Chinese Provincial Leader Visits to Taiwan: Opportunities for U.S.-Taiwan Relations?

The People's Republic of China (PRC) State Council Taiwan Affairs Office recently announced the visit of Fujian Governor Su Shulin [苏树林] to Taiwan the last week of March 2012.  Su is expected to lead a delegation to meet with local farmers, fishermen and young entrepreneurs in order to “build understanding between mainland and Taiwanese people and promote trade between Fujian and Taiwan.”    While unclear, Su may also promote a proposal for joint governance of Pingtan Island and the long standing concept of a Western Taiwan Strait Economic Zone (“Haixi” for short).

With at least 21 provincial leaders landing on Taiwan over the last three years, visits that were unthinkable only five years ago have become commonplace. However, Su’s visit may be unique.  Su Shulin will be the first potential member of China’s “Sixth Generation” leadership to travel to Taiwan.  Born in 1962, Su has spent most of his career in China’s oil business, and served as chairman of the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), ranked seventh on Fortune Global 500’s list of the world’s largest corporations in 2010.  Su Shulin assumed the Fujian governor position last year.


Chinese Influence Operations and the Double Edged Sword

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee has promoted increasingly frequent senior level visits to Taiwan as part of a broader strategy aimed at winning hearts and minds on the island. Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Jia Qinglin [贾庆林], appears to be managing China’s strategy toward Taiwan on behalf of Hu Jintao, or at least coordinating policy on Taiwan.  Jia Qinglin is a member of the CCP Small Leading Group on Taiwan Affairs.

The linkage between the high tempo of exchanges and recent elections on Taiwan is hard to miss.  Pledging economic benefits may be a more effective way of influencing elections than lobbing missiles off the coast.  These visits seek to win hearts and minds.  Committing to opening markets to Taiwanese enterprises and buying sprees, Beijing has targeted the central and southern areas of Taiwan, the traditional power bases of the sovereign-minded Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

From another angle, Chinese provincial/municipal party and government leaders may hope to attract the kinds of investment that could ensure career advancement in the lead up to the 18th Party Congress later this year.  Delegations have generally met with Honorary KMT Chairmen Lien Chan and Wu Po-hsiung, Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, People First Party Chairman James Soong, and New Party Chairman Yu Mu-ming.

Taiwanese enterprises have at least U.S. $150 billion invested in China, and provincial/municipal leaders understand that a successful record in local economic development is the key to career advancement within the CCP. Senior CCP members need Taiwan for personal and professional advancement as much as, if not more than, Taiwan needs China.  The visits have been taking place within the context of a series of KMT-CCP cross-Strait economic, trade, and cultural forum meetings.  To date, forum meetings had been held in Beijing (April 2006); Hainan (October 2006) Beijing (April 2007); Shanghai (December 2008); Changsha (July 2009); Guangzhou (July 2010); and Chengdu (May 2011).  KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung and CPPCC Chairman Jia Qinglin have led each side's respective delegations.

Each provincial visit is a double edged sword.  Spending time on both sides of the Taiwan Strait is one the best ways to understand that Taiwan and China are as different as the United States is from the UK or Australia.  Taiwan, under its existing Republic of China (ROC) constitution, is an independent, sovereign state. Taiwanese hosts are gracious and accommodating to foreign guests, and Chinese visitors should be wined, dined, and granted diplomatic courtesies the same as Americans and other international representatives.

At the same time, the KMT and DPP understand the games authorities play in Beijing.  Based on policy prescriptions of the CCP Small Leading Group on Taiwan, the CCP Propaganda Department seeks to manipulate perceptions that Taiwan is equal to a province in stature, thus expanding the sovereignty gap in China’s favor.

Opportunities for Deepening and Broadening U.S.-Taiwan Relations

Increasingly sensitive to signs of abandonment or neglect, the Ma administration has been consistent in requesting interactions with the Obama administration that in effect seek balance in cross-Strait and U.S.-Taiwan relations.  Senior U.S. officials presumably see these visits as positive.  Expanding cross-Strait interactions offer U.S. policymakers with opportunities, should officials have the foresight to recognize them.  Visits create an environment conducive to relaxed restrictions on more senior U.S. visits to Taiwan.  It’s happening, although slow.  U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel B. Poneman visited Taiwan in December 2011, the most senior official to visit in over a decade.   United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator Rajiv Shah also visited Taipei in December. However, Congress should be nudging the Executive Branch to pay attention and do more.

The Ma Administration is investing hope in the Obama Administration’s willingness to help address the sovereignty gap.  US-Taiwan relations should maintain pace with growing cross-Strait ties, and six areas need further attention:

• Further commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and further reaffirmation of the Six Assurances made to Taiwan in 1982; 
• Regularized arms sales notifications to Congress, including those for direct commercial sales, under Sections 36(b) and 36(c) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA);
• Increase in frequency and level of senior U.S. Executive Branch visits to Taiwan.  
• Reinvigorating the economic dialogue, including Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) negotiations that have been frozen since July 2007.
• Further support for Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations, specifically UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

List of Chinese Provincial Level Visits to Taiwan, 2009-2012

For reference purposes, here’s a sampling of provincial-level leadership visits:

Leader	Dates	Comments
Li Chongxi 李崇禧 Sichuan Province	1-6 Nov 09	Li Chongxi, Sichuan’s Deputy Communist Party Chief, led a 250+ member delegation to Taiwan to discuss cooperation in trade and tourism.  The visit was in part intended to express appreciation for Taiwan’s assistance to earthquake relief in May 2008, and to reciprocate for several visits of Lien Chan, Wu Poh-hsiung and Chiang Pin-kung to Sichuan.
Liang Baohua 梁保华 Jiangsu Province	9-15 Nov 09	At the invitation of the KMT Central Committee, Jiangsu Communist Party Chief Liang Baohua visited Taiwan for six days, the first provincial leader visit since 1949.  In its reporting, China’s Xinhua News Agency referred to Taiwan as a “province” in commemorating the opening of "Jiangsu-Taiwan Week." With the highest per capita GDP in China, Jiangsu is hosts more than 30% of Taiwan’s total investment in China, with half of this concentrated in Kunshan.  Liang Baohua is a member of the 17th Central Committee.
Xu Guangchun 徐光春 Henan Province	14-20 Dec 09	Henan Province Communist Party Chief Xu Guangchun committed to buying as much as US $500 million in goods.  He also pledged to produce over 100,000 tourists to Taiwan in 2010. He was formerly head of Xinhua’s Shanghai bureau, Minister of State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), and Deputy Director of the CCP Propaganda Department.
Han Zheng 韩正 Shanghai Municipality	4-9 Apr 10	Shanghai Mayor Han Zheng led a delegation of more than 200 representatives to Taiwan in the lead up to the World Expo 2010 in Shanghai.  Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin led a delegation to visit Shanghai in June 2008, and Han Zheng’s visit marked the first by a Shanghai mayor in history.  Civic organizations from Taipei and Shanghai had conducted annual exchanges each year since 2001.
Luo Qingquan 罗清泉 Hubei Province	19-25 Apr 10	Hubei Communist Party Chief Luo Qingquan visited Taiwan for a six day visit.  The group pledged purchases of Taiwanese products valued at U.S. $500 million.  Luo, a member of 17th Central Committee, also visited Chungtian TV facilities.
Huang Xiaojing 黄小晶 Fujian Province	5-10 May 10	Fujian Governor Huang Xiaojing made a six-day visit to Taiwan at the invitation of the KMT’s National Policy Foundation.
Liu Qibao 刘奇葆 Sichuan Province	23-28 May 10	Sichuan Party Chief Liu Qibao visited Taiwan for exchanges in the areas of economy, finance, education and culture.
Lu Zushan 吕祖善 Zhejiang Province	10-18 Jun 10	Zhejiang Governor Lu Zushan made an eight-day visit to Taiwan to initiate cooperative programs in finance, agriculture, tourism, culture and education.
Guo Shengkun 郭声琨 Guangxi Autonomous Region	1-10 Jul 10	Guangxi Communist Party Chief Guo Shengkun led a large delegation to Taiwan in early July 2010 for purchasing of agricultural products machinery valued at U.S. $200 million and to attract Taiwanese investment.  The visit took place in the wake of the ECFA signing in Chongqing on 29 Jun 10.  ECFA was to be in force as of 1 January 2011.
Chen Weigen 陈伟根 Jilin Province	4-10 Jul 10	Jilin Vice Governor Chen Weigen led a buying delegation to Taiwan consisting of representatives from eight major enterprises. The delegation targeted agricultural products, food packaging equipments, auto parts, textile products, handcrafts, and furniture from Taiwan.  Born in 1955, Chen formerly served as Chairman, China National Machinery Import and Export Group.
Mei Kebao 梅克保 Hunan Province	3-8 Aug 10	Hunan Communist Party Deputy Chief Mei Kebao led a delegation of over 100 representatives from Hunan for “Hunan-Taiwan week” and the 6th Hunan-Taiwan Exchange and Cooperation Forum on Economy and Trade at the Grand Hotel in Taipei. Mei represented Hunan Party Chief Zhou Qiang, considered to a rising Sixth Generation leader within the CCP.  A Hunan website referred to Taiwan as a province. The visit was followed up by a group from Taiwan that visited Hunan for the 7th Hunan-Taiwan Financial Cooperation Forum, including New Party Chairman Yok Mu-ming and Want Want Holdings CEO Cai Yanming.  The group met with Zhou Qiang, Governor Xu Shousheng, and Chen Yunlin.
Zhao Zhengyong 赵正勇 Shaanxi Province	13-19 Sep 10	Shaanxi Governor Zhao Zhengyong visited Taiwan for “Taiwan-Shaanxi Week.” Zhao ran Anhui Province’s Public Security Bureau from 1993 to 2001.  Zhao’s visit was the last before a two month freeze on visits in the lead up to the 27 November 2010 municipal elections on Taiwan.
Pre-Municipal Election Freeze September 2010 – December 2010
Ji Lin 吉林 Beijing Municipality	13-17 Dec 10	After the municipal elections in Taiwan, Beijing Vice Mayor Ji Lin led a 200-member delegation to Taiwan for discussions with senior officials in Taipei and a cross-Strait forum on science and technology held at the Howard Plaza Hotel in Taichung on 15 December.   Before his arrival, Falungong practitioners in Taiwan filed a lawsuit against Ji Lin for abuses in Beijing. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan adopted a resolution earlier in the month requiring Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the National Immigration Agency (NIA) to deny entry for Chinese officials known to have been involved in human rights abuses.
Chen Zhenggao 陈政高 Liaoning Province	15-21 Feb 11	Liaoning Governor Chen Zhenggao led a delegation to Taiwan for a “Liaoning-Taiwan Economic &Trade Corporation Forum. “ The groundwork for Chen’s visit was established in August 2010, when Dalian Deputy Mayor Dai Yulin led a buying delegation, with meetings held at the Taipei International Convention Center. Chen traveled to Hsinchu and Taichung where he allegedly placed large orders for agricultural products like tea, wine, honey and oranges.  The visit was hosted by the Taiwan Council for Industrial and Commercial Development (CICD). Taiwanese investment in Liaoning is growing, and the 10th annual Liaoning-Taiwan was held in Dandong in September 2011. Chen Zhenggao’s visit was followed by Vice Minister Jiang Zengwei, who represented Beijing for the first Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee (ECC), held in Chungli (Taoyuan County) on 22 February 2011.
Wang Sanyun 王三运 Anhui Province	18-25 Apr 11	Governor Wang Sanyun led a 2000-member delegation from Anhui to visit Taipei, Hsinchu, Kaohisung, and other locations on Taiwan.
Ma Biao 马飚 Guangxi Autonomous Region	23-30 Apr 11	Guangxi Communist Party Chief Ma Biao spent most of his time in Hualian, where buyers were focused on tea and clam products. Closely following the visit was the seventh Cross-Strait Economic, Trade, and Culture Forum held in Chengdu on 6 May 2011.  Representing Taiwan was KMT Honorary Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung, who met with CCP Secretary General Hu Jintao in Beijing afterwards.  Jia Qinglin, CPPCC Chairman urged the people of Taiwan to "choose the right person" in two upcoming major elections on the island in order to maintain the stable development of the cross-strait relationship.
Jiang Jufeng 蒋巨峰 Sichuan Province	21-26 May 11	Sichuan Governor Jiang Jufeng visited Taiwan for “Taiwan and Sichuan Week.”  The first provincial-level leader to arrive Taiwan via Kaohsiung, Jiang spent most of his time in southern Taiwan and visited areas affected by Typhoon Morakot.  In Taipei, the visit was marked by a scuffle between security at the Grand Hotel and pro-Tibetan protestors. Jiang visited Sichuan pandas at the Taipei zoo.  Until his assignment to Sichuan, Jiang had spent most of his career in Zhejiang.
Zhao Hongzhu 赵洪祝 Zhejiang Province	26 May – 5 Jun 11	Zhejiang Party Secretary Zhao Hongzhu led a delegation of more than 660 people to Taiwan.
Jiang Daming 姜大明 Shandong Province	11-17 Jul 11	Governor Jiang Daming led a delegation from Shandong Province to Taiwan for an economic and trade forum at Taipei's World Trade Center.  Shandong rates fourth after Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Fujian, in level of Taiwanese investment.  Foxconn’s manufacturing plant in Yantai, which employs 80,ooo workers, is Taiwan’s largest single investment in Shandong.  This single factory is said to produce over 10% of Shandong’s exports.
Huang Huahua 黄华华 Guangdong Province	16-22 Aug 11	Guangdong Governor Huang Huahua supposedly pledged to buy more than U.S. $5 billion in agricultural and electronic products.  Huang resigned his position as governor in November 2011, and was replaced by Zhu Xiaodan [朱小丹]. Before his assignment as governor in 2003, Huang had served in senior party positions in Guangdong’s Shaoguan and Meizhou, cities that host PLA Second Artillery ballistic missile brigades oriented toward Taiwan.
Pre-National Election Freeze September 2011 – February 2012
Guo Jinlong 郭金龙 Beijing Municipality	16-21 Feb 12	Beijing Mayor Guo Jinlong led a delegation of more than 100 people and was the first mayor of Beijing to visit Taiwan.
Su Shulin 苏树林 Fujian Province	upcoming	Governor of Fujian Province Su Shulin is scheduled to visit Taiwan the last week of March 2012.   Other visits this Spring are said to include Jiangsu Communist Party Secretary Luo Zhijun [罗志军].  Luo was formerly in charge of the Communist Youth League-managed China Youth Daily and mayor of Nanjing.   Another group from Hubei Province is scheduled to visit Taiwan this Spring.  It had been delayed from last year due to severe flooding of the Yangzi River.

END

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Obama’s Failing Taiwan Policy

Recent reports and editorials have highlighted challenges that the Obama administration faces in managing ties with Taiwan. Sensing a failing Taiwan policy. Members of Congress are ratcheting up the pressure. And rightly so. Plagued by an acute case of decidophobia, the Obama administration’s unwillingness to accept and act upon a legitimate request for a follow-on procurement of F-16 fighters symbolizes a broader problem. The problem is creeping abandonment of democratic Taiwan in favor of an increasingly assertive authoritarian People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Not since the Carter administration has an Executive Branch inched so close to casting aside Taiwan in order to placate China for ostensibly strategic reasons. This isn’t just a Republican-Democrat issue. Relatively speaking, the Clinton administration deserves high marks. And the current failings of the Obama administration can, at least in part, be a carry-over from the latter part of the Bush administration. While difficult to pinpoint, one could trace the problem to a select number of senior political appointees close to the President, weak leadership at the senior levels of the Pentagon, and an increasingly sophisticated and effective PRC influence operations campaign.

The Obama Team’s Line Up

One had high hopes for the Obama team as it entered office in January 2009. The administration’s Asia team members included seasoned, strategically-minded veterans, such as Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of Defense LTG (ret) Chip Gregson, and Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Derek Mitchell. The latter two focused much of their time on Central Asia issues, despite having significant “boots on the ground” time in Taiwan. Chip Gregson has departed, and Derek Mitchell has been nominated to serve as Special Representative to Burma. Replacements have yet to be confirmed, including nomination of Mark Lippert as Chip Gregson’s replacement.

Sharp, seasoned Pentagon staffers with years of China/Taiwan policy experience within the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) include retired Navy Captain Joe Skinner and Principal Director Dave Helvey. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense with direct oversight of Taiwan policy is long time Dianne Feinstein staffer Mike Schiffer. Most likely focused on Korea, Japan, and China military-to-military issues, Schiffer has made few public statements indicating strong support for Taiwan’s position. His former boss, Senator Feinstein, has been a leading proponent of China and advocate of U.S.-China relations. At the same time, she has questioned U.S. security assistance to Taiwan (see below).

Highly sensitive to how Taiwan arms sales could affect the U.S.-China military relationship, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Under Secretary of Defense Michelle Flournoy have been less vocal than their predecessors on Taiwan issues. In fact, Secretary Gates was quite sensitive to Chinese concerns regarding arms sales, without much apparent concern for Taiwan. Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Lynn, who served as a senior Raytheon executive for seven years, appears to have recused himself on Taiwan issues. Lynn has announced his departure later this summer or Fall, and a replacement has yet to be named.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Mike Mullen has endorsed Track 2 dialogues between ostensibly retired senior PLA officers and retired Navy Admiral Bill Owens, Joe Prueher, and others who have advocated abandonment of Taiwan. “Abandonment” of Taiwan presumably means amending or revoking the Taiwan Relations Act. Unlike their authoritarian cousins to the west who meet with the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon and in Beijing on a regular basis, Taiwan’s access to senior Pentagon officials remains severely limited. Newly appointed Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, may be more sympathetic to Taiwan, and Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) ADM Robert Willard has been a solid advocate of Taiwan’s defense.

The remainder of the bureaucracy is relatively consistent with the past. Senior representatives of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), such as Bill Stanton, Ray Burghart, Barbara Schrage, and Greg Man offer solid policy advice. Very capable China hands originally included Jeff Bader, President Obama’s senior director for East Asian affairs.  Jeff has returned to Brookings, and been replaced by a Korea specialist, Danny Russel.  Former RAND analyst Evan Medeiros manages the China/Taiwan portfolio on the National Security Staff. As the sole remaining China hand in the Old Executive Office Building, Evan has demonstrated sympathy to Taiwan in the past, despite reports to the contrary.

This has been a solid line up, and people who should have been able develop creative solutions to balance interests in good China relations while not sacrificing Taiwan. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, presumably under advisement from Kurt Campbell, deserves high marks, as demonstrated by her tough rebukes against Chinese activities in the South China Sea. The remainder of the State Department bureaucracy serves as the bedrock of a principled status quo. These days, principled status quo is good. One should never forget the State Department resisted DoD efforts to re-establish military-to-military relations with China in the wake of the PLA’s bloody crackdown on protestors in June 1989.

Weaknesses

So where is Obama team failing? Even the perception of drift toward abandoning a democracy in favor of an authoritarian Chinese government that relies on implied threats of force to resolve political differences. After all, the objective reality is that the Republic of China (ROC) exists as nation-state, despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations.In addition to weak support at senior levels within the Pentagon, problems may start with the Deputies Committee (DC). First, Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg is said to have been personally invested in the notion of “strategic reassurance” with China, which presumably means accommodation of China (e.g., appeasement). The new buzzword is “strategic mutual trust.” Until his recent departure, Steinberg likely dominated DC meetings that addressed China issues, or Taiwan if ever raised to that level in the past couple of years. Tom Donilon served as Deputy National Security Advisor until last year, when he was appointed as Obama’s National Security Advisor. Donilon’s replacement, Denis McDonough, has no apparent record on Taiwan issues.

Theoretically, DC meetings tee up issues for consideration by the Principals. Secretary of Defense Bill Gates has been weak, and Donilon has no record on Taiwan to speak of. In short, adding to the weakness is a relatively passive Department of Defense, the traditional bedrock of support for Taiwan. Perhaps supporting a policy of strategic reassurance, senior uniformed military officers, such as CJCS Mullen, appear personally invested in a politically-tinged military relationship with counterparts within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Influencing Taiwan Policy from the Outside

Another factor contributing toward the drift in U.S. Taiwan policy may be the role of informal opinion leaders or groups. Beijing understands where to focus its influence – retired senior U.S. military officers with residual connections in the Pentagon, the financial establishment, and other communities of influence. Beijing has actively sought out U.S. friends willing to call for a halt to arms sales, amendment of the Taiwan Relations Act, or abandonment of Taiwan. China and its representatives also has been targeting traditionally conservative groups, such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW).

One forum in particular – the Sanya Initiative - has involved retired four star generals and admirals. Sponsors have included the China Association for International Friendly Contact, C.H Tung’s Hong Kong-based China-US Exchange Foundation, and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. The PLA's Foreign Affairs Office supposedly provided translation support.

In the lead up to the initial meetings in 2008, CJCS Mike Mullen signed a letter to the organizers saying “I specifically endorse the meeting of four U.S. four star officers with their counterparts” in China. Then-PACOM Commander, ADM Tim Keating, also endorsed the dialogue. During the first round from February 19-22, 2008, former Nanjing Military Region Commander, General Zhu Wenquan, requested U.S. participants advocate in favor of a cessation of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, reduction in other forms of military cooperation, and a “review of the Taiwan Relations Act.”

As outlined in the meeting report, U.S. participants assured Chinese counterparts that the PLA's case - presumably including selling out a de facto democratic nation-state - would be made in Washington DC. In March 2008, one U.S. Sanya delegation representative -- a member of the U.S. Defense Policy Board – briefed the board on a proposal for the U.S.-China military relationship to be based on the “Sanya model,” and presented a plan to then-Secretary of Defense Bill Gates to change U.S. China policy. Another U.S. representative, a retired U.S. Marine general, advocated adjustments to DoD senior service school curriculum. Another offered to use channels to lobby the White House.

By September 2009, the organizer, former VCJCS, ADM (ret) Bill Owens, published an op-ed in the Financial Times. He advocated a halt to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and revisions to the Taiwan Relations Act, charging that the legislation is outdated and “not in our best interests.” Among other business pursuits, ADM (ret) Owens is a senior executive with AEA Investors, a major financial firm with close connections with former SecState Henry Kissinger and former AIG CEO Hank Greenberg. The latter has been cited as a source of funding for the Sanya Initiative.

The second round of meetings took place in Hawaii from October 16-24, 2009. Participants met with CJCS Mullen (see photo of CJCS with Owens, Xiong Guangkai, and rest of Sanya group above) and PACOM Commander Tim Keating. In recounting the meeting, one of the key Chinese sponsors asserted that “the joint statement issued after the talks said that the (retired) American military leaders unanimously felt that the Taiwan Relations Act needs to be reviewed.” After the Hawaii meetings, the Chinese side proceeded on to Washington, where they met with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Lynn, VCJCS General James Cartwright, and members of Congress. U.S. participants included former PACOM Commander, U.S. Ambassador to China, and Vice Chairman of the National Committee on U.S.- China Relations -- ADM (ret) Joe Prueher. The third round of the Sanya dialogue took place in Hangzhou on October 28-29. 2010, and included a new member to the U.S. group -- former PACOM Commander Tim Keating. The meetings also included U.S. Embassy participation.

Perhaps informed by the series of senior retired officer exchanges, the "abandon Taiwan" theme, ostensibly due to overriding strategic interests in China, appears to have expanded. In February 2010, Owens' replacement as VCJCS -- USAF Gen (ret) Joe Ralston -- published an editorial in the Wall Street Journal citing the freeze of US-China military relations as a result of the January 2010 Congressional notifications on Taiwan arms sales. He then proceeds to outline the overriding national security interests in the US-China military-to-military relationship, and establishing personal counterpart relations (e.g., assuming that PLA counterparts would actually answer a phone during a crisis). The editorial implied that Taiwan arms sales are an obstacle to the US-China military relationship. General (ret) Ralston is Vice Chairman of the Cohen Group, an enterprise with expanding business interests in China.

In June 2010, a senior U.S. senator (Diane Feinstein) stated that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were hurting closer ties with China, and asked Defense Secretary Gates what Beijing would have to do for the Pentagon to reconsider the transfers. By March 2011, retired U.S. Pacific Command commanders Joe Prueher and Tim Keating, both with affiliations with the Sanya initiative, succeeded in getting more than a half dozen signatures on a report published by the University of Virginia Miller Center calling for a review of the Taiwan Relations Act and end to the “vicious circle” caused by U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. In September 2010, another senator, Arlen Specter, argued on the floor that revisions to US arms sales could be warranted In Spring 2011, international relations theorist Charles Glaser joined the growing chorus calling for the abandonment of Taiwan. In May 2011, at the invitation of the Naval War College’s Maritime Studies Institute, one former senior U.S. official advocated U.S. support for Taiwan’s unification with China.

In late May 2011, visiting PLA Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde continued the campaign on Taiwan. During a joint press conference with ADM Mullen, Chen said "since I've arrived in the United States, I've had the opportunity to talk to some members of Congress and some of them told me that they also think that it is time for the United States to review this legislation.” Mullen responded by pointing the audience in the right direction: U.S. Congress should be the ones to initiate abandonment of Taiwan.

Arms Sales Freeze

China’s influence operations campaign appears to be working, at least with the Executive Branch. The F-16 issue, or rather the Obama administration’s refusal to accept and act upon a legitimate request to replace Taiwan’s remaining 60 F-5s, best symbolizes the Obama administration’s policy drift on Taiwan. Before 2001, representatives from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense submitted a list of requests to senior U.S. policy officials in annual face to face meetings, thus ensuring stated requirements were understood and addressed. At the time, Bush administration officials assured counterparts from Taipei that written responses to requests would be provided within a reasonable timeframe (e.g., standard of 60 days).

What makes the F-16 issue so egregious is the refusal to accept formal letters of request (LOR) for price and availability (P&A) data since 2006.In July, the Obama administration is said to have committed to resolve the fighter issue by October 1, 2011. ADM Mullen reiterated the Obama administration’s commitment to make a decision by October 1, 2011. However, observers have noted that the most likely course of action is to retrofit a portion of Taiwan’s existing F-16 fighter fleet with new radar systems and possibly engines. In effect, upgrades would be roughly on a par with F-16 Block 50/52. It remains unclear what configuration would be involved. Based on Defense News reporting from 2009, options likely include replacing APG-66(V)3 radar systems on current airframes with the APG-68(V)9 or perhaps an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. Also included could be upgrades to the mission computer, new color multifunction displays and helmet mounted cueing, air-to-air and maritime interdiction munitions, as well as electronic countermeasure systems. Although likely to send the retrofit price tag through the roof, engine candidates include the General Electric F110-GE-129 and the Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-229, with the latter as a preferable option.

If reporting is correct, release of additional F-16s – the priority – could continue to be held in abeyance. Release of F-16 Block 50/52 capabilities, yet withholding new airframes to replace aging F-5s, appears to be ill-advised. A minimalist decision is likely to draw Beijing’s ire, offer Taiwan’s political and military leadership with little choice but to proceed with the retrofit, force a deferral on replacement fighters for the F-5s, and undercut Taiwan’s leverage in cross-Strait relations. Congress is likely see a minimalist solution as insufficient. Click here for more.

Beyond F-16s

However, the problem goes beyond F-16s. The Executive Branch has in effect had a freeze on new arms sales since 2007. The notifications sent to Congress in October 2008 and January 2010 constituted one of the final administrative steps following policy-level approvals for PATRIOT PAC-3 ground systems and missiles (policy approval in 2001); AH-64D APACHE attack helicopters (policy approval in 2002); and UH-60 BLACKHAWK utility helicopters (policy approval in 2007). The BLACKHAWKs were the last major arms sales to be approved.Perhaps most egregious is a reversal of U.S. policy commitments made in April 2011 to assist Taiwan in its acquisition of diesel electric submarines. In 2007, Taiwan's legislature authorized funding of the first of a two phased program through FMS channels. Unconfirmed rumors exist that senior members of the White House staff recommended to senior counterparts in Taiwan to abandon the program, initially in June 2008.

Since then, the Obama administration has frozen the Congressional notification of Phase I, estimated at U.S. $360 million.The Obama administration also has deferred resumption of trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA) talks. Taiwan’s restrictions on market access for U.S. beef have been cited as one rationale for freezing TIFA talks for the past four years. Unlike Taiwan, the U.S. Trade Representative has included the beef issue in trade negotiations with South Korean counterparts. Other Taiwan-related negotiations, including visa waiver and extradition initiatives, appear stalled. In the meantime, the director of China's State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Wang Yi visited Washington in late July 2011 to lobby senior US officials against arms sales.

The Return of Congress

Since 1979, Congress has played a traditional role in offsetting natural bureaucratic tendencies of the Executive Branch to write Taiwan off. Almost half the Senate signed off on a letter sent to President Obama on 26 May that advocated approval of F-16s. On August 1, 2011, more than 180 members of Congress signed another letter to the President arguing in favor of additional F-16s for Taiwan.

Other actions have been taken. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX), presumably support by fellow members, held up the nomination of Bill Burns for Deputy Secretary of State. Nominations for Mark Lippert as Assistant Secretary of Defense and Wendy Sherman, as undersecretary of state for political affairs, could run into difficulties.

These have been initial shots across the bow. Much more may need needed to get U.S. Asia policy back on track. By enacting a de facto freeze on new major arms sales, deferring renewal of TIFA talks, and unwillingness to actively support Taiwan in its efforts gaining entry into international organizations, such as the ICAO, one could swear that the Obama administration is actively trying to resolve the “Taiwan problem” once and for all, and in a manner amenable to Chinese interests. This probably isn’t intentional. But the effects are the same.

On the low end of the political intensity spectrum, Senate and House staffers could consider introduction of language into FY12 legislation akin to the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act of 1999. Congress also could move to freeze military to military exchanges, using Representative Frank Wolf’s ban on NASA exchanges with Chinese counterparts as a model. An insightful and well-crafted op-ed published last month by a former Pentagon and State Department official highlighted some of the shortcomings of the current military relationship. The op-ed coincided with a vastly different perspective published by CJCS Mullen the same day in the New York Times. ADM Mullen had argued that military relations with China were "vital" to U.S. interests. Fact is, defense policy exchanges with PLA counterparts can be helpful. But not at the cost of fundamental interests in Taiwan. Allies and friends should take priority, given limited theater engagement funding.

At the extreme end, maybe Congress could go beyond a simple review of the Taiwan Relations Act, as friends of the Obama administration have advocated (e.g., Bill Owens, Joe Prueher, etc). Perhaps a review could consider aligning U.S. foreign policy with an objective reality: the existence of Taiwan, under its existing Republic of China (ROC) constitutional framework, as equally deserving of diplomatic status as the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Along these lines, Brookings Institute's Richard Bush offers some very thoughtful insights.

Taipei needs a regular, strong, visible signs of US support. Insecurity created by even the perception of waning U.S. support has historically resulted in radical policies on Taiwan, including development of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery in the wake of the US-China 1972 and 1979 Communiques. Continuation of the on-going de facto freeze on new major arms sales, including deferral of Taiwan’s request for additional F-16s, arguably undermines new cross-Strait initiatives. The connection between past arms sales and subsequent breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations is amorphous, but not insignificant. And the Obama administration’s inaction sends the wrong signal by legitimizing military coercion as a means to resolve territorial and sovereignty disputes around the PRC periphery. It’s also very unfortunate that retired U.S. officials forget basic principles upon which the U.S. was founded, including support for fellow democracies. Fortunately, U.S. Congress has resumed its traditional role in offsetting natural Executive Branch tendencies to write Taiwan off.

END

Obama White House Denies Taiwan Additional F-16 Fighters

President Ma Ying-jeou and his administration have been stepping up Taiwan's campaign to procure an additional 66 F-16s to replace the Republic of China (ROC) Air Force's aging fleet of F-5 E/F fighters (see report below). The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), passed by the U.S. Congress in 1979, requires the United States "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character."

Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) first submitted a formal letter of request (LOR) for price and availability (P&A) for an additional 66 F-16 fighters as early as March 2006. To date, two successive administrations have refused to acknowledge or act upon the LOR due to fear of Chinese retribution. Released by President George Bush in 1992, the ROC Air Force currently has 146 F-16s in its active inventory. A former senior U.S. Air Force official said in a July 2010 Reuters interview that a positive Obama administration decision on moving forward on an F-16 deal is "way past due."

Concerned over how the China issue could affect re-election prospects in 2012, opposition to release of additional F-16s to Taiwan is said to be concentrated within a small circle of pro-Beijing political advisors around President Obama. As a fully fledged democracy, the ROC on Taiwan has municipal elections scheduled for later this year, and with Presidential elections slated for March 2012.


"Taiwan seeks F-16s to boost defence"

Thursday 19th August, 2010 (IANS)

Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou called Thursday on the US to sell F-16s to Taipei to boost the island's defences after the Pentagon said this week that China is gaining military superiority over Taiwan.

'Taiwan people's top concern is Taiwan's security,' Ma said. 'I hope the US can cautiously consider selling F-16C/Ds to Taiwan as the balance of cross-Strait military power is tipping in China's favour.'

Ma made the comment while receiving visiting US Senator Roland Burris. It is the third time this month that Ma had raised the F-16 purchase while receiving US visitors.

Taiwan ordered 150 F-16A/Bs from the US in 1992 but is seeking to buy 66 F-16C/Ds to replace the outdated models.

The US is evaluating Taipei's request after Beijing asked Washington to end arms sales to Taiwan, calling them an obstacle to Taiwan-China unification.

China regards Taiwan as a breakaway province, to be brought back into the motherland one day, by force if necessary.

Taiwan Arms Sales: Temporary Hold or Freeze?

Today's Taipei Times covered an interesting Washington Times editorial penned by Randy Schriver. Randy is former Senior Country Director for China and Taiwan for the Secretary of Defense, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for China/Taiwan affairs during the Bush administration. He currently presides over the Project 2049 Institute and is an associate with Armitage International.

The editorial and Taipei Times' reporter William Lowther's summary, coming in the wake of the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), is a useful reminder of an often ignored fact. Despite expanding cross-Strait economic links, China still relies on implicit or explicit threats of military force to resolve political differences with the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan).

Taiwan Link commentary is in blue (NOTE: Image courtesy of the Washington Times)

US may be considering Asia-Pacific policy shift

BY WILLIAM LOWTHER

STAFF REPORTER IN WASHINGTON

Wednesday, Jul 14, 2010, Page 1

Former US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia Randy Schriver said that US President Barack Obama's administration may be “on the verge” of changing its policies toward Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

COMMENT: Guided by a coherent strategy and US legal statutes, policies should shift along with the dynamic nature of cross-Strait relations, China, Taiwan, and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. However, a policy that is grounded upon the so-called "status quo" is doomed to be reactive in nature. The lack of a coherent Obama administration strategy, juxtaposed against well-defined Chinese goals, exacerbates the problem. Instead of actively advancing positive foreign policy goals, such as a Chinese renunciation of use of force, a "status quo" policy emphasizes negatives. Setting the bar as low as possible, success is defined by no PRC use of force. However, real success is Chinese abandonment of the military instrument as a means to resolve an inherently political problem.

While not spelling out the possible change in detail, Schriver strongly hinted that it could result in a Taiwan arms sale freeze.

COMMENT: One could argue that a freeze on release of new systems has been in place since the Obama administration assumed control of the Executive Branch in January 2009. The Congressional notification package submitted in January 2010 was a final step in a long process that began with Bush administration policy decisions made years ago. The Bush administration committed to release the systems. The January 2010 Congressional notifications constituted the remaining second half of a package that the Bush administration should have forwarded in October 2008. President Barack Obama and his small group of political advisers have yet to approve and notify Congress of any new sale of major defense articles to Taiwan.

There may be a belief that a freeze on any new arms sales to Taiwan will reap benefits from Beijing, such as cooperation on North Korea, exchange rate adjustment, war on terrorism, Iran, etc. Or that the political costs of freezing new arms sales to Taiwan are and will be minimal, at least compared to the political pain that Obama's political advisers perceive China could dish out. And having committed to a "no trouble making" policy, the Ma administration is unlikely to push too hard on any US policy issue, economic, military, or otherwise. However, in bowing to Chinese pressure without any sign of direct reciprocation in the form of a substantive missile pull-back, the Obama administration is implicitly giving credence to China's reliance on military coercion as an instrument of national policy.

And furthermore, the Obama administration has reversed a policy decision made by President Bush in April 2001: diesel electric submarines. However, in fairness, there's plenty of responsibility to go around for failure to execute the submarine program. The ROC Navy earns low marks for creativity for placing the program in the hands of a conservative US Navy that never wanted to manage the program in the first place. The ROC Navy could have easily assumed programmatic responsibility and entrusted Taiwan's own shipbuilding industry.

Presidents Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou could have directed the ROC Navy to pursue alternative acquisition paths. However, sources close to both the Bush and Obama White House allege thatWhite House officials strongly suggested that the new Ma administration abandon Taiwan's 40-year quest for a fleet of 10 submarines. The Obama White House allegedly has repeated the suggestion. As a result, the Ma administration appears to have shelved the ROC Navy's long standing requirement.

In an article published on Monday in the conservative Washington Times, Schriver said that following the signing of the Economic Cooperative Framework Agreement (ECFA) by Taiwan and China, there was further evidence of cross-strait rapprochement.

“Curiously,” he wrote, the Chinese military buildup opposite Taiwan continues, with analysts saying that about 1,500 ballistic missiles are pointed at Taiwan.

COMMENT: This is where one should exercise caution. Bean counting of ballistic missiles has long been a metric of Chinese intent. Detractors could argue that there is little hard evidence that the 1500 number is valid, and that the growth has leveled off. But one has to define what class of ballistic missile one is referring to and elaborate upon the estimate's basis.

The ballistic missiles that are unambiguously dedicated toward Taiwan and have political and strategic significance are the short range ballistic missiles subordinate to the Second Artillery's 52 Base. An additional two 300 kilometer-range DF-11 brigades are subordinate to the Nanjing Military Region and provide tactical support for landing operations, rather than those under the Second Artillery that carry strategic significance. Furthermore, brigades equipped with nuclear-capable medium range ballistic missiles have a more diverse set of targets, and therefore could not necessarily be described as "targeted against Taiwan." The same goes for PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Navy (PLAN) assets assigned to the Nanjing Military Region.

Therefore, the units that could best be classified as dedicated toward Taiwan are the five Second Artillery SRBM brigades that have been established for over five years. As in most military organizations, a standard table of equipment likely exists with a set number of missile assigned to each brigade. A standard number is set to match the logistical capacity of the units to which the missiles are assigned. Once the table has been filled, that's it. To continue an expansion, a new brigade with another logistical infrastructure should be formed.

If the 1500 number is based upon cumulative estimates of SRBMs manufactured and delivered, then one explanation is that new SRBM variants are replacing older variants. Older variants are likely retired. Solid rocket motors generally have a shelf life of around seven years, the point when cracks in the propellent significantly reduce the reliability and safety of the missile. Advanced storage and refurbishment technologies can serve to extend the shelf life. As new guidance, navigation, and control technologies become available, the entire design of a missile changes, foreclosing options for refurbishment.

Therefore, a plausible case could be made that the growth reflects production of replacement missiles rather than an expansion of the overall SRBM inventory (NOTE: Some have speculated that the PLA could attempt to get political credit for retiring older missile variants. However, political credit should be granted only for a true reduction in capabilities).

But could there be a new SRBM brigade, in addition to production of new variants to replace missiles in existing brigades? There is a new brigade being formed under the 52 Base. The question is whether or not the new brigade is being equipped with SRBMs or medium range ballistic missiles.

“Why have we not seen even a modest, symbolic step on China’s part, commensurate with improvements in the economic and political spheres, to reduce the military intimidation it imposes on the people of Taiwan?” Schriver asked.

“Understanding why the buildup continues, informs policy decisions the Obama administration must face,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Very good point. Mr. Schriver continues below.

There are four possible explanations for the continuing Chinese military buildup, he wrote.

The first is that China has “no intent whatsoever to diminish the tools of intimidation and coercion in which so much investment has been made.”

Rather, Chinese leaders “are forced to conclude that they must retain the military threat to keep Taiwan in check,” he wrote.

Yes, indeed! In general, the PLA has an organizational and bureaucratic interest in whipping up the Taiwan independence "threat." They likely argue that maintenance or expansion of the force posture is needed to deter independence advocates. These arguments are questionable on many grounds. However, the most relevant is that China's military posture may be the single-most important factor in alienating a large portion of Taiwan's domestic polity and has the reverse effect.

Second, civilian leaders in China may be unwilling — or perhaps even unable — to challenge the People's Liberation Army (PLA) leadership. In turn, the PLA knows that if it pulls back on Taiwan, its budget — and justification for its continued growth — could be cut, Schriver wrote.

The third possible explanation for the military buildup opposite Taiwan, he said, was it is really designed to threaten other US allies such as Japan.

COMMENT: Certainly. If Taiwan independence no longer became the justification, a new basis would be needed for military expenditures. But an overt preparations for a possible Japan contingency would undercut the PRC "peaceful development" image that the propaganda machine wants to project.

“Finally, a fourth possible explanation is that China might be willing to pull back missiles and reduce the threat — but is waiting for the right time and the right deal,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Just what would that deal be? One theory is that the PRC may want to deal with the US, rather than Taiwan on military-related issues, including confidence building measures (CBMs) that could relate to Taiwan (e.g., cross-Strait CBMs are kind of silly since Beijing's goal is to minimize Taiwan's confidence). The deal that Jiang Zemin allegedly tabled in 2002 was a missile withdrawal in exchange for agreement for halting or setting a timetable for halting arms sales.

The basic premise of such a bargain has merit and is at the foundation of the 1982 Communique. However, explicit bargaining is neither wise or justifiable. The basis for US arms sales is and should be the nature of the military challenge that China poses to Taiwan. The current PRC posture warrants a wide open door for the release of defense articles that the democratically elected government of Ma Ying-jeou deems necessary. Of course the US should make decisions to approve, disapprove, or defer based on its own interests. But as long as China refuses to significantly reduce its military posture opposite Taiwan, then arms sales should be routine and forthcoming.

Sources close the Obama administration have stated that a small group of former US government officials, senior retired flag officers, and foreign policy specialists have an on-going program with counterparts in Beijing designed to examine an "arms sales for force reductions" bargain under the auspices of a confidence building measures dialogue. The Sanya Initiative, spearheaded by retired Vice Admiral Bill Owens, has been similar, and one with explicit written blessing of Obama administration officials. A separate initiative for discussion of CBMs involves former US officials, including a former PACOM Commander. The next round of CBM talks is scheduled to take place in Beijing within the next week or two."

“If the PLA military buildup opposite Taiwan continues apace, the need to provide Taiwan with weapons for self-defense also continues. This should be manageable if Washington doesn’t lose its nerve,” he wrote.

COMMENT: But the Obama administration never had a nerve to lose. There has been no release and notifications of any new systems to Taiwan. The three notifications reported as being frozen in a June 2010 Defense News article are not even major defense items.

“The US approach over the course of many years has been to make weapons available to Taiwan so that Taipei’s leaders have the confidence to go to the negotiating table with Beijing. This approach is paying off, but some would have us abandon it just when benefits are being reaped,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Indeed. However, the ECFA is a functional, technical agreement and its political significance is overblown. It is necessary for economic reasons. The real negotiations would be those that address the permanent resolution of political differences in a manner amenable to Taiwan's democratic system of government. Negotiations would work toward a defining the international personality of the ROC or Taiwan, and the nature of its political relationship with the PRC. However, the Ma administration's position continues that of its predecessors. No political negotiations under conditions of military coercion. It has rightfully decided to make withdrawal of missiles directed against Taiwan a precondition for preliminary political negotiations that could lead toward some form of peace agreement.

He said that either through “willful misdirection” or through “naivete,” the Obama administration appears to be ready to change the long-standing policy of providing weapons to Taiwan.

“The Obama administration has gone to great lengths to deny a Taiwan arms-sales freeze is in place, perhaps protesting a bit too much,” he wrote.

COMMENT: There indeed are pretty solid signs that that senior political advisers to President Obama have recommended sidelining Taiwan issues, including a conscious decision to defer any further Congressional notifications for Taiwan arms sales for the remainder of the year. Other sources allege that after the January 2010 notifications, assurances were provided to Chinese interlocutors that there would no more arms sales in the near term, without specifying for how long.

Regardless, principled, professional Asia/China hands on the NSC staff, and within State Department and the Pentagon know better, and of course will rush to reassure the public audience that there is no freeze. But the real test will be in the next few months. If the three minor notifications that President Obama has decided to hold aren't unfrozen in the next few months, then political pressure likely will mount, especially should the Republicans do well in the November elections.

However, a key driver that may put any further notifications on ice for the rest of the year could be the invitation that President Obama issued to Chinese President Hu Jintao last month for an official state visit, which most likely would occur shortly after Congressional elections in November 2010.

“Why does the administration continue a fiction that Taiwan has not formally requested more F-16[C/D] fighters? Why do mid and junior-level officials within the Obama administration allude to instructions from ‘senior leadership’ to hold congressional notifications on Taiwan arms sales and not to expect another major sale in 2010?” he asked.

COMMENT: See above. Under normal circumstances, release of additional F-16s should be a no-brainer. Taiwan already has F-16s, and additional airframes are replacements for old F-5s that are at the end of their useful service life. With Block 20 F-16s no longer in production, the Block 50/52 C/D version is the least capable variant available. Block 60 F-16 C/Ds would be a jump, as would the F-35B, which most analysts would agree is best suited for Taiwan's unique operating environment. If the F-16 issue isn't resolved by the end of this issue, the ROC Air Force (ROCAF), Ministry of National Defense (MND), and the Ma administration would be well-advised to submit a letter of request (LOR) for price and availability (P&A) data for 66 F-35B fighters to the Obama administration. And send a copy to the key staffers on the Hill to make sure they know that an LOR has been submitted.

“Even after [the] ECFA, a strong and capable Taiwan remains a key ingredient to security in the region,” he wrote.