Sanya Initiative: PLA Sends Team to Hawaii for Second Meeting with Retired US Flag/General Officers

As a follow-on to the previous post on Bill Owens' Financial Times editorial, the Hawaii-based Star Bulletin has reported that the second corporate-sponsored meeting of retired U.S. and Chinese flag/general officers took place on 17-18 October 2009 in Honolulu, Hawaii. Known as the Sanya Initiative, the Financial Times reported last year that the dialogue is funded by Bill Owens' parent company, AEA Investors (Vincent Mai), as well as C.V. Starr (Maurice "Hank" Greenberg), and the China-U.S. Exchange Foundation. Another report, apparently a formal report to funders, also credited the Carnegie Corporation and National Committee on U.S.-China Relations for helping to fund the event.

The eight day visit of the Chinese delegation also included stops in New York City and Washington DC for meetings with the Secretary of State and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The delegation's visit preceded the visit of Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission GEN Xu Caihou.

Access and Influence: Financial Executive Opens Doors in Washington for the PLA

The Chinese delegation was led by Xiong Guangkai, former head of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) intelligence community. Xiong currently serves as director of an elite PLA intelligence analytical unit. The Chinese delegation also included five retired senior military officers. Leading and organizing the U.S. side was AEA Investors' Bill Owens, who served as Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Clinton administration.

After meetings in Hawaii, Owens leveraged connections in the Obama administration, and escorted Xiong and the rest of the Chinese delegation for meetings in Washington D.C. with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Mike Mullins (click here for Financial Times reporting). Both ADM Mullins and former Commander, Pacific Command Tim Keating endorsed the initiative in writing (see pages 19 and 20 of the formal report).

Reflecting the views of his Chinese colleagues, Bill Owens is a critic of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Owens was quoted as saying "we look to be a model for active-duty military where the relationship is officially not very good.” Indeed, Owens and his Chinese colleagues do appear to be trying to influence DoD's views regarding the TRA and arms sales. Before departing New York City, Xiong led the entourage in singing "The More We Get Together." {NOTE: No joke here. Read the Financial Times article hyperlinked above. Inquiring minds want to know if Xiong Guangkai, perhaps reflecting on his successes, peered into Owens' eyes while singing "and your friends are my friends"}.

The Star-Bulletin reported that the China Association for International Friendly Contact "coordinated" the trip for the Chinese side. Administratively subordinate to the PRC Ministry of Civil Affairs, the China Association for International Friendly Contact [youlianhui; 友联会] is also known as the International Liaison Department of the PLA General Political Department (GPD). According to Ann Marie Brady in Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic, the Association targets "friendly personages" or "foreign leftists," and reports up the chain to the PLA GPD and presumably beyond.

Members of the U.S. team for the talks in Hawaii were:

Bill Owens. AEA Investors (Asia). ADM (ret) William Owens also is former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See previous post for more details on Owens and his company.

Ron Fogleman. CEO, Alliant Techsystems (ATK); Vice President, Projects International. Gen Ronald Fogleman also is former chief of staff of the Air Force.

Charles E. Wilhelm. Board of directors, OmniPerception; adviser, Battelle Science & Technology, International; former member of advisory board, Lucent Technologies; member of board of advisers, M.I.C.. Industries.Retired four star general and former commander of U.S. Southern Command; and mentor to Joint Forces Command. Gen (ret, USMC) Charles Wilhelm also is former Commander, Southern Command.

Denny Reimer. Director, DFI Government Services (now Detica), a subsidiary of defense contractor BAE Systems. Detica specialises in "collecting, managing and exploiting information to reveal actionable intelligence." He also serves as advisor, VirtualAgility. Gen (ret) Dennis Reimer also is former Army chief of staff.

Chinese delegation members were:

Xiong Guangkai. Xiong serves as Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS). CIISS is subordinate to the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) Second Department (intelligence). As Bates Gill and James Mulvenon noted in a 2002 China Quarterly article, CIISS is "an important interface between the military intelligence apparatus and foreign experts, with regular interactions both at home and abroad."

CIISS houses both active duty and retired military officers, including what Michael Swaine notes in the Gill/Mulvenon article as "some of the best military analysts from the intelligence department." Xiong served as head of the PLA's intelligence community before moving to direct CIISS. As a member of the Taiwan Affairs Leading Group, Xiong also has been a key player in leading the charge for Taiwan's annexation. LTG (ret) Xiong Guangkai also is former deputy chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.

Yu Zhenwu. GEN (ret) Yu Zhenwu is former commander of the PLA Air Force. Beijing cut his visit to the United States while he was PLAAF Commander in May 1995 to protest the visit of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to the United States. Fogleman was his counterpart at the time.

Li Qianyuan. GEN (ret) Li Qianyuan is former commander of the Lanzhou Military Area Command. He also served as commander, 1st Group Army in the Nanjing Military Region, which is a key Taiwan-related position.

Pei Huailiang. GEN (ret) Pei Huailiang is former president of the PLA National Defense University. Pei also has been viewed as a Taiwan specialist in light of extensive experience in planning and operational positions in the Nanjing Military Region, as well as Jinan Military Region.

Zhao Guojun. VADM (ret) Zhao Guojun is former commander of the East Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy.

Retired PLA generals who participated in the initial meeting in Sanya, Hainan Island, but not the more recent one include GEN (ret) Zhu Wenquan, former Commander, Nanjing Military Region; and GEN (ret) Yang Deqing, former Political Commissar, Guangzhou Military Region.

Financial Executive and Former Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Bill Owens Advocates Selling Out Taiwan

{UPDATE: Yesterday's Nelson Report covered the Owens/Taiwan issue as well, with astute commentary by Eric McVadon. Chris Nelson reports that "the reaction across Washington has been shock and dismay at what is seen as a stunning lack of political sophistication. Chris adds "his long-standing affiliation with a PRC-sponsored talk-shop might be clouding both his political and strategic judgment."}

Last week, a prominent and influential American businessman based in Hong Kong published an editorial in the Financial Times that should have caused quite a stir in Taiwan.

The author, AEA Investors executive and former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Bill Owens, calls for abrogation of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and a halt to arms sales. On the surface, the bulk of the editorial appears innocent. A retired senior U.S. military officer advocates friendship with China in a financial newspaper. Not a big deal, at least at first glance.

However, the author, who he represents, and what he is advocating, are worth a detailed examination. Operating at the nexus of high finance, high tech, and high level military, Owens is a very powerful and influential man. As Malcolm Gladwell argues in The Tipping Point, only a handful of people in the world are capable of initiating infectious ideas. And Owens is certainly one. His ideas are worthy of debate. But what makes his editorial alarming is that his views on the TRA and arms sales, whether intentional or not, support a broader PRC campaign to solve the “Taiwan problem,” once and for all.

Consciously or unconsciously adopting Beijing’s position, Owens fails to recognize the obstacle to solving the so-called “Taiwan issue” is the PRC’s refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve differences with Taiwan and making tangible reductions in its force posture arrayed against the island.

A Businessman and Former Senior Official Calls for Abandonment of Taiwan

In his 17 Nov 09 Financial Times editorial, Bill Owens advocates a major shift in U.S. policy. The centerpiece of his argument is what he refers to as a “thoughtful review” of the Taiwan Relations Act. Describing it as “outdated” and without offering an alternative, however, Owens implies that the legislation should be scrapped in its entirety. According to Owens, a “thoughtful” review of the TRA “would be viewed by China as a genuine attempt to set a new course for a relationship that can develop into openness, trust and even friendship.”

A “thoughtful” TRA review would focus on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, a process that Owens deems as as “not in our best interest.” He adds:

The first step to halting arms sales might be to observe that the Chinese have stopped the short range missile build-up across the Taiwan Straits (I believe this is true). The US could then stop selling arms to Taiwan unless that build-up was renewed. We must always protect the democracy and freedoms Taiwan has developed – but weapons sales do not do this.

Owens also cautions that if current trends continue, China’s military could rival or surpass those of the United States, offering allies in the region a choice between China and the United States. He calls for a shift in how we view China from a national security perspective:

It is often politically expedient to paint China as an adversary, or worse, a future enemy. Our national security apparatus is aiming to continue the present level of defence spending and emphasising 30-year-old legislation that is doing more harm than good.

He argues: “The solution is to approach the US/China relationship not with hedging, competition or watchfulness, but with co-operation, openness and trust.” Finally, he outlines an agenda for a new China relationship:

Following Mr Obama’s visit to Beijing, I hope we see the following kinds of military initiatives: an agreement to a thoughtful review of the implementation of TRA and other outdated legislation; a commitment to true military-to-military engagement across all levels including academic exchanges between military academies; a partnership in fighting terrorism and addressing, as partners, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (including North Korea and Iran); and an approach to addressing the increasing threat of cyberattack, perhaps with a “no first use of cyberattack” policy.

The “other outdated legislation” presumably would be the 1989 Tiananmen sanctions and Section 1201 of the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) restricting U.S-China military-to-military relations.

Owens argues that “many think the Chinese are unable or unwilling to accept such a progressive and innovative agenda. We will never know unless we try.”

From China’s perspective, what is there not to like about such a “progressive and innovative agenda?” Does retired ADM Owens think that the Chinese would be unable or unwilling to accept U.S. abandonment of Taiwan, halt to all arms sales, and overturning other legislation that places restrictions on our relations with the PRC? Academic exchanges already take place between PRC and U.S. military establishments. If he means letting PRC students attend our military academies, then we would have to discontinue admission of ROC students. Which of course is what he is advocating, along with the TRA review and halt to all defense assistance to Taiwan.

The rest of his agenda is harmless and even valid. We should partner with China, and others for that matter, in fighting terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and addressing issues associated with cyberattack. In another editorial for Carnegie, Owens proposed a U.S.-China space-based global transparency initiative. One could outline an even more aggressive bilateral agenda that would be in both PRC and U.S. interests, assuming our interests in Taiwan were not sacrificed in the process.

PRC “Stopping” Missile Deployments: Justification for a Halt in U.S. Arms Sales?

AEA Investors’ Bill Owens calls for a thoughtful review of the Taiwan Relations Act and a halt to arms sales. A halt to arms sales is justified in part by what he views as a freeze in PRC deployment of short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) opposite Taiwan. He doesn’t cite his sources in making this assertion. But let’s assume his sources are credible, particularly since Owens is well connected in Beijing and U.S. policy and intelligence circles.

Why would the PRC stop deployment of ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan? Because the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) have already filled PLA production orders to satisfy out a planned force structure of seven SRBM units. Five or perhaps six are under the Second Artillery, and one or perhaps two are organic to the Nanjing Military Region. Let’s look at the Second Artillery 52 Base order of battle (in probable order of establishment):

96165 Unit (Leping)

96167 Unit (Yong’an)

96169 Unit (Meizhou)

96162 Unit (Ganzhou)

96164 Unit (Jinhua)

96166 Unit (Chizhou, in same vicinity as DF-21 unit)

Each of these brigades has as many as six battalions, each equipped with a certain number of launchers and a standardized table of organization and equipment inventory of SRBMs. It’s not clear what this standard number is, but there likely is a ceiling unless a decision is made to add another SRBM brigade under the 52 Base. The 2009 DoD Report to Congress on PRC Military Power asserted that as of September 2008 the PLA had as many as 1150 SRBMs and was “increasing” its inventory at a rate of over 100 missiles per year.

If Owens is correct, then the PLA Second Artillery 52 Base is no longer increasing its inventory. The last SRBM brigade under the 52 Base likely is the 96166 Unit in Chizhou. Does this mean that the DF-15 production facility in Beijing (211 Factory) and DF-11 factory in Hubei (the 066 Base) have stopped assembling new DF-11s and DF-15s? According to Owens, maybe the blanket order for new SRBMs has been satisfied and units have filled out their table of organization and equipment. However, filling out the final SRBM unit does not necessarily indicate peaceful intent with regards to Taiwan. It indicates that the Second Artillery 52 Base is prepared and mission ready. It is very likely that R&D and production of sub-systems, such as solid rocket motors and guidance, navigation, and control systems, would continue.

If Owens is looking for a sign of peaceful intent, he should be looking for dismantlement of SRBM brigades and their supporting infrastructure, and not a stop in new missile deployments. Furthermore, PRC military capabilities based on a Taiwan scenario go far beyond SRBMs. Land attack cruise missiles, medium range ballistic missiles, conventional fixed wing aircraft, electronic warfare assets, surface combatants, submarines, and a range of ground combat systems are important as well.

In short, a PLA judgment that it has sufficient numbers of SRBMs to fulfill its operational mission does not justify a halt to U.S. arms sales. The only justification for curtailing arms sales to Taiwan would be a PRC renunciation of use of force to resolve its differences with Taiwan, and a tangible reduction in the military capabilities that could be brought to bear against the ROC and its democratically elected leadership.

Abandonment of the TRA: What Would It Mean

Yet to Bill Owens, a halt is a halt. The Taiwan Relations Act and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are impediments to U.S-China friendship. Therefore, Owens believes that a review and reversal of this outdated legislation is warranted. Owens is implicitly advocating removing the legal basis for U.S. relations with Taiwan, and acquiescence of the PRC’s "one country, two systems" approach to resolving its differences with Taiwan. Without the TRA, there would be no American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). Taiwan would be treated as a province of the PRC, which has longed viewed the TRA as an unwarranted intrusion by the United States into the internal affairs of China. Without the TRA, Taiwan’s democracy likely would collapse, perhaps only after a major upheaval on the island in reaction to what would be perhaps the only peaceful abandonment of a democracy to an authoritarian power in U.S. history.

Arms sales are the most visible manifestation of the U.S. recognition of the ROC’s unresolved international status. Besides ensuring that the cost of PRC use of force would be sufficiently high so as to deter such a course of action, the TRA and U.S. provision of defense articles and services provide an atmosphere in which Taiwan’s democratically elected leadership can negotiate with counterparts in Beijing with confidence. Taiwan’s difficult transition to a democracy, which coincides with its economic miracle that continues until today, is a possible model for democracy advocates in China. The ROC's existence as a defacto independent state is perhaps the only impetus for the PRC to transition into a multi-party system. Democracies are not as efficient in mobilizing resources as authoritarian one-party states. But they are certainly are more conducive to giving citizens greater say in how they are governed and in a more peaceful international environment.

China’s Access and Influence

Owens’ editorial is interesting from another perspective. Because it echoes a theme that the PRC has long represented, one has to examine Owens, his company, and his network as witting or unwitting channels of access and influence. One new channel with close links to Owens is a well-endowed Hong Kong non-profit entity (China-U.S. Exchange Foundation; 中美交流基金会) and a new dialogue – the so-called Sanya Initiative -- that Owens and this new foundation established last year.

The Foundation’s governing board consists of leading figures in Hong Kong who facilitated its reversion back to China, members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CCPCC), avid supporters of China’s one-country, two systems formula for annexing Taiwan, and elite in doing big business in China. These include former governor C.H. Tung (董建華), his brother C.C. Tung, Payson Cha, Ronnie Chan, Daniel Fung, Elsie Leung, Liu Changle, Peter Woo, and Gordon Wu. Its honorary advisors include Henry Kissinger, Hank Greenberg, Xu Kuangdi, and Tang Jiaxuan. It has cross-links with the newly established China Center of International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE) in Beijing and One Country, Two Systems Research Institute in Hong Kong. U.S. financial powerhouse AIG and the Starr Foundation are prominently listed as counselors.

The website claims the Foundation’s funding “is presently derived from the support of individuals and corporations in Hong Kong who share the Foundation's commitment to fostering stronger relations between China and the United States.” No corporations are listed, but private funders include: Chao Sze Kwong George; Ms. Vivien W. W. Chen; Mr. Kenneth Fang; Mr. Timothy Fok; Dr. Stanley Ho; Mr. Albert Hung; Dr. Lee Shau Kee; Dr. K.S. Lo; Mr. Robert Ng; Dr. Charles Yeung. Li Ka-shing’s son, Richard Li, is listed as a counselor.

All that’s missing is the precise nature of its relationship with what elements of the government in Beijing, and a direct linkage likely won’t be found barring some major investigative journalism by the likes of Jimmy Lai. However, it’s worth noting that Beijing’s use of Hong Kong-based cut outs for influencing political views in Washington has precedents. The PRC –specifically the PLA – attempted to contribute at least U.S. $300,000 to the Democratic Party in 1996 using the daughter of a senior PLA general (Liu Chaoying)and a China Aerospace Corporation subsidiary as the (China Aerospace International Holdings, Ltd) as the white glove. PLA General Ji Shengde, the predecessor of Xiong Guangkai and responsible for foreign relations and intelligence, led the operation. For reporting, click here. However, the Republicans also received questionable funding from a Hong Kong source with links in China, although somewhat different. Young Brothers Development Ltd loaned around U.S. $1 million to a RNC cut out, although there is no evidence that the funds originated in China or were on behalf of China.

Having learned lessons from the past, Beijing’s use of a Hong Kong-based think tank as an agent of and funding source for influence in Washington and at the state level is fair game. The goal is to enhance bilateral relations, but the Taiwan angle should not be forgotten. Its influence operations should be watched carefully. Hong Kong is part of the PRC, and many of the Foundation’s leaders have formal PRC government positions within the CCPCC. Other initiatives have or will include funded travel for U.S. journalists, state officials, including lieutenant governors and state legislators.

The China-US Exchange Foundation is no simple philanthropically-oriented institution. It has retained high powered lobbying firms, including Brown Lloyd James and Fontheim International, as part of its influence operations mission. Fontheim has registered with the Senate to lobby on behalf the the Foundation.

The Sanya Initiative: Working the U.S. Military Old Boy Network

One of the first orders of business for the China-US Exchange Foundation was support for a new dialogue between retired senior U.S. military officers and counterparts from the PLA. Funding support was provided not only by the Foundation, but also Owens’ company, AEA Investors and CV Starr (click here for pre-Sanya meeting coverage in the Financial Times). The dialogue, termed the Sanya Initiative, included five senior PLA general officers led by retired General Xiong Guangkai. The four retired U.S. officers include Bill Owens and General Ronald R. Fogleman, former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. In addition to consulting for Boeing, Fogleman has been Senior Vice Chairman, Projects International, a company that has close ties in Beijing through its founder, Chas Freeman. Fogleman was just recently appointed as CEO of a major defense firm, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. Other participants include General John M. Keane, and General Charles E. Wilhelm. Wives were invited along as well.

The meeting in Sanya took place on February 21 in order to commemorate the anniversary of former U.S. president Richard Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972 to meet with Chairman Mao Zedong. Immediately preceding the dialogue, Owens’ published his first editorial in the Financial Times with similar themes as last week's, minus the Taiwan-related issues.

The participants pledged after the February 2008 dialogue to maintain “continuous communication through various channels such as personal letters, bi-monthly telecommunications, and a second meeting to be convened later this year.” The group also allegedly committed to launching a strategic media campaign to correct U.S. misperceptions of the Chinese military.

All are honorable and served their country with distinction while in uniform, and continue to contribute where they can. However, all four of these officers also settled in to lucrative corporate positions after taking off their uniforms, with the leader of this well-connected U.S. team – Bill Owens – having the clearest and most significant business interests in China.

A Retired Admiral Turns Businessman

After stepping down as Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (the second highest ranking uniformed officer in the military), Bill Owens aggressively entered the business world. He started in the defense industry (SAIC), moved to Teledesic, then to Nortel, a major telecommunications company with significant business interests in China. Observers note Owens’ demanded a substantial severance package after only just over a year with Nortel. After his brief stint as CEO of the troubled Nortel, Bill Owens moved to spearhead the China investment arm of the U.S. private equity firm AEA, which includes clients or partners such as AIG, C.V. Starr, and JPMorgan Chase. It’s here where paths cross with the political-economic godfathers of the U.S.-China relationship, such as Henry Kissinger, Hank Greenberg, and Gen (ret) Al Haig.

Owens also has or is serving on the corporate boards of Teledesic, LLC, Polycom, Viasat, Microvision, TIBCO, Symantec, Metal Storm LLC, Telstra, Nortel Corp. Ltd., BAT, Cray, and Biolase. He has served on the boards of Carnegie Foundation, Brookings Institute, Harvard Kennedy School, and the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board.

Regardless, China has grown quite adept at leveraging the business interests of former senior U.S. officials in order to further its own political agenda. And getting the U.S. to break on its relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan), particularly arms sales, is perhaps the highest priority. The China-U.S. Exchange Foundation and its recruitment of these four flag/general officers is an example of how sophisticated China’s influence operations have become. The targeting of senior retired U.S. military officers appears to be the Foundation’s first order of business, with the Sanya Initiative taking place less than a month after being established (28 January 2008). It also was two months before Taiwan’s presidential elections and nine before before the U.S. presidential elections.

As a final note, Owens’ advocacy on making China a friend coincides with some major financial business dealings that are unclear at this point. Owens’ firm, AEA Investors, has been making a run to buy a portion of PLA-affiliated Huawei. Media reporting noted that Owens was the brains and muscle behind making it to the short list. One report noted that Huawei’s intent in opening up to foreign investors is to gain a foothold in the U.S. and overcome political opposition from Congress. Media reporting also indicates that Owens had aggressively sought out a strategic alliance between Nortel and Huawei while he served as Nortel CEO.

In short, while ADM (ret) Owens probably had noble motives in calling for the abandonment of Taiwan, his ideas should be brought into proper context. This story is still unfolding, and there’s likely more to come.

END

Andrew Yang Appointed as Taiwan's Deputy Minister of Defense

Taipei Times yesterday covered the appointment of Dr. Andrew Yang (楊念祖) to serve as Deputy Minister of Defense. In this position, Andrew will be responsible to newly appointed Minister of Defense Kao Hua-chu for defense policy and execution. He replaces Chang Liang-jen (張良任), who had been in the position since September 2008.

The Taipei Times report quoted a former military official saying Andrew “was unlikely to last long, as he — like Chang — has no military background.” To the contrary, Andrew Yang is one of Taiwan's foremost authorities on PRC military affairs, and has the strategic perspective that is needed within the Ministry of National Defense (MND). Since the establishment of this second-most senior position within MND in 2000, all appointees have been civilian. Peter Chen (Chen Pi-chao; 陳必照) was the first, and was followed by Kang Ning-hsiang (康寧祥), Lin Chong-pin (林中斌), Michael Tsai (蔡明憲), and Ko Chen-heng (柯承亨).

Andrew served as Secretary General of the Chinese Council for Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), a Taipei-based think tank that has focused on security and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) studies for more than a decade. In this position, Andrew has earned the respect and admiration from PLA watchers on both sides of the political spectrum in Washington D.C. In addition to being a frequent commentator in local and U.S. media, including Defense News, Andrew has been teaching at the Sun Yat-Sen University in Kaohsiung over the last several years.

His links in Washington are extensive. In addition to a long standing relationship with RAND and its alumni, Carnegie Endowment, and National Defense University, Andrew has been an active member of the Project 2049 Institute International Advisory Council. He was last in Washington D.C. in July 2009 for a conference the “China Faces the Future” conference co-hosted by the Brookings Institution and National Chengchi University’s Institute Of International Relations

Issues that Andrew most likely will be facing:

-- Force modernization in a resource-constrained environment;

-- Transition toward an all-volunteer force;

-- Integration of natural disaster warning, response, and recovery into defense strategy;

-- Cross-Strait confidence building measures;

-- Civil-military relations and inter-service rivalry;

-- U.S.-Taiwan defense relations.

He has a difficult job ahead of him, but will do very well.

CV Chen on Military's Role in Disaster Relief

China Times carried an editorial yesterday authored by prominent lawyer and Taiwan Red Cross Director Chen Chang-wen (CV Chen). He argues that Pingtung County authorities are critical of the slow Ministry of National Defense (MND) response to Typhoon Morakot. He also argues that for every NT $100 paid in taxes, NT $20 goes toward defense. Yet over the last 20 years, few deaths have resulted from armed conflict while Taiwan suffers the ravages of natural disasters each year.

He's critical of the Ma administration for not listing disaster warning, recovery, and response as a key mission of the armed services, particularly as cross-Strait relations have improved. Chen argues that Japan's Self-Defense Forces have been recognized for their involvement in emergency preparedness. He closes by asking if it's the PLA or natural disasters that pose the greatest threat to Taiwan.

An open advocate of cross-Strait unification, albeit without foreclosing the option of independence, CV Chen often is overly critical of MND. On this particular issue regarding military missions, he has a point. The facts on where lapses occurred in this most recent disaster aren't out yet. But as a general principle, Taiwan's senior civilian and military leadership should be examining the utility of an "all-hazards" defense strategy. All national emergencies -- pandemics, typhoons, earthquakes, terrorist attacks, and use of military force -- share commonalities in command and control, demand for survivable communications, rapid response, mobility, and situational awareness.

No other society must cope with the type of military challenge that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) poses to Taiwan. The severity of the PRC military threat to Taiwan is matched only by the challenges posed by natural disasters. As highlighted in the World Bank’s March 2005 report, Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis, “Taiwan may be the place on Earth most vulnerable to natural hazards, with 73 percent of its land and population exposed to three or more hazards.” Where else can one sit on a major fault line with powerful earthquakes and potential volcanic activity; in the path of a growing number of typhoons that are increasing in strength due to rising ocean temperatures in the Pacific; a geography characterized by some of the highest mountains in the Asia-Pacific region and a sharp drop to the ocean that creates rapid runoffs of rain water to create floods in the alluvial plains on the west side of the island?

An "all hazards" approach involves adjusting the operational requirements documentation process to include consideration of other national emergencies, and perhaps even scientific research. Oftentimes there is no fit -- an F-16 or PATRIOT would have utility in only one type of emergency. Yet other times, there are systems that could be of use across the entire spectrum of disaster warning, recovery, and response. Take the examples of a broadband communications satellite, remote sensing satellite, (e.g., FORMOSAT 2 Follow-on), unmanned aerial vehicles, HF/VHF/UHF radio systems, maritime surveillance, undersea surveillance, and a range of command and control systems. In the case of the two satellite systems, a strong argument could be made that these programs would be alive and well if the primary rationale for their procurement would have been disaster warning, response, and recovery, rather than pure military. Ditto for the radio systems and undersea surveillance.

Just a thought for the day...

UPDATE (August 11, 2009). Central News Agency published a report yesterday that outlined the significant role that Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) is playing in disaster relief. According to a press release, the ministry has deployed 8,235 soldiers over the past three days to assist local governments in typhoon rescue operations. According to an MND, statement, the military has evacuated 2,868 people, as well as deployed 101 amphibious vehicles, 214 trucks, 168 armored vehicles, 166 Humvees, 243 other tactical vehicles, 166 rafts, and 12 back up power generators.

More Chinese Netizen Commentary on Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Program

A reader directed my attention toward another source of chatter from the Chinese bulletin board system (BBS) regarding China’s anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) program. I had excluded it in the previous post on the subject simply because it seems to be a mix of hyperbole and aspiration. However, even with the hyperbole and aspiration, the article could offer some insights when matched against authoritative sources. Because the article has been so widely proliferated around Chinese cyberspace, including on official government sites, it may be worth attention.

Post by "Marine Major" (陆战队少校), the original article seems to have first appeared on iFeng BBS on August 14, 2008. In the following weeks, it spread to other major BBS sites (Huanqiu, Tiexue, Chnqiang, etc), including onto the Xinhua network, the official government news agency. The article continues to be reposted on major BBS sites until today. Interestingly enough, the same article appeared on the Lianyungang city government website for a period of time until it was removed. It’s unclear if the author is the original source.

The article alleges that China has completed R&D on a new variant of the ASBM, referred to as the DF-25B. Presumably because the DF-25 didn’t have sufficient missile defense countermeasures, the PLA put forth the upgrade requirement in 2006. The author describes the new DF-25 variant as flying a depressed trajectory at an altitude of 20-30 kilometers. The “mother body,” presumably a third stage, houses multiple independently guided warheads. The third stage itself has a reserve propellant tank and incorporates electronic countermeasures as it bears down on a carrier at hypersonic speed.

Specifics in this particular BBS article should be taken with a grain of salt. However, as pointed out in the previous post, authoritative industry sources do indicate that significant R&D is being carried out into a boost-glide capability, and there is significant interest into developing a range of flight vehicles that operate in the upper atmosphere between 20-100 kilometers in altitude. The chart to the right shows one relatively basic glide control concept from an industry source (the DF-21D reference appears to be added on later by the BBS service that posted the industry article).

The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) First Academy (China Academy of Launch Technology) stood up a new research institute in late 2008 that focuses on nothing but upper atmosphere flight vehicles (sources available upon request). In addition, authoritative publications indicate an interest in a submarine-launch ASBM.

Keeping in the mind that some of the technical terms are challenging, below is a rough paraphrased translation of the article. I posted the Chinese as well for interested readers:

China’s New Aircraft Carrier Killer Revealed

中国最新航母克星“航母末日” 嚗光

August 14, 2008
http://blog.ifeng.com/article/1643766.html

弹道导弹打航母的构想大约是出自1996年台海危机。当时，美国派２个航母战斗群部署在台海周围以军事吓阻我们处理“两国论”引发的台海危机的军事行动。

The concept for an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) comes from the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. At that time, the US deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups off the coast of Taiwan as a means to deter our military operations intended to manage Taiwan’s “two states theory.”

当时我军只拥有歼－7、歼－8等二代战机和从俄罗斯进口的第一批26架苏－27。而美军航母即使按中等威胁区实施威慑的态势，其F-14A“雄猫”战斗机（现在已经退役，被Ｆ－18Ｅ／Ｆ取代）2个中队24架、F／A-18A“大黄蜂”战斗／攻击队24架，加起来也有近50架三代战机。就是说一艘航母的三代战机已经是当时我们所拥有三代战机总和的2倍！

At that time, our military had only two types of second generation fighters – the F-7 and F-8, as well as 26 Russian Su-27s. But United States military was able to assemble two squadrons of F-14As (already retired and replaced by F-18s), and a squadron of F/A-18As for a total of nearly 50 aircraft. This is about double the number of our third generation aircraft.

中国海军建立了以空潜快炮为主的海防体系，然而共和国的决策者们在海湾战争后猛然发现，苦心孤诣40年的心血已经无法继续信任下去，世纪末战争中美国海军以射程1000海里的巡航导弹告诉全世界，你们的海岸——不设防。如果说海湾战争对中国军队还只是震撼，96年的台海冲突则给了我们切肤之痛。没有远洋打击力量，更不具备远海防御能力，堂堂三百万人民解放军竟然无法对抗美国海军的两个航母战斗群。近海防御海军的窘迫就在于无法脱离陆地独立行动，不具备远洋攻防作战体系，不能构筑海上钢铁长城御敌于国门之外，只能作为陆军的附属保卫区区十二海里领海线。

The PLA Navy established an air and sub-surface maritime defense system, but decision makers suddenly realized that after 40 years of devoting resources to the military, there’s no defense against U.S. 1000-kilometer range cruise missiles – “your coastal defense sucks” (to paraphrase). If one would characterize the Gulf War as a shock, then the 1996 crisis was hari-kari (meaning extremely painful). Our coastal Navy couldn’t get away from the land or establish a long range interdiction and defensive operational system, and only could come up with an Army-affiliated 12 nautical mile defense zone.

可以说，美国人调集了两个航母编队，极大地刺激了改革开放以来一直让“军队要忍耐”的中国政府。所以，中国提出了一套新的理论，这就是99年的超限战理论。“弹道导弹打航母”便是其中之一。

One could say that the deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups marked the end of the Chinese government’s policy of military restraint since the reform and opening of China.

最新研制成功的东风－25弹道导弹，可以运载一个或几个分导弹头，弹头内装有被动红外导引装置。弹头重返大气层后，可以进行机动以精确对准目标。

The DF-25 missile has been successfully researched and developed, is able to launch one or a number of warheads that are equipped with passive infrared terminal guidance. After warheads reenter the atmosphere, they are able to maneuver accurately toward the target.

但是美国海军计划对所有装备“宙斯盾”系统的62艘驱逐舰和22艘巡洋舰进行升级，使其具备弹道导弹防御能力。根据美军计划，到2009年美国海军将拥有18艘装备“弹道导弹防御型宙斯盾”系统的战舰，其中包括15艘驱逐舰和3艘巡洋舰。五角大楼水面战委员会主席维克托•吉尔罗伊少将15日表示，18艘反导宙斯盾舰远不够用，因此计划首先对所有的“阿利•伯克”级导弹驱逐舰进行升级，使其具备拦截弹道导弹的能力。随后22艘导弹巡洋舰的升级也将被列上日程。这对地区和平、尤其是东亚和台海安全构成了严重威胁。

But the U.S. Navy planned to upgrade Aegis system, including 62 destroyers and 22 cruisers for missile defense. According to the Navy plans, it will have 18 sea-based missile defense equipped ships, including 15 destroyers and 3 cruisers. A U.S. Navy committee argued that all Arleigh Burke’s should be upgraded. This presents a serious threat to regional peace, especially for security in East Asia and the Taiwan Strait.

从理论上说，如果美国全部宙斯盾战舰作战系统都升级为“导弹防御型宙斯盾”，这样一支反导舰队集中部署在一个方向，将可以同时拦截500枚以上的中程弹道导弹。

Theoretically speaking, if America assembled all its Aegis assets together, they could intercept more than 500 medium range ballistic missiles at one time.

从拦截区域上看，海基拦截系统覆盖面积是“爱国者-3”反导系统的100倍；从技术成熟度上来看，目前海基拦截系统是美国所有能拦截中程弹道导弹的反导系统中拦截成功率最高的一种。
From the perspective of defended area, sea-based missile defenses cover an area 100 times larger than that of PAC-3. In terms of technology, sea-based missile defenses have had the highest success rates.

所以，东风－25弹道导弹采用了“隐形战术弹头”概念，以减少弹头在实施分导开始阶段的“雷达反应红外线” 特征，使得东风25导弹更加难以拦击。但要确保突破宙斯盾反导系统从而达到击沉航母的目的，还是有很大难度的。

Therefore, the DF-25 incorporates a “tactical stealth warhead” concept in order to reduce the “radar reaction infrared” (awkward wording in Chinese that is hard to translate), when the warhead is in the initial phase of payload separation, and make the DF-25 hard to intercept. But it’s still difficult to ensure the ability of missile to penetrate the Aegis missile defense system and destroy the carrier target.

故中国人民解放军在2006年提出了进一步研制新型弹道导弹，争取在3年内装备3种新型弹（目前定型为：东风25乙 东风26甲 东风26乙三型）。要求采用低轨分导式，既导弹升空后保持在20千米至30千米的低轨道飞行，不必重返大气层，使美军装备的“宙斯盾”海基拦截系统没有充足的反应拦截时间。

In accordance with a 2006 PLA proposal, R&D began on new ballistic missiles to be finished within three years (finalized designs include the DF-25B, DF-26A, and DF-26B). The requirement is to adopt a low trajectory with separable warheads, maintain a 20-30 kilometer altitude in order to not give Aegis destroyers sufficient time to respond.

{{Note: In a version posted on Sina.com a few days after the iFeng article, the language stresses a DF-26 sea-launch variant, rather than the surface-launched DF-25:

其中东风25乙为路基型，东风26甲为海基型，东风26乙的具体情况还不太清楚。

Roughly translated, “the DF-25B is ground-launched, the DF-26A is sea-launched, and specific details of the DF-26B aren’t clear.” }}

野战陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航母导弹系统（即东风25乙）的部分性能指标：

Following is a general description for the ground-based, depressed trajectory, multiple warhead, “carrier killer” (literally “final days of the aircraft carrier”) ASBM system (specifically the DF-25B):

1.弹头数量：6枚分弹头

1. Number of warheads: Six

2.导弹飞行高度：20千米至30千米低轨机动飞行

2. Missile flight altitude: 20-30 kilometers, maneuvering, depressed trajectory

3.导弹射程：1300千米__1800千米

3. Missile range: 1300-1800 kilometers

4.机动发射准备时间：小于9分钟

4. Mobile launcher preparation time: Less than nine minutes

5.每枚弹头当量：450千克黑索今 (相当于1100千克TNT当量)

5. Individual warhead weight: 450kg explosive (equivalent to 1100kgs of TNT)

6.导弹飞行速度：8马赫__12马赫

6. Missile flight speed: Mach 8-12

7.弹头攻击角度：60度__90度俯冲攻击

7. Warhead angle of attack: Between 60-90 degrees diving attack

8.弹头飞行速度：6马赫__8马赫小动量变轨飞行

8. Warhead flight speed: Mach 6-8 with minor maneuvering

9. 弹头制导方式：红外; 自备激光群发; 可视电视; 图像记忆

9. Warhead Guidance: Infrared, self-equipped lasing (this is a tough one to translate); electro-optical; imaging

10. 弹头攻击方式：穿甲; 延时自爆

10. Warhead Attack Method: Armor piercing; delayed fuse

11. 弹头飞行距离：60千米

11. Warhead flight range: 60 kilometers

野战陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航母导弹（东风25乙）具备隐身和超强抗各种干扰能力，发射准备阶段和距离航母舰队500千米前，利用GPS、北斗系统、低轨侦察卫星、天波雷达、地面监听站等设备对航母舰队进行连续跟踪，以保证飞行方向。距离航母舰队500千米时，弹载雷达设备自动寻的，对目标方位进行修正、定位。

Using stealth and ECCM, the ground-launched “carrier killer” ASBM (DF-25B) relies on GPS, Beidou, LEO satellites, OTH-B, and SIGINT sites to establish a continuous track during the launch preparation stage and up to 500 kilometers from the aircraft carrier group. At a range of 500 kilometers, the missile-borne radar starts its autonomous search for the target, and adjusting its direction and position in relation to the target.

其它性能：

Other Characteristics:

1．导弹母体在飞行中敌方雷达可探测距离小于100千米。

1. Enemy radars can detect the main missile body at a range of less than 100 kilometers.

2．导弹母体在释放出分弹头后，可在战区上空盘旋，为分弹头提供制导，并对航母舰队进行强电磁、电子压制。

2. After the main missile body releases warheads, it can loiter within the theater and provide warheads with guidance as well as conduct electronic countermeasures against the aircraft carrier battle group.

3．导弹母体保持200秒以上盘旋时间。

The main missile body can loiter for more than 200 seconds.

4．导弹母体保持200秒以上盘旋时间后，携带预留高燃剂以10马赫速度、90度直角俯冲攻击航空母舰。

4. After loitering for more than 200 seconds, the missile body can carry a reserve high energy propellant in order to achieve a speed of Mach 10 and dive toward the carrier at a 90 degree angle of attack.

5．导弹母体俯冲攻击航空母舰兼磁爆效应。

5．As it dives, it can have an electromagnetic explosive effect (difficult to translate).

另外，野战陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航弹道母导弹（东风25乙）备有多种弹头

In addition, the ASBM (DF-25B) has several types of warheads:

1．高爆穿甲弹

High-explosive armor piercing shell

2．电磁炸弹

EMP Bomb

3．高爆穿甲燃烧弹

Highly explosive armor piercing incendiary shell

4．高爆子母弹

High explosive submunitions

5．声波弹

Acoustic warhead

6．诱饵弹

Decoys

前段时间国防大学军事专家张教授提出我国目前并不急于建造航空母舰的建议，原因很可能是知道反航母弹道导弹“航母末日”既将问世。

At previous times, NDU Professor Zhang raised that China shouldn’t rush to build aircraft carriers, because perhaps the “final days of the aircraft carrier” are going to become public.

陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”可有效地将航空母舰阻挡在海岸线1000千米——1500千米外，并对进入“航母末日”有效射程范围内的敌舰予以毁灭性的打击。

Ground-based low trajectory, separable warhead ASBM could effectively prevent the aircraft carrier from crossing a 1000-1500 kilometer line. And also the ASBM will effectively enable us to destroy vessels that come within this range.

{{Note: In the Sina.com version, the final two paragraphs are substituted with the following discussion of the sub-launched DF-26 variant and a torpedo-like payload without any additional detail:

另外具可靠消息透露,中国军方正加紧开发新型“航母末日”专用超高速潜水高爆火箭弹头,取名“龙啸”。预计“龙啸”脱离母弹入水后的速度为500千米，水下航程80千米，爆炸当量达到900千克TNT.

In addition, according to reliable sources, the PLA is developing a special use underwater warhead referred to as the “Longxiao.” It’s estimated that the Longxiao would separate from the main missile body and enter the water at a range of 500 kilometers (Chinese says “speed” though), have an underwater range of 80 kilometers, and have 900kg of explosives.

美军方分析，因潜射型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航弹道母导弹弹体偏大，目前中方只有094型战略导弹核潜艇和在研的095型核攻击潜艇、096型战略导弹核潜艇能够搭载。由于094型、096型战略导弹核潜艇的定位不同，携带“航母末日”的数量在3枚以内；095型核攻击潜艇可携带“航母末日”的数量在8——10枚左右.

American sources claim that because the size of a sub-launched ASBM structure is large, only the 094 submarine, 095 submarine that’s in development, and the 096 submarine could serve as launch platforms. Because the positions of the 094 and the 096 subs aren’t the same, they can only carry three missiles or less. The 095 should be able to carry 8-10 missiles.

END

Wild Strawberries in Washington DC

Reliable sources indicate that a handful of activists from Taiwan’s Wild Strawberry movement are in Washington DC for a two week visit. Sponsored by the Formosa Foundation, the activists are part of the foundation's annual Ambassador Program.

As a student movement, the Wild Strawberries jumped onto Taiwan's national scene in November 2008, when students launched a sit-in movement against what they perceived to be a heavy handed government approach to restricting the right to protest during the visit to Taiwan of Chen Yunlin, director of China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS).

Regardless of specific cause, it’s heartening to see activism in an era of global complacency and apathy. This is not to say that Taiwan is an apathetic democracy. Reflecting a sense of public civic duty, Taiwan’s turnout rate for national elections has been quite high since its first president election in 1996. In that year, the voter turnout was a remarkable 76%. Four years later, in the first peaceful transition of power, the voter turnout increased to nearly 83%. In 2004, it was 80%. In the March 2008 election that marked the second peaceful transfer of power in Taiwan’s history, voter turnout was 76%. In marked contrast, the United States has averaged a voter turnout of 50-55%. And in China, voter turnout was…well…0%. A high turnout is generally seen as evidence of the legitimacy of the current system.

Taiwan’s nascent democracy certainly has plenty of room for improvement, just as in our own system. One area in particular where youthful idealism can make a contribution is envisioning the future. Perhaps in part due to traditional passive resignation to fate, what sometimes seems to be lacking in Taiwan society is confidence in the ability to shape one’s future. Shaping the future starts with a clear long term vision, a net assessment of challenges and opportunities, and a detailed strategy broken down by focus area, goals, objectives, and specific actions. But it starts with defining an ideal future, and youth tend to be the best equipped for the necessary idealism. In a competitive environment, the side with a clear long term vision of what it wants and a detailed, measurable plan on how to get there will tend to be most successful.