Obama’s Failing Taiwan Policy

Recent reports and editorials have highlighted challenges that the Obama administration faces in managing ties with Taiwan. Sensing a failing Taiwan policy. Members of Congress are ratcheting up the pressure. And rightly so. Plagued by an acute case of decidophobia, the Obama administration’s unwillingness to accept and act upon a legitimate request for a follow-on procurement of F-16 fighters symbolizes a broader problem. The problem is creeping abandonment of democratic Taiwan in favor of an increasingly assertive authoritarian People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Not since the Carter administration has an Executive Branch inched so close to casting aside Taiwan in order to placate China for ostensibly strategic reasons. This isn’t just a Republican-Democrat issue. Relatively speaking, the Clinton administration deserves high marks. And the current failings of the Obama administration can, at least in part, be a carry-over from the latter part of the Bush administration. While difficult to pinpoint, one could trace the problem to a select number of senior political appointees close to the President, weak leadership at the senior levels of the Pentagon, and an increasingly sophisticated and effective PRC influence operations campaign.

The Obama Team’s Line Up

One had high hopes for the Obama team as it entered office in January 2009. The administration’s Asia team members included seasoned, strategically-minded veterans, such as Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of Defense LTG (ret) Chip Gregson, and Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Derek Mitchell. The latter two focused much of their time on Central Asia issues, despite having significant “boots on the ground” time in Taiwan. Chip Gregson has departed, and Derek Mitchell has been nominated to serve as Special Representative to Burma. Replacements have yet to be confirmed, including nomination of Mark Lippert as Chip Gregson’s replacement.

Sharp, seasoned Pentagon staffers with years of China/Taiwan policy experience within the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) include retired Navy Captain Joe Skinner and Principal Director Dave Helvey. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense with direct oversight of Taiwan policy is long time Dianne Feinstein staffer Mike Schiffer. Most likely focused on Korea, Japan, and China military-to-military issues, Schiffer has made few public statements indicating strong support for Taiwan’s position. His former boss, Senator Feinstein, has been a leading proponent of China and advocate of U.S.-China relations. At the same time, she has questioned U.S. security assistance to Taiwan (see below).

Highly sensitive to how Taiwan arms sales could affect the U.S.-China military relationship, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Under Secretary of Defense Michelle Flournoy have been less vocal than their predecessors on Taiwan issues. In fact, Secretary Gates was quite sensitive to Chinese concerns regarding arms sales, without much apparent concern for Taiwan. Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Lynn, who served as a senior Raytheon executive for seven years, appears to have recused himself on Taiwan issues. Lynn has announced his departure later this summer or Fall, and a replacement has yet to be named.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Mike Mullen has endorsed Track 2 dialogues between ostensibly retired senior PLA officers and retired Navy Admiral Bill Owens, Joe Prueher, and others who have advocated abandonment of Taiwan. “Abandonment” of Taiwan presumably means amending or revoking the Taiwan Relations Act. Unlike their authoritarian cousins to the west who meet with the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon and in Beijing on a regular basis, Taiwan’s access to senior Pentagon officials remains severely limited. Newly appointed Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, may be more sympathetic to Taiwan, and Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) ADM Robert Willard has been a solid advocate of Taiwan’s defense.

The remainder of the bureaucracy is relatively consistent with the past. Senior representatives of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), such as Bill Stanton, Ray Burghart, Barbara Schrage, and Greg Man offer solid policy advice. Very capable China hands originally included Jeff Bader, President Obama’s senior director for East Asian affairs.  Jeff has returned to Brookings, and been replaced by a Korea specialist, Danny Russel.  Former RAND analyst Evan Medeiros manages the China/Taiwan portfolio on the National Security Staff. As the sole remaining China hand in the Old Executive Office Building, Evan has demonstrated sympathy to Taiwan in the past, despite reports to the contrary.

This has been a solid line up, and people who should have been able develop creative solutions to balance interests in good China relations while not sacrificing Taiwan. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, presumably under advisement from Kurt Campbell, deserves high marks, as demonstrated by her tough rebukes against Chinese activities in the South China Sea. The remainder of the State Department bureaucracy serves as the bedrock of a principled status quo. These days, principled status quo is good. One should never forget the State Department resisted DoD efforts to re-establish military-to-military relations with China in the wake of the PLA’s bloody crackdown on protestors in June 1989.

Weaknesses

So where is Obama team failing? Even the perception of drift toward abandoning a democracy in favor of an authoritarian Chinese government that relies on implied threats of force to resolve political differences. After all, the objective reality is that the Republic of China (ROC) exists as nation-state, despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations.In addition to weak support at senior levels within the Pentagon, problems may start with the Deputies Committee (DC). First, Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg is said to have been personally invested in the notion of “strategic reassurance” with China, which presumably means accommodation of China (e.g., appeasement). The new buzzword is “strategic mutual trust.” Until his recent departure, Steinberg likely dominated DC meetings that addressed China issues, or Taiwan if ever raised to that level in the past couple of years. Tom Donilon served as Deputy National Security Advisor until last year, when he was appointed as Obama’s National Security Advisor. Donilon’s replacement, Denis McDonough, has no apparent record on Taiwan issues.

Theoretically, DC meetings tee up issues for consideration by the Principals. Secretary of Defense Bill Gates has been weak, and Donilon has no record on Taiwan to speak of. In short, adding to the weakness is a relatively passive Department of Defense, the traditional bedrock of support for Taiwan. Perhaps supporting a policy of strategic reassurance, senior uniformed military officers, such as CJCS Mullen, appear personally invested in a politically-tinged military relationship with counterparts within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Influencing Taiwan Policy from the Outside

Another factor contributing toward the drift in U.S. Taiwan policy may be the role of informal opinion leaders or groups. Beijing understands where to focus its influence – retired senior U.S. military officers with residual connections in the Pentagon, the financial establishment, and other communities of influence. Beijing has actively sought out U.S. friends willing to call for a halt to arms sales, amendment of the Taiwan Relations Act, or abandonment of Taiwan. China and its representatives also has been targeting traditionally conservative groups, such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW).

One forum in particular – the Sanya Initiative - has involved retired four star generals and admirals. Sponsors have included the China Association for International Friendly Contact, C.H Tung’s Hong Kong-based China-US Exchange Foundation, and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. The PLA's Foreign Affairs Office supposedly provided translation support.

In the lead up to the initial meetings in 2008, CJCS Mike Mullen signed a letter to the organizers saying “I specifically endorse the meeting of four U.S. four star officers with their counterparts” in China. Then-PACOM Commander, ADM Tim Keating, also endorsed the dialogue. During the first round from February 19-22, 2008, former Nanjing Military Region Commander, General Zhu Wenquan, requested U.S. participants advocate in favor of a cessation of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, reduction in other forms of military cooperation, and a “review of the Taiwan Relations Act.”

As outlined in the meeting report, U.S. participants assured Chinese counterparts that the PLA's case - presumably including selling out a de facto democratic nation-state - would be made in Washington DC. In March 2008, one U.S. Sanya delegation representative -- a member of the U.S. Defense Policy Board – briefed the board on a proposal for the U.S.-China military relationship to be based on the “Sanya model,” and presented a plan to then-Secretary of Defense Bill Gates to change U.S. China policy. Another U.S. representative, a retired U.S. Marine general, advocated adjustments to DoD senior service school curriculum. Another offered to use channels to lobby the White House.

By September 2009, the organizer, former VCJCS, ADM (ret) Bill Owens, published an op-ed in the Financial Times. He advocated a halt to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and revisions to the Taiwan Relations Act, charging that the legislation is outdated and “not in our best interests.” Among other business pursuits, ADM (ret) Owens is a senior executive with AEA Investors, a major financial firm with close connections with former SecState Henry Kissinger and former AIG CEO Hank Greenberg. The latter has been cited as a source of funding for the Sanya Initiative.

The second round of meetings took place in Hawaii from October 16-24, 2009. Participants met with CJCS Mullen (see photo of CJCS with Owens, Xiong Guangkai, and rest of Sanya group above) and PACOM Commander Tim Keating. In recounting the meeting, one of the key Chinese sponsors asserted that “the joint statement issued after the talks said that the (retired) American military leaders unanimously felt that the Taiwan Relations Act needs to be reviewed.” After the Hawaii meetings, the Chinese side proceeded on to Washington, where they met with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Lynn, VCJCS General James Cartwright, and members of Congress. U.S. participants included former PACOM Commander, U.S. Ambassador to China, and Vice Chairman of the National Committee on U.S.- China Relations -- ADM (ret) Joe Prueher. The third round of the Sanya dialogue took place in Hangzhou on October 28-29. 2010, and included a new member to the U.S. group -- former PACOM Commander Tim Keating. The meetings also included U.S. Embassy participation.

Perhaps informed by the series of senior retired officer exchanges, the "abandon Taiwan" theme, ostensibly due to overriding strategic interests in China, appears to have expanded. In February 2010, Owens' replacement as VCJCS -- USAF Gen (ret) Joe Ralston -- published an editorial in the Wall Street Journal citing the freeze of US-China military relations as a result of the January 2010 Congressional notifications on Taiwan arms sales. He then proceeds to outline the overriding national security interests in the US-China military-to-military relationship, and establishing personal counterpart relations (e.g., assuming that PLA counterparts would actually answer a phone during a crisis). The editorial implied that Taiwan arms sales are an obstacle to the US-China military relationship. General (ret) Ralston is Vice Chairman of the Cohen Group, an enterprise with expanding business interests in China.

In June 2010, a senior U.S. senator (Diane Feinstein) stated that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were hurting closer ties with China, and asked Defense Secretary Gates what Beijing would have to do for the Pentagon to reconsider the transfers. By March 2011, retired U.S. Pacific Command commanders Joe Prueher and Tim Keating, both with affiliations with the Sanya initiative, succeeded in getting more than a half dozen signatures on a report published by the University of Virginia Miller Center calling for a review of the Taiwan Relations Act and end to the “vicious circle” caused by U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. In September 2010, another senator, Arlen Specter, argued on the floor that revisions to US arms sales could be warranted In Spring 2011, international relations theorist Charles Glaser joined the growing chorus calling for the abandonment of Taiwan. In May 2011, at the invitation of the Naval War College’s Maritime Studies Institute, one former senior U.S. official advocated U.S. support for Taiwan’s unification with China.

In late May 2011, visiting PLA Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde continued the campaign on Taiwan. During a joint press conference with ADM Mullen, Chen said "since I've arrived in the United States, I've had the opportunity to talk to some members of Congress and some of them told me that they also think that it is time for the United States to review this legislation.” Mullen responded by pointing the audience in the right direction: U.S. Congress should be the ones to initiate abandonment of Taiwan.

Arms Sales Freeze

China’s influence operations campaign appears to be working, at least with the Executive Branch. The F-16 issue, or rather the Obama administration’s refusal to accept and act upon a legitimate request to replace Taiwan’s remaining 60 F-5s, best symbolizes the Obama administration’s policy drift on Taiwan. Before 2001, representatives from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense submitted a list of requests to senior U.S. policy officials in annual face to face meetings, thus ensuring stated requirements were understood and addressed. At the time, Bush administration officials assured counterparts from Taipei that written responses to requests would be provided within a reasonable timeframe (e.g., standard of 60 days).

What makes the F-16 issue so egregious is the refusal to accept formal letters of request (LOR) for price and availability (P&A) data since 2006.In July, the Obama administration is said to have committed to resolve the fighter issue by October 1, 2011. ADM Mullen reiterated the Obama administration’s commitment to make a decision by October 1, 2011. However, observers have noted that the most likely course of action is to retrofit a portion of Taiwan’s existing F-16 fighter fleet with new radar systems and possibly engines. In effect, upgrades would be roughly on a par with F-16 Block 50/52. It remains unclear what configuration would be involved. Based on Defense News reporting from 2009, options likely include replacing APG-66(V)3 radar systems on current airframes with the APG-68(V)9 or perhaps an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. Also included could be upgrades to the mission computer, new color multifunction displays and helmet mounted cueing, air-to-air and maritime interdiction munitions, as well as electronic countermeasure systems. Although likely to send the retrofit price tag through the roof, engine candidates include the General Electric F110-GE-129 and the Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-229, with the latter as a preferable option.

If reporting is correct, release of additional F-16s – the priority – could continue to be held in abeyance. Release of F-16 Block 50/52 capabilities, yet withholding new airframes to replace aging F-5s, appears to be ill-advised. A minimalist decision is likely to draw Beijing’s ire, offer Taiwan’s political and military leadership with little choice but to proceed with the retrofit, force a deferral on replacement fighters for the F-5s, and undercut Taiwan’s leverage in cross-Strait relations. Congress is likely see a minimalist solution as insufficient. Click here for more.

Beyond F-16s

However, the problem goes beyond F-16s. The Executive Branch has in effect had a freeze on new arms sales since 2007. The notifications sent to Congress in October 2008 and January 2010 constituted one of the final administrative steps following policy-level approvals for PATRIOT PAC-3 ground systems and missiles (policy approval in 2001); AH-64D APACHE attack helicopters (policy approval in 2002); and UH-60 BLACKHAWK utility helicopters (policy approval in 2007). The BLACKHAWKs were the last major arms sales to be approved.Perhaps most egregious is a reversal of U.S. policy commitments made in April 2011 to assist Taiwan in its acquisition of diesel electric submarines. In 2007, Taiwan's legislature authorized funding of the first of a two phased program through FMS channels. Unconfirmed rumors exist that senior members of the White House staff recommended to senior counterparts in Taiwan to abandon the program, initially in June 2008.

Since then, the Obama administration has frozen the Congressional notification of Phase I, estimated at U.S. $360 million.The Obama administration also has deferred resumption of trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA) talks. Taiwan’s restrictions on market access for U.S. beef have been cited as one rationale for freezing TIFA talks for the past four years. Unlike Taiwan, the U.S. Trade Representative has included the beef issue in trade negotiations with South Korean counterparts. Other Taiwan-related negotiations, including visa waiver and extradition initiatives, appear stalled. In the meantime, the director of China's State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Wang Yi visited Washington in late July 2011 to lobby senior US officials against arms sales.

The Return of Congress

Since 1979, Congress has played a traditional role in offsetting natural bureaucratic tendencies of the Executive Branch to write Taiwan off. Almost half the Senate signed off on a letter sent to President Obama on 26 May that advocated approval of F-16s. On August 1, 2011, more than 180 members of Congress signed another letter to the President arguing in favor of additional F-16s for Taiwan.

Other actions have been taken. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX), presumably support by fellow members, held up the nomination of Bill Burns for Deputy Secretary of State. Nominations for Mark Lippert as Assistant Secretary of Defense and Wendy Sherman, as undersecretary of state for political affairs, could run into difficulties.

These have been initial shots across the bow. Much more may need needed to get U.S. Asia policy back on track. By enacting a de facto freeze on new major arms sales, deferring renewal of TIFA talks, and unwillingness to actively support Taiwan in its efforts gaining entry into international organizations, such as the ICAO, one could swear that the Obama administration is actively trying to resolve the “Taiwan problem” once and for all, and in a manner amenable to Chinese interests. This probably isn’t intentional. But the effects are the same.

On the low end of the political intensity spectrum, Senate and House staffers could consider introduction of language into FY12 legislation akin to the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act of 1999. Congress also could move to freeze military to military exchanges, using Representative Frank Wolf’s ban on NASA exchanges with Chinese counterparts as a model. An insightful and well-crafted op-ed published last month by a former Pentagon and State Department official highlighted some of the shortcomings of the current military relationship. The op-ed coincided with a vastly different perspective published by CJCS Mullen the same day in the New York Times. ADM Mullen had argued that military relations with China were "vital" to U.S. interests. Fact is, defense policy exchanges with PLA counterparts can be helpful. But not at the cost of fundamental interests in Taiwan. Allies and friends should take priority, given limited theater engagement funding.

At the extreme end, maybe Congress could go beyond a simple review of the Taiwan Relations Act, as friends of the Obama administration have advocated (e.g., Bill Owens, Joe Prueher, etc). Perhaps a review could consider aligning U.S. foreign policy with an objective reality: the existence of Taiwan, under its existing Republic of China (ROC) constitutional framework, as equally deserving of diplomatic status as the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Along these lines, Brookings Institute's Richard Bush offers some very thoughtful insights.

Taipei needs a regular, strong, visible signs of US support. Insecurity created by even the perception of waning U.S. support has historically resulted in radical policies on Taiwan, including development of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery in the wake of the US-China 1972 and 1979 Communiques. Continuation of the on-going de facto freeze on new major arms sales, including deferral of Taiwan’s request for additional F-16s, arguably undermines new cross-Strait initiatives. The connection between past arms sales and subsequent breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations is amorphous, but not insignificant. And the Obama administration’s inaction sends the wrong signal by legitimizing military coercion as a means to resolve territorial and sovereignty disputes around the PRC periphery. It’s also very unfortunate that retired U.S. officials forget basic principles upon which the U.S. was founded, including support for fellow democracies. Fortunately, U.S. Congress has resumed its traditional role in offsetting natural Executive Branch tendencies to write Taiwan off.

END

Taiwan’s Sanya Initiative: The PLA Targeting Retired Senior ROC Military Officers

Yesterday’s China Times carried an interesting article regarding growing U.S. and Ma administration wariness over exchanges between retired military officers on both sides of the Taiwan Strait (click here for an English version).

Note: See Michael Turton's excellent 31 Aug 10 View from Taiwan write up on the retired officer exchanges.

Indeed, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) appears to be courting a new partner. As authorities in Beijing keep military-to-military exchanges with the United States in a deep freeze in protest over U.S. arms sales, formalized contacts between “retired” PLA military officers and counterparts on Taiwan have rapidly filled the vacuum. The PLA, using the so-called “Sanya Initiative” as a vehicle, seems to have learned just how effective retired senior U.S. military officers can be in influencing policymakers in Washington.

Since November 2009, the PLA has placed retired military officer exchanges on the front burner as an integral component of a broader influence operations campaign on Taiwan. The target appears to be a key faction within the KMT representing veterans and their families, perhaps as well as Taiwan's defense establishment via informal links between retired and active duty general and flag officers. The recent media reporting from Taiwan indicates that President Ma Ying-jeou and his administration is casting a leery eye over the brisk pace of exchanges over the last several months.

Cross-Strait Academic Conferences

Retired military officers from the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan have visited birthplaces and extended family members in China since the 1980s. However, the PLA’s direct leveraging of senior retired military officers on Taiwan for political purposes seems to be a relatively new phenomenon. During cross-Strait academic conferences in November 2009, Chinese interlocutors presumably linked with PLA planners pro-offered the concept of retired military officer exchanges as an intermediate step toward establishing a “military confidence building mechanism.” In November 2009, two such meetings took place, one during the Sunzi Conference in Beijing and another in Taipei, hosted by the Pacific Cultural Foundation. During these exchanges, retired PLA officers were alleged to have cited the Ma administration as pursuing “peaceful independence.”

While Taipei may view confidence building as a means to reduce the chances of misunderstandings or accidents that could lead toward conflict, Beijing views “confidence building” as limiting Taiwan’s future international options. Or perhaps even to lock the KMT and the Ma administration into Beijing’s definition of “One China.”

Organized and led by former General Political Warfare Department Director General Hsu Li-nung [许历农; b. Anhui, 1921], at least 18 retired general and flag-rank officers visited Beijing in April 2010. In order to help in “building mutual political trust,” Chinese hosts granted the delegation “unprecedented access” to senior civilian and military leaders in Beijing, such as Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi. While reporting is inconsistent, indications exist that the delegation also spent time with senior PLA leaders. The delegation also visited China’s “Space City” and chatted with Shenzhou astronauts. Hsu Li-nung is associated with the New Alliance Association [新同盟会] and the New Party.

Retired ROC military officer participants included Cheng Kuo-chih [程国治], former Army CINCs Gen Chen Ting-chung [陈廷宠] and Gen Li Chen-lin [李桢林; b. Shandong, 1933], former Political Warfare Department Director Gen Tsao Wen-sheng [曹文生; b. Hunan, 1943], former Navy CINC ADM Miao Yung-ching [苗永庆; b. Shanxi, 1941], and former Navy Vice CINC and MND Vice Chief of General Staff ADM Fei Hong-po [费鸿波; b. Shandong, 1944]. A key theme in discussions was the need to build trust between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Reviving the Whampoa Spirit

The April visits were followed by a larger two-day “Zhongshan Whampoa Cross-Strait Relations Forum" [中山·黄埔·两岸情论坛] in May 2010 in Taipei’s Sunworld Dynasty Hotel. The event, cast as a reunion of Whampoa Military Academy alumni and their descendants, was attended by over 140 retired officers and other dignitaries, including Zhou Bingde, niece of Zhou Enlai.

In his opening remarks, KMT Honorary Chairman Wu Po-hsiung highlighted the importance of military confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a precursor to a cross-Strait peace agreement. Noting the difficulties in formal political dialogue, Wu suggested that sensitive political and military issues could be addressed through academic channels. Former Deputy Minister of Defense Wang Wen-hsieh (王文燮; b. Shandong, 1932) was quoted as saying “as long as political issues are solved, mainland China will withdraw all its missiles aimed at Taiwan.” Wu Po-hsiung paid homage to the former site of the Whampoa Military Academy during a visit to Guangdong in July 2010.

In June 2010, China’s Whampoa Association Chairman Zhu Jingguang [朱京光] led a mainland delegation to Taiwan. At least 20 retired military officers have been invited to attend another Whampoa Forum scheduled for late August in Nanjing.

Golfing for Peace in the People’s Republic

Activities also have included annual golf tournaments that bring together retired military officers from both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The first event, held in Xiamen in 2009, included 37 participants. The second was in late May 2010. Among PRC participants included former Deputy Chiefs of Staff Gen Xiong Guangkai and Qian Shugen. Taiwan participants include former Army CINC Huang Hsing-chiang [黄幸强; b. 1931, Hunan], former Army CINC Chen Ting-chung [陈廷宠; b. 1931, Jiangsu], and former ROCAF Deputy CINC Shiah Ying-jou [夏瀛洲; b. 1939, Shandong].

Where Is It All Leading?

On the surface, exchanges between retired military officers appear harmless. Generally, general and flag rank officers have a three year "cooling off" period after retirement before legally able to visit China. It’s natural for aging or bored soldiers, sailors, and airmen to want to come to closure with an old enemy, or perhaps make some contribution to a larger cause. The general and flag officers participating in these cross-Strait exchanges have dedicated much of their lives to defend the ROC against Communist Chinese aggression. At the personal level, participation in these exchanges indicates that the Civil War is over, at least for them.

However, there may be more to the story. One could also conclude that the PLA has launched an ambitious influence operations campaign to woo an powerful interest group within the KMT as a means to promote its “peaceful development” of cross-Strait relations. Retired military officers form a relatively significant interest group within the KMT - the Huang Fu Hsing Faction [黄复兴党部]. Retired Army Generals Hsu Li-nung, Li Chen-lin, and Wang Wen-hsieh are former Huang Fu Hsing chairmen. In May 2010, President Ma Ying-jeou publicly called upon new Huang Fu Hsing Chairman King En-chin [金恩慶; b. 1943, Jiangxi] to maintain loyalty to the KMT in the run-up to the November 2010 special municipality elections. China’s Whampoa Association Chairman, Zhu Jingguang, also heads the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (CCPPR). In fact, the two organizations share the same address and phone number.

In short, while participants from Taiwan may have no malign intent, the same can't be said for the China side. The participation and presence of Xiong Guangkai by itself should give a hint. Xiong serves as Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS). CIISS is subordinate to the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) Second Department (intelligence). CIISS serve as an interface between the military intelligence establishment, experts in Taiwan and elsewhere, with regular interactions both at home and abroad."Xiong served as head of the PLA's intelligence community before moving to direct CIISS. As a member of the Taiwan Affairs Leading Group, Xiong also has been a key player in leading the charge for Taiwan's annexation. LTG (ret) Xiong Guangkai also is former deputy chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.

Confidence Building: Intended for Beijing, Not Taipei

Confidence building measures (CBMs), such as hotlines, transparency initiatives, and military exchanges, are intended to reduce tensions and increase trust between two or more parties. CBMs are also intended to reduce the risks of miscalculations and accidents that could escalate into armed conflict. However, the PRC’s continued reliance on military instruments of national power to dissuade and coerce Taiwan into a political settlement on its terms is likely to limit the degree of confidence that could be built. Other limiting factors include asymmetries in transparency due to differing political systems, and internal political divisions in Beijing and Taipei.

“Political trust” and CBMs have become themes of cross-Strait and other international academic exchanges, albeit at a much more measure pace than that the retired military officer engagements. At a conference in Taipei in November 2009, Taiwanese scholars outlined the difficulties associated with military CBMs without political trust.

Trilateral exchanges also have addressed CBMs. European academics initiated a Track 2 forum with counterparts from Taiwan and China, in large part geared toward addressing confidence building. Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has a similar program, and conducted its latest round of discussions in Taipei in July 2010. Participants included former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) ADM Timothy Keating, Bonnie Glaser, and Alan Romberg.

Beijing’s aggressive courting of retired military officers from Taiwan is likely to backfire, as media reporting already suggests. PLA influence operations targeting retired ROC military officers has parallels in the United States with the so-called “Sanya Initiative” (Click here and here and here for background).

Obama White House Denies Taiwan Additional F-16 Fighters

President Ma Ying-jeou and his administration have been stepping up Taiwan's campaign to procure an additional 66 F-16s to replace the Republic of China (ROC) Air Force's aging fleet of F-5 E/F fighters (see report below). The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), passed by the U.S. Congress in 1979, requires the United States "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character."

Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) first submitted a formal letter of request (LOR) for price and availability (P&A) for an additional 66 F-16 fighters as early as March 2006. To date, two successive administrations have refused to acknowledge or act upon the LOR due to fear of Chinese retribution. Released by President George Bush in 1992, the ROC Air Force currently has 146 F-16s in its active inventory. A former senior U.S. Air Force official said in a July 2010 Reuters interview that a positive Obama administration decision on moving forward on an F-16 deal is "way past due."

Concerned over how the China issue could affect re-election prospects in 2012, opposition to release of additional F-16s to Taiwan is said to be concentrated within a small circle of pro-Beijing political advisors around President Obama. As a fully fledged democracy, the ROC on Taiwan has municipal elections scheduled for later this year, and with Presidential elections slated for March 2012.


"Taiwan seeks F-16s to boost defence"

Thursday 19th August, 2010 (IANS)

Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou called Thursday on the US to sell F-16s to Taipei to boost the island's defences after the Pentagon said this week that China is gaining military superiority over Taiwan.

'Taiwan people's top concern is Taiwan's security,' Ma said. 'I hope the US can cautiously consider selling F-16C/Ds to Taiwan as the balance of cross-Strait military power is tipping in China's favour.'

Ma made the comment while receiving visiting US Senator Roland Burris. It is the third time this month that Ma had raised the F-16 purchase while receiving US visitors.

Taiwan ordered 150 F-16A/Bs from the US in 1992 but is seeking to buy 66 F-16C/Ds to replace the outdated models.

The US is evaluating Taipei's request after Beijing asked Washington to end arms sales to Taiwan, calling them an obstacle to Taiwan-China unification.

China regards Taiwan as a breakaway province, to be brought back into the motherland one day, by force if necessary.

Taiwan Arms Sales: Temporary Hold or Freeze?

Today's Taipei Times covered an interesting Washington Times editorial penned by Randy Schriver. Randy is former Senior Country Director for China and Taiwan for the Secretary of Defense, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for China/Taiwan affairs during the Bush administration. He currently presides over the Project 2049 Institute and is an associate with Armitage International.

The editorial and Taipei Times' reporter William Lowther's summary, coming in the wake of the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), is a useful reminder of an often ignored fact. Despite expanding cross-Strait economic links, China still relies on implicit or explicit threats of military force to resolve political differences with the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan).

Taiwan Link commentary is in blue (NOTE: Image courtesy of the Washington Times)

US may be considering Asia-Pacific policy shift

BY WILLIAM LOWTHER

STAFF REPORTER IN WASHINGTON

Wednesday, Jul 14, 2010, Page 1

Former US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia Randy Schriver said that US President Barack Obama's administration may be “on the verge” of changing its policies toward Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

COMMENT: Guided by a coherent strategy and US legal statutes, policies should shift along with the dynamic nature of cross-Strait relations, China, Taiwan, and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. However, a policy that is grounded upon the so-called "status quo" is doomed to be reactive in nature. The lack of a coherent Obama administration strategy, juxtaposed against well-defined Chinese goals, exacerbates the problem. Instead of actively advancing positive foreign policy goals, such as a Chinese renunciation of use of force, a "status quo" policy emphasizes negatives. Setting the bar as low as possible, success is defined by no PRC use of force. However, real success is Chinese abandonment of the military instrument as a means to resolve an inherently political problem.

While not spelling out the possible change in detail, Schriver strongly hinted that it could result in a Taiwan arms sale freeze.

COMMENT: One could argue that a freeze on release of new systems has been in place since the Obama administration assumed control of the Executive Branch in January 2009. The Congressional notification package submitted in January 2010 was a final step in a long process that began with Bush administration policy decisions made years ago. The Bush administration committed to release the systems. The January 2010 Congressional notifications constituted the remaining second half of a package that the Bush administration should have forwarded in October 2008. President Barack Obama and his small group of political advisers have yet to approve and notify Congress of any new sale of major defense articles to Taiwan.

There may be a belief that a freeze on any new arms sales to Taiwan will reap benefits from Beijing, such as cooperation on North Korea, exchange rate adjustment, war on terrorism, Iran, etc. Or that the political costs of freezing new arms sales to Taiwan are and will be minimal, at least compared to the political pain that Obama's political advisers perceive China could dish out. And having committed to a "no trouble making" policy, the Ma administration is unlikely to push too hard on any US policy issue, economic, military, or otherwise. However, in bowing to Chinese pressure without any sign of direct reciprocation in the form of a substantive missile pull-back, the Obama administration is implicitly giving credence to China's reliance on military coercion as an instrument of national policy.

And furthermore, the Obama administration has reversed a policy decision made by President Bush in April 2001: diesel electric submarines. However, in fairness, there's plenty of responsibility to go around for failure to execute the submarine program. The ROC Navy earns low marks for creativity for placing the program in the hands of a conservative US Navy that never wanted to manage the program in the first place. The ROC Navy could have easily assumed programmatic responsibility and entrusted Taiwan's own shipbuilding industry.

Presidents Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou could have directed the ROC Navy to pursue alternative acquisition paths. However, sources close to both the Bush and Obama White House allege thatWhite House officials strongly suggested that the new Ma administration abandon Taiwan's 40-year quest for a fleet of 10 submarines. The Obama White House allegedly has repeated the suggestion. As a result, the Ma administration appears to have shelved the ROC Navy's long standing requirement.

In an article published on Monday in the conservative Washington Times, Schriver said that following the signing of the Economic Cooperative Framework Agreement (ECFA) by Taiwan and China, there was further evidence of cross-strait rapprochement.

“Curiously,” he wrote, the Chinese military buildup opposite Taiwan continues, with analysts saying that about 1,500 ballistic missiles are pointed at Taiwan.

COMMENT: This is where one should exercise caution. Bean counting of ballistic missiles has long been a metric of Chinese intent. Detractors could argue that there is little hard evidence that the 1500 number is valid, and that the growth has leveled off. But one has to define what class of ballistic missile one is referring to and elaborate upon the estimate's basis.

The ballistic missiles that are unambiguously dedicated toward Taiwan and have political and strategic significance are the short range ballistic missiles subordinate to the Second Artillery's 52 Base. An additional two 300 kilometer-range DF-11 brigades are subordinate to the Nanjing Military Region and provide tactical support for landing operations, rather than those under the Second Artillery that carry strategic significance. Furthermore, brigades equipped with nuclear-capable medium range ballistic missiles have a more diverse set of targets, and therefore could not necessarily be described as "targeted against Taiwan." The same goes for PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Navy (PLAN) assets assigned to the Nanjing Military Region.

Therefore, the units that could best be classified as dedicated toward Taiwan are the five Second Artillery SRBM brigades that have been established for over five years. As in most military organizations, a standard table of equipment likely exists with a set number of missile assigned to each brigade. A standard number is set to match the logistical capacity of the units to which the missiles are assigned. Once the table has been filled, that's it. To continue an expansion, a new brigade with another logistical infrastructure should be formed.

If the 1500 number is based upon cumulative estimates of SRBMs manufactured and delivered, then one explanation is that new SRBM variants are replacing older variants. Older variants are likely retired. Solid rocket motors generally have a shelf life of around seven years, the point when cracks in the propellent significantly reduce the reliability and safety of the missile. Advanced storage and refurbishment technologies can serve to extend the shelf life. As new guidance, navigation, and control technologies become available, the entire design of a missile changes, foreclosing options for refurbishment.

Therefore, a plausible case could be made that the growth reflects production of replacement missiles rather than an expansion of the overall SRBM inventory (NOTE: Some have speculated that the PLA could attempt to get political credit for retiring older missile variants. However, political credit should be granted only for a true reduction in capabilities).

But could there be a new SRBM brigade, in addition to production of new variants to replace missiles in existing brigades? There is a new brigade being formed under the 52 Base. The question is whether or not the new brigade is being equipped with SRBMs or medium range ballistic missiles.

“Why have we not seen even a modest, symbolic step on China’s part, commensurate with improvements in the economic and political spheres, to reduce the military intimidation it imposes on the people of Taiwan?” Schriver asked.

“Understanding why the buildup continues, informs policy decisions the Obama administration must face,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Very good point. Mr. Schriver continues below.

There are four possible explanations for the continuing Chinese military buildup, he wrote.

The first is that China has “no intent whatsoever to diminish the tools of intimidation and coercion in which so much investment has been made.”

Rather, Chinese leaders “are forced to conclude that they must retain the military threat to keep Taiwan in check,” he wrote.

Yes, indeed! In general, the PLA has an organizational and bureaucratic interest in whipping up the Taiwan independence "threat." They likely argue that maintenance or expansion of the force posture is needed to deter independence advocates. These arguments are questionable on many grounds. However, the most relevant is that China's military posture may be the single-most important factor in alienating a large portion of Taiwan's domestic polity and has the reverse effect.

Second, civilian leaders in China may be unwilling — or perhaps even unable — to challenge the People's Liberation Army (PLA) leadership. In turn, the PLA knows that if it pulls back on Taiwan, its budget — and justification for its continued growth — could be cut, Schriver wrote.

The third possible explanation for the military buildup opposite Taiwan, he said, was it is really designed to threaten other US allies such as Japan.

COMMENT: Certainly. If Taiwan independence no longer became the justification, a new basis would be needed for military expenditures. But an overt preparations for a possible Japan contingency would undercut the PRC "peaceful development" image that the propaganda machine wants to project.

“Finally, a fourth possible explanation is that China might be willing to pull back missiles and reduce the threat — but is waiting for the right time and the right deal,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Just what would that deal be? One theory is that the PRC may want to deal with the US, rather than Taiwan on military-related issues, including confidence building measures (CBMs) that could relate to Taiwan (e.g., cross-Strait CBMs are kind of silly since Beijing's goal is to minimize Taiwan's confidence). The deal that Jiang Zemin allegedly tabled in 2002 was a missile withdrawal in exchange for agreement for halting or setting a timetable for halting arms sales.

The basic premise of such a bargain has merit and is at the foundation of the 1982 Communique. However, explicit bargaining is neither wise or justifiable. The basis for US arms sales is and should be the nature of the military challenge that China poses to Taiwan. The current PRC posture warrants a wide open door for the release of defense articles that the democratically elected government of Ma Ying-jeou deems necessary. Of course the US should make decisions to approve, disapprove, or defer based on its own interests. But as long as China refuses to significantly reduce its military posture opposite Taiwan, then arms sales should be routine and forthcoming.

Sources close the Obama administration have stated that a small group of former US government officials, senior retired flag officers, and foreign policy specialists have an on-going program with counterparts in Beijing designed to examine an "arms sales for force reductions" bargain under the auspices of a confidence building measures dialogue. The Sanya Initiative, spearheaded by retired Vice Admiral Bill Owens, has been similar, and one with explicit written blessing of Obama administration officials. A separate initiative for discussion of CBMs involves former US officials, including a former PACOM Commander. The next round of CBM talks is scheduled to take place in Beijing within the next week or two."

“If the PLA military buildup opposite Taiwan continues apace, the need to provide Taiwan with weapons for self-defense also continues. This should be manageable if Washington doesn’t lose its nerve,” he wrote.

COMMENT: But the Obama administration never had a nerve to lose. There has been no release and notifications of any new systems to Taiwan. The three notifications reported as being frozen in a June 2010 Defense News article are not even major defense items.

“The US approach over the course of many years has been to make weapons available to Taiwan so that Taipei’s leaders have the confidence to go to the negotiating table with Beijing. This approach is paying off, but some would have us abandon it just when benefits are being reaped,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Indeed. However, the ECFA is a functional, technical agreement and its political significance is overblown. It is necessary for economic reasons. The real negotiations would be those that address the permanent resolution of political differences in a manner amenable to Taiwan's democratic system of government. Negotiations would work toward a defining the international personality of the ROC or Taiwan, and the nature of its political relationship with the PRC. However, the Ma administration's position continues that of its predecessors. No political negotiations under conditions of military coercion. It has rightfully decided to make withdrawal of missiles directed against Taiwan a precondition for preliminary political negotiations that could lead toward some form of peace agreement.

He said that either through “willful misdirection” or through “naivete,” the Obama administration appears to be ready to change the long-standing policy of providing weapons to Taiwan.

“The Obama administration has gone to great lengths to deny a Taiwan arms-sales freeze is in place, perhaps protesting a bit too much,” he wrote.

COMMENT: There indeed are pretty solid signs that that senior political advisers to President Obama have recommended sidelining Taiwan issues, including a conscious decision to defer any further Congressional notifications for Taiwan arms sales for the remainder of the year. Other sources allege that after the January 2010 notifications, assurances were provided to Chinese interlocutors that there would no more arms sales in the near term, without specifying for how long.

Regardless, principled, professional Asia/China hands on the NSC staff, and within State Department and the Pentagon know better, and of course will rush to reassure the public audience that there is no freeze. But the real test will be in the next few months. If the three minor notifications that President Obama has decided to hold aren't unfrozen in the next few months, then political pressure likely will mount, especially should the Republicans do well in the November elections.

However, a key driver that may put any further notifications on ice for the rest of the year could be the invitation that President Obama issued to Chinese President Hu Jintao last month for an official state visit, which most likely would occur shortly after Congressional elections in November 2010.

“Why does the administration continue a fiction that Taiwan has not formally requested more F-16[C/D] fighters? Why do mid and junior-level officials within the Obama administration allude to instructions from ‘senior leadership’ to hold congressional notifications on Taiwan arms sales and not to expect another major sale in 2010?” he asked.

COMMENT: See above. Under normal circumstances, release of additional F-16s should be a no-brainer. Taiwan already has F-16s, and additional airframes are replacements for old F-5s that are at the end of their useful service life. With Block 20 F-16s no longer in production, the Block 50/52 C/D version is the least capable variant available. Block 60 F-16 C/Ds would be a jump, as would the F-35B, which most analysts would agree is best suited for Taiwan's unique operating environment. If the F-16 issue isn't resolved by the end of this issue, the ROC Air Force (ROCAF), Ministry of National Defense (MND), and the Ma administration would be well-advised to submit a letter of request (LOR) for price and availability (P&A) data for 66 F-35B fighters to the Obama administration. And send a copy to the key staffers on the Hill to make sure they know that an LOR has been submitted.

“Even after [the] ECFA, a strong and capable Taiwan remains a key ingredient to security in the region,” he wrote.

Sanya Initiative: PLA Sends Team to Hawaii for Second Meeting with Retired US Flag/General Officers

As a follow-on to the previous post on Bill Owens' Financial Times editorial, the Hawaii-based Star Bulletin has reported that the second corporate-sponsored meeting of retired U.S. and Chinese flag/general officers took place on 17-18 October 2009 in Honolulu, Hawaii. Known as the Sanya Initiative, the Financial Times reported last year that the dialogue is funded by Bill Owens' parent company, AEA Investors (Vincent Mai), as well as C.V. Starr (Maurice "Hank" Greenberg), and the China-U.S. Exchange Foundation. Another report, apparently a formal report to funders, also credited the Carnegie Corporation and National Committee on U.S.-China Relations for helping to fund the event.

The eight day visit of the Chinese delegation also included stops in New York City and Washington DC for meetings with the Secretary of State and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The delegation's visit preceded the visit of Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission GEN Xu Caihou.

Access and Influence: Financial Executive Opens Doors in Washington for the PLA

The Chinese delegation was led by Xiong Guangkai, former head of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) intelligence community. Xiong currently serves as director of an elite PLA intelligence analytical unit. The Chinese delegation also included five retired senior military officers. Leading and organizing the U.S. side was AEA Investors' Bill Owens, who served as Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Clinton administration.

After meetings in Hawaii, Owens leveraged connections in the Obama administration, and escorted Xiong and the rest of the Chinese delegation for meetings in Washington D.C. with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Mike Mullins (click here for Financial Times reporting). Both ADM Mullins and former Commander, Pacific Command Tim Keating endorsed the initiative in writing (see pages 19 and 20 of the formal report).

Reflecting the views of his Chinese colleagues, Bill Owens is a critic of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Owens was quoted as saying "we look to be a model for active-duty military where the relationship is officially not very good.” Indeed, Owens and his Chinese colleagues do appear to be trying to influence DoD's views regarding the TRA and arms sales. Before departing New York City, Xiong led the entourage in singing "The More We Get Together." {NOTE: No joke here. Read the Financial Times article hyperlinked above. Inquiring minds want to know if Xiong Guangkai, perhaps reflecting on his successes, peered into Owens' eyes while singing "and your friends are my friends"}.

The Star-Bulletin reported that the China Association for International Friendly Contact "coordinated" the trip for the Chinese side. Administratively subordinate to the PRC Ministry of Civil Affairs, the China Association for International Friendly Contact [youlianhui; 友联会] is also known as the International Liaison Department of the PLA General Political Department (GPD). According to Ann Marie Brady in Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic, the Association targets "friendly personages" or "foreign leftists," and reports up the chain to the PLA GPD and presumably beyond.

Members of the U.S. team for the talks in Hawaii were:

Bill Owens. AEA Investors (Asia). ADM (ret) William Owens also is former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See previous post for more details on Owens and his company.

Ron Fogleman. CEO, Alliant Techsystems (ATK); Vice President, Projects International. Gen Ronald Fogleman also is former chief of staff of the Air Force.

Charles E. Wilhelm. Board of directors, OmniPerception; adviser, Battelle Science & Technology, International; former member of advisory board, Lucent Technologies; member of board of advisers, M.I.C.. Industries.Retired four star general and former commander of U.S. Southern Command; and mentor to Joint Forces Command. Gen (ret, USMC) Charles Wilhelm also is former Commander, Southern Command.

Denny Reimer. Director, DFI Government Services (now Detica), a subsidiary of defense contractor BAE Systems. Detica specialises in "collecting, managing and exploiting information to reveal actionable intelligence." He also serves as advisor, VirtualAgility. Gen (ret) Dennis Reimer also is former Army chief of staff.

Chinese delegation members were:

Xiong Guangkai. Xiong serves as Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS). CIISS is subordinate to the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) Second Department (intelligence). As Bates Gill and James Mulvenon noted in a 2002 China Quarterly article, CIISS is "an important interface between the military intelligence apparatus and foreign experts, with regular interactions both at home and abroad."

CIISS houses both active duty and retired military officers, including what Michael Swaine notes in the Gill/Mulvenon article as "some of the best military analysts from the intelligence department." Xiong served as head of the PLA's intelligence community before moving to direct CIISS. As a member of the Taiwan Affairs Leading Group, Xiong also has been a key player in leading the charge for Taiwan's annexation. LTG (ret) Xiong Guangkai also is former deputy chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.

Yu Zhenwu. GEN (ret) Yu Zhenwu is former commander of the PLA Air Force. Beijing cut his visit to the United States while he was PLAAF Commander in May 1995 to protest the visit of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to the United States. Fogleman was his counterpart at the time.

Li Qianyuan. GEN (ret) Li Qianyuan is former commander of the Lanzhou Military Area Command. He also served as commander, 1st Group Army in the Nanjing Military Region, which is a key Taiwan-related position.

Pei Huailiang. GEN (ret) Pei Huailiang is former president of the PLA National Defense University. Pei also has been viewed as a Taiwan specialist in light of extensive experience in planning and operational positions in the Nanjing Military Region, as well as Jinan Military Region.

Zhao Guojun. VADM (ret) Zhao Guojun is former commander of the East Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy.

Retired PLA generals who participated in the initial meeting in Sanya, Hainan Island, but not the more recent one include GEN (ret) Zhu Wenquan, former Commander, Nanjing Military Region; and GEN (ret) Yang Deqing, former Political Commissar, Guangzhou Military Region.

Financial Executive and Former Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Bill Owens Advocates Selling Out Taiwan

{UPDATE: Yesterday's Nelson Report covered the Owens/Taiwan issue as well, with astute commentary by Eric McVadon. Chris Nelson reports that "the reaction across Washington has been shock and dismay at what is seen as a stunning lack of political sophistication. Chris adds "his long-standing affiliation with a PRC-sponsored talk-shop might be clouding both his political and strategic judgment."}

Last week, a prominent and influential American businessman based in Hong Kong published an editorial in the Financial Times that should have caused quite a stir in Taiwan.

The author, AEA Investors executive and former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Bill Owens, calls for abrogation of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and a halt to arms sales. On the surface, the bulk of the editorial appears innocent. A retired senior U.S. military officer advocates friendship with China in a financial newspaper. Not a big deal, at least at first glance.

However, the author, who he represents, and what he is advocating, are worth a detailed examination. Operating at the nexus of high finance, high tech, and high level military, Owens is a very powerful and influential man. As Malcolm Gladwell argues in The Tipping Point, only a handful of people in the world are capable of initiating infectious ideas. And Owens is certainly one. His ideas are worthy of debate. But what makes his editorial alarming is that his views on the TRA and arms sales, whether intentional or not, support a broader PRC campaign to solve the “Taiwan problem,” once and for all.

Consciously or unconsciously adopting Beijing’s position, Owens fails to recognize the obstacle to solving the so-called “Taiwan issue” is the PRC’s refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve differences with Taiwan and making tangible reductions in its force posture arrayed against the island.

A Businessman and Former Senior Official Calls for Abandonment of Taiwan

In his 17 Nov 09 Financial Times editorial, Bill Owens advocates a major shift in U.S. policy. The centerpiece of his argument is what he refers to as a “thoughtful review” of the Taiwan Relations Act. Describing it as “outdated” and without offering an alternative, however, Owens implies that the legislation should be scrapped in its entirety. According to Owens, a “thoughtful” review of the TRA “would be viewed by China as a genuine attempt to set a new course for a relationship that can develop into openness, trust and even friendship.”

A “thoughtful” TRA review would focus on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, a process that Owens deems as as “not in our best interest.” He adds:

The first step to halting arms sales might be to observe that the Chinese have stopped the short range missile build-up across the Taiwan Straits (I believe this is true). The US could then stop selling arms to Taiwan unless that build-up was renewed. We must always protect the democracy and freedoms Taiwan has developed – but weapons sales do not do this.

Owens also cautions that if current trends continue, China’s military could rival or surpass those of the United States, offering allies in the region a choice between China and the United States. He calls for a shift in how we view China from a national security perspective:

It is often politically expedient to paint China as an adversary, or worse, a future enemy. Our national security apparatus is aiming to continue the present level of defence spending and emphasising 30-year-old legislation that is doing more harm than good.

He argues: “The solution is to approach the US/China relationship not with hedging, competition or watchfulness, but with co-operation, openness and trust.” Finally, he outlines an agenda for a new China relationship:

Following Mr Obama’s visit to Beijing, I hope we see the following kinds of military initiatives: an agreement to a thoughtful review of the implementation of TRA and other outdated legislation; a commitment to true military-to-military engagement across all levels including academic exchanges between military academies; a partnership in fighting terrorism and addressing, as partners, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (including North Korea and Iran); and an approach to addressing the increasing threat of cyberattack, perhaps with a “no first use of cyberattack” policy.

The “other outdated legislation” presumably would be the 1989 Tiananmen sanctions and Section 1201 of the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) restricting U.S-China military-to-military relations.

Owens argues that “many think the Chinese are unable or unwilling to accept such a progressive and innovative agenda. We will never know unless we try.”

From China’s perspective, what is there not to like about such a “progressive and innovative agenda?” Does retired ADM Owens think that the Chinese would be unable or unwilling to accept U.S. abandonment of Taiwan, halt to all arms sales, and overturning other legislation that places restrictions on our relations with the PRC? Academic exchanges already take place between PRC and U.S. military establishments. If he means letting PRC students attend our military academies, then we would have to discontinue admission of ROC students. Which of course is what he is advocating, along with the TRA review and halt to all defense assistance to Taiwan.

The rest of his agenda is harmless and even valid. We should partner with China, and others for that matter, in fighting terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and addressing issues associated with cyberattack. In another editorial for Carnegie, Owens proposed a U.S.-China space-based global transparency initiative. One could outline an even more aggressive bilateral agenda that would be in both PRC and U.S. interests, assuming our interests in Taiwan were not sacrificed in the process.

PRC “Stopping” Missile Deployments: Justification for a Halt in U.S. Arms Sales?

AEA Investors’ Bill Owens calls for a thoughtful review of the Taiwan Relations Act and a halt to arms sales. A halt to arms sales is justified in part by what he views as a freeze in PRC deployment of short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) opposite Taiwan. He doesn’t cite his sources in making this assertion. But let’s assume his sources are credible, particularly since Owens is well connected in Beijing and U.S. policy and intelligence circles.

Why would the PRC stop deployment of ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan? Because the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) have already filled PLA production orders to satisfy out a planned force structure of seven SRBM units. Five or perhaps six are under the Second Artillery, and one or perhaps two are organic to the Nanjing Military Region. Let’s look at the Second Artillery 52 Base order of battle (in probable order of establishment):

96165 Unit (Leping)

96167 Unit (Yong’an)

96169 Unit (Meizhou)

96162 Unit (Ganzhou)

96164 Unit (Jinhua)

96166 Unit (Chizhou, in same vicinity as DF-21 unit)

Each of these brigades has as many as six battalions, each equipped with a certain number of launchers and a standardized table of organization and equipment inventory of SRBMs. It’s not clear what this standard number is, but there likely is a ceiling unless a decision is made to add another SRBM brigade under the 52 Base. The 2009 DoD Report to Congress on PRC Military Power asserted that as of September 2008 the PLA had as many as 1150 SRBMs and was “increasing” its inventory at a rate of over 100 missiles per year.

If Owens is correct, then the PLA Second Artillery 52 Base is no longer increasing its inventory. The last SRBM brigade under the 52 Base likely is the 96166 Unit in Chizhou. Does this mean that the DF-15 production facility in Beijing (211 Factory) and DF-11 factory in Hubei (the 066 Base) have stopped assembling new DF-11s and DF-15s? According to Owens, maybe the blanket order for new SRBMs has been satisfied and units have filled out their table of organization and equipment. However, filling out the final SRBM unit does not necessarily indicate peaceful intent with regards to Taiwan. It indicates that the Second Artillery 52 Base is prepared and mission ready. It is very likely that R&D and production of sub-systems, such as solid rocket motors and guidance, navigation, and control systems, would continue.

If Owens is looking for a sign of peaceful intent, he should be looking for dismantlement of SRBM brigades and their supporting infrastructure, and not a stop in new missile deployments. Furthermore, PRC military capabilities based on a Taiwan scenario go far beyond SRBMs. Land attack cruise missiles, medium range ballistic missiles, conventional fixed wing aircraft, electronic warfare assets, surface combatants, submarines, and a range of ground combat systems are important as well.

In short, a PLA judgment that it has sufficient numbers of SRBMs to fulfill its operational mission does not justify a halt to U.S. arms sales. The only justification for curtailing arms sales to Taiwan would be a PRC renunciation of use of force to resolve its differences with Taiwan, and a tangible reduction in the military capabilities that could be brought to bear against the ROC and its democratically elected leadership.

Abandonment of the TRA: What Would It Mean

Yet to Bill Owens, a halt is a halt. The Taiwan Relations Act and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are impediments to U.S-China friendship. Therefore, Owens believes that a review and reversal of this outdated legislation is warranted. Owens is implicitly advocating removing the legal basis for U.S. relations with Taiwan, and acquiescence of the PRC’s "one country, two systems" approach to resolving its differences with Taiwan. Without the TRA, there would be no American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). Taiwan would be treated as a province of the PRC, which has longed viewed the TRA as an unwarranted intrusion by the United States into the internal affairs of China. Without the TRA, Taiwan’s democracy likely would collapse, perhaps only after a major upheaval on the island in reaction to what would be perhaps the only peaceful abandonment of a democracy to an authoritarian power in U.S. history.

Arms sales are the most visible manifestation of the U.S. recognition of the ROC’s unresolved international status. Besides ensuring that the cost of PRC use of force would be sufficiently high so as to deter such a course of action, the TRA and U.S. provision of defense articles and services provide an atmosphere in which Taiwan’s democratically elected leadership can negotiate with counterparts in Beijing with confidence. Taiwan’s difficult transition to a democracy, which coincides with its economic miracle that continues until today, is a possible model for democracy advocates in China. The ROC's existence as a defacto independent state is perhaps the only impetus for the PRC to transition into a multi-party system. Democracies are not as efficient in mobilizing resources as authoritarian one-party states. But they are certainly are more conducive to giving citizens greater say in how they are governed and in a more peaceful international environment.

China’s Access and Influence

Owens’ editorial is interesting from another perspective. Because it echoes a theme that the PRC has long represented, one has to examine Owens, his company, and his network as witting or unwitting channels of access and influence. One new channel with close links to Owens is a well-endowed Hong Kong non-profit entity (China-U.S. Exchange Foundation; 中美交流基金会) and a new dialogue – the so-called Sanya Initiative -- that Owens and this new foundation established last year.

The Foundation’s governing board consists of leading figures in Hong Kong who facilitated its reversion back to China, members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CCPCC), avid supporters of China’s one-country, two systems formula for annexing Taiwan, and elite in doing big business in China. These include former governor C.H. Tung (董建華), his brother C.C. Tung, Payson Cha, Ronnie Chan, Daniel Fung, Elsie Leung, Liu Changle, Peter Woo, and Gordon Wu. Its honorary advisors include Henry Kissinger, Hank Greenberg, Xu Kuangdi, and Tang Jiaxuan. It has cross-links with the newly established China Center of International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE) in Beijing and One Country, Two Systems Research Institute in Hong Kong. U.S. financial powerhouse AIG and the Starr Foundation are prominently listed as counselors.

The website claims the Foundation’s funding “is presently derived from the support of individuals and corporations in Hong Kong who share the Foundation's commitment to fostering stronger relations between China and the United States.” No corporations are listed, but private funders include: Chao Sze Kwong George; Ms. Vivien W. W. Chen; Mr. Kenneth Fang; Mr. Timothy Fok; Dr. Stanley Ho; Mr. Albert Hung; Dr. Lee Shau Kee; Dr. K.S. Lo; Mr. Robert Ng; Dr. Charles Yeung. Li Ka-shing’s son, Richard Li, is listed as a counselor.

All that’s missing is the precise nature of its relationship with what elements of the government in Beijing, and a direct linkage likely won’t be found barring some major investigative journalism by the likes of Jimmy Lai. However, it’s worth noting that Beijing’s use of Hong Kong-based cut outs for influencing political views in Washington has precedents. The PRC –specifically the PLA – attempted to contribute at least U.S. $300,000 to the Democratic Party in 1996 using the daughter of a senior PLA general (Liu Chaoying)and a China Aerospace Corporation subsidiary as the (China Aerospace International Holdings, Ltd) as the white glove. PLA General Ji Shengde, the predecessor of Xiong Guangkai and responsible for foreign relations and intelligence, led the operation. For reporting, click here. However, the Republicans also received questionable funding from a Hong Kong source with links in China, although somewhat different. Young Brothers Development Ltd loaned around U.S. $1 million to a RNC cut out, although there is no evidence that the funds originated in China or were on behalf of China.

Having learned lessons from the past, Beijing’s use of a Hong Kong-based think tank as an agent of and funding source for influence in Washington and at the state level is fair game. The goal is to enhance bilateral relations, but the Taiwan angle should not be forgotten. Its influence operations should be watched carefully. Hong Kong is part of the PRC, and many of the Foundation’s leaders have formal PRC government positions within the CCPCC. Other initiatives have or will include funded travel for U.S. journalists, state officials, including lieutenant governors and state legislators.

The China-US Exchange Foundation is no simple philanthropically-oriented institution. It has retained high powered lobbying firms, including Brown Lloyd James and Fontheim International, as part of its influence operations mission. Fontheim has registered with the Senate to lobby on behalf the the Foundation.

The Sanya Initiative: Working the U.S. Military Old Boy Network

One of the first orders of business for the China-US Exchange Foundation was support for a new dialogue between retired senior U.S. military officers and counterparts from the PLA. Funding support was provided not only by the Foundation, but also Owens’ company, AEA Investors and CV Starr (click here for pre-Sanya meeting coverage in the Financial Times). The dialogue, termed the Sanya Initiative, included five senior PLA general officers led by retired General Xiong Guangkai. The four retired U.S. officers include Bill Owens and General Ronald R. Fogleman, former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. In addition to consulting for Boeing, Fogleman has been Senior Vice Chairman, Projects International, a company that has close ties in Beijing through its founder, Chas Freeman. Fogleman was just recently appointed as CEO of a major defense firm, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. Other participants include General John M. Keane, and General Charles E. Wilhelm. Wives were invited along as well.

The meeting in Sanya took place on February 21 in order to commemorate the anniversary of former U.S. president Richard Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972 to meet with Chairman Mao Zedong. Immediately preceding the dialogue, Owens’ published his first editorial in the Financial Times with similar themes as last week's, minus the Taiwan-related issues.

The participants pledged after the February 2008 dialogue to maintain “continuous communication through various channels such as personal letters, bi-monthly telecommunications, and a second meeting to be convened later this year.” The group also allegedly committed to launching a strategic media campaign to correct U.S. misperceptions of the Chinese military.

All are honorable and served their country with distinction while in uniform, and continue to contribute where they can. However, all four of these officers also settled in to lucrative corporate positions after taking off their uniforms, with the leader of this well-connected U.S. team – Bill Owens – having the clearest and most significant business interests in China.

A Retired Admiral Turns Businessman

After stepping down as Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (the second highest ranking uniformed officer in the military), Bill Owens aggressively entered the business world. He started in the defense industry (SAIC), moved to Teledesic, then to Nortel, a major telecommunications company with significant business interests in China. Observers note Owens’ demanded a substantial severance package after only just over a year with Nortel. After his brief stint as CEO of the troubled Nortel, Bill Owens moved to spearhead the China investment arm of the U.S. private equity firm AEA, which includes clients or partners such as AIG, C.V. Starr, and JPMorgan Chase. It’s here where paths cross with the political-economic godfathers of the U.S.-China relationship, such as Henry Kissinger, Hank Greenberg, and Gen (ret) Al Haig.

Owens also has or is serving on the corporate boards of Teledesic, LLC, Polycom, Viasat, Microvision, TIBCO, Symantec, Metal Storm LLC, Telstra, Nortel Corp. Ltd., BAT, Cray, and Biolase. He has served on the boards of Carnegie Foundation, Brookings Institute, Harvard Kennedy School, and the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board.

Regardless, China has grown quite adept at leveraging the business interests of former senior U.S. officials in order to further its own political agenda. And getting the U.S. to break on its relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan), particularly arms sales, is perhaps the highest priority. The China-U.S. Exchange Foundation and its recruitment of these four flag/general officers is an example of how sophisticated China’s influence operations have become. The targeting of senior retired U.S. military officers appears to be the Foundation’s first order of business, with the Sanya Initiative taking place less than a month after being established (28 January 2008). It also was two months before Taiwan’s presidential elections and nine before before the U.S. presidential elections.

As a final note, Owens’ advocacy on making China a friend coincides with some major financial business dealings that are unclear at this point. Owens’ firm, AEA Investors, has been making a run to buy a portion of PLA-affiliated Huawei. Media reporting noted that Owens was the brains and muscle behind making it to the short list. One report noted that Huawei’s intent in opening up to foreign investors is to gain a foothold in the U.S. and overcome political opposition from Congress. Media reporting also indicates that Owens had aggressively sought out a strategic alliance between Nortel and Huawei while he served as Nortel CEO.

In short, while ADM (ret) Owens probably had noble motives in calling for the abandonment of Taiwan, his ideas should be brought into proper context. This story is still unfolding, and there’s likely more to come.

END