated toward Taiwan and have political and strategic significance are the short range ballistic missiles subordinate to the Second Artillery's 52 Base. An additional two 300 kilometer-range DF-11 brigades are subordinate to the Nanjing Military Region and provide tactical support for landing operations, rather than those under the Second Artillery that carry strategic significance. Furthermore, brigades equipped with nuclear-capable medium range ballistic missiles have a more diverse set of targets, and therefore could not necessarily be described as "targeted against Taiwan." The same goes for PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Navy (PLAN) assets assigned to the Nanjing Military Region.

Therefore, the units that could best be classified as dedicated toward Taiwan are the five Second Artillery SRBM brigades that have been established for over five years. As in most military organizations, a standard table of equipment likely exists with a set number of missile assigned to each brigade. A standard number is set to match the logistical capacity of the units to which the missiles are assigned. Once the table has been filled, that's it. To continue an expansion, a new brigade with another logistical infrastructure should be formed.

If the 1500 number is based upon cumulative estimates of SRBMs manufactured and delivered, then one explanation is that new SRBM variants are replacing older variants. Older variants are likely retired. Solid rocket motors generally have a shelf life of around seven years, the point when cracks in the propellent significantly reduce the reliability and safety of the missile. Advanced storage and refurbishment technologies can serve to extend the shelf life. As new guidance, navigation, and control technologies become available, the entire design of a missile changes, foreclosing options for refurbishment.

Therefore, a plausible case could be made that the growth reflects production of replacement missiles rather than an expansion of the overall SRBM inventory (NOTE: Some have speculated that the PLA could attempt to get political credit for retiring older missile variants. However, political credit should be granted only for a true reduction in capabilities).

But could there be a new SRBM brigade, in addition to production of new variants to replace missiles in existing brigades? There is a new brigade being formed under the 52 Base. The question is whether or not the new brigade is being equipped with SRBMs or medium range ballistic missiles.

“Why have we not seen even a modest, symbolic step on China’s part, commensurate with improvements in the economic and political spheres, to reduce the military intimidation it imposes on the people of Taiwan?” Schriver asked.

“Understanding why the buildup continues, informs policy decisions the Obama administration must face,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Very good point. Mr. Schriver continues below.

There are four possible explanations for the continuing Chinese military buildup, he wrote.

The first is that China has “no intent whatsoever to diminish the tools of intimidation and coercion in which so much investment has been made.”

Rather, Chinese leaders “are forced to conclude that they must retain the military threat to keep Taiwan in check,” he wrote.

Yes, indeed! In general, the PLA has an organizational and bureaucratic interest in whipping up the Taiwan independence "threat." They likely argue that maintenance or expansion of the force posture is needed to deter independence advocates. These arguments are questionable on many grounds. However, the most relevant is that China's military posture may be the single-most important factor in alienating a large portion of Taiwan's domestic polity and has the reverse effect.

Second, civilian leaders in China may be unwilling — or perhaps even unable — to challenge the People's Liberation Army (PLA) leadership. In turn, the PLA knows that if it pulls back on Taiwan, its budget — and justification for its continued growth — could be cut, Schriver wrote.

The third possible explanation for the military buildup opposite Taiwan, he said, was it is really designed to threaten other US allies such as Japan.

COMMENT: Certainly. If Taiwan independence no longer became the justification, a new basis would be needed for military expenditures. But an overt preparations for a possible Japan contingency would undercut the PRC "peaceful development" image that the propaganda machine wants to project.

“Finally, a fourth possible explanation is that China might be willing to pull back missiles and reduce the threat — but is waiting for the right time and the right deal,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Just what would that deal be? One theory is that the PRC may want to deal with the US, rather than Taiwan on military-related issues, including confidence building measures (CBMs) that could relate to Taiwan (e.g., cross-Strait CBMs are kind of silly since Beijing's goal is to minimize Taiwan's confidence). The deal that Jiang Zemin allegedly tabled in 2002 was a missile withdrawal in exchange for agreement for halting or setting a timetable for halting arms sales.

The basic premise of such a bargain has merit and is at the foundation of the 1982 Communique. However, explicit bargaining is neither wise or justifiable. The basis for US arms sales is and should be the nature of the military challenge that China poses to Taiwan. The current PRC posture warrants a wide open door for the release of defense articles that the democratically elected government of Ma Ying-jeou deems necessary. Of course the US should make decisions to approve, disapprove, or defer based on its own interests. But as long as China refuses to significantly reduce its military posture opposite Taiwan, then arms sales should be routine and forthcoming.

Sources close the Obama administration have stated that a small group of former US government officials, senior retired flag officers, and foreign policy specialists have an on-going program with counterparts in Beijing designed to examine an "arms sales for force reductions" bargain under the auspices of a confidence building measures dialogue. The Sanya Initiative, spearheaded by retired Vice Admiral Bill Owens, has been similar, and one with explicit written blessing of Obama administration officials. A separate initiative for discussion of CBMs involves former US officials, including a former PACOM Commander. The next round of CBM talks is scheduled to take place in Beijing within the next week or two."

“If the PLA military buildup opposite Taiwan continues apace, the need to provide Taiwan with weapons for self-defense also continues. This should be manageable if Washington doesn’t lose its nerve,” he wrote.

COMMENT: But the Obama administration never had a nerve to lose. There has been no release and notifications of any new systems to Taiwan. The three notifications reported as being frozen in a June 2010 Defense News article are not even major defense items.

“The US approach over the course of many years has been to make weapons available to Taiwan so that Taipei’s leaders have the confidence to go to the negotiating table with Beijing. This approach is paying off, but some would have us abandon it just when benefits are being reaped,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Indeed. However, the ECFA is a functional, technical agreement and its political significance is overblown. It is necessary for economic reasons. The real negotiations would be those that address the permanent resolution of political differences in a manner amenable to Taiwan's democratic system of government. Negotiations would work toward a defining the international personality of the ROC or Taiwan, and the nature of its political relationship with the PRC. However, the Ma administration's position continues that of its predecessors. No political negotiations under conditions of military coercion. It has rightfully decided to make withdrawal of missiles directed against Taiwan a precondition for preliminary political negotiations that could lead toward some form of peace agreement.

He said that either through “willful misdirection” or through “naivete,” the Obama administration appears to be ready to change the long-standing policy of providing weapons to Taiwan.

“The Obama administration has gone to great lengths to deny a Taiwan arms-sales freeze is in place, perhaps protesting a bit too much,” he wrote.

COMMENT: There indeed are pretty solid signs that that senior political advisers to President Obama have recommended sidelining Taiwan issues, including a conscious decision to defer any further Congressional notifications for Taiwan arms sales for the remainder of the year. Other sources allege that after the January 2010 notifications, assurances were provided to Chinese interlocutors that there would no more arms sales in the near term, without specifying for how long.

Regardless, principled, professional Asia/China hands on the NSC staff, and within State Department and the Pentagon know better, and of course will rush to reassure the public audience that there is no freeze. But the real test will be in the next few months. If the three minor notifications that President Obama has decided to hold aren't unfrozen in the next few months, then political pressure likely will mount, especially should the Republicans do well in the November elections.

However, a key driver that may put any further notifications on ice for the rest of the year could be the invitation that President Obama issued to Chinese President Hu Jintao last month for an official state visit, which most likely would occur shortly after Congressional elections in November 2010.

“Why does the administration continue a fiction that Taiwan has not formally requested more F-16[C/D] fighters? Why do mid and junior-level officials within the Obama administration allude to instructions from ‘senior leadership’ to hold congressional notifications on Taiwan arms sales and not to expect another major sale in 2010?” he asked.

COMMENT: See above. Under normal circumstances, release of additional F-16s should be a no-brainer. Taiwan already has F-16s, and additional airframes are replacements for old F-5s that are at the end of their useful service life. With Block 20 F-16s no longer in production, the Block 50/52 C/D version is the least capable variant available. Block 60 F-16 C/Ds would be a jump, as would the F-35B, which most analysts would agree is best suited for Taiwan's unique operating environment. If the F-16 issue isn't resolved by the end of this issue, the ROC Air Force (ROCAF), Ministry of National Defense (MND), and the Ma administration would be well-advised to submit a letter of request (LOR) for price and availability (P&A) data for 66 F-35B fighters to the Obama administration. And send a copy to the key staffers on the Hill to make sure they know that an LOR has been submitted.

“Even after [the] ECFA, a strong and capable Taiwan remains a key ingredient to security in the region,” he wrote.

China’s Missile Defense Interceptor Program: An Independent Chinese Analysis

China’s successful exo-atmospheric interception of a ballistic missile on January 11, 2010 marked a major milestone in a long term program with roots in the 1980s. Taking place three years to the day after the successful intercept of an aging satellite in low earth orbit, details of the recent test are scarce and likely will be for some time.

However, a well regarded independent Chinese military-technical analyst, known as KKTT, published a detailed analysis on a national bulletin board site (BBS) site the day following the announcement of the test. In an article entitled “A Preliminary Analysis of China’s Ground-Based Mid-Course Missile Defense Interceptor Technology Test” (我国“陆基中段反导拦截技术试验”初步分析), the author appears to be not only informing his domestic audience what the test represents and what it doesn’t, but also communicating an implicit message to foreign audiences: the test is modest, legitimate, and not necessarily containing a political message. Following is a summary of the article, which appears to be the most detailed assessment of China’s missile defense program to date.

The Rationale for Missile Defense

The author begins with an assessment of four drivers or characteristics of a missile defense program scaled to protect against ballistic missiles with a range of 3500 kilometers or less:

Neutral Effect on Strategic Stability. A missile defense system is not intended to affect strategic stability with the United States and Russia. An ability to undercut the ballistic missile capabilities of the major nuclear powers is unrealistic. According to the author, an assured second strike capability will remain the bedrock of China’s nuclear deterrent.

Defense against Small Nuclear States With Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles. A missile defense capability would be reasonable as a hedge against smaller nuclear powers, such as India. Citing the Agni III program, the author asserts that India has linked ballistic missile development programs with China.

Support for Local Conventional Warfare. If Taiwan develops ballistic missiles, and with “independence elements” threatening to strike the Three Gorges Dam, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, then missile defenses are needed.

Point Defense Against Conventional Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles. The author cites discussions in the U.S. to field a conventionally armed submarine launched ballistic missile intended to go after hard buried targets, such as command centers.

While advocating defenses against ballistic missiles with a range of 3500 kilometers or less, KKTT acknowledges the possibility of fielding a system capable of intercepting ICBMs operating at higher velocities over the longer term.

Roots in the 640 Program and U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative

After a general discussion regarding basic missile defense technologies, the author caveats that his analysis is pieced together from publicly available sources within China and its accuracy not guaranteed.

With China’s efforts to develop a missile defense interceptor and ASAT in the 1960s establishing a foundation, preliminary research on a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) began in the wake of the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) announcement in March 1983. As China’s answer to the SDI, the 863 Program “advanced defense” focus area included direct ascent ASAT and missile defense interceptor programs (specifically 863-409). [NOTE: The earlier effort was known as the 640 Program, which was cancelled in the 1970s. Other focus areas within the 863-4XX series include high power laser and high powered microwave].

The program remained in the preliminary research phase of the research and development (R&D) cycle until the mid-1990s. The specific basic technologies included a digital closed loop fiber optic gyroscope, binary optical/mid-wave infrared seeker, restartable attitude/orbital control system, and “thrust precision control.” The Second Academy overcame a technical bottleneck in 1999 when it did its first “suspension” (悬浮) test of the KKV, the second country in the world to do so.

When the 863 Program was restructured in 2002, the KT-409 interceptor project transitioned from the preliminary research to the R&D phase in 2002. R&D was divided into two focus areas: 863-801 and 863-805, with the latter including an ASAT test as an intermediate milestone in the KKV program.

The author asserts that the KKV weighes 35 kilograms, as compared to 60kg for the U.S. Ground Based Interceptor and 18kg for Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). The PLA General Armaments Department (GAD) is said to have awarded a prize to designers of the 35kg KKV in 2000 for overcoming technical obstacles. {NOTE: While not explicit, a possible connection may exist between the 35kg KKV and China’s microsatellite and nanosatellite buses.}

Testing

The author indicates that testing on sub-systems began as early as 2003. The China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) 066 Base and Sixth Academy were responsible for developing the solid rocket motors for a three-stage solid launch vehicle to be used in ASAT and missile defense interceptor tests. The 066 Base is said to have overseen the first test of a modified solid rocket motor in 2003. {NOTE: Under normal circumstances, the CASIC Sixth Academy is responsible for solid motors with a diameter less than 2 meters. Other sources indicate that the solid motor used in the missile defense interceptor is a variant of DF-21’s FG-05 (FG-5D). The FG-05D supposedly uses a lighter weight composite material in the motor casing, thus increasing its strength to weight ratio.}

Integrated ASAT flight tests were conducted from the Jiuquan Space Launch Center on July 7, 2005 and February 6, 2006. With these first two tests proving unsuccessful, a third test from Xichang space launch center on January 11, 2007 intercepted its intended target. Members of the Central Military Commission (CMC) visited Xichang and awarded the designers with one of China’s highest technical honors. After the ASAT test, the Second Academy conducted a strategy review session, redesignated the KT-409 interceptor as the HQ-19, and began plans for testing against a ballistic missile target.

The author asserts that preparations for the missile defense test appeared to be underway since early December 2009, with no connection with Taiwan arms sales-related contract announcements. The author assesses the target missile – DF-3 or DF-21 – was launched from Taiyuan Space Launch Center. The interceptor was launched from the Korla area in Xinjiang, with impact in the vicinity of the Gansu-Xinjiang border. The flight profile of the target was basic and more increasingly stressful testing is to be expected. The test allegedly was supported by a new phased array radar in the Korla area (+41° 38' 28.17", +86° 14' 11.98"), which was under construction in 2004. The Korla radar is said to support the PLA General Armaments Department (GAD) 20 Base. {NOTE: See Google Earth image of the new Korla radar above.}

The Missile Defense/ASAT Senior Design Team

The author assesses that Chen Dingchang (陈定昌) serves as chief designer of the ASAT/missile defense system. Born in Shanghai in 1937, Chen Dingchang is a graduate of the Tsinghua University and was trained briefly in the former Soviet Union. Leading the Second Academy’s design department when the 863 Program began, Chen was promoted to the Second Academy directorship in 1990. He subsequently directed the China Aerospace Mechanical and Electronics Corporation (CAMEC) (now CASIC). In addition to serving as a member of CASIC’s S&T Committee, Chen directs the General Armaments Department (GAD) Precision Guidance Expert Group (总装备部精确制导专业组). {Click here for more background on Chen Dingchang.}

Zhang Yiqun (张奕群) is said to be the deputy chief designer for the KKV sub-system. Zhang is from the Second Academy’s Second Design Department. A senior designer from the CASIC Fourth Academy’s Fourth Design Department, Zheng Chenghuo (郑盛火), is said to be leading the development of the solid launch vehicle sub-system.

KKTT concludes with an assertion that the interceptor is only one part of a broader system, including space surveillance and tracking and national and operational-level command and control systems. The PLA Air Force has been pressing on the need to integrate air and space defense, but no decision has been made regarding subordination of a missile defense system.

China's Nuclear Warhead Modernization and Stewardship: The Man Behind the Scenes

In a recent dinner table discussion, a youthful family member asked who makes China's nuclear weapons. The question is intriguing: which individual is most responsible for designing, developing, and manufacturing the nuclear weapons that China now has in its inventory? Since China has a small but real inventory of nuclear weapons that factor into U.S. policymaking with regards to Taiwan, it would be good to know the man behind China's second generation of nukes.

Once a decision has been made to invest resources in a major program, the traditional practice of China’s senior political and military leadership has been to assign a chief designer (总设计师) to manage the research and development (R&D) process. John Lewis and Xue Litai’s China Builds the Bomb offers an outstanding overview of the humans behind China’s first generation nuclear device, including chief designer Li Jue. However, that was a long time ago and the PLA Second Artillery’s stockpile now includes a new generation of miniaturized warheads.

Xu Zhilei: The Man Behind China’s Second Generation of Nuclear Warheads

The individual credited with leading the effort to design and develop China’s second generation of nuclear warheads has modest roots in Ningbo, Zhejiang province (for examples of sources, click here and here). Born in 1930, Xu Zhilei (徐志磊) graduated from Shanghai's Datong University in 1952 and served as a precision machining specialist in the Shanghai Machine Tool Factory (上海机床厂) for the next 10 years. In August 1963, he was recruited into the Ninth Academy’s design department to work on China’s first nuclear device. Among his specialties was hydrogen embrittlement, structural engineering, and component design. He was said to be a leading figure in four ground tests and two flight tests of China’s first generation nuclear weapons. In 1987 and again in 1989, Xu was a recipient of one of China’s highest prizes for defense S&T achievement for design and manufacturing on the fissile core of a nuclear device, known as the “pit.”

In the 1980s, Xu was appointed as chief designer for the miniaturized warhead sub-system on two new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Concurrently, Xu functioned as deputy chief designer for the DF-31 program. In this position, Xu oversaw the technical aspects of 10 nuclear tests. In heading up the warhead sub-system of the DF-31, Xu Zhilei ostensibly would have supported Wang Yongzhi (王永志) and Liu Baoyong (刘宝镛), who have been cited as the chief designers of the missile system (presumably the DF-31 and DF-31A respectively). Wang and Liu are both from the China Academy of Launch Technology's First Design Department. Other key DF-31 sub-systems include solid rocket motors, which unsubstantiated reporting refers to as the FG-6 and FG-7. Passing reference is made to Xu’s involvement in a neutron bomb (中子弹) program.

Nuclear Warhead Stockpile Reliability

So Xu Zhilei could be viewed as the father of China's second generation of nuclear warheads. However, since finalization of the miniaturized design, he also has been cited as a key player in ensuring the reliability of China’s existing stockpile of nuclear warheads. Authoritative writings indicate that he and the China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) have supported a “certain base” of the Second Artillery to upgrade its storage, inspection, and transportation support systems for second generation warheads. Assisting Xu in the stockpile stewardship program included Peng Xianjue (彭先觉), Tang Xisheng (唐西生), and Liu Senlin (刘森林) from the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE).

Reliability and safety of nuclear warheads have become sensitive issues in Chinese politics. Veterans from four units associated with testing, storage, and maintenance of nuclear warheads in the 1960s and 1970s have submitted legal claims to the Chongqing city government related to radiation-linked health problems. The specific warhead storage units were all under the former Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) 22 Base, which was an outgrowth of a security regiment known as the 8322 Unit. The warhead storage, transportation, and maintenance function was resubordinated to the Second Artillery in the late 1970s.

One of the 22 Base entities – the 89902 Unit – was headquartered in Shangwuzhuang’s Nabucang (纳卜藏) village, around 50 kilometers northwest of Xining, Qinghai province. While it's unclear what role these facilities play today, the old 89002 unit administrative compound can still be seen on Google Earth. Unverified references indicate the current presence of regimental-level support elements subordinate to the 56 Base. Elements that appear to be linked with the Nabucang administrative facility can be seen along the roads stretching out from the compound and into some pretty desolate territory.

Stockpile stewardship programs and technologies have become increasingly important in the wake of China’s signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. However, legislative bodies in both China and the United States have yet to ratify the CTBT. While maintaining a moratorium on nuclear tests, Beijing authorities have asserted the need to continue to evaluate the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons. Further detail on the Second Artillery’s nuclear warhead storage and handling system can wait for another time. But as a starter, it’s good to know that Xu Zhilei not only led the design and development effort for China’s second generation of nuclear warheads, but also has been a leading figure in ensuring the safety of China's existing warhead inventory.

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The PLA Air Force Over the Horizon Radar Brigade

Over the last year, there has been substantial interest in China’s development of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). When deployed, its strategic goal would likely be to influence Taiwan’s domestic polity and manipulate the cost-benefit calculus of U.S. policymakers.

The ballistic missile program itself – the DF-21D – has been the primary focus. However, the cueing and surveillance architecture that would support an ASBM capability remains somewhat of a mystery. An integrated sensor network would be needed for initial situational awareness of maritime activity in the Western Pacific Ocean and to cue an ASBM before launch. A key element is believed to be a skywave over the horizon (OTH) radar. In November 2008, Sean O'Connor posted a great analysis of the OTH radar system and its role in an ASBM program on his IMINT & Analysis website, including the Google Earth image above. Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang (Naval War College and RAND), Mark Stokes (Project 2049 Institute), Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin (China Security), and Tony Capaccio (Bloomberg) also have addressed the OTH radar cueing issue. However, limited information exists on specific capabilities and how an OTH radar system would fit in to a broader architecture.

One interesting insight is its subordination. A Chinese blogger posted an article in November 2007 that highlighted a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) “Skywave Brigade” (天波旅). The post first appeared on the Wangchao bulletin board website and has been reposted hundreds of times since then. The author asserts that the brigade operates China’s first strategic early warning system in over 20 years, when a brigade operated a missile early warning system in the area of Xuanhua, north of Beijing. The missile early warning radar has been dismantled. The author, careful to avoid censors, uses Pinyin abbreviations for locations of the transmitter and receiver and names of the commander and political commissar of the PLAAF radar brigade. He/she also notes a requirement for additional sites in Fujian and presumably other locations along the east coast for measuring the ionosphere.

Taiwan Link research confirms much of the Chinese author’s analysis. A relatively new PLA Air Force radar brigade – the 95980 Unit – operates the OTH radar system. The PLAAF “Skywave Brigade" is situated in the southern edge of Xiangfan [襄樊], Hubei province, or specifically in Yingpan Village in the Xiangcheng District. On Google Earth, a guarded underground facility can be seen to the east of the village. While not confirmed, the mountain complex could house the OTH surveillance and warning system.

The PLAAF radar brigade has at least six subordinate elements (fendui). Two are near Xiangfan: the 52^nd Element in the Zaoyang Municipal District and the 53^rd in Nanzhang County. The blog poster notes that the OTH transmitter is in “ZY” and receiver is in “NZ.” The OTH receiver array that Sean O’Connor discovered on Google Earth indeed is in Nanzhang county. The coastal sites subordinate to the OTH brigade are:

-- 61^st Element based near Xitangqiao Village [西塘桥镇];

-- 64^th Element located near Fuqing [福清],

-- 66^th Element near Jinjiang [晋江], Fujian province Sanshan Village [三山镇]; and

-- 67^th Element near Wenlin City Shitang Village [石塘镇].

Most likely subordinate to the Guangzhou Military Region Air Force (GMRAF), the radar brigade's priority probably is air activity. Maritime tracks that the system generates could be filtered off to PLA Navy watch centers for tagging and correlation. More analysis would have to be done to figure out the command and control and service coordination arrangements.

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Sanya Initiative: PLA Sends Team to Hawaii for Second Meeting with Retired US Flag/General Officers

As a follow-on to the previous post on Bill Owens' Financial Times editorial, the Hawaii-based Star Bulletin has reported that the second corporate-sponsored meeting of retired U.S. and Chinese flag/general officers took place on 17-18 October 2009 in Honolulu, Hawaii. Known as the Sanya Initiative, the Financial Times reported last year that the dialogue is funded by Bill Owens' parent company, AEA Investors (Vincent Mai), as well as C.V. Starr (Maurice "Hank" Greenberg), and the China-U.S. Exchange Foundation. Another report, apparently a formal report to funders, also credited the Carnegie Corporation and National Committee on U.S.-China Relations for helping to fund the event.

The eight day visit of the Chinese delegation also included stops in New York City and Washington DC for meetings with the Secretary of State and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The delegation's visit preceded the visit of Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission GEN Xu Caihou.

Access and Influence: Financial Executive Opens Doors in Washington for the PLA

The Chinese delegation was led by Xiong Guangkai, former head of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) intelligence community. Xiong currently serves as director of an elite PLA intelligence analytical unit. The Chinese delegation also included five retired senior military officers. Leading and organizing the U.S. side was AEA Investors' Bill Owens, who served as Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Clinton administration.

After meetings in Hawaii, Owens leveraged connections in the Obama administration, and escorted Xiong and the rest of the Chinese delegation for meetings in Washington D.C. with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Mike Mullins (click here for Financial Times reporting). Both ADM Mullins and former Commander, Pacific Command Tim Keating endorsed the initiative in writing (see pages 19 and 20 of the formal report).

Reflecting the views of his Chinese colleagues, Bill Owens is a critic of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Owens was quoted as saying "we look to be a model for active-duty military where the relationship is officially not very good.” Indeed, Owens and his Chinese colleagues do appear to be trying to influence DoD's views regarding the TRA and arms sales. Before departing New York City, Xiong led the entourage in singing "The More We Get Together." {NOTE: No joke here. Read the Financial Times article hyperlinked above. Inquiring minds want to know if Xiong Guangkai, perhaps reflecting on his successes, peered into Owens' eyes while singing "and your friends are my friends"}.

The Star-Bulletin reported that the China Association for International Friendly Contact "coordinated" the trip for the Chinese side. Administratively subordinate to the PRC Ministry of Civil Affairs, the China Association for International Friendly Contact [youlianhui; 友联会] is also known as the International Liaison Department of the PLA General Political Department (GPD). According to Ann Marie Brady in Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic, the Association targets "friendly personages" or "foreign leftists," and reports up the chain to the PLA GPD and presumably beyond.

Members of the U.S. team for the talks in Hawaii were:

Bill Owens. AEA Investors (Asia). ADM (ret) William Owens also is former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See previous post for more details on Owens and his company.

Ron Fogleman. CEO, Alliant Techsystems (ATK); Vice President, Projects International. Gen Ronald Fogleman also is former chief of staff of the Air Force.

Charles E. Wilhelm. Board of directors, OmniPerception; adviser, Battelle Science & Technology, International; former member of advisory board, Lucent Technologies; member of board of advisers, M.I.C.. Industries.Retired four star general and former commander of U.S. Southern Command; and mentor to Joint Forces Command. Gen (ret, USMC) Charles Wilhelm also is former Commander, Southern Command.

Denny Reimer. Director, DFI Government Services (now Detica), a subsidiary of defense contractor BAE Systems. Detica specialises in "collecting, managing and exploiting information to reveal actionable intelligence." He also serves as advisor, VirtualAgility. Gen (ret) Dennis Reimer also is former Army chief of staff.

Chinese delegation members were:

Xiong Guangkai. Xiong serves as Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS). CIISS is subordinate to the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) Second Department (intelligence). As Bates Gill and James Mulvenon noted in a 2002 China Quarterly article, CIISS is "an important interface between the military intelligence apparatus and foreign experts, with regular interactions both at home and abroad."

CIISS houses both active duty and retired military officers, including what Michael Swaine notes in the Gill/Mulvenon article as "some of the best military analysts from the intelligence department." Xiong served as head of the PLA's intelligence community before moving to direct CIISS. As a member of the Taiwan Affairs Leading Group, Xiong also has been a key player in leading the charge for Taiwan's annexation. LTG (ret) Xiong Guangkai also is former deputy chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.

Yu Zhenwu. GEN (ret) Yu Zhenwu is former commander of the PLA Air Force. Beijing cut his visit to the United States while he was PLAAF Commander in May 1995 to protest the visit of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to the United States. Fogleman was his counterpart at the time.

Li Qianyuan. GEN (ret) Li Qianyuan is former commander of the Lanzhou Military Area Command. He also served as commander, 1st Group Army in the Nanjing Military Region, which is a key Taiwan-related position.

Pei Huailiang. GEN (ret) Pei Huailiang is former president of the PLA National Defense University. Pei also has been viewed as a Taiwan specialist in light of extensive experience in planning and operational positions in the Nanjing Military Region, as well as Jinan Military Region.

Zhao Guojun. VADM (ret) Zhao Guojun is former commander of the East Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy.

Retired PLA generals who participated in the initial meeting in Sanya, Hainan Island, but not the more recent one include GEN (ret) Zhu Wenquan, former Commander, Nanjing Military Region; and GEN (ret) Yang Deqing, former Political Commissar, Guangzhou Military Region.