Taiwan Arms Sales: Temporary Hold or Freeze?

Today's Taipei Times covered an interesting Washington Times editorial penned by Randy Schriver. Randy is former Senior Country Director for China and Taiwan for the Secretary of Defense, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for China/Taiwan affairs during the Bush administration. He currently presides over the Project 2049 Institute and is an associate with Armitage International.

The editorial and Taipei Times' reporter William Lowther's summary, coming in the wake of the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), is a useful reminder of an often ignored fact. Despite expanding cross-Strait economic links, China still relies on implicit or explicit threats of military force to resolve political differences with the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan).

Taiwan Link commentary is in blue (NOTE: Image courtesy of the Washington Times)

US may be considering Asia-Pacific policy shift

BY WILLIAM LOWTHER

STAFF REPORTER IN WASHINGTON

Wednesday, Jul 14, 2010, Page 1

Former US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia Randy Schriver said that US President Barack Obama's administration may be “on the verge” of changing its policies toward Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

COMMENT: Guided by a coherent strategy and US legal statutes, policies should shift along with the dynamic nature of cross-Strait relations, China, Taiwan, and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. However, a policy that is grounded upon the so-called "status quo" is doomed to be reactive in nature. The lack of a coherent Obama administration strategy, juxtaposed against well-defined Chinese goals, exacerbates the problem. Instead of actively advancing positive foreign policy goals, such as a Chinese renunciation of use of force, a "status quo" policy emphasizes negatives. Setting the bar as low as possible, success is defined by no PRC use of force. However, real success is Chinese abandonment of the military instrument as a means to resolve an inherently political problem.

While not spelling out the possible change in detail, Schriver strongly hinted that it could result in a Taiwan arms sale freeze.

COMMENT: One could argue that a freeze on release of new systems has been in place since the Obama administration assumed control of the Executive Branch in January 2009. The Congressional notification package submitted in January 2010 was a final step in a long process that began with Bush administration policy decisions made years ago. The Bush administration committed to release the systems. The January 2010 Congressional notifications constituted the remaining second half of a package that the Bush administration should have forwarded in October 2008. President Barack Obama and his small group of political advisers have yet to approve and notify Congress of any new sale of major defense articles to Taiwan.

There may be a belief that a freeze on any new arms sales to Taiwan will reap benefits from Beijing, such as cooperation on North Korea, exchange rate adjustment, war on terrorism, Iran, etc. Or that the political costs of freezing new arms sales to Taiwan are and will be minimal, at least compared to the political pain that Obama's political advisers perceive China could dish out. And having committed to a "no trouble making" policy, the Ma administration is unlikely to push too hard on any US policy issue, economic, military, or otherwise. However, in bowing to Chinese pressure without any sign of direct reciprocation in the form of a substantive missile pull-back, the Obama administration is implicitly giving credence to China's reliance on military coercion as an instrument of national policy.

And furthermore, the Obama administration has reversed a policy decision made by President Bush in April 2001: diesel electric submarines. However, in fairness, there's plenty of responsibility to go around for failure to execute the submarine program. The ROC Navy earns low marks for creativity for placing the program in the hands of a conservative US Navy that never wanted to manage the program in the first place. The ROC Navy could have easily assumed programmatic responsibility and entrusted Taiwan's own shipbuilding industry.

Presidents Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou could have directed the ROC Navy to pursue alternative acquisition paths. However, sources close to both the Bush and Obama White House allege thatWhite House officials strongly suggested that the new Ma administration abandon Taiwan's 40-year quest for a fleet of 10 submarines. The Obama White House allegedly has repeated the suggestion. As a result, the Ma administration appears to have shelved the ROC Navy's long standing requirement.

In an article published on Monday in the conservative Washington Times, Schriver said that following the signing of the Economic Cooperative Framework Agreement (ECFA) by Taiwan and China, there was further evidence of cross-strait rapprochement.

“Curiously,” he wrote, the Chinese military buildup opposite Taiwan continues, with analysts saying that about 1,500 ballistic missiles are pointed at Taiwan.

COMMENT: This is where one should exercise caution. Bean counting of ballistic missiles has long been a metric of Chinese intent. Detractors could argue that there is little hard evidence that the 1500 number is valid, and that the growth has leveled off. But one has to define what class of ballistic missile one is referring to and elaborate upon the estimate's basis.

The ballistic missiles that are unambiguously dedicated toward Taiwan and have political and strategic significance are the short range ballistic missiles subordinate to the Second Artillery's 52 Base. An additional two 300 kilometer-range DF-11 brigades are subordinate to the Nanjing Military Region and provide tactical support for landing operations, rather than those under the Second Artillery that carry strategic significance. Furthermore, brigades equipped with nuclear-capable medium range ballistic missiles have a more diverse set of targets, and therefore could not necessarily be described as "targeted against Taiwan." The same goes for PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Navy (PLAN) assets assigned to the Nanjing Military Region.

Therefore, the units that could best be classified as dedicated toward Taiwan are the five Second Artillery SRBM brigades that have been established for over five years. As in most military organizations, a standard table of equipment likely exists with a set number of missile assigned to each brigade. A standard number is set to match the logistical capacity of the units to which the missiles are assigned. Once the table has been filled, that's it. To continue an expansion, a new brigade with another logistical infrastructure should be formed.

If the 1500 number is based upon cumulative estimates of SRBMs manufactured and delivered, then one explanation is that new SRBM variants are replacing older variants. Older variants are likely retired. Solid rocket motors generally have a shelf life of around seven years, the point when cracks in the propellent significantly reduce the reliability and safety of the missile. Advanced storage and refurbishment technologies can serve to extend the shelf life. As new guidance, navigation, and control technologies become available, the entire design of a missile changes, foreclosing options for refurbishment.

Therefore, a plausible case could be made that the growth reflects production of replacement missiles rather than an expansion of the overall SRBM inventory (NOTE: Some have speculated that the PLA could attempt to get political credit for retiring older missile variants. However, political credit should be granted only for a true reduction in capabilities).

But could there be a new SRBM brigade, in addition to production of new variants to replace missiles in existing brigades? There is a new brigade being formed under the 52 Base. The question is whether or not the new brigade is being equipped with SRBMs or medium range ballistic missiles.

“Why have we not seen even a modest, symbolic step on China’s part, commensurate with improvements in the economic and political spheres, to reduce the military intimidation it imposes on the people of Taiwan?” Schriver asked.

“Understanding why the buildup continues, informs policy decisions the Obama administration must face,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Very good point. Mr. Schriver continues below.

There are four possible explanations for the continuing Chinese military buildup, he wrote.

The first is that China has “no intent whatsoever to diminish the tools of intimidation and coercion in which so much investment has been made.”

Rather, Chinese leaders “are forced to conclude that they must retain the military threat to keep Taiwan in check,” he wrote.

Yes, indeed! In general, the PLA has an organizational and bureaucratic interest in whipping up the Taiwan independence "threat." They likely argue that maintenance or expansion of the force posture is needed to deter independence advocates. These arguments are questionable on many grounds. However, the most relevant is that China's military posture may be the single-most important factor in alienating a large portion of Taiwan's domestic polity and has the reverse effect.

Second, civilian leaders in China may be unwilling — or perhaps even unable — to challenge the People's Liberation Army (PLA) leadership. In turn, the PLA knows that if it pulls back on Taiwan, its budget — and justification for its continued growth — could be cut, Schriver wrote.

The third possible explanation for the military buildup opposite Taiwan, he said, was it is really designed to threaten other US allies such as Japan.

COMMENT: Certainly. If Taiwan independence no longer became the justification, a new basis would be needed for military expenditures. But an overt preparations for a possible Japan contingency would undercut the PRC "peaceful development" image that the propaganda machine wants to project.

“Finally, a fourth possible explanation is that China might be willing to pull back missiles and reduce the threat — but is waiting for the right time and the right deal,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Just what would that deal be? One theory is that the PRC may want to deal with the US, rather than Taiwan on military-related issues, including confidence building measures (CBMs) that could relate to Taiwan (e.g., cross-Strait CBMs are kind of silly since Beijing's goal is to minimize Taiwan's confidence). The deal that Jiang Zemin allegedly tabled in 2002 was a missile withdrawal in exchange for agreement for halting or setting a timetable for halting arms sales.

The basic premise of such a bargain has merit and is at the foundation of the 1982 Communique. However, explicit bargaining is neither wise or justifiable. The basis for US arms sales is and should be the nature of the military challenge that China poses to Taiwan. The current PRC posture warrants a wide open door for the release of defense articles that the democratically elected government of Ma Ying-jeou deems necessary. Of course the US should make decisions to approve, disapprove, or defer based on its own interests. But as long as China refuses to significantly reduce its military posture opposite Taiwan, then arms sales should be routine and forthcoming.

Sources close the Obama administration have stated that a small group of former US government officials, senior retired flag officers, and foreign policy specialists have an on-going program with counterparts in Beijing designed to examine an "arms sales for force reductions" bargain under the auspices of a confidence building measures dialogue. The Sanya Initiative, spearheaded by retired Vice Admiral Bill Owens, has been similar, and one with explicit written blessing of Obama administration officials. A separate initiative for discussion of CBMs involves former US officials, including a former PACOM Commander. The next round of CBM talks is scheduled to take place in Beijing within the next week or two."

“If the PLA military buildup opposite Taiwan continues apace, the need to provide Taiwan with weapons for self-defense also continues. This should be manageable if Washington doesn’t lose its nerve,” he wrote.

COMMENT: But the Obama administration never had a nerve to lose. There has been no release and notifications of any new systems to Taiwan. The three notifications reported as being frozen in a June 2010 Defense News article are not even major defense items.

“The US approach over the course of many years has been to make weapons available to Taiwan so that Taipei’s leaders have the confidence to go to the negotiating table with Beijing. This approach is paying off, but some would have us abandon it just when benefits are being reaped,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Indeed. However, the ECFA is a functional, technical agreement and its political significance is overblown. It is necessary for economic reasons. The real negotiations would be those that address the permanent resolution of political differences in a manner amenable to Taiwan's democratic system of government. Negotiations would work toward a defining the international personality of the ROC or Taiwan, and the nature of its political relationship with the PRC. However, the Ma administration's position continues that of its predecessors. No political negotiations under conditions of military coercion. It has rightfully decided to make withdrawal of missiles directed against Taiwan a precondition for preliminary political negotiations that could lead toward some form of peace agreement.

He said that either through “willful misdirection” or through “naivete,” the Obama administration appears to be ready to change the long-standing policy of providing weapons to Taiwan.

“The Obama administration has gone to great lengths to deny a Taiwan arms-sales freeze is in place, perhaps protesting a bit too much,” he wrote.

COMMENT: There indeed are pretty solid signs that that senior political advisers to President Obama have recommended sidelining Taiwan issues, including a conscious decision to defer any further Congressional notifications for Taiwan arms sales for the remainder of the year. Other sources allege that after the January 2010 notifications, assurances were provided to Chinese interlocutors that there would no more arms sales in the near term, without specifying for how long.

Regardless, principled, professional Asia/China hands on the NSC staff, and within State Department and the Pentagon know better, and of course will rush to reassure the public audience that there is no freeze. But the real test will be in the next few months. If the three minor notifications that President Obama has decided to hold aren't unfrozen in the next few months, then political pressure likely will mount, especially should the Republicans do well in the November elections.

However, a key driver that may put any further notifications on ice for the rest of the year could be the invitation that President Obama issued to Chinese President Hu Jintao last month for an official state visit, which most likely would occur shortly after Congressional elections in November 2010.

“Why does the administration continue a fiction that Taiwan has not formally requested more F-16[C/D] fighters? Why do mid and junior-level officials within the Obama administration allude to instructions from ‘senior leadership’ to hold congressional notifications on Taiwan arms sales and not to expect another major sale in 2010?” he asked.

COMMENT: See above. Under normal circumstances, release of additional F-16s should be a no-brainer. Taiwan already has F-16s, and additional airframes are replacements for old F-5s that are at the end of their useful service life. With Block 20 F-16s no longer in production, the Block 50/52 C/D version is the least capable variant available. Block 60 F-16 C/Ds would be a jump, as would the F-35B, which most analysts would agree is best suited for Taiwan's unique operating environment. If the F-16 issue isn't resolved by the end of this issue, the ROC Air Force (ROCAF), Ministry of National Defense (MND), and the Ma administration would be well-advised to submit a letter of request (LOR) for price and availability (P&A) data for 66 F-35B fighters to the Obama administration. And send a copy to the key staffers on the Hill to make sure they know that an LOR has been submitted.

“Even after [the] ECFA, a strong and capable Taiwan remains a key ingredient to security in the region,” he wrote.

China’s Missile Defense Interceptor Program: An Independent Chinese Analysis

China’s successful exo-atmospheric interception of a ballistic missile on January 11, 2010 marked a major milestone in a long term program with roots in the 1980s. Taking place three years to the day after the successful intercept of an aging satellite in low earth orbit, details of the recent test are scarce and likely will be for some time.

However, a well regarded independent Chinese military-technical analyst, known as KKTT, published a detailed analysis on a national bulletin board site (BBS) site the day following the announcement of the test. In an article entitled “A Preliminary Analysis of China’s Ground-Based Mid-Course Missile Defense Interceptor Technology Test” (我国“陆基中段反导拦截技术试验”初步分析), the author appears to be not only informing his domestic audience what the test represents and what it doesn’t, but also communicating an implicit message to foreign audiences: the test is modest, legitimate, and not necessarily containing a political message. Following is a summary of the article, which appears to be the most detailed assessment of China’s missile defense program to date.

The Rationale for Missile Defense

The author begins with an assessment of four drivers or characteristics of a missile defense program scaled to protect against ballistic missiles with a range of 3500 kilometers or less:

Neutral Effect on Strategic Stability. A missile defense system is not intended to affect strategic stability with the United States and Russia. An ability to undercut the ballistic missile capabilities of the major nuclear powers is unrealistic. According to the author, an assured second strike capability will remain the bedrock of China’s nuclear deterrent.

Defense against Small Nuclear States With Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles. A missile defense capability would be reasonable as a hedge against smaller nuclear powers, such as India. Citing the Agni III program, the author asserts that India has linked ballistic missile development programs with China.

Support for Local Conventional Warfare. If Taiwan develops ballistic missiles, and with “independence elements” threatening to strike the Three Gorges Dam, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, then missile defenses are needed.

Point Defense Against Conventional Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles. The author cites discussions in the U.S. to field a conventionally armed submarine launched ballistic missile intended to go after hard buried targets, such as command centers.

While advocating defenses against ballistic missiles with a range of 3500 kilometers or less, KKTT acknowledges the possibility of fielding a system capable of intercepting ICBMs operating at higher velocities over the longer term.

Roots in the 640 Program and U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative

After a general discussion regarding basic missile defense technologies, the author caveats that his analysis is pieced together from publicly available sources within China and its accuracy not guaranteed.

With China’s efforts to develop a missile defense interceptor and ASAT in the 1960s establishing a foundation, preliminary research on a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) began in the wake of the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) announcement in March 1983. As China’s answer to the SDI, the 863 Program “advanced defense” focus area included direct ascent ASAT and missile defense interceptor programs (specifically 863-409). [NOTE: The earlier effort was known as the 640 Program, which was cancelled in the 1970s. Other focus areas within the 863-4XX series include high power laser and high powered microwave].

The program remained in the preliminary research phase of the research and development (R&D) cycle until the mid-1990s. The specific basic technologies included a digital closed loop fiber optic gyroscope, binary optical/mid-wave infrared seeker, restartable attitude/orbital control system, and “thrust precision control.” The Second Academy overcame a technical bottleneck in 1999 when it did its first “suspension” (悬浮) test of the KKV, the second country in the world to do so.

When the 863 Program was restructured in 2002, the KT-409 interceptor project transitioned from the preliminary research to the R&D phase in 2002. R&D was divided into two focus areas: 863-801 and 863-805, with the latter including an ASAT test as an intermediate milestone in the KKV program.

The author asserts that the KKV weighes 35 kilograms, as compared to 60kg for the U.S. Ground Based Interceptor and 18kg for Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). The PLA General Armaments Department (GAD) is said to have awarded a prize to designers of the 35kg KKV in 2000 for overcoming technical obstacles. {NOTE: While not explicit, a possible connection may exist between the 35kg KKV and China’s microsatellite and nanosatellite buses.}

Testing

The author indicates that testing on sub-systems began as early as 2003. The China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) 066 Base and Sixth Academy were responsible for developing the solid rocket motors for a three-stage solid launch vehicle to be used in ASAT and missile defense interceptor tests. The 066 Base is said to have overseen the first test of a modified solid rocket motor in 2003. {NOTE: Under normal circumstances, the CASIC Sixth Academy is responsible for solid motors with a diameter less than 2 meters. Other sources indicate that the solid motor used in the missile defense interceptor is a variant of DF-21’s FG-05 (FG-5D). The FG-05D supposedly uses a lighter weight composite material in the motor casing, thus increasing its strength to weight ratio.}

Integrated ASAT flight tests were conducted from the Jiuquan Space Launch Center on July 7, 2005 and February 6, 2006. With these first two tests proving unsuccessful, a third test from Xichang space launch center on January 11, 2007 intercepted its intended target. Members of the Central Military Commission (CMC) visited Xichang and awarded the designers with one of China’s highest technical honors. After the ASAT test, the Second Academy conducted a strategy review session, redesignated the KT-409 interceptor as the HQ-19, and began plans for testing against a ballistic missile target.

The author asserts that preparations for the missile defense test appeared to be underway since early December 2009, with no connection with Taiwan arms sales-related contract announcements. The author assesses the target missile – DF-3 or DF-21 – was launched from Taiyuan Space Launch Center. The interceptor was launched from the Korla area in Xinjiang, with impact in the vicinity of the Gansu-Xinjiang border. The flight profile of the target was basic and more increasingly stressful testing is to be expected. The test allegedly was supported by a new phased array radar in the Korla area (+41° 38' 28.17", +86° 14' 11.98"), which was under construction in 2004. The Korla radar is said to support the PLA General Armaments Department (GAD) 20 Base. {NOTE: See Google Earth image of the new Korla radar above.}

The Missile Defense/ASAT Senior Design Team

The author assesses that Chen Dingchang (陈定昌) serves as chief designer of the ASAT/missile defense system. Born in Shanghai in 1937, Chen Dingchang is a graduate of the Tsinghua University and was trained briefly in the former Soviet Union. Leading the Second Academy’s design department when the 863 Program began, Chen was promoted to the Second Academy directorship in 1990. He subsequently directed the China Aerospace Mechanical and Electronics Corporation (CAMEC) (now CASIC). In addition to serving as a member of CASIC’s S&T Committee, Chen directs the General Armaments Department (GAD) Precision Guidance Expert Group (总装备部精确制导专业组). {Click here for more background on Chen Dingchang.}

Zhang Yiqun (张奕群) is said to be the deputy chief designer for the KKV sub-system. Zhang is from the Second Academy’s Second Design Department. A senior designer from the CASIC Fourth Academy’s Fourth Design Department, Zheng Chenghuo (郑盛火), is said to be leading the development of the solid launch vehicle sub-system.

KKTT concludes with an assertion that the interceptor is only one part of a broader system, including space surveillance and tracking and national and operational-level command and control systems. The PLA Air Force has been pressing on the need to integrate air and space defense, but no decision has been made regarding subordination of a missile defense system.

China's Nuclear Warhead Modernization and Stewardship: The Man Behind the Scenes

In a recent dinner table discussion, a youthful family member asked who makes China's nuclear weapons. The question is intriguing: which individual is most responsible for designing, developing, and manufacturing the nuclear weapons that China now has in its inventory? Since China has a small but real inventory of nuclear weapons that factor into U.S. policymaking with regards to Taiwan, it would be good to know the man behind China's second generation of nukes.

Once a decision has been made to invest resources in a major program, the traditional practice of China’s senior political and military leadership has been to assign a chief designer (总设计师) to manage the research and development (R&D) process. John Lewis and Xue Litai’s China Builds the Bomb offers an outstanding overview of the humans behind China’s first generation nuclear device, including chief designer Li Jue. However, that was a long time ago and the PLA Second Artillery’s stockpile now includes a new generation of miniaturized warheads.

Xu Zhilei: The Man Behind China’s Second Generation of Nuclear Warheads

The individual credited with leading the effort to design and develop China’s second generation of nuclear warheads has modest roots in Ningbo, Zhejiang province (for examples of sources, click here and here). Born in 1930, Xu Zhilei (徐志磊) graduated from Shanghai's Datong University in 1952 and served as a precision machining specialist in the Shanghai Machine Tool Factory (上海机床厂) for the next 10 years. In August 1963, he was recruited into the Ninth Academy’s design department to work on China’s first nuclear device. Among his specialties was hydrogen embrittlement, structural engineering, and component design. He was said to be a leading figure in four ground tests and two flight tests of China’s first generation nuclear weapons. In 1987 and again in 1989, Xu was a recipient of one of China’s highest prizes for defense S&T achievement for design and manufacturing on the fissile core of a nuclear device, known as the “pit.”

In the 1980s, Xu was appointed as chief designer for the miniaturized warhead sub-system on two new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Concurrently, Xu functioned as deputy chief designer for the DF-31 program. In this position, Xu oversaw the technical aspects of 10 nuclear tests. In heading up the warhead sub-system of the DF-31, Xu Zhilei ostensibly would have supported Wang Yongzhi (王永志) and Liu Baoyong (刘宝镛), who have been cited as the chief designers of the missile system (presumably the DF-31 and DF-31A respectively). Wang and Liu are both from the China Academy of Launch Technology's First Design Department. Other key DF-31 sub-systems include solid rocket motors, which unsubstantiated reporting refers to as the FG-6 and FG-7. Passing reference is made to Xu’s involvement in a neutron bomb (中子弹) program.

Nuclear Warhead Stockpile Reliability

So Xu Zhilei could be viewed as the father of China's second generation of nuclear warheads. However, since finalization of the miniaturized design, he also has been cited as a key player in ensuring the reliability of China’s existing stockpile of nuclear warheads. Authoritative writings indicate that he and the China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) have supported a “certain base” of the Second Artillery to upgrade its storage, inspection, and transportation support systems for second generation warheads. Assisting Xu in the stockpile stewardship program included Peng Xianjue (彭先觉), Tang Xisheng (唐西生), and Liu Senlin (刘森林) from the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE).

Reliability and safety of nuclear warheads have become sensitive issues in Chinese politics. Veterans from four units associated with testing, storage, and maintenance of nuclear warheads in the 1960s and 1970s have submitted legal claims to the Chongqing city government related to radiation-linked health problems. The specific warhead storage units were all under the former Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) 22 Base, which was an outgrowth of a security regiment known as the 8322 Unit. The warhead storage, transportation, and maintenance function was resubordinated to the Second Artillery in the late 1970s.

One of the 22 Base entities – the 89902 Unit – was headquartered in Shangwuzhuang’s Nabucang (纳卜藏) village, around 50 kilometers northwest of Xining, Qinghai province. While it's unclear what role these facilities play today, the old 89002 unit administrative compound can still be seen on Google Earth. Unverified references indicate the current presence of regimental-level support elements subordinate to the 56 Base. Elements that appear to be linked with the Nabucang administrative facility can be seen along the roads stretching out from the compound and into some pretty desolate territory.

Stockpile stewardship programs and technologies have become increasingly important in the wake of China’s signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. However, legislative bodies in both China and the United States have yet to ratify the CTBT. While maintaining a moratorium on nuclear tests, Beijing authorities have asserted the need to continue to evaluate the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons. Further detail on the Second Artillery’s nuclear warhead storage and handling system can wait for another time. But as a starter, it’s good to know that Xu Zhilei not only led the design and development effort for China’s second generation of nuclear warheads, but also has been a leading figure in ensuring the safety of China's existing warhead inventory.

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The PLA Air Force Over the Horizon Radar Brigade

Over the last year, there has been substantial interest in China’s development of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). When deployed, its strategic goal would likely be to influence Taiwan’s domestic polity and manipulate the cost-benefit calculus of U.S. policymakers.

The ballistic missile program itself – the DF-21D – has been the primary focus. However, the cueing and surveillance architecture that would support an ASBM capability remains somewhat of a mystery. An integrated sensor network would be needed for initial situational awareness of maritime activity in the Western Pacific Ocean and to cue an ASBM before launch. A key element is believed to be a skywave over the horizon (OTH) radar. In November 2008, Sean O'Connor posted a great analysis of the OTH radar system and its role in an ASBM program on his IMINT & Analysis website, including the Google Earth image above. Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang (Naval War College and RAND), Mark Stokes (Project 2049 Institute), Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin (China Security), and Tony Capaccio (Bloomberg) also have addressed the OTH radar cueing issue. However, limited information exists on specific capabilities and how an OTH radar system would fit in to a broader architecture.

One interesting insight is its subordination. A Chinese blogger posted an article in November 2007 that highlighted a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) “Skywave Brigade” (天波旅). The post first appeared on the Wangchao bulletin board website and has been reposted hundreds of times since then. The author asserts that the brigade operates China’s first strategic early warning system in over 20 years, when a brigade operated a missile early warning system in the area of Xuanhua, north of Beijing. The missile early warning radar has been dismantled. The author, careful to avoid censors, uses Pinyin abbreviations for locations of the transmitter and receiver and names of the commander and political commissar of the PLAAF radar brigade. He/she also notes a requirement for additional sites in Fujian and presumably other locations along the east coast for measuring the ionosphere.

Taiwan Link research confirms much of the Chinese author’s analysis. A relatively new PLA Air Force radar brigade – the 95980 Unit – operates the OTH radar system. The PLAAF “Skywave Brigade" is situated in the southern edge of Xiangfan [襄樊], Hubei province, or specifically in Yingpan Village in the Xiangcheng District. On Google Earth, a guarded underground facility can be seen to the east of the village. While not confirmed, the mountain complex could house the OTH surveillance and warning system.

The PLAAF radar brigade has at least six subordinate elements (fendui). Two are near Xiangfan: the 52^nd Element in the Zaoyang Municipal District and the 53^rd in Nanzhang County. The blog poster notes that the OTH transmitter is in “ZY” and receiver is in “NZ.” The OTH receiver array that Sean O’Connor discovered on Google Earth indeed is in Nanzhang county. The coastal sites subordinate to the OTH brigade are:

-- 61^st Element based near Xitangqiao Village [西塘桥镇];

-- 64^th Element located near Fuqing [福清],

-- 66^th Element near Jinjiang [晋江], Fujian province Sanshan Village [三山镇]; and

-- 67^th Element near Wenlin City Shitang Village [石塘镇].

Most likely subordinate to the Guangzhou Military Region Air Force (GMRAF), the radar brigade's priority probably is air activity. Maritime tracks that the system generates could be filtered off to PLA Navy watch centers for tagging and correlation. More analysis would have to be done to figure out the command and control and service coordination arrangements.

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Financial Executive and Former Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Bill Owens Advocates Selling Out Taiwan

{UPDATE: Yesterday's Nelson Report covered the Owens/Taiwan issue as well, with astute commentary by Eric McVadon. Chris Nelson reports that "the reaction across Washington has been shock and dismay at what is seen as a stunning lack of political sophistication. Chris adds "his long-standing affiliation with a PRC-sponsored talk-shop might be clouding both his political and strategic judgment."}

Last week, a prominent and influential American businessman based in Hong Kong published an editorial in the Financial Times that should have caused quite a stir in Taiwan.

The author, AEA Investors executive and former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Bill Owens, calls for abrogation of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and a halt to arms sales. On the surface, the bulk of the editorial appears innocent. A retired senior U.S. military officer advocates friendship with China in a financial newspaper. Not a big deal, at least at first glance.

However, the author, who he represents, and what he is advocating, are worth a detailed examination. Operating at the nexus of high finance, high tech, and high level military, Owens is a very powerful and influential man. As Malcolm Gladwell argues in The Tipping Point, only a handful of people in the world are capable of initiating infectious ideas. And Owens is certainly one. His ideas are worthy of debate. But what makes his editorial alarming is that his views on the TRA and arms sales, whether intentional or not, support a broader PRC campaign to solve the “Taiwan problem,” once and for all.

Consciously or unconsciously adopting Beijing’s position, Owens fails to recognize the obstacle to solving the so-called “Taiwan issue” is the PRC’s refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve differences with Taiwan and making tangible reductions in its force posture arrayed against the island.

A Businessman and Former Senior Official Calls for Abandonment of Taiwan

In his 17 Nov 09 Financial Times editorial, Bill Owens advocates a major shift in U.S. policy. The centerpiece of his argument is what he refers to as a “thoughtful review” of the Taiwan Relations Act. Describing it as “outdated” and without offering an alternative, however, Owens implies that the legislation should be scrapped in its entirety. According to Owens, a “thoughtful” review of the TRA “would be viewed by China as a genuine attempt to set a new course for a relationship that can develop into openness, trust and even friendship.”

A “thoughtful” TRA review would focus on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, a process that Owens deems as as “not in our best interest.” He adds:

The first step to halting arms sales might be to observe that the Chinese have stopped the short range missile build-up across the Taiwan Straits (I believe this is true). The US could then stop selling arms to Taiwan unless that build-up was renewed. We must always protect the democracy and freedoms Taiwan has developed – but weapons sales do not do this.

Owens also cautions that if current trends continue, China’s military could rival or surpass those of the United States, offering allies in the region a choice between China and the United States. He calls for a shift in how we view China from a national security perspective:

It is often politically expedient to paint China as an adversary, or worse, a future enemy. Our national security apparatus is aiming to continue the present level of defence spending and emphasising 30-year-old legislation that is doing more harm than good.

He argues: “The solution is to approach the US/China relationship not with hedging, competition or watchfulness, but with co-operation, openness and trust.” Finally, he outlines an agenda for a new China relationship:

Following Mr Obama’s visit to Beijing, I hope we see the following kinds of military initiatives: an agreement to a thoughtful review of the implementation of TRA and other outdated legislation; a commitment to true military-to-military engagement across all levels including academic exchanges between military academies; a partnership in fighting terrorism and addressing, as partners, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (including North Korea and Iran); and an approach to addressing the increasing threat of cyberattack, perhaps with a “no first use of cyberattack” policy.

The “other outdated legislation” presumably would be the 1989 Tiananmen sanctions and Section 1201 of the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) restricting U.S-China military-to-military relations.

Owens argues that “many think the Chinese are unable or unwilling to accept such a progressive and innovative agenda. We will never know unless we try.”

From China’s perspective, what is there not to like about such a “progressive and innovative agenda?” Does retired ADM Owens think that the Chinese would be unable or unwilling to accept U.S. abandonment of Taiwan, halt to all arms sales, and overturning other legislation that places restrictions on our relations with the PRC? Academic exchanges already take place between PRC and U.S. military establishments. If he means letting PRC students attend our military academies, then we would have to discontinue admission of ROC students. Which of course is what he is advocating, along with the TRA review and halt to all defense assistance to Taiwan.

The rest of his agenda is harmless and even valid. We should partner with China, and others for that matter, in fighting terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and addressing issues associated with cyberattack. In another editorial for Carnegie, Owens proposed a U.S.-China space-based global transparency initiative. One could outline an even more aggressive bilateral agenda that would be in both PRC and U.S. interests, assuming our interests in Taiwan were not sacrificed in the process.

PRC “Stopping” Missile Deployments: Justification for a Halt in U.S. Arms Sales?

AEA Investors’ Bill Owens calls for a thoughtful review of the Taiwan Relations Act and a halt to arms sales. A halt to arms sales is justified in part by what he views as a freeze in PRC deployment of short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) opposite Taiwan. He doesn’t cite his sources in making this assertion. But let’s assume his sources are credible, particularly since Owens is well connected in Beijing and U.S. policy and intelligence circles.

Why would the PRC stop deployment of ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan? Because the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) have already filled PLA production orders to satisfy out a planned force structure of seven SRBM units. Five or perhaps six are under the Second Artillery, and one or perhaps two are organic to the Nanjing Military Region. Let’s look at the Second Artillery 52 Base order of battle (in probable order of establishment):

96165 Unit (Leping)

96167 Unit (Yong’an)

96169 Unit (Meizhou)

96162 Unit (Ganzhou)

96164 Unit (Jinhua)

96166 Unit (Chizhou, in same vicinity as DF-21 unit)

Each of these brigades has as many as six battalions, each equipped with a certain number of launchers and a standardized table of organization and equipment inventory of SRBMs. It’s not clear what this standard number is, but there likely is a ceiling unless a decision is made to add another SRBM brigade under the 52 Base. The 2009 DoD Report to Congress on PRC Military Power asserted that as of September 2008 the PLA had as many as 1150 SRBMs and was “increasing” its inventory at a rate of over 100 missiles per year.

If Owens is correct, then the PLA Second Artillery 52 Base is no longer increasing its inventory. The last SRBM brigade under the 52 Base likely is the 96166 Unit in Chizhou. Does this mean that the DF-15 production facility in Beijing (211 Factory) and DF-11 factory in Hubei (the 066 Base) have stopped assembling new DF-11s and DF-15s? According to Owens, maybe the blanket order for new SRBMs has been satisfied and units have filled out their table of organization and equipment. However, filling out the final SRBM unit does not necessarily indicate peaceful intent with regards to Taiwan. It indicates that the Second Artillery 52 Base is prepared and mission ready. It is very likely that R&D and production of sub-systems, such as solid rocket motors and guidance, navigation, and control systems, would continue.

If Owens is looking for a sign of peaceful intent, he should be looking for dismantlement of SRBM brigades and their supporting infrastructure, and not a stop in new missile deployments. Furthermore, PRC military capabilities based on a Taiwan scenario go far beyond SRBMs. Land attack cruise missiles, medium range ballistic missiles, conventional fixed wing aircraft, electronic warfare assets, surface combatants, submarines, and a range of ground combat systems are important as well.

In short, a PLA judgment that it has sufficient numbers of SRBMs to fulfill its operational mission does not justify a halt to U.S. arms sales. The only justification for curtailing arms sales to Taiwan would be a PRC renunciation of use of force to resolve its differences with Taiwan, and a tangible reduction in the military capabilities that could be brought to bear against the ROC and its democratically elected leadership.

Abandonment of the TRA: What Would It Mean

Yet to Bill Owens, a halt is a halt. The Taiwan Relations Act and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are impediments to U.S-China friendship. Therefore, Owens believes that a review and reversal of this outdated legislation is warranted. Owens is implicitly advocating removing the legal basis for U.S. relations with Taiwan, and acquiescence of the PRC’s "one country, two systems" approach to resolving its differences with Taiwan. Without the TRA, there would be no American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). Taiwan would be treated as a province of the PRC, which has longed viewed the TRA as an unwarranted intrusion by the United States into the internal affairs of China. Without the TRA, Taiwan’s democracy likely would collapse, perhaps only after a major upheaval on the island in reaction to what would be perhaps the only peaceful abandonment of a democracy to an authoritarian power in U.S. history.

Arms sales are the most visible manifestation of the U.S. recognition of the ROC’s unresolved international status. Besides ensuring that the cost of PRC use of force would be sufficiently high so as to deter such a course of action, the TRA and U.S. provision of defense articles and services provide an atmosphere in which Taiwan’s democratically elected leadership can negotiate with counterparts in Beijing with confidence. Taiwan’s difficult transition to a democracy, which coincides with its economic miracle that continues until today, is a possible model for democracy advocates in China. The ROC's existence as a defacto independent state is perhaps the only impetus for the PRC to transition into a multi-party system. Democracies are not as efficient in mobilizing resources as authoritarian one-party states. But they are certainly are more conducive to giving citizens greater say in how they are governed and in a more peaceful international environment.

China’s Access and Influence

Owens’ editorial is interesting from another perspective. Because it echoes a theme that the PRC has long represented, one has to examine Owens, his company, and his network as witting or unwitting channels of access and influence. One new channel with close links to Owens is a well-endowed Hong Kong non-profit entity (China-U.S. Exchange Foundation; 中美交流基金会) and a new dialogue – the so-called Sanya Initiative -- that Owens and this new foundation established last year.

The Foundation’s governing board consists of leading figures in Hong Kong who facilitated its reversion back to China, members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CCPCC), avid supporters of China’s one-country, two systems formula for annexing Taiwan, and elite in doing big business in China. These include former governor C.H. Tung (董建華), his brother C.C. Tung, Payson Cha, Ronnie Chan, Daniel Fung, Elsie Leung, Liu Changle, Peter Woo, and Gordon Wu. Its honorary advisors include Henry Kissinger, Hank Greenberg, Xu Kuangdi, and Tang Jiaxuan. It has cross-links with the newly established China Center of International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE) in Beijing and One Country, Two Systems Research Institute in Hong Kong. U.S. financial powerhouse AIG and the Starr Foundation are prominently listed as counselors.

The website claims the Foundation’s funding “is presently derived from the support of individuals and corporations in Hong Kong who share the Foundation's commitment to fostering stronger relations between China and the United States.” No corporations are listed, but private funders include: Chao Sze Kwong George; Ms. Vivien W. W. Chen; Mr. Kenneth Fang; Mr. Timothy Fok; Dr. Stanley Ho; Mr. Albert Hung; Dr. Lee Shau Kee; Dr. K.S. Lo; Mr. Robert Ng; Dr. Charles Yeung. Li Ka-shing’s son, Richard Li, is listed as a counselor.

All that’s missing is the precise nature of its relationship with what elements of the government in Beijing, and a direct linkage likely won’t be found barring some major investigative journalism by the likes of Jimmy Lai. However, it’s worth noting that Beijing’s use of Hong Kong-based cut outs for influencing political views in Washington has precedents. The PRC –specifically the PLA – attempted to contribute at least U.S. $300,000 to the Democratic Party in 1996 using the daughter of a senior PLA general (Liu Chaoying)and a China Aerospace Corporation subsidiary as the (China Aerospace International Holdings, Ltd) as the white glove. PLA General Ji Shengde, the predecessor of Xiong Guangkai and responsible for foreign relations and intelligence, led the operation. For reporting, click here. However, the Republicans also received questionable funding from a Hong Kong source with links in China, although somewhat different. Young Brothers Development Ltd loaned around U.S. $1 million to a RNC cut out, although there is no evidence that the funds originated in China or were on behalf of China.

Having learned lessons from the past, Beijing’s use of a Hong Kong-based think tank as an agent of and funding source for influence in Washington and at the state level is fair game. The goal is to enhance bilateral relations, but the Taiwan angle should not be forgotten. Its influence operations should be watched carefully. Hong Kong is part of the PRC, and many of the Foundation’s leaders have formal PRC government positions within the CCPCC. Other initiatives have or will include funded travel for U.S. journalists, state officials, including lieutenant governors and state legislators.

The China-US Exchange Foundation is no simple philanthropically-oriented institution. It has retained high powered lobbying firms, including Brown Lloyd James and Fontheim International, as part of its influence operations mission. Fontheim has registered with the Senate to lobby on behalf the the Foundation.

The Sanya Initiative: Working the U.S. Military Old Boy Network

One of the first orders of business for the China-US Exchange Foundation was support for a new dialogue between retired senior U.S. military officers and counterparts from the PLA. Funding support was provided not only by the Foundation, but also Owens’ company, AEA Investors and CV Starr (click here for pre-Sanya meeting coverage in the Financial Times). The dialogue, termed the Sanya Initiative, included five senior PLA general officers led by retired General Xiong Guangkai. The four retired U.S. officers include Bill Owens and General Ronald R. Fogleman, former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. In addition to consulting for Boeing, Fogleman has been Senior Vice Chairman, Projects International, a company that has close ties in Beijing through its founder, Chas Freeman. Fogleman was just recently appointed as CEO of a major defense firm, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. Other participants include General John M. Keane, and General Charles E. Wilhelm. Wives were invited along as well.

The meeting in Sanya took place on February 21 in order to commemorate the anniversary of former U.S. president Richard Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972 to meet with Chairman Mao Zedong. Immediately preceding the dialogue, Owens’ published his first editorial in the Financial Times with similar themes as last week's, minus the Taiwan-related issues.

The participants pledged after the February 2008 dialogue to maintain “continuous communication through various channels such as personal letters, bi-monthly telecommunications, and a second meeting to be convened later this year.” The group also allegedly committed to launching a strategic media campaign to correct U.S. misperceptions of the Chinese military.

All are honorable and served their country with distinction while in uniform, and continue to contribute where they can. However, all four of these officers also settled in to lucrative corporate positions after taking off their uniforms, with the leader of this well-connected U.S. team – Bill Owens – having the clearest and most significant business interests in China.

A Retired Admiral Turns Businessman

After stepping down as Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (the second highest ranking uniformed officer in the military), Bill Owens aggressively entered the business world. He started in the defense industry (SAIC), moved to Teledesic, then to Nortel, a major telecommunications company with significant business interests in China. Observers note Owens’ demanded a substantial severance package after only just over a year with Nortel. After his brief stint as CEO of the troubled Nortel, Bill Owens moved to spearhead the China investment arm of the U.S. private equity firm AEA, which includes clients or partners such as AIG, C.V. Starr, and JPMorgan Chase. It’s here where paths cross with the political-economic godfathers of the U.S.-China relationship, such as Henry Kissinger, Hank Greenberg, and Gen (ret) Al Haig.

Owens also has or is serving on the corporate boards of Teledesic, LLC, Polycom, Viasat, Microvision, TIBCO, Symantec, Metal Storm LLC, Telstra, Nortel Corp. Ltd., BAT, Cray, and Biolase. He has served on the boards of Carnegie Foundation, Brookings Institute, Harvard Kennedy School, and the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board.

Regardless, China has grown quite adept at leveraging the business interests of former senior U.S. officials in order to further its own political agenda. And getting the U.S. to break on its relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan), particularly arms sales, is perhaps the highest priority. The China-U.S. Exchange Foundation and its recruitment of these four flag/general officers is an example of how sophisticated China’s influence operations have become. The targeting of senior retired U.S. military officers appears to be the Foundation’s first order of business, with the Sanya Initiative taking place less than a month after being established (28 January 2008). It also was two months before Taiwan’s presidential elections and nine before before the U.S. presidential elections.

As a final note, Owens’ advocacy on making China a friend coincides with some major financial business dealings that are unclear at this point. Owens’ firm, AEA Investors, has been making a run to buy a portion of PLA-affiliated Huawei. Media reporting noted that Owens was the brains and muscle behind making it to the short list. One report noted that Huawei’s intent in opening up to foreign investors is to gain a foothold in the U.S. and overcome political opposition from Congress. Media reporting also indicates that Owens had aggressively sought out a strategic alliance between Nortel and Huawei while he served as Nortel CEO.

In short, while ADM (ret) Owens probably had noble motives in calling for the abandonment of Taiwan, his ideas should be brought into proper context. This story is still unfolding, and there’s likely more to come.

END