Obama White House Denies Taiwan Additional F-16 Fighters

President Ma Ying-jeou and his administration have been stepping up Taiwan's campaign to procure an additional 66 F-16s to replace the Republic of China (ROC) Air Force's aging fleet of F-5 E/F fighters (see report below). The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), passed by the U.S. Congress in 1979, requires the United States "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character."

Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) first submitted a formal letter of request (LOR) for price and availability (P&A) for an additional 66 F-16 fighters as early as March 2006. To date, two successive administrations have refused to acknowledge or act upon the LOR due to fear of Chinese retribution. Released by President George Bush in 1992, the ROC Air Force currently has 146 F-16s in its active inventory. A former senior U.S. Air Force official said in a July 2010 Reuters interview that a positive Obama administration decision on moving forward on an F-16 deal is "way past due."

Concerned over how the China issue could affect re-election prospects in 2012, opposition to release of additional F-16s to Taiwan is said to be concentrated within a small circle of pro-Beijing political advisors around President Obama. As a fully fledged democracy, the ROC on Taiwan has municipal elections scheduled for later this year, and with Presidential elections slated for March 2012.


"Taiwan seeks F-16s to boost defence"

Thursday 19th August, 2010 (IANS)

Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou called Thursday on the US to sell F-16s to Taipei to boost the island's defences after the Pentagon said this week that China is gaining military superiority over Taiwan.

'Taiwan people's top concern is Taiwan's security,' Ma said. 'I hope the US can cautiously consider selling F-16C/Ds to Taiwan as the balance of cross-Strait military power is tipping in China's favour.'

Ma made the comment while receiving visiting US Senator Roland Burris. It is the third time this month that Ma had raised the F-16 purchase while receiving US visitors.

Taiwan ordered 150 F-16A/Bs from the US in 1992 but is seeking to buy 66 F-16C/Ds to replace the outdated models.

The US is evaluating Taipei's request after Beijing asked Washington to end arms sales to Taiwan, calling them an obstacle to Taiwan-China unification.

China regards Taiwan as a breakaway province, to be brought back into the motherland one day, by force if necessary.

Taiwan Arms Sales: Temporary Hold or Freeze?

Today's Taipei Times covered an interesting Washington Times editorial penned by Randy Schriver. Randy is former Senior Country Director for China and Taiwan for the Secretary of Defense, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for China/Taiwan affairs during the Bush administration. He currently presides over the Project 2049 Institute and is an associate with Armitage International.

The editorial and Taipei Times' reporter William Lowther's summary, coming in the wake of the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), is a useful reminder of an often ignored fact. Despite expanding cross-Strait economic links, China still relies on implicit or explicit threats of military force to resolve political differences with the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan).

Taiwan Link commentary is in blue (NOTE: Image courtesy of the Washington Times)

US may be considering Asia-Pacific policy shift

BY WILLIAM LOWTHER

STAFF REPORTER IN WASHINGTON

Wednesday, Jul 14, 2010, Page 1

Former US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia Randy Schriver said that US President Barack Obama's administration may be “on the verge” of changing its policies toward Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

COMMENT: Guided by a coherent strategy and US legal statutes, policies should shift along with the dynamic nature of cross-Strait relations, China, Taiwan, and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. However, a policy that is grounded upon the so-called "status quo" is doomed to be reactive in nature. The lack of a coherent Obama administration strategy, juxtaposed against well-defined Chinese goals, exacerbates the problem. Instead of actively advancing positive foreign policy goals, such as a Chinese renunciation of use of force, a "status quo" policy emphasizes negatives. Setting the bar as low as possible, success is defined by no PRC use of force. However, real success is Chinese abandonment of the military instrument as a means to resolve an inherently political problem.

While not spelling out the possible change in detail, Schriver strongly hinted that it could result in a Taiwan arms sale freeze.

COMMENT: One could argue that a freeze on release of new systems has been in place since the Obama administration assumed control of the Executive Branch in January 2009. The Congressional notification package submitted in January 2010 was a final step in a long process that began with Bush administration policy decisions made years ago. The Bush administration committed to release the systems. The January 2010 Congressional notifications constituted the remaining second half of a package that the Bush administration should have forwarded in October 2008. President Barack Obama and his small group of political advisers have yet to approve and notify Congress of any new sale of major defense articles to Taiwan.

There may be a belief that a freeze on any new arms sales to Taiwan will reap benefits from Beijing, such as cooperation on North Korea, exchange rate adjustment, war on terrorism, Iran, etc. Or that the political costs of freezing new arms sales to Taiwan are and will be minimal, at least compared to the political pain that Obama's political advisers perceive China could dish out. And having committed to a "no trouble making" policy, the Ma administration is unlikely to push too hard on any US policy issue, economic, military, or otherwise. However, in bowing to Chinese pressure without any sign of direct reciprocation in the form of a substantive missile pull-back, the Obama administration is implicitly giving credence to China's reliance on military coercion as an instrument of national policy.

And furthermore, the Obama administration has reversed a policy decision made by President Bush in April 2001: diesel electric submarines. However, in fairness, there's plenty of responsibility to go around for failure to execute the submarine program. The ROC Navy earns low marks for creativity for placing the program in the hands of a conservative US Navy that never wanted to manage the program in the first place. The ROC Navy could have easily assumed programmatic responsibility and entrusted Taiwan's own shipbuilding industry.

Presidents Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou could have directed the ROC Navy to pursue alternative acquisition paths. However, sources close to both the Bush and Obama White House allege thatWhite House officials strongly suggested that the new Ma administration abandon Taiwan's 40-year quest for a fleet of 10 submarines. The Obama White House allegedly has repeated the suggestion. As a result, the Ma administration appears to have shelved the ROC Navy's long standing requirement.

In an article published on Monday in the conservative Washington Times, Schriver said that following the signing of the Economic Cooperative Framework Agreement (ECFA) by Taiwan and China, there was further evidence of cross-strait rapprochement.

“Curiously,” he wrote, the Chinese military buildup opposite Taiwan continues, with analysts saying that about 1,500 ballistic missiles are pointed at Taiwan.

COMMENT: This is where one should exercise caution. Bean counting of ballistic missiles has long been a metric of Chinese intent. Detractors could argue that there is little hard evidence that the 1500 number is valid, and that the growth has leveled off. But one has to define what class of ballistic missile one is referring to and elaborate upon the estimate's basis.

The ballistic missiles that are unambiguously dedicated toward Taiwan and have political and strategic significance are the short range ballistic missiles subordinate to the Second Artillery's 52 Base. An additional two 300 kilometer-range DF-11 brigades are subordinate to the Nanjing Military Region and provide tactical support for landing operations, rather than those under the Second Artillery that carry strategic significance. Furthermore, brigades equipped with nuclear-capable medium range ballistic missiles have a more diverse set of targets, and therefore could not necessarily be described as "targeted against Taiwan." The same goes for PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Navy (PLAN) assets assigned to the Nanjing Military Region.

Therefore, the units that could best be classified as dedicated toward Taiwan are the five Second Artillery SRBM brigades that have been established for over five years. As in most military organizations, a standard table of equipment likely exists with a set number of missile assigned to each brigade. A standard number is set to match the logistical capacity of the units to which the missiles are assigned. Once the table has been filled, that's it. To continue an expansion, a new brigade with another logistical infrastructure should be formed.

If the 1500 number is based upon cumulative estimates of SRBMs manufactured and delivered, then one explanation is that new SRBM variants are replacing older variants. Older variants are likely retired. Solid rocket motors generally have a shelf life of around seven years, the point when cracks in the propellent significantly reduce the reliability and safety of the missile. Advanced storage and refurbishment technologies can serve to extend the shelf life. As new guidance, navigation, and control technologies become available, the entire design of a missile changes, foreclosing options for refurbishment.

Therefore, a plausible case could be made that the growth reflects production of replacement missiles rather than an expansion of the overall SRBM inventory (NOTE: Some have speculated that the PLA could attempt to get political credit for retiring older missile variants. However, political credit should be granted only for a true reduction in capabilities).

But could there be a new SRBM brigade, in addition to production of new variants to replace missiles in existing brigades? There is a new brigade being formed under the 52 Base. The question is whether or not the new brigade is being equipped with SRBMs or medium range ballistic missiles.

“Why have we not seen even a modest, symbolic step on China’s part, commensurate with improvements in the economic and political spheres, to reduce the military intimidation it imposes on the people of Taiwan?” Schriver asked.

“Understanding why the buildup continues, informs policy decisions the Obama administration must face,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Very good point. Mr. Schriver continues below.

There are four possible explanations for the continuing Chinese military buildup, he wrote.

The first is that China has “no intent whatsoever to diminish the tools of intimidation and coercion in which so much investment has been made.”

Rather, Chinese leaders “are forced to conclude that they must retain the military threat to keep Taiwan in check,” he wrote.

Yes, indeed! In general, the PLA has an organizational and bureaucratic interest in whipping up the Taiwan independence "threat." They likely argue that maintenance or expansion of the force posture is needed to deter independence advocates. These arguments are questionable on many grounds. However, the most relevant is that China's military posture may be the single-most important factor in alienating a large portion of Taiwan's domestic polity and has the reverse effect.

Second, civilian leaders in China may be unwilling — or perhaps even unable — to challenge the People's Liberation Army (PLA) leadership. In turn, the PLA knows that if it pulls back on Taiwan, its budget — and justification for its continued growth — could be cut, Schriver wrote.

The third possible explanation for the military buildup opposite Taiwan, he said, was it is really designed to threaten other US allies such as Japan.

COMMENT: Certainly. If Taiwan independence no longer became the justification, a new basis would be needed for military expenditures. But an overt preparations for a possible Japan contingency would undercut the PRC "peaceful development" image that the propaganda machine wants to project.

“Finally, a fourth possible explanation is that China might be willing to pull back missiles and reduce the threat — but is waiting for the right time and the right deal,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Just what would that deal be? One theory is that the PRC may want to deal with the US, rather than Taiwan on military-related issues, including confidence building measures (CBMs) that could relate to Taiwan (e.g., cross-Strait CBMs are kind of silly since Beijing's goal is to minimize Taiwan's confidence). The deal that Jiang Zemin allegedly tabled in 2002 was a missile withdrawal in exchange for agreement for halting or setting a timetable for halting arms sales.

The basic premise of such a bargain has merit and is at the foundation of the 1982 Communique. However, explicit bargaining is neither wise or justifiable. The basis for US arms sales is and should be the nature of the military challenge that China poses to Taiwan. The current PRC posture warrants a wide open door for the release of defense articles that the democratically elected government of Ma Ying-jeou deems necessary. Of course the US should make decisions to approve, disapprove, or defer based on its own interests. But as long as China refuses to significantly reduce its military posture opposite Taiwan, then arms sales should be routine and forthcoming.

Sources close the Obama administration have stated that a small group of former US government officials, senior retired flag officers, and foreign policy specialists have an on-going program with counterparts in Beijing designed to examine an "arms sales for force reductions" bargain under the auspices of a confidence building measures dialogue. The Sanya Initiative, spearheaded by retired Vice Admiral Bill Owens, has been similar, and one with explicit written blessing of Obama administration officials. A separate initiative for discussion of CBMs involves former US officials, including a former PACOM Commander. The next round of CBM talks is scheduled to take place in Beijing within the next week or two."

“If the PLA military buildup opposite Taiwan continues apace, the need to provide Taiwan with weapons for self-defense also continues. This should be manageable if Washington doesn’t lose its nerve,” he wrote.

COMMENT: But the Obama administration never had a nerve to lose. There has been no release and notifications of any new systems to Taiwan. The three notifications reported as being frozen in a June 2010 Defense News article are not even major defense items.

“The US approach over the course of many years has been to make weapons available to Taiwan so that Taipei’s leaders have the confidence to go to the negotiating table with Beijing. This approach is paying off, but some would have us abandon it just when benefits are being reaped,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Indeed. However, the ECFA is a functional, technical agreement and its political significance is overblown. It is necessary for economic reasons. The real negotiations would be those that address the permanent resolution of political differences in a manner amenable to Taiwan's democratic system of government. Negotiations would work toward a defining the international personality of the ROC or Taiwan, and the nature of its political relationship with the PRC. However, the Ma administration's position continues that of its predecessors. No political negotiations under conditions of military coercion. It has rightfully decided to make withdrawal of missiles directed against Taiwan a precondition for preliminary political negotiations that could lead toward some form of peace agreement.

He said that either through “willful misdirection” or through “naivete,” the Obama administration appears to be ready to change the long-standing policy of providing weapons to Taiwan.

“The Obama administration has gone to great lengths to deny a Taiwan arms-sales freeze is in place, perhaps protesting a bit too much,” he wrote.

COMMENT: There indeed are pretty solid signs that that senior political advisers to President Obama have recommended sidelining Taiwan issues, including a conscious decision to defer any further Congressional notifications for Taiwan arms sales for the remainder of the year. Other sources allege that after the January 2010 notifications, assurances were provided to Chinese interlocutors that there would no more arms sales in the near term, without specifying for how long.

Regardless, principled, professional Asia/China hands on the NSC staff, and within State Department and the Pentagon know better, and of course will rush to reassure the public audience that there is no freeze. But the real test will be in the next few months. If the three minor notifications that President Obama has decided to hold aren't unfrozen in the next few months, then political pressure likely will mount, especially should the Republicans do well in the November elections.

However, a key driver that may put any further notifications on ice for the rest of the year could be the invitation that President Obama issued to Chinese President Hu Jintao last month for an official state visit, which most likely would occur shortly after Congressional elections in November 2010.

“Why does the administration continue a fiction that Taiwan has not formally requested more F-16[C/D] fighters? Why do mid and junior-level officials within the Obama administration allude to instructions from ‘senior leadership’ to hold congressional notifications on Taiwan arms sales and not to expect another major sale in 2010?” he asked.

COMMENT: See above. Under normal circumstances, release of additional F-16s should be a no-brainer. Taiwan already has F-16s, and additional airframes are replacements for old F-5s that are at the end of their useful service life. With Block 20 F-16s no longer in production, the Block 50/52 C/D version is the least capable variant available. Block 60 F-16 C/Ds would be a jump, as would the F-35B, which most analysts would agree is best suited for Taiwan's unique operating environment. If the F-16 issue isn't resolved by the end of this issue, the ROC Air Force (ROCAF), Ministry of National Defense (MND), and the Ma administration would be well-advised to submit a letter of request (LOR) for price and availability (P&A) data for 66 F-35B fighters to the Obama administration. And send a copy to the key staffers on the Hill to make sure they know that an LOR has been submitted.

“Even after [the] ECFA, a strong and capable Taiwan remains a key ingredient to security in the region,” he wrote.

China’s Missile Defense Interceptor Program: An Independent Chinese Analysis

China’s successful exo-atmospheric interception of a ballistic missile on January 11, 2010 marked a major milestone in a long term program with roots in the 1980s. Taking place three years to the day after the successful intercept of an aging satellite in low earth orbit, details of the recent test are scarce and likely will be for some time.

However, a well regarded independent Chinese military-technical analyst, known as KKTT, published a detailed analysis on a national bulletin board site (BBS) site the day following the announcement of the test. In an article entitled “A Preliminary Analysis of China’s Ground-Based Mid-Course Missile Defense Interceptor Technology Test” (我国“陆基中段反导拦截技术试验”初步分析), the author appears to be not only informing his domestic audience what the test represents and what it doesn’t, but also communicating an implicit message to foreign audiences: the test is modest, legitimate, and not necessarily containing a political message. Following is a summary of the article, which appears to be the most detailed assessment of China’s missile defense program to date.

The Rationale for Missile Defense

The author begins with an assessment of four drivers or characteristics of a missile defense program scaled to protect against ballistic missiles with a range of 3500 kilometers or less:

Neutral Effect on Strategic Stability. A missile defense system is not intended to affect strategic stability with the United States and Russia. An ability to undercut the ballistic missile capabilities of the major nuclear powers is unrealistic. According to the author, an assured second strike capability will remain the bedrock of China’s nuclear deterrent.

Defense against Small Nuclear States With Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles. A missile defense capability would be reasonable as a hedge against smaller nuclear powers, such as India. Citing the Agni III program, the author asserts that India has linked ballistic missile development programs with China.

Support for Local Conventional Warfare. If Taiwan develops ballistic missiles, and with “independence elements” threatening to strike the Three Gorges Dam, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, then missile defenses are needed.

Point Defense Against Conventional Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles. The author cites discussions in the U.S. to field a conventionally armed submarine launched ballistic missile intended to go after hard buried targets, such as command centers.

While advocating defenses against ballistic missiles with a range of 3500 kilometers or less, KKTT acknowledges the possibility of fielding a system capable of intercepting ICBMs operating at higher velocities over the longer term.

Roots in the 640 Program and U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative

After a general discussion regarding basic missile defense technologies, the author caveats that his analysis is pieced together from publicly available sources within China and its accuracy not guaranteed.

With China’s efforts to develop a missile defense interceptor and ASAT in the 1960s establishing a foundation, preliminary research on a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) began in the wake of the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) announcement in March 1983. As China’s answer to the SDI, the 863 Program “advanced defense” focus area included direct ascent ASAT and missile defense interceptor programs (specifically 863-409). [NOTE: The earlier effort was known as the 640 Program, which was cancelled in the 1970s. Other focus areas within the 863-4XX series include high power laser and high powered microwave].

The program remained in the preliminary research phase of the research and development (R&D) cycle until the mid-1990s. The specific basic technologies included a digital closed loop fiber optic gyroscope, binary optical/mid-wave infrared seeker, restartable attitude/orbital control system, and “thrust precision control.” The Second Academy overcame a technical bottleneck in 1999 when it did its first “suspension” (悬浮) test of the KKV, the second country in the world to do so.

When the 863 Program was restructured in 2002, the KT-409 interceptor project transitioned from the preliminary research to the R&D phase in 2002. R&D was divided into two focus areas: 863-801 and 863-805, with the latter including an ASAT test as an intermediate milestone in the KKV program.

The author asserts that the KKV weighes 35 kilograms, as compared to 60kg for the U.S. Ground Based Interceptor and 18kg for Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). The PLA General Armaments Department (GAD) is said to have awarded a prize to designers of the 35kg KKV in 2000 for overcoming technical obstacles. {NOTE: While not explicit, a possible connection may exist between the 35kg KKV and China’s microsatellite and nanosatellite buses.}

Testing

The author indicates that testing on sub-systems began as early as 2003. The China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) 066 Base and Sixth Academy were responsible for developing the solid rocket motors for a three-stage solid launch vehicle to be used in ASAT and missile defense interceptor tests. The 066 Base is said to have overseen the first test of a modified solid rocket motor in 2003. {NOTE: Under normal circumstances, the CASIC Sixth Academy is responsible for solid motors with a diameter less than 2 meters. Other sources indicate that the solid motor used in the missile defense interceptor is a variant of DF-21’s FG-05 (FG-5D). The FG-05D supposedly uses a lighter weight composite material in the motor casing, thus increasing its strength to weight ratio.}

Integrated ASAT flight tests were conducted from the Jiuquan Space Launch Center on July 7, 2005 and February 6, 2006. With these first two tests proving unsuccessful, a third test from Xichang space launch center on January 11, 2007 intercepted its intended target. Members of the Central Military Commission (CMC) visited Xichang and awarded the designers with one of China’s highest technical honors. After the ASAT test, the Second Academy conducted a strategy review session, redesignated the KT-409 interceptor as the HQ-19, and began plans for testing against a ballistic missile target.

The author asserts that preparations for the missile defense test appeared to be underway since early December 2009, with no connection with Taiwan arms sales-related contract announcements. The author assesses the target missile – DF-3 or DF-21 – was launched from Taiyuan Space Launch Center. The interceptor was launched from the Korla area in Xinjiang, with impact in the vicinity of the Gansu-Xinjiang border. The flight profile of the target was basic and more increasingly stressful testing is to be expected. The test allegedly was supported by a new phased array radar in the Korla area (+41° 38' 28.17", +86° 14' 11.98"), which was under construction in 2004. The Korla radar is said to support the PLA General Armaments Department (GAD) 20 Base. {NOTE: See Google Earth image of the new Korla radar above.}

The Missile Defense/ASAT Senior Design Team

The author assesses that Chen Dingchang (陈定昌) serves as chief designer of the ASAT/missile defense system. Born in Shanghai in 1937, Chen Dingchang is a graduate of the Tsinghua University and was trained briefly in the former Soviet Union. Leading the Second Academy’s design department when the 863 Program began, Chen was promoted to the Second Academy directorship in 1990. He subsequently directed the China Aerospace Mechanical and Electronics Corporation (CAMEC) (now CASIC). In addition to serving as a member of CASIC’s S&T Committee, Chen directs the General Armaments Department (GAD) Precision Guidance Expert Group (总装备部精确制导专业组). {Click here for more background on Chen Dingchang.}

Zhang Yiqun (张奕群) is said to be the deputy chief designer for the KKV sub-system. Zhang is from the Second Academy’s Second Design Department. A senior designer from the CASIC Fourth Academy’s Fourth Design Department, Zheng Chenghuo (郑盛火), is said to be leading the development of the solid launch vehicle sub-system.

KKTT concludes with an assertion that the interceptor is only one part of a broader system, including space surveillance and tracking and national and operational-level command and control systems. The PLA Air Force has been pressing on the need to integrate air and space defense, but no decision has been made regarding subordination of a missile defense system.

China's Nuclear Warhead Modernization and Stewardship: The Man Behind the Scenes

In a recent dinner table discussion, a youthful family member asked who makes China's nuclear weapons. The question is intriguing: which individual is most responsible for designing, developing, and manufacturing the nuclear weapons that China now has in its inventory? Since China has a small but real inventory of nuclear weapons that factor into U.S. policymaking with regards to Taiwan, it would be good to know the man behind China's second generation of nukes.

Once a decision has been made to invest resources in a major program, the traditional practice of China’s senior political and military leadership has been to assign a chief designer (总设计师) to manage the research and development (R&D) process. John Lewis and Xue Litai’s China Builds the Bomb offers an outstanding overview of the humans behind China’s first generation nuclear device, including chief designer Li Jue. However, that was a long time ago and the PLA Second Artillery’s stockpile now includes a new generation of miniaturized warheads.

Xu Zhilei: The Man Behind China’s Second Generation of Nuclear Warheads

The individual credited with leading the effort to design and develop China’s second generation of nuclear warheads has modest roots in Ningbo, Zhejiang province (for examples of sources, click here and here). Born in 1930, Xu Zhilei (徐志磊) graduated from Shanghai's Datong University in 1952 and served as a precision machining specialist in the Shanghai Machine Tool Factory (上海机床厂) for the next 10 years. In August 1963, he was recruited into the Ninth Academy’s design department to work on China’s first nuclear device. Among his specialties was hydrogen embrittlement, structural engineering, and component design. He was said to be a leading figure in four ground tests and two flight tests of China’s first generation nuclear weapons. In 1987 and again in 1989, Xu was a recipient of one of China’s highest prizes for defense S&T achievement for design and manufacturing on the fissile core of a nuclear device, known as the “pit.”

In the 1980s, Xu was appointed as chief designer for the miniaturized warhead sub-system on two new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Concurrently, Xu functioned as deputy chief designer for the DF-31 program. In this position, Xu oversaw the technical aspects of 10 nuclear tests. In heading up the warhead sub-system of the DF-31, Xu Zhilei ostensibly would have supported Wang Yongzhi (王永志) and Liu Baoyong (刘宝镛), who have been cited as the chief designers of the missile system (presumably the DF-31 and DF-31A respectively). Wang and Liu are both from the China Academy of Launch Technology's First Design Department. Other key DF-31 sub-systems include solid rocket motors, which unsubstantiated reporting refers to as the FG-6 and FG-7. Passing reference is made to Xu’s involvement in a neutron bomb (中子弹) program.

Nuclear Warhead Stockpile Reliability

So Xu Zhilei could be viewed as the father of China's second generation of nuclear warheads. However, since finalization of the miniaturized design, he also has been cited as a key player in ensuring the reliability of China’s existing stockpile of nuclear warheads. Authoritative writings indicate that he and the China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) have supported a “certain base” of the Second Artillery to upgrade its storage, inspection, and transportation support systems for second generation warheads. Assisting Xu in the stockpile stewardship program included Peng Xianjue (彭先觉), Tang Xisheng (唐西生), and Liu Senlin (刘森林) from the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE).

Reliability and safety of nuclear warheads have become sensitive issues in Chinese politics. Veterans from four units associated with testing, storage, and maintenance of nuclear warheads in the 1960s and 1970s have submitted legal claims to the Chongqing city government related to radiation-linked health problems. The specific warhead storage units were all under the former Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) 22 Base, which was an outgrowth of a security regiment known as the 8322 Unit. The warhead storage, transportation, and maintenance function was resubordinated to the Second Artillery in the late 1970s.

One of the 22 Base entities – the 89902 Unit – was headquartered in Shangwuzhuang’s Nabucang (纳卜藏) village, around 50 kilometers northwest of Xining, Qinghai province. While it's unclear what role these facilities play today, the old 89002 unit administrative compound can still be seen on Google Earth. Unverified references indicate the current presence of regimental-level support elements subordinate to the 56 Base. Elements that appear to be linked with the Nabucang administrative facility can be seen along the roads stretching out from the compound and into some pretty desolate territory.

Stockpile stewardship programs and technologies have become increasingly important in the wake of China’s signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. However, legislative bodies in both China and the United States have yet to ratify the CTBT. While maintaining a moratorium on nuclear tests, Beijing authorities have asserted the need to continue to evaluate the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons. Further detail on the Second Artillery’s nuclear warhead storage and handling system can wait for another time. But as a starter, it’s good to know that Xu Zhilei not only led the design and development effort for China’s second generation of nuclear warheads, but also has been a leading figure in ensuring the safety of China's existing warhead inventory.

END

Andrew Yang Appointed as Taiwan's Deputy Minister of Defense

Taipei Times yesterday covered the appointment of Dr. Andrew Yang (楊念祖) to serve as Deputy Minister of Defense. In this position, Andrew will be responsible to newly appointed Minister of Defense Kao Hua-chu for defense policy and execution. He replaces Chang Liang-jen (張良任), who had been in the position since September 2008.

The Taipei Times report quoted a former military official saying Andrew “was unlikely to last long, as he — like Chang — has no military background.” To the contrary, Andrew Yang is one of Taiwan's foremost authorities on PRC military affairs, and has the strategic perspective that is needed within the Ministry of National Defense (MND). Since the establishment of this second-most senior position within MND in 2000, all appointees have been civilian. Peter Chen (Chen Pi-chao; 陳必照) was the first, and was followed by Kang Ning-hsiang (康寧祥), Lin Chong-pin (林中斌), Michael Tsai (蔡明憲), and Ko Chen-heng (柯承亨).

Andrew served as Secretary General of the Chinese Council for Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), a Taipei-based think tank that has focused on security and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) studies for more than a decade. In this position, Andrew has earned the respect and admiration from PLA watchers on both sides of the political spectrum in Washington D.C. In addition to being a frequent commentator in local and U.S. media, including Defense News, Andrew has been teaching at the Sun Yat-Sen University in Kaohsiung over the last several years.

His links in Washington are extensive. In addition to a long standing relationship with RAND and its alumni, Carnegie Endowment, and National Defense University, Andrew has been an active member of the Project 2049 Institute International Advisory Council. He was last in Washington D.C. in July 2009 for a conference the “China Faces the Future” conference co-hosted by the Brookings Institution and National Chengchi University’s Institute Of International Relations

Issues that Andrew most likely will be facing:

-- Force modernization in a resource-constrained environment;

-- Transition toward an all-volunteer force;

-- Integration of natural disaster warning, response, and recovery into defense strategy;

-- Cross-Strait confidence building measures;

-- Civil-military relations and inter-service rivalry;

-- U.S.-Taiwan defense relations.

He has a difficult job ahead of him, but will do very well.

CV Chen on Military's Role in Disaster Relief

China Times carried an editorial yesterday authored by prominent lawyer and Taiwan Red Cross Director Chen Chang-wen (CV Chen). He argues that Pingtung County authorities are critical of the slow Ministry of National Defense (MND) response to Typhoon Morakot. He also argues that for every NT $100 paid in taxes, NT $20 goes toward defense. Yet over the last 20 years, few deaths have resulted from armed conflict while Taiwan suffers the ravages of natural disasters each year.

He's critical of the Ma administration for not listing disaster warning, recovery, and response as a key mission of the armed services, particularly as cross-Strait relations have improved. Chen argues that Japan's Self-Defense Forces have been recognized for their involvement in emergency preparedness. He closes by asking if it's the PLA or natural disasters that pose the greatest threat to Taiwan.

An open advocate of cross-Strait unification, albeit without foreclosing the option of independence, CV Chen often is overly critical of MND. On this particular issue regarding military missions, he has a point. The facts on where lapses occurred in this most recent disaster aren't out yet. But as a general principle, Taiwan's senior civilian and military leadership should be examining the utility of an "all-hazards" defense strategy. All national emergencies -- pandemics, typhoons, earthquakes, terrorist attacks, and use of military force -- share commonalities in command and control, demand for survivable communications, rapid response, mobility, and situational awareness.

No other society must cope with the type of military challenge that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) poses to Taiwan. The severity of the PRC military threat to Taiwan is matched only by the challenges posed by natural disasters. As highlighted in the World Bank’s March 2005 report, Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis, “Taiwan may be the place on Earth most vulnerable to natural hazards, with 73 percent of its land and population exposed to three or more hazards.” Where else can one sit on a major fault line with powerful earthquakes and potential volcanic activity; in the path of a growing number of typhoons that are increasing in strength due to rising ocean temperatures in the Pacific; a geography characterized by some of the highest mountains in the Asia-Pacific region and a sharp drop to the ocean that creates rapid runoffs of rain water to create floods in the alluvial plains on the west side of the island?

An "all hazards" approach involves adjusting the operational requirements documentation process to include consideration of other national emergencies, and perhaps even scientific research. Oftentimes there is no fit -- an F-16 or PATRIOT would have utility in only one type of emergency. Yet other times, there are systems that could be of use across the entire spectrum of disaster warning, recovery, and response. Take the examples of a broadband communications satellite, remote sensing satellite, (e.g., FORMOSAT 2 Follow-on), unmanned aerial vehicles, HF/VHF/UHF radio systems, maritime surveillance, undersea surveillance, and a range of command and control systems. In the case of the two satellite systems, a strong argument could be made that these programs would be alive and well if the primary rationale for their procurement would have been disaster warning, response, and recovery, rather than pure military. Ditto for the radio systems and undersea surveillance.

Just a thought for the day...

UPDATE (August 11, 2009). Central News Agency published a report yesterday that outlined the significant role that Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) is playing in disaster relief. According to a press release, the ministry has deployed 8,235 soldiers over the past three days to assist local governments in typhoon rescue operations. According to an MND, statement, the military has evacuated 2,868 people, as well as deployed 101 amphibious vehicles, 214 trucks, 168 armored vehicles, 166 Humvees, 243 other tactical vehicles, 166 rafts, and 12 back up power generators.

More Chinese Netizen Commentary on Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Program

A reader directed my attention toward another source of chatter from the Chinese bulletin board system (BBS) regarding China’s anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) program. I had excluded it in the previous post on the subject simply because it seems to be a mix of hyperbole and aspiration. However, even with the hyperbole and aspiration, the article could offer some insights when matched against authoritative sources. Because the article has been so widely proliferated around Chinese cyberspace, including on official government sites, it may be worth attention.

Post by "Marine Major" (陆战队少校), the original article seems to have first appeared on iFeng BBS on August 14, 2008. In the following weeks, it spread to other major BBS sites (Huanqiu, Tiexue, Chnqiang, etc), including onto the Xinhua network, the official government news agency. The article continues to be reposted on major BBS sites until today. Interestingly enough, the same article appeared on the Lianyungang city government website for a period of time until it was removed. It’s unclear if the author is the original source.

The article alleges that China has completed R&D on a new variant of the ASBM, referred to as the DF-25B. Presumably because the DF-25 didn’t have sufficient missile defense countermeasures, the PLA put forth the upgrade requirement in 2006. The author describes the new DF-25 variant as flying a depressed trajectory at an altitude of 20-30 kilometers. The “mother body,” presumably a third stage, houses multiple independently guided warheads. The third stage itself has a reserve propellant tank and incorporates electronic countermeasures as it bears down on a carrier at hypersonic speed.

Specifics in this particular BBS article should be taken with a grain of salt. However, as pointed out in the previous post, authoritative industry sources do indicate that significant R&D is being carried out into a boost-glide capability, and there is significant interest into developing a range of flight vehicles that operate in the upper atmosphere between 20-100 kilometers in altitude. The chart to the right shows one relatively basic glide control concept from an industry source (the DF-21D reference appears to be added on later by the BBS service that posted the industry article).

The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) First Academy (China Academy of Launch Technology) stood up a new research institute in late 2008 that focuses on nothing but upper atmosphere flight vehicles (sources available upon request). In addition, authoritative publications indicate an interest in a submarine-launch ASBM.

Keeping in the mind that some of the technical terms are challenging, below is a rough paraphrased translation of the article. I posted the Chinese as well for interested readers:

China’s New Aircraft Carrier Killer Revealed

中国最新航母克星“航母末日” 嚗光

August 14, 2008
http://blog.ifeng.com/article/1643766.html

弹道导弹打航母的构想大约是出自1996年台海危机。当时，美国派２个航母战斗群部署在台海周围以军事吓阻我们处理“两国论”引发的台海危机的军事行动。

The concept for an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) comes from the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. At that time, the US deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups off the coast of Taiwan as a means to deter our military operations intended to manage Taiwan’s “two states theory.”

当时我军只拥有歼－7、歼－8等二代战机和从俄罗斯进口的第一批26架苏－27。而美军航母即使按中等威胁区实施威慑的态势，其F-14A“雄猫”战斗机（现在已经退役，被Ｆ－18Ｅ／Ｆ取代）2个中队24架、F／A-18A“大黄蜂”战斗／攻击队24架，加起来也有近50架三代战机。就是说一艘航母的三代战机已经是当时我们所拥有三代战机总和的2倍！

At that time, our military had only two types of second generation fighters – the F-7 and F-8, as well as 26 Russian Su-27s. But United States military was able to assemble two squadrons of F-14As (already retired and replaced by F-18s), and a squadron of F/A-18As for a total of nearly 50 aircraft. This is about double the number of our third generation aircraft.

中国海军建立了以空潜快炮为主的海防体系，然而共和国的决策者们在海湾战争后猛然发现，苦心孤诣40年的心血已经无法继续信任下去，世纪末战争中美国海军以射程1000海里的巡航导弹告诉全世界，你们的海岸——不设防。如果说海湾战争对中国军队还只是震撼，96年的台海冲突则给了我们切肤之痛。没有远洋打击力量，更不具备远海防御能力，堂堂三百万人民解放军竟然无法对抗美国海军的两个航母战斗群。近海防御海军的窘迫就在于无法脱离陆地独立行动，不具备远洋攻防作战体系，不能构筑海上钢铁长城御敌于国门之外，只能作为陆军的附属保卫区区十二海里领海线。

The PLA Navy established an air and sub-surface maritime defense system, but decision makers suddenly realized that after 40 years of devoting resources to the military, there’s no defense against U.S. 1000-kilometer range cruise missiles – “your coastal defense sucks” (to paraphrase). If one would characterize the Gulf War as a shock, then the 1996 crisis was hari-kari (meaning extremely painful). Our coastal Navy couldn’t get away from the land or establish a long range interdiction and defensive operational system, and only could come up with an Army-affiliated 12 nautical mile defense zone.

可以说，美国人调集了两个航母编队，极大地刺激了改革开放以来一直让“军队要忍耐”的中国政府。所以，中国提出了一套新的理论，这就是99年的超限战理论。“弹道导弹打航母”便是其中之一。

One could say that the deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups marked the end of the Chinese government’s policy of military restraint since the reform and opening of China.

最新研制成功的东风－25弹道导弹，可以运载一个或几个分导弹头，弹头内装有被动红外导引装置。弹头重返大气层后，可以进行机动以精确对准目标。

The DF-25 missile has been successfully researched and developed, is able to launch one or a number of warheads that are equipped with passive infrared terminal guidance. After warheads reenter the atmosphere, they are able to maneuver accurately toward the target.

但是美国海军计划对所有装备“宙斯盾”系统的62艘驱逐舰和22艘巡洋舰进行升级，使其具备弹道导弹防御能力。根据美军计划，到2009年美国海军将拥有18艘装备“弹道导弹防御型宙斯盾”系统的战舰，其中包括15艘驱逐舰和3艘巡洋舰。五角大楼水面战委员会主席维克托•吉尔罗伊少将15日表示，18艘反导宙斯盾舰远不够用，因此计划首先对所有的“阿利•伯克”级导弹驱逐舰进行升级，使其具备拦截弹道导弹的能力。随后22艘导弹巡洋舰的升级也将被列上日程。这对地区和平、尤其是东亚和台海安全构成了严重威胁。

But the U.S. Navy planned to upgrade Aegis system, including 62 destroyers and 22 cruisers for missile defense. According to the Navy plans, it will have 18 sea-based missile defense equipped ships, including 15 destroyers and 3 cruisers. A U.S. Navy committee argued that all Arleigh Burke’s should be upgraded. This presents a serious threat to regional peace, especially for security in East Asia and the Taiwan Strait.

从理论上说，如果美国全部宙斯盾战舰作战系统都升级为“导弹防御型宙斯盾”，这样一支反导舰队集中部署在一个方向，将可以同时拦截500枚以上的中程弹道导弹。

Theoretically speaking, if America assembled all its Aegis assets together, they could intercept more than 500 medium range ballistic missiles at one time.

从拦截区域上看，海基拦截系统覆盖面积是“爱国者-3”反导系统的100倍；从技术成熟度上来看，目前海基拦截系统是美国所有能拦截中程弹道导弹的反导系统中拦截成功率最高的一种。
From the perspective of defended area, sea-based missile defenses cover an area 100 times larger than that of PAC-3. In terms of technology, sea-based missile defenses have had the highest success rates.

所以，东风－25弹道导弹采用了“隐形战术弹头”概念，以减少弹头在实施分导开始阶段的“雷达反应红外线” 特征，使得东风25导弹更加难以拦击。但要确保突破宙斯盾反导系统从而达到击沉航母的目的，还是有很大难度的。

Therefore, the DF-25 incorporates a “tactical stealth warhead” concept in order to reduce the “radar reaction infrared” (awkward wording in Chinese that is hard to translate), when the warhead is in the initial phase of payload separation, and make the DF-25 hard to intercept. But it’s still difficult to ensure the ability of missile to penetrate the Aegis missile defense system and destroy the carrier target.

故中国人民解放军在2006年提出了进一步研制新型弹道导弹，争取在3年内装备3种新型弹（目前定型为：东风25乙 东风26甲 东风26乙三型）。要求采用低轨分导式，既导弹升空后保持在20千米至30千米的低轨道飞行，不必重返大气层，使美军装备的“宙斯盾”海基拦截系统没有充足的反应拦截时间。

In accordance with a 2006 PLA proposal, R&D began on new ballistic missiles to be finished within three years (finalized designs include the DF-25B, DF-26A, and DF-26B). The requirement is to adopt a low trajectory with separable warheads, maintain a 20-30 kilometer altitude in order to not give Aegis destroyers sufficient time to respond.

{{Note: In a version posted on Sina.com a few days after the iFeng article, the language stresses a DF-26 sea-launch variant, rather than the surface-launched DF-25:

其中东风25乙为路基型，东风26甲为海基型，东风26乙的具体情况还不太清楚。

Roughly translated, “the DF-25B is ground-launched, the DF-26A is sea-launched, and specific details of the DF-26B aren’t clear.” }}

野战陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航母导弹系统（即东风25乙）的部分性能指标：

Following is a general description for the ground-based, depressed trajectory, multiple warhead, “carrier killer” (literally “final days of the aircraft carrier”) ASBM system (specifically the DF-25B):

1.弹头数量：6枚分弹头

1. Number of warheads: Six

2.导弹飞行高度：20千米至30千米低轨机动飞行

2. Missile flight altitude: 20-30 kilometers, maneuvering, depressed trajectory

3.导弹射程：1300千米__1800千米

3. Missile range: 1300-1800 kilometers

4.机动发射准备时间：小于9分钟

4. Mobile launcher preparation time: Less than nine minutes

5.每枚弹头当量：450千克黑索今 (相当于1100千克TNT当量)

5. Individual warhead weight: 450kg explosive (equivalent to 1100kgs of TNT)

6.导弹飞行速度：8马赫__12马赫

6. Missile flight speed: Mach 8-12

7.弹头攻击角度：60度__90度俯冲攻击

7. Warhead angle of attack: Between 60-90 degrees diving attack

8.弹头飞行速度：6马赫__8马赫小动量变轨飞行

8. Warhead flight speed: Mach 6-8 with minor maneuvering

9. 弹头制导方式：红外; 自备激光群发; 可视电视; 图像记忆

9. Warhead Guidance: Infrared, self-equipped lasing (this is a tough one to translate); electro-optical; imaging

10. 弹头攻击方式：穿甲; 延时自爆

10. Warhead Attack Method: Armor piercing; delayed fuse

11. 弹头飞行距离：60千米

11. Warhead flight range: 60 kilometers

野战陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航母导弹（东风25乙）具备隐身和超强抗各种干扰能力，发射准备阶段和距离航母舰队500千米前，利用GPS、北斗系统、低轨侦察卫星、天波雷达、地面监听站等设备对航母舰队进行连续跟踪，以保证飞行方向。距离航母舰队500千米时，弹载雷达设备自动寻的，对目标方位进行修正、定位。

Using stealth and ECCM, the ground-launched “carrier killer” ASBM (DF-25B) relies on GPS, Beidou, LEO satellites, OTH-B, and SIGINT sites to establish a continuous track during the launch preparation stage and up to 500 kilometers from the aircraft carrier group. At a range of 500 kilometers, the missile-borne radar starts its autonomous search for the target, and adjusting its direction and position in relation to the target.

其它性能：

Other Characteristics:

1．导弹母体在飞行中敌方雷达可探测距离小于100千米。

1. Enemy radars can detect the main missile body at a range of less than 100 kilometers.

2．导弹母体在释放出分弹头后，可在战区上空盘旋，为分弹头提供制导，并对航母舰队进行强电磁、电子压制。

2. After the main missile body releases warheads, it can loiter within the theater and provide warheads with guidance as well as conduct electronic countermeasures against the aircraft carrier battle group.

3．导弹母体保持200秒以上盘旋时间。

The main missile body can loiter for more than 200 seconds.

4．导弹母体保持200秒以上盘旋时间后，携带预留高燃剂以10马赫速度、90度直角俯冲攻击航空母舰。

4. After loitering for more than 200 seconds, the missile body can carry a reserve high energy propellant in order to achieve a speed of Mach 10 and dive toward the carrier at a 90 degree angle of attack.

5．导弹母体俯冲攻击航空母舰兼磁爆效应。

5．As it dives, it can have an electromagnetic explosive effect (difficult to translate).

另外，野战陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航弹道母导弹（东风25乙）备有多种弹头

In addition, the ASBM (DF-25B) has several types of warheads:

1．高爆穿甲弹

High-explosive armor piercing shell

2．电磁炸弹

EMP Bomb

3．高爆穿甲燃烧弹

Highly explosive armor piercing incendiary shell

4．高爆子母弹

High explosive submunitions

5．声波弹

Acoustic warhead

6．诱饵弹

Decoys

前段时间国防大学军事专家张教授提出我国目前并不急于建造航空母舰的建议，原因很可能是知道反航母弹道导弹“航母末日”既将问世。

At previous times, NDU Professor Zhang raised that China shouldn’t rush to build aircraft carriers, because perhaps the “final days of the aircraft carrier” are going to become public.

陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”可有效地将航空母舰阻挡在海岸线1000千米——1500千米外，并对进入“航母末日”有效射程范围内的敌舰予以毁灭性的打击。

Ground-based low trajectory, separable warhead ASBM could effectively prevent the aircraft carrier from crossing a 1000-1500 kilometer line. And also the ASBM will effectively enable us to destroy vessels that come within this range.

{{Note: In the Sina.com version, the final two paragraphs are substituted with the following discussion of the sub-launched DF-26 variant and a torpedo-like payload without any additional detail:

另外具可靠消息透露,中国军方正加紧开发新型“航母末日”专用超高速潜水高爆火箭弹头,取名“龙啸”。预计“龙啸”脱离母弹入水后的速度为500千米，水下航程80千米，爆炸当量达到900千克TNT.

In addition, according to reliable sources, the PLA is developing a special use underwater warhead referred to as the “Longxiao.” It’s estimated that the Longxiao would separate from the main missile body and enter the water at a range of 500 kilometers (Chinese says “speed” though), have an underwater range of 80 kilometers, and have 900kg of explosives.

美军方分析，因潜射型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航弹道母导弹弹体偏大，目前中方只有094型战略导弹核潜艇和在研的095型核攻击潜艇、096型战略导弹核潜艇能够搭载。由于094型、096型战略导弹核潜艇的定位不同，携带“航母末日”的数量在3枚以内；095型核攻击潜艇可携带“航母末日”的数量在8——10枚左右.

American sources claim that because the size of a sub-launched ASBM structure is large, only the 094 submarine, 095 submarine that’s in development, and the 096 submarine could serve as launch platforms. Because the positions of the 094 and the 096 subs aren’t the same, they can only carry three missiles or less. The 095 should be able to carry 8-10 missiles.

END