Wednesday, September 10, 2008

Annual State Department Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan

The recent release of State Department guidelines covering "unofficial" relations with Taiwan seems to have generated quite a bit of media coverage (see today's Taipei Times for one example). Henry Chen, spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has it about right:

“The same guideline is circulated around the same time each year to all the foreign embassies and US government posts. It was nothing new,” ministry spokesman Henry Chen (陳銘政) said, adding that Taiwan has suggested Washington stop repeating the same gesture each year to avoid misunderstandings. “Some people, when they hear there is a new guideline, they might misinterpret that the US has adopted new policies on Taiwan, which is not the case,” he said.

The MOFA spokesman has a good point. It is kind of silly to retransmit what in effect are the same guidelines year after year. The media quotes unnamed critics as saying this year's document is more restrictive than previous ones. One example: "the new guideline specifically bars the display of the Republic of China flag on US premises, a condition not listed in the 2001 guideline, critics said." Maybe true that the 2001 State Department guidance didn't have that restriction. But maybe the 1985, 1993, 1999, and 2004 versions did.

Anyway, most in the government who deal with Taiwan know the self imposed rules. They stick to them almost to a fault. Reason why a staff officer on the Taiwan Coordination staff may have put the language back in this year is to send a reminder to some organization that may have violated one of these long-established yet bizarre commandments sometime within the last several months. So, rule is "thou shalt not fly the ROC flag." Breaking these rules can be fun, by the way. If you get caught, though, prepare to be castigated by Guidelines Police.

Beyond this, here's a rough list of other dos and don'ts, whether in the guidelines or not.

1) Starting with the most basic, there will be no visits of officials with a rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary-level or higher from the Department of State and Department of Defense. And there will be no general/flag officer visits. Exceptions can be made with the approval of the Secretary of State, presumably in consultation with the National Security Advisor and probably the President himself these days.

And there have been plenty of exceptions. First, it should be noted that the under the Clinton administration, there were at least five Cabinet-level officials who visited Taiwan. This was an outcome from the 1994 Taiwan Policy Review. And how many under the Bush administration? None come to mind. Under the Clinton administration, there was a DoD Deputy Assistant Secretary who visited Taiwan - Andy Hoehn. And the Bush administration? None come to mind. However, State Department did send one Deputy Assistant Secretary level official under the Bush administration - Don Keyser. Whoops. Actually twice, but the second time time didn't count since it was a private visit. And State/NSC Staff did arrange to send one general officer to Taiwan in the Bush administration. Of course, what should have been cause for celebration turned out to be an unpleasant occasion. President Bush sent a two-star Marine - a great American - to send a warning to the DPP administration.

But the Senior Director for Asia within the National Security Council (NSC) staff, now Dennis Wilder, and before him Mike Green, Jim Moriarty, Torkel Patterson, Ken Lieberthal, Sandy Kristoff, Stanley Roth, Doug Paal, Jim Kelly, etc, etc before him, have been considered to be Assistant Secretary-level positions and have been able to travel to Taiwan with few restrictions. Of course, they all have had the President behind them, so that helps a bit.

2) Speaking of private visits, another rule has been that U.S. government people who do travel to Taiwan are indeed unofficial and private. In fact, they are there as AIT consultants. And all visits to Taiwan by U.S. government personnel must be scrutinized and approved by the Taiwan Coordination Staff.

3) There are no Taiwan "officials" - only "authorities."

4) It is the policy of the United States that there is no "Republic of China." Only "Taiwan." There used to be an ROC before 1979, but it disappeared. The implication is that the ROC is an illegitimate regime? Regardless, uttering words like "ROC officials said..." are enough to earn six months confinement by the Guidelines Police. And, by the way, Taiwan nor the ROC is a country. It may be a new democracy, but the ROC is not a country.

5) All correspondence should be on plain white paper and sent through AIT channels. And no formal titles. If for whatever reason a memo with letterhead and titles does get sent over to AIT for transmittal, it doesn't really matter. They can retype it onto AIT letterhead and delete the titles. They can even edit and correct misspellings. No biggie. One side rule to memos and correspondence. There shall be no formal thank you notes sent to senior Taiwan authorities for their contributions to America in the global war on terrorism. Nevermind that Taiwan gave more financial and other assistance in kind to the United States than China and most other members of the international community.

6) Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense shall not come within 50 miles of Washington DC, if they can can get visas at all. And there are to be no meetings between Taiwan authorities (have to get that language right) in the White House or the main State Department building in Foggy Bottom. The Palestinian Liberation Organization's Yasser Arafat or Sinn Fein's Gerry Adams though? No problem and with honors.


I'm sure there are many more quirks in the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship. They all demonstrate the strength of bureaucratic inertia and an amazing lack of courage, decency, and respect for a long time friend and democracy. And in some cases, restrictions such as not allowing general/flag officer visits to Taiwan have a direct relationship with Taiwan's ability to defend itself. The mentoring and knowledge diffusion that goes on with frequent senior-level interactions with counterparts in other military establishments around the world are invaluable. There is much, much more senior level military officer interaction with counterparts in the Chinese People's Liberation Army than with Taiwan. Which side of the Taiwan Strait needs frequent senior level interaction more?

No visits to Foggy Bottom, but meeting in a coffee shop a block down is OK. What difference does it make? No formal titles to memos? What is this - plausible deniability? And why does the Senior Asia Director within NSC -- an Assistant Secretary-level position -- get to travel to Taiwan but not his counterpart within State? And why would NSC/State direct a two-star general from the Pentagon to travel to Taiwan to dress down a democratically elected president, but not routinize such visits to bring Taiwan's defense establishment out of its isolated shell? Who knows, more senior level interaction may make a big difference in Taiwan's ability to defend itself.

Bottom line is that all these silly rules are self-imposed, based on subjective judgments, and intended to demonstrate the unofficial nature of our relationship with Taiwan. They are driven by fear of China. Would either an Obama or McCain administration be willing to review these rules? Probably not, but it's not too early to start putting a bug in their ears.

Monday, September 8, 2008

U.S. Food Exports to Taiwan Grow


U.S. AgNet is reporting that U.S. grain exports to Taiwan are on the rise in the wake of a breakthrough in negotiating a relaxation in Taiwan's regulatory regime on grain imports. Taiwan has been the U.S.' fourth largest customer -- behind Japan, Mexico, and South Korea -- of corn from America's heartland. Importing as much as 4-5 billion tons a year, most corn imports go to feed Taiwan's large number of pigs. Taiwan has been said to have the highest density of hog farms in the world. Over the least two years, China's Taiwan Affairs Office has been placing growing public pressure on Taiwan to loosen its restrictions on Chinese corn.


Change in Taiwan's Import Regs a Win For U.S. Corn Growers

USAgNet - 09/05/2008

A change in Taiwan's import regulations is affording U.S. farmers greater opportunities to increase corn exports to the country. At the same time, Taiwanese livestock producers are seeing easier access to feed grains supplies.

The U.S. Grains Council is calling this move a win-win for U.S. farmers and for end-users overseas."The Council has always worked with regulators in Taiwan and throughout the world to ensure fair, scientific and safe procedures are in place," said Clover Chang, USGC assistant director in Taiwan.

Taiwan's Bureau of Food Safety, which is a division of the Department of Health, separated the managements of imported corn for feed from corn imported for human consumption. Regulators will now only test imported feed-use corn for aflatoxins, which are mycotoxins produced by fungi, and not pesticide residues.

Until recently, there was only one commodity classification code for importing corn thus feed-use corn and food-use corn were facing the same standards, according to Chang. "Roughly 95 percent of imported corn is destined for feed use in Taiwan's vibrant livestock industry," Chang noted.

Taiwan imports of U.S. corn through the first six months of 2008 are on pace to exceed the record $753 million (4.2 million metric tons or 165 million bushels) of exports in 2007.

Sunday, September 7, 2008

Taiwan's 2009 Central Government Budget


The Taiwan Journal reported on September 5, 2008 that the Executive Yuan sent its annual budget over to the Legislative Yuan last week. Not too many surprises, although the defense budget has some anomalies.

Taiwan has averaged between U.S. 7-10 billion a year on defense. About U.S. $750 million to $2 billion has been earmarked each year for buying weapons, at least based on the assumption that the bulk of secret part of the defense budget goes for foreign procurement of arms.

In the CY08 defense budget, however, a whopping NT $97 billion out of the overall NT $334 billion -- about U.S. $3.1 billion -- was classified. The EY's requested budget for next year (CY09), NT $52.7 billion (about US $1.7 billion) out of a projected NT $325 billion defense budget is classified - about 16.2% of the total budget.

Bottom line is that it has been a mistaken assumption to think that Taiwan has not been dedicating the proper resources to its defense. All too often, the metric of Taiwan's commitment is how much it buys from the United States. If the classified portion of the defense budget indeed does reflect expenditures for arms through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, then U.S. $1 billion a year dedicated toward buying weapons seems pretty generous.

This does beg one question. Why wouldn't Taiwan taxpayers want its government to be transparent about how their tax dollars are being used? Couple of reasons, but one is that policy is running on inertia - USG wants all bilateral dealings to be handled with the utmost discretion. But, so much for democracy. In any case, just for comparison, the secret NT $50 billion portion of the defense budget by itself is more than the National Science Council's NT $42 billion budget; more than MOFA's budget of NT 31.3 billion; and close to the annual social insurance expenditure of NT $61 billion. But then again, Taiwan may not be so different than the U.S. While 16% of its defense budget is hidden, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis estimates that 19% of the U.S. FY09 defense budget is classified.

Here's a few excerpts from the Taiwan Journal article:

The ROC government's proposed budget for 2009 will total US$58 billion, marking a 6.9percent increase from 2008, the Cabinet-level Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics announced Aug. 28. Education, science and culture will take up the largest pieces of the pie at 18.7 percent, followed by social welfare at 17.9 percent, and defense at 17.2 percent.

According to the DGBAS, the government's 2009 tax revenue is estimated at about US$54.2 billion, a shortfall of US$3.8 billion--the second deficit in a row. The government will issue state bonds and use surpluses accumulated from previous years to cover the shortfall. The budget has been approved by the Cabinet and submitted to the Legislature, which is expected to give its final approval before the end of the year.

The proposed 2009 budget for classified diplomatic missions was slashed to US$120.6 million from 2008's US$181 million and now stands at 6 percent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' total diplomatic allocations. The overall budget for MOFA slated for 2009 was US$995.2 million, up US$20.3 million from this year.

MOFA spokesman Henry Chen explained that the cut to ministry's classified diplomatic missions was in line with President Ma Ying-jeou's "flexible diplomacy" policy, which focuses on strengthening relations with the ROC's existing diplomatic allies. Other goals for MOFA in the coming year include forming cooperative relations with countries that Taiwan has no diplomatic ties and expanding humanitarian relief work.
Regarding national defense expenditure, a total of US$10 billion will be allocated for 2009. According to the defense budget plan, as of the end of next year, the number of military personnel will be reduced to a total of 275,000. A five-year national defense buildup plan for 2009 to 2013, roughly US$54.2 billion is expected to be allocated by the government as military expenditure, constituting 3 percent of the gross domestic product. Meanwhile, the plan also proposes a budget of US$2.95 billion allocated by the government in 2009 for the investing in necessary defensive weapons.

Education, scientific research and cultural development will take the biggest share of the government's budget for 2009. The draft budget allocates US$10.8 billion for these sectors in the coming year. Social welfare spending comes in second at US$10.4 billion, marking an increase of 9.8 percent from this year's total.

Friday, August 22, 2008

President Ma Confirms Commitment to Defense of Taiwan


China Times reported today that President Ma emphasized the importance of keeping Taiwan's defense spending pegged to 3% of GDP in a meeting with a US Congressional commission. Deputy Commissioner of the US-China Economic and Security Commission Carolyn Bartholomew, Dan Blumenthal, and others are in Taipei on a fact finding mission. Ma defended his cross-Strait policies, saying that improving relations is in the interests of both Taiwan and the United States. Reference also is made to a phone call he had with 31 Congressmen during his stop over in the U.S. on the way to South America. Full article is below:

馬:國軍購不會低於國民生產毛額3%

2008-08-22
今日晚報
中時電子報毛嘉慶/台北報導】

馬英九總統今(二十二)日呼籲,台灣需要維持適當的國防水準,希望美國行政部門儘快將台灣採購的武器清單交由國會審查。他表示,雖然台海情勢已經有了「根本的變化」,但台灣與美國的關係還要繼續加強,未來國防預算「不會少於國內生產毛額的百分之三」,以展現自我防衛決心。

馬英九上午在總統府接見美國國會任命的「美中經濟安全檢討委員會」(USCC)副主席白嘉玲(Carolyn Bartholomew)等人。馬英九指出,台灣非常歡迎就當前形勢和美方交換意見,政府過去三個月來在兩岸關係的努力,已經使得台海地區的緊張情勢大為降低。

馬英九表示,最近他到中南美洲,途經美國洛杉磯與舊金山,和三十一名參眾議員見面或通電話,他們的的反應是兩岸關係的發展符合美國的利益。他對訪客說,在場許多人士都來過台灣,這次來訪和過去有不同,因為台海情勢已經有了根本的變化。另外一方面,台灣和美國關係不但維持友好,更會繼續加強。

馬英九重申,未來幾個月,政府會繼續和中國大陸商談貿易與交通等議題,希望除了經濟關係的正常化外,在國際關係方面能夠進行外交和解與休兵,減少雙方在國際間的惡性競爭,「這樣可以讓大家都鬆一口氣,台灣海峽與國際社會都可以邁向和解」。

馬英九也呼籲,美國應儘快通過台灣請求採購的七項武器系統,讓台灣國防維持適當水準。總統承諾,未來台灣的國防預算不會少於國內生產毛額的百分之三,展現台灣自我防衛的決心。

Taiwan Supporter, McCain Advisor Under Fire


A solid Taiwan supporter - Randy Scheunemann - took a hit in the Huffington Post today. Yes, Randy was a public relations specialist, strategic communicator, lobbyist, or whatever one likes to call the business. And his previous company, Orion Strategies, registered under the Foreign Agent Registry Act (FARA) with Taiwan as a client. Randy's been hit in the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Rightweb, and a range of other commentaries, journals, and dailies.

As election day nears, people supporting both the McCain and Obama teams are on the look out for any perceived weakness in the opposing camp. And then take any perceived weakness, and then access the media to cast the message in manner that best suits your interests. It's politics, and it gets nasty. Fact is that attacks against Randy are less about conflict of interest than about his position on the McCain campaign team, as well as his foreign policy positions as a hawk on national defense.

Lobbying is a form of marketing, specifically geared toward Congress. Yet, it's more than that. It's shaping a message in the media, writing letters officials in the Executive Branch, and such. The business seeks to win people over to the cause of whoever the lobbyists' clients are. Most lobbyists tend to match business clients with pre-existing views, causes, and passions. Success comes easier if a lobbyist shares the same passion as his client. In fact, that's probably how he/she got the contact - the client is willing to pay because he/she knows the lobbyist cares. So a lobbyist does well by doing good, at least as defined by the lobbyist and the client.

So...Randy was passionate about Taiwan. And then Orion was able to land a one year contract in 2005 for U.S. $200,000 a year. Randy had to back out of Orion when he signed up for the McCain campaign. The Orion contract was small potatoes, although not bad for a small and until recently low key company. It's the big names that get the big contracts. Level of retainer seems to be based on how senior of an official you were. If you were a Senator, Representative, Ambassador, Cabinet Secretary, or even a deputy Cabinet official, you'll get alot. If you were a measly staffer, don't expect alot.

At the same time as it contracted with Orion in March 2005, the DPP signed up Barbour, Griffith, and Rogers (BGR) in a sweet three year deal for $1.5 million ($500,000 a year). BGR, packed with former senior Republican National Committee and Bush administration officials, such as Haley Barbour, Bob Blackwell and Steve Yates. BGR's contract was terminated early though, in the wake of the departure of Steve Yates among others. The KMT/PFP office in Washington signed up O'Neill and Associates for $12,000 a month. McGuire Woods Consulting, another major lobbying firm, was able to land a contract for $25,000 a month, or $300,000 a year. Ford Associates signed up for just over $500,000 a year. These are just a partial list of contracts triggering a FARA registration.

So Orion was one of a number of lobbying firms, modest in light of other larger firms. Question, however, is cost effectiveness for Taiwan. Most of us like and defend Taiwan because we like the place, have wives or girlfriends from Taiwan, have a strong dislike of the Gomer government in Beijing, or some other emotional attachment to Taiwan, and write, advocate, or give advice without Taiwan authorities paying for it. But it does take hiring lobbyists to market for Taiwan in Washington, and Taiwan isn't alone. China has come on strong, and has a vast lobbying campaign that is outpacing Taiwan's. Few foreign governments don't have lobbyists in Washington.

Problem for Taiwan is that its management of lobbyists may have problems. Little coordination, direction, and perhaps wasting money on lobbying firms that do very little for the money. Because Orion Strategies is a small firm, managed by former staffers, odds are that it has been effective where it specializes - the Hill. But effectiveness of others isn't clear.

Bottom line - Randy's been taking hits for his lobbying business. Taiwan was a client. But Taiwan needs more like Randy to maintain its relevance, especially in the face of a growing Chinese effort to win over policymakers and Congressmen. More on this later...

Friday, August 15, 2008

Taiwan Giving Up on United Nations?


The Associated Press carried an article today reflecting a shift in position regarding the pursuing membership in the United Nations. It's not clear whether or not the announcement is related to the outcome of the two referenda in March 2008 asking if Taiwan or the ROC should join the UN, or an honest effort to shift focus onto representation in UN agencies. It may be the case that if a referendum fails, either in the vote count or by failing to have enough people vote, then issue itself can't be pursued for three years. Portions of the article are below:


A senior Taiwanese diplomat says Taiwan is not bidding for United Nations membership this year for the first time since 1992, but is seeking representation in U.N. agencies instead.


The Friday statement by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrew Hsia comes as President Ma Ying-jeou pursues a less confrontational relationship with China than his predecessor.


Hsia says this year's U.N. proposal is ''milder and more feasible'' than the previous administration's efforts, and urges China to accept it.

China and Taiwan split amid civil war in 1949. Beijing continues to claim the island as part of its territory, and opposes anything that gives Taiwan the trappings of sovereignty, including membership in international organizations.


Monday, August 11, 2008

Doug Paal Returns to Taiwan


Taiwan government press entity, Central News Agency (CNA), reported on a July 27, 2008 meeting between Doug Paal and others with President Ma Ying-jeou in the Presidential Palace. Paal, a former CIA analyst and White House staffer under the George Bush administration in the early 1990s, served as AIT Director from 2002 to 2006. After he stepped down, he was quoted in one prominent U.S. journal as saying that the Pentagon had been encouraging pro-independence advocates in Taiwan.

Earlier this year, Paal joined the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as Director of its China Program in Washington and Beijing. He recently published his outline for the next president's foreign policy. While at the NSC, he worked with International Republican Institute Director Lorne Craner. Before arriving in Taipei, he was founder and president of the Asia-Pacific Policy Center.

Other U.S. attendees included Bob Ross from Harvard, Steve Goldstein from Harvard, Bob Sutter from Georgetown, Jonathon Pollack from the Naval War College, and Michael Swaine, also from Carnegie. Attendees along with President Ma were new defacto ambassador Jason Yuan, Secretary General National Security Council Su Chi, and a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative.

Most of the Central News Agency release was pro forma. However, what's interesting was a commentary from a Now News that analyzed why CNA posted such an unusual release:

由於馬英九接見包道格,事前並沒有預告行程,但府方卻在事後發布會晤新聞稿,外界認為,此一安排相當不尋常,一方面綠營最近不斷援引美國保守派人士、軍火商言論,質疑兩岸走得太近,可能會妨礙台美共同利益,已引起美國政府的憂慮,府方似有經由包道格公開表達華府對目前兩岸關係抱持歡迎的態度來消毒,另一方面,馬英九也藉此機會,強調不會藉著出訪進行政治操作,形同向對岸提出說明。

The essence of it is that the President's office may have released the contents of the meeting, and the delegation's glowing praise for the Ma administration's cross-Strait policies, as a means to head off criticism from others in Taiwan and abroad. Conservative U.S. think tanks, arms dealers, and other nefarious characters supposedly have been expressing concern over the pace of Ma's warming to China. The CNA release shows that the Ma administration can count on at least some Americans to approve of its policies.