PLA Eastern Theater Command Army SIGINT Operations Targeting Taiwan

One should assume that any electronic transmission on, into, and out of Taiwan -- military or civilian – is subject to Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) signals intelligence (SIGINT) monitoring. The Eastern Theater Command (ETC) Army manages the PLA’s largest enterprise responsible for monitoring Taiwan’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks.

Before 1985, the SIGINT enterprise opposite Taiwan was designated as the Fuzhou Military Region (FZMR) 3rd Bureau. After the FZMR's dissolution in 1985, the organization was incorporated into the Nanjing Military Region (NJMR) and designated as the NJMR 2nd Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (TRB). The NJMR was dissolved in January 2016, and supplanted by the ETC. The 2nd TRB (Unit 73630) has been reassigned to the ETC Army. It remains unknown if the unit retained its bureau (ju 局) designation. For the purposes of this discussion, the unit will be referred to as the ETC 2nd TRB.

Leadership

The ETC Army 2nd TRB is a division leader grade organization headquartered in a fairly large compound within Fuzhou's Cangshan District. Senior Colonel (SCOL) Zhou En (周恩) was assigned as director of the 2nd TRB in 2015, replacing Xu Yonggen (徐永根). SCOL Yang Longxi (杨龙溪; b. 1966) was assigned as political commissar in 2014. He previously served as political commissar of the Jinhua Military Sub-District (2013-2015) and deputy political commissar of  31st Group Army’s 86th Motorized Infanty Division. He replaced Zhai Weiping (翟卫平), who transferred to serve as political commissar of the ETC Army's Sanjie Training Base.

Bureau leaders oversee headquarters, political, and logistics departments, as well as a number of division deputy and/or regiment leader grade offices (chu 处) and a training group in Fuzhou's northern outskirts, including an annex of the PLA University of Information Engineering. An office may consist of a number of sections (ke 科 ), including field stations. At least two subordinate offices are headquartered in Fuzhou’s Gulou District, adjacent to the PLA’s “Three Warfares Base” (Base 311). Base 311, which is responsible for strategic psychological operations and propaganda directed against Taiwan’s society, is likely reliant on the 2nd TRB for intelligence support. One of the Gulou District offices (Unit 73635) has been suspected of cyber espionage against Taiwan government networks.

Field Stations

The 2nd TRB oversees at least nine field stations situated on higher elevations along the coast. Most are collocated with PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Navy (PLAN) air surveillance and/or technical reconnaissance sites. Following is a listing of suspected ETC 2nd TRB field stations:

Yushan Mountain Field Station. The Yushan Field Station is located within Ningde City's Xiapu County. The site, consisting of three geodesic domes and probable admin/operations buildings, is on a 1000 meter peak about seven kilometers northwest of a newly constructed Shuimen airbase (Geocoord: 26.994002, 120.028885).

Gushan Mountain Field Station. The Gushan Field Station is located in Fuzhou's Jin'an District, specifically on Gushan Mountain, just to the east of the city. At an elevation of more than 800 meters, the field station is collocated with a site subordinate to the PLAAF 2nd TRB. Five geodesic domes can be seen on Google Earth imagery, along with a number of uncovered parabolic dish antennas (Geocoord: 26.064769, 119.397687)

Dongjing Mountain Field Station. The Dongjing Field Station reportedly hosts elements of two ETC Army 2nd TRB offices (Fourth and Ninth) in Fuzhou (Fuqing) township of Donghang. The site has been in operation since the 1960s if not earlier (for English reporting, see here and here). The Dongjing Mountain facility also hosts elements of the PLAAF 4th Radar Brigade and the Xiamen ETC Army Electronic Countermeasures Regiment. Six radomes and at least nine parabolic antennas are visible on Google Earth. An additional radome can be seen at an annex about one kilometer to the southeast (Geocoord: 25.417109, 119.635307).

Junshan Mountain Field Station. The ETC Army 2nd TRB Fourth Office appears to maintain a collection activity on Junshan Mountain at the eastern end of Pingtan Island. At an elevation of 400 meters, the station is possibly associated with the Fourth Office and is collocated with a battalion under the PLAAF 4th Radar Brigade and a UI Navy unit. At least five geodesic domes can be seen on Google Earth, along with one probable air surveillance radar (Geocoord: 25.600175, 119.814155).

Nanhu Mountain Field Station. A probable 2nd TRB field station was established on Nanhu Mountain in the township of Dongzhang sometime between 2011 and 2014. The site consists of a single radome and a possible admin/operations building less than a kilometer to the northwest. At an elevation of 800 meters, the field station may be subordinate to the Ninth Office, which is headquartered in the Fuzhou City (Fuqing) township of Longtian (Geocoord: 25.742774, 119.237122).

Hugong Mountain Field Station. Another field station probably linked with the 2nd TRB Fourth Office is located on Putian's Hugong Mountain. A 25-meter geodesic dome can be seen on Google Earth imagery, along with a UI antenna and admin/ops area (Geocoord: 25.359888, 119.007907).

Nanri Island Detachment. An ETC Army 2nd TRB Fourth Office detachment reportedly is stationed in the village of Dachikou on Putian's Nanri Island. In that area, a single 4-meter radome and possible support building are visible on Google Earth (Geocoord: 25.174894, 119.531909).

Wanshiyan Field Station. A relatively new field station appears to have established on Xiamen's Wanshiyan community (Dongping Mountain) after 2005. Site construction continued through 2012. The site consists of four geodesic domes and at least two possible admin/operations areas. A associated compound is on Yundingyan Mountain (Xiguling), about 4.5 kilometers to the east. The latter facility at Xiguling appears to support the PLAN's 2nd TRB (Geocoord: 24.451641, 118.111547).

Daimao Mountain Field Station. The ETC Army 2nd TRB Daimao Mountain Field Station is located north of Zhangpu County's Chilingxiang village. Site construction began in 2005, and consists of two radomes and an admin/ops area (Geocoord: 24.325314, 117.800643).

PLA Eastern Theater Command Leadership

The establishment of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command on February 1, 2016 marked a milestone in the security situation in the Taiwan Strait. The command succeeded the Nanjing Military Region as the principle organization responsible for political-military coercion and use of force against Taiwan. The Eastern Theater Command’s geographic scope covers the provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Fuzhou, and Jiangxi, as well as Shanghai City. For an outstanding overview of the broader PLA reorganization, see Ken Allen, Dennis Blasko, and John Corbett's two-part article published in February 2016 by the Jamestown Foundation. 

Under authority of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the Eastern Theater's Party Committee probably functions as the command’s senior-most policy-making body. The political commissar presumably serves as party secretary. The commander is deputy secretary. Party Committee members include three standing deputy commanders, at least one standing deputy political commissar (the secretary of the command's Discipline Inspection Commission has yet to be identified), Army, Navy and Air Force component commanders (dual hatted as Eastern Theater Command deputy commanders), and directors of the Logistical Support and Equipment Departments (two of four standing deputy commanders also function as directors of the Joint Staff and Political Work Departments). Below are brief biographical summaries of senior Eastern Theater Command personalities (eg., theater and deputy theater grade officers). 

Eastern Theater Command General Headquarters

东部战区

Nanjing

General (GEN) Liu Yuejun (刘粤军; b. 1954) was assigned as commander of the PLA Eastern Theater Command in February 2016. He previously commanded the Lanzhou Military Region (LMR; 2012-2015), served as LMR chief of staff (2007-2012), commanded the 42nd Group Army (2002-2007), and was the first commander of the Macao Garrison (1999-2002). Liu Yuejun spent much of his early career with the 41st Group Army’s 123rd Infantry Division and allegedly commanded a company during the Vietnamese border conflict. He was promoted to lieutentant general (LTG) in 2008 and GEN in 2015, and is a full member of the 18th Central Committee. His father reportedly is Liu Yide (刘义德), who was involved in political work with the 41st Group Army.

GEN Zheng Weiping (郑卫平; b. 1955) was assigned as political commissar of the Eastern Theater Command in February 2016. He previously served as political commissar of the Nanjing Military Region (NMR; 2012-01/2016), directed the Guangzhou Military Region Political Department (2007-2012) and served as political commissar of the 41st Group Army (2005-2007). Earlier in his career, he served in various National Defense University positions and was a mishu within the General Political Department (GPD) General Office, likely supporting former GPD director, Li Jinai (李继耐; b. 1942). Zheng Weiping was promoted to GEN in 2015, and is a member of the 18th Central Committee.

LTG Yang Hui (杨晖; b. 1963) was assigned as deputy commander of the Eastern Theater Command in February 2016. He is dual hatted as chief of staff, directing the command's Joint Staff Department. He previously served as NMR chief of staff (2011-2016) and directed the GSD Intelligence Department (2PLA; 2007-2011). He also served as deputy commander of the 31st Group Army (2006-2007), maintained a brief affiliation with the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (2005-2006), and served as deputy director of the GSD Technical Reconnaissance Department (3PLA; 2001-2005). He was promoted to major general (MG) in 2007 and LTG in 2013, and is an alternate member of the 18th Central Committee.

LTG Wang Ping (王平; b. 1955) was assigned as deputy political commissar of the Eastern Theater Command in February 2016. He is dual hatted as director of the command’s Political Department. He previously served as deputy political commissar of the Nanjing Military Region (2012-2015) and political commissar of the 1st Group Army (2006-2012). With roots within the Shenyang Military Region, Wang Ping also directed the 16th Group Army Political Department, and subsequently served as its deputy political commissar (2002-2006). He was assigned to the 39th Group Army earlier in his career. He was promoted to LTG in 2014.

Rear Admiral (RADM) Gu Xiangbing (顾祥兵; b. 1959) was assigned as deputy commander of the Eastern Theater Command in February 2016. He previously served as deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet (07/2011-02/2016), commandant of the Submarine Academy (2009-2011), deputy chief of staff of the North Sea Fleet, and commander of a UI submarine unit. He was promoted to RADM in 2010.

LTG Sun Herong (孙和荣; b. 1957) was assigned as deputy commander of the Eastern Theater Command in February 2016. He previously commanded the Jinan Military Region Air Force (JMRAF; 2012-2015); served as deputy commander and chief of staff of the JMRAF (2011-2012); deputy chief of staff of the Nanjing Military Region Air Force (NMRAF); and deputy chief of staff of the Shenyang Military Region Air Force.

Eastern Theater Command Army

东部战区陆军

Fuzhou

LTG Qin Weijiang (秦卫江; b. 1955) was assigned as commander of the Eastern Theater Command Army in February 2016. He is dual hatted as deputy commander of the Eastern Theater Command. He previously served as deputy commander of the Nanjing Military Region (12/2010-01/2016), commanded the 27th Group Army (2006-2010), served as deputy chief of staff of the Beijing Military Region (BMR; 2005-2006), deputy commander of the 65th Group Army, and commanded of the Shanxi Military District. He is reportedly the son of former Minister of Defense Qin Jiwei (秦基伟; 1914-1997). Qin Weijiang was promoted to MG in 2000 and LTG in 2012.

MG Liao Keduo (廖可铎; b. 1958) was assigned as political commissar of the Eastern Theater Command Army in February 2016. He previously served as political commissar of the Tianjin Garrison (2015-2016), deputy director of the BMR Political Department (2010-2012), and director of the 38th Group Army Political Department (2006-2010). Most of his earlier career was spent within the BMR Political Department. He was promoted to MG in 2008.

Eastern Theater Command Navy (East Sea Fleet)

东部战区海军 / 海军东海舰队

Ningbo

Vice Admiral (VADM) Su Zhiqian (苏支前; b. 1955) was assigned as commander of the Eastern Theater Command Navy in February 2016. He is dual hatted as deputy commander of the Eastern Theater Command. He previously commanded the East Sea Fleet (2011-01/2016), commanded the South Sea Fleet (2008-2011), and served as South Sea Fleet deputy chief of staff, chief of staff, and deputy commander (2000-2008). He was promoted to VADM in 2010. 

VADM Wang Huayong (王华勇; b. 1955) was assigned as political commissar of the Eastern Theater Command Navy in February 2016. He is dual hatted as deputy political commissar of the Eastern Theater Command. He previously served as political commissar of the East Sea Fleet, directed the South Sea Fleet Political Department, and served as political commissar of the Yulin Support Base. He was promoted to VADM in 2014.

Eastern Theater Command Air Force

东部战区空军

Nanjing

LTG Huang Guoxin (黄国显; b. 1962) was assigned as commander of the Eastern Theater Command Air Force in February 2016. He is dual hatted as deputy commander of the Eastern Command. He previously commanded the Nanjing Military Region Air Force (NMRAF; 2013-2015), served as NMRAF chief of staff (2011-2013), and commanded the Fuzhou Air Command Post (2005-2011) and Kunming Air Command Post (2004-2005). He was promoted to MG in 2009 and LTG in 2014.

MG Liu Dewei (刘德伟; b. 1959) was assigned as political commissar of the Eastern Theater Command Air Force in February 2016. He previously served as NMRAF political commissar (07/2015-01/2016) and as deputy director of the PLAAF Political Department (2013-2015). He was promoted to MG in 2010.

Michael O’Hanlon, “One China, Two Governments,” and Taiwan’s Defense

During a recent conference hosted by the National Bureau of Asian Research and reported in the Taipei Times, Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution asked the audience to consider if the US needed to “weaken” its defense commitment to Taiwan. Consideration of weakened defense commitment presumably would entail a thoughtful review of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). O’Hanlon asks if U.S. “strategy for the defense of Taiwan” has the ability to survive for another decade or two.” He also commented on perceived asymmetry of interests between America and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and injected a personal view, saying “China cares more about Taiwan than we do — it’s just a fact.”

Michael O’Hanlon is a talented and esteemed defense policy analyst, and his call for greater creativity in deliberate war planning is dead on. However, his “dramatic” question – whether or not the US needs to weaken its defense commitment to Taiwan – could be reframed in order to better focus public attention.

How to Best Align U.S. Policy With Objective Reality?

The key question we should be asking is this: How could U.S. policy toward Taiwan best reflect a more accurate representation of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait? An unintended consequence of a thoughtful review of the TRA is the introduction of alternatives. When compared side by side, normalization of relations with both sides of the Taiwan Strait -- the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) -- is more consistent with US interests than abandonment of principles through repeal of the TRA. The more the Beijing and its supporters push for abrogation of the TRA, and by extension full adoption of the CCP position on sovereignty, the more attention should be directed toward the most viable alternative -- normalization of diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Taiwan, under its existing ROC constitutional framework, exists as an independent sovereign state. The status quo today is the existence of two sovereign, independent states on both sides of the Taiwan Strait with overlapping territorial claims embedded in their constitutions – authoritarian PRC and democratic Taiwan. Taiwan is a state by any accepted definition of customary international law and practice. Millions of residents from the island carry a passport that says “Republic of China (Taiwan),” a democratically elected government that controls an area the size of Maryland, Delaware, and Rhode Island combined. Taiwan has a convertible currency, a capitol, and the capacity to make and respect international commitments. Taiwan has been one of America’s top 10 trading partners and a critical node in the international high tech supply chain. Anyone who has spent a reasonable amount of time on Taiwan and in China can sense the two sides are as different as the United States is from Canada, the United Kingdom, or Australia.

“One China, Two Governments” as the Alternative to Abandonment

Dual recognition in the Taiwan Strait is unlikely but possible within the context of a “One China” policy since the PRC and ROC constitutions can be interpreted as having overlapping territorial jurisdictional claims. In other words, “One China” is embodied in constitutional overlap. Between the Conlon Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of 1959 and the UN seat issue of 1971, the mainstream U.S. policy and academic community viewed dual recognition as in the best interest of the United States. Former National Security Advisor to President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, operated in isolation from this community, and it’s an uphill battle to recover from the colossal mistake that he still tries to glorify. He sacrificed the dual recognition option in favor of short term political expediency related to Vietnam and Nixon’s flailing public image.

Under a “One China, Two Governments” formula, the United States would continue to abstain from supporting either side’s territorial claim. Normalization of U.S.-ROC relations would not undermine a “One China” principle any more than our dual recognition of both Germanys during the Cold War. Dual recognition would not imply support for de jure Taiwan independence, and nor would it foreclose the option. Issues of independence or unification should be left to both sides of the Taiwan Strait to work out between themselves. If the two sides of the Taiwan Strait decide to unify at some point in the future, that result should be welcomed as long as it is uncoerced. And Taiwan independence should not be ruled out as a viable outcome as long as the process is peaceful.

KMT, DPP, and “One China, Two Governments”

The only reasonable and enduring solution for stable, constructive ties with both sides of the Taiwan Strait is dual recognition. Would both KMT and DPP Central Committees oppose or support normalization of US-ROC relations? Fundamental areas of consensus exist between the KMT and DPP on key policy issues. Normalization would be a dream come true for the KMT and Ma administration, but they can not openly push it. It’s possible that they could push ROC sovereignty if Beijing steps up its campaign in Washington for a “thoughtful review” of the Taiwan Relations Act. Short of that, making trouble with both Beijing and Washington at the same time would be disastrous. Many senior KMT members thought Chiang Kai-shek’s refusal to push for such an arrangement in the lead up to the UN vote in 1971 was idiotic (see Jay Taylor’s fascinating bio of Chiang Kai-shek on this issue). Oddly enough, hardline nationalists in the DPP could undermine a move within Congress in favor of normalization if it implied Taiwan is part of “One China,” regardless of how loosely “China” is defined.

Yet political competition leads toward a natural tendency of both sides to paint the other in the darkest hue of Blue or Green as possible. Americans should understand democracy and this tendency. But they often buy into pan-Blue rhetoric that casts the DPP as crazed troublemakers intent on sacrificing every drop of American blood for Taiwan independence. And they often buy DPP rhetoric that the KMT is pro-China, which is implied to be synonymous with pro-Communist. The KMT dropped any reference to unification in their 2009 revised party charter. In 2009, Chinese observers slammed Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou as “mianli cangzhen” or “hiding a needle in cotton,” and a “dutai fenzi,” advocating an independent Taiwan. An “independent Taiwan” is defined as advocating shared sovereignty, coexistence of equal entities with each side having its own administrative jurisdiction that is not subordinate to the other, and a status quo calling for “mutual non-denial,” and highlighting unification as an option but not inevitable.

As a consensus on Taiwan regarding sovereignty solidifies, political leaders in Beijing may find themselves forced to come to grips with an objective reality. If CCP authorities are sincere in their desire to arrive at some sustainable political solution, then the party's cross-Strait policy has to change in a fundamental way. In this environment, DPP supporters could play the loyal opposition in a DPP/KMT good cop/bad cop effort, and push dual recognition in the name of the ROC. The US side could even negotiate a U.S.-ROC Joint Communique to enshrine a “One China” policy in bilateral relations if needed. Or maybe even a fourth US-PRC Communique!

Another Core Question

For the cost of one PAC-3 missile, another fundamental question that the Obama administration or Congress could pose to federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), public think tanks, and America’s best and brightest China scholars for serious study is this:

How to best persuade the CCP Central Committee Standing Committee to accommodate objective reality and relate to Taiwan as an equally legitimate member of the international community?

Even Hu Jintao said “under One China, anything is possible.” Taiwan is undeniably a state within any conventional use of that term in common parlance or international law. Yet Taiwan is not recognized by much of the international community due to subjective interpretation of potential effects that dual recognition could have on relations with the PRC. 

So under what conditions would leaders in Beijing accept the ROC as a legitimate equal to the PRC, and how could America help make this happen? Maybe the answer is that normalization of U.S.-ROC relations would only come with utter and complete collapse of the CCP’s monopoly on power. Regardless, one should be careful about assuming China cares more about Taiwan than we do until a much better accounting of complexities, costs, and opportunities.

Taiwan is Defensible

Final comment. Because Taiwan’s democratic system of government – an alternative to mainland China’s authoritarian model -- presents an existential challenge to the CCP, the PLA continues to rely on military coercion to compel concessions on sovereignty. CCP success in alienating Taiwan legitimizes its reliance of coercive military power to resolve political differences around its periphery.

As one recent article notes, Taiwan is a core interest of the United States and has a pivotal role to play as an ad hoc coalition partner in U.S. defense policy and the strategic rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific. Michael O’Hanlon asserts that U.S., Taiwan, and other defense establishments in the region may weaken relative to China. PLA anti-access, area denial (A2/D2) capabilities are getting good. But not that good. The PLA Joint Theater Command directing an amphibious invasion campaign is a complex system. Like any system, vulnerable single points of failure exist. Properly equipped, trained, and backed as needed by a U.S. Joint Task Force, Taiwan is and will remain defensible. The basis of O’Hanlon’s assertion that Taiwan, with U.S. intervention, would over time be unable to defend against an amphibious invasion is unclear.

END

Chinese Provincial Leader Visits to Taiwan: Opportunities for U.S.-Taiwan Relations?

The People's Republic of China (PRC) State Council Taiwan Affairs Office recently announced the visit of Fujian Governor Su Shulin [苏树林] to Taiwan the last week of March 2012.  Su is expected to lead a delegation to meet with local farmers, fishermen and young entrepreneurs in order to “build understanding between mainland and Taiwanese people and promote trade between Fujian and Taiwan.”    While unclear, Su may also promote a proposal for joint governance of Pingtan Island and the long standing concept of a Western Taiwan Strait Economic Zone (“Haixi” for short).

With at least 21 provincial leaders landing on Taiwan over the last three years, visits that were unthinkable only five years ago have become commonplace. However, Su’s visit may be unique.  Su Shulin will be the first potential member of China’s “Sixth Generation” leadership to travel to Taiwan.  Born in 1962, Su has spent most of his career in China’s oil business, and served as chairman of the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), ranked seventh on Fortune Global 500’s list of the world’s largest corporations in 2010.  Su Shulin assumed the Fujian governor position last year.


Chinese Influence Operations and the Double Edged Sword

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee has promoted increasingly frequent senior level visits to Taiwan as part of a broader strategy aimed at winning hearts and minds on the island. Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Jia Qinglin [贾庆林], appears to be managing China’s strategy toward Taiwan on behalf of Hu Jintao, or at least coordinating policy on Taiwan.  Jia Qinglin is a member of the CCP Small Leading Group on Taiwan Affairs.

The linkage between the high tempo of exchanges and recent elections on Taiwan is hard to miss.  Pledging economic benefits may be a more effective way of influencing elections than lobbing missiles off the coast.  These visits seek to win hearts and minds.  Committing to opening markets to Taiwanese enterprises and buying sprees, Beijing has targeted the central and southern areas of Taiwan, the traditional power bases of the sovereign-minded Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

From another angle, Chinese provincial/municipal party and government leaders may hope to attract the kinds of investment that could ensure career advancement in the lead up to the 18th Party Congress later this year.  Delegations have generally met with Honorary KMT Chairmen Lien Chan and Wu Po-hsiung, Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, People First Party Chairman James Soong, and New Party Chairman Yu Mu-ming.

Taiwanese enterprises have at least U.S. $150 billion invested in China, and provincial/municipal leaders understand that a successful record in local economic development is the key to career advancement within the CCP. Senior CCP members need Taiwan for personal and professional advancement as much as, if not more than, Taiwan needs China.  The visits have been taking place within the context of a series of KMT-CCP cross-Strait economic, trade, and cultural forum meetings.  To date, forum meetings had been held in Beijing (April 2006); Hainan (October 2006) Beijing (April 2007); Shanghai (December 2008); Changsha (July 2009); Guangzhou (July 2010); and Chengdu (May 2011).  KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung and CPPCC Chairman Jia Qinglin have led each side's respective delegations.

Each provincial visit is a double edged sword.  Spending time on both sides of the Taiwan Strait is one the best ways to understand that Taiwan and China are as different as the United States is from the UK or Australia.  Taiwan, under its existing Republic of China (ROC) constitution, is an independent, sovereign state. Taiwanese hosts are gracious and accommodating to foreign guests, and Chinese visitors should be wined, dined, and granted diplomatic courtesies the same as Americans and other international representatives.

At the same time, the KMT and DPP understand the games authorities play in Beijing.  Based on policy prescriptions of the CCP Small Leading Group on Taiwan, the CCP Propaganda Department seeks to manipulate perceptions that Taiwan is equal to a province in stature, thus expanding the sovereignty gap in China’s favor.

Opportunities for Deepening and Broadening U.S.-Taiwan Relations

Increasingly sensitive to signs of abandonment or neglect, the Ma administration has been consistent in requesting interactions with the Obama administration that in effect seek balance in cross-Strait and U.S.-Taiwan relations.  Senior U.S. officials presumably see these visits as positive.  Expanding cross-Strait interactions offer U.S. policymakers with opportunities, should officials have the foresight to recognize them.  Visits create an environment conducive to relaxed restrictions on more senior U.S. visits to Taiwan.  It’s happening, although slow.  U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel B. Poneman visited Taiwan in December 2011, the most senior official to visit in over a decade.   United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator Rajiv Shah also visited Taipei in December. However, Congress should be nudging the Executive Branch to pay attention and do more.

The Ma Administration is investing hope in the Obama Administration’s willingness to help address the sovereignty gap.  US-Taiwan relations should maintain pace with growing cross-Strait ties, and six areas need further attention:

• Further commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and further reaffirmation of the Six Assurances made to Taiwan in 1982; 
• Regularized arms sales notifications to Congress, including those for direct commercial sales, under Sections 36(b) and 36(c) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA);
• Increase in frequency and level of senior U.S. Executive Branch visits to Taiwan.  
• Reinvigorating the economic dialogue, including Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) negotiations that have been frozen since July 2007.
• Further support for Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations, specifically UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

List of Chinese Provincial Level Visits to Taiwan, 2009-2012

For reference purposes, here’s a sampling of provincial-level leadership visits:

Leader	Dates	Comments
Li Chongxi 李崇禧 Sichuan Province	1-6 Nov 09	Li Chongxi, Sichuan’s Deputy Communist Party Chief, led a 250+ member delegation to Taiwan to discuss cooperation in trade and tourism.  The visit was in part intended to express appreciation for Taiwan’s assistance to earthquake relief in May 2008, and to reciprocate for several visits of Lien Chan, Wu Poh-hsiung and Chiang Pin-kung to Sichuan.
Liang Baohua 梁保华 Jiangsu Province	9-15 Nov 09	At the invitation of the KMT Central Committee, Jiangsu Communist Party Chief Liang Baohua visited Taiwan for six days, the first provincial leader visit since 1949.  In its reporting, China’s Xinhua News Agency referred to Taiwan as a “province” in commemorating the opening of "Jiangsu-Taiwan Week." With the highest per capita GDP in China, Jiangsu is hosts more than 30% of Taiwan’s total investment in China, with half of this concentrated in Kunshan.  Liang Baohua is a member of the 17th Central Committee.
Xu Guangchun 徐光春 Henan Province	14-20 Dec 09	Henan Province Communist Party Chief Xu Guangchun committed to buying as much as US $500 million in goods.  He also pledged to produce over 100,000 tourists to Taiwan in 2010. He was formerly head of Xinhua’s Shanghai bureau, Minister of State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), and Deputy Director of the CCP Propaganda Department.
Han Zheng 韩正 Shanghai Municipality	4-9 Apr 10	Shanghai Mayor Han Zheng led a delegation of more than 200 representatives to Taiwan in the lead up to the World Expo 2010 in Shanghai.  Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin led a delegation to visit Shanghai in June 2008, and Han Zheng’s visit marked the first by a Shanghai mayor in history.  Civic organizations from Taipei and Shanghai had conducted annual exchanges each year since 2001.
Luo Qingquan 罗清泉 Hubei Province	19-25 Apr 10	Hubei Communist Party Chief Luo Qingquan visited Taiwan for a six day visit.  The group pledged purchases of Taiwanese products valued at U.S. $500 million.  Luo, a member of 17th Central Committee, also visited Chungtian TV facilities.
Huang Xiaojing 黄小晶 Fujian Province	5-10 May 10	Fujian Governor Huang Xiaojing made a six-day visit to Taiwan at the invitation of the KMT’s National Policy Foundation.
Liu Qibao 刘奇葆 Sichuan Province	23-28 May 10	Sichuan Party Chief Liu Qibao visited Taiwan for exchanges in the areas of economy, finance, education and culture.
Lu Zushan 吕祖善 Zhejiang Province	10-18 Jun 10	Zhejiang Governor Lu Zushan made an eight-day visit to Taiwan to initiate cooperative programs in finance, agriculture, tourism, culture and education.
Guo Shengkun 郭声琨 Guangxi Autonomous Region	1-10 Jul 10	Guangxi Communist Party Chief Guo Shengkun led a large delegation to Taiwan in early July 2010 for purchasing of agricultural products machinery valued at U.S. $200 million and to attract Taiwanese investment.  The visit took place in the wake of the ECFA signing in Chongqing on 29 Jun 10.  ECFA was to be in force as of 1 January 2011.
Chen Weigen 陈伟根 Jilin Province	4-10 Jul 10	Jilin Vice Governor Chen Weigen led a buying delegation to Taiwan consisting of representatives from eight major enterprises. The delegation targeted agricultural products, food packaging equipments, auto parts, textile products, handcrafts, and furniture from Taiwan.  Born in 1955, Chen formerly served as Chairman, China National Machinery Import and Export Group.
Mei Kebao 梅克保 Hunan Province	3-8 Aug 10	Hunan Communist Party Deputy Chief Mei Kebao led a delegation of over 100 representatives from Hunan for “Hunan-Taiwan week” and the 6th Hunan-Taiwan Exchange and Cooperation Forum on Economy and Trade at the Grand Hotel in Taipei. Mei represented Hunan Party Chief Zhou Qiang, considered to a rising Sixth Generation leader within the CCP.  A Hunan website referred to Taiwan as a province. The visit was followed up by a group from Taiwan that visited Hunan for the 7th Hunan-Taiwan Financial Cooperation Forum, including New Party Chairman Yok Mu-ming and Want Want Holdings CEO Cai Yanming.  The group met with Zhou Qiang, Governor Xu Shousheng, and Chen Yunlin.
Zhao Zhengyong 赵正勇 Shaanxi Province	13-19 Sep 10	Shaanxi Governor Zhao Zhengyong visited Taiwan for “Taiwan-Shaanxi Week.” Zhao ran Anhui Province’s Public Security Bureau from 1993 to 2001.  Zhao’s visit was the last before a two month freeze on visits in the lead up to the 27 November 2010 municipal elections on Taiwan.
Pre-Municipal Election Freeze September 2010 – December 2010
Ji Lin 吉林 Beijing Municipality	13-17 Dec 10	After the municipal elections in Taiwan, Beijing Vice Mayor Ji Lin led a 200-member delegation to Taiwan for discussions with senior officials in Taipei and a cross-Strait forum on science and technology held at the Howard Plaza Hotel in Taichung on 15 December.   Before his arrival, Falungong practitioners in Taiwan filed a lawsuit against Ji Lin for abuses in Beijing. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan adopted a resolution earlier in the month requiring Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the National Immigration Agency (NIA) to deny entry for Chinese officials known to have been involved in human rights abuses.
Chen Zhenggao 陈政高 Liaoning Province	15-21 Feb 11	Liaoning Governor Chen Zhenggao led a delegation to Taiwan for a “Liaoning-Taiwan Economic &Trade Corporation Forum. “ The groundwork for Chen’s visit was established in August 2010, when Dalian Deputy Mayor Dai Yulin led a buying delegation, with meetings held at the Taipei International Convention Center. Chen traveled to Hsinchu and Taichung where he allegedly placed large orders for agricultural products like tea, wine, honey and oranges.  The visit was hosted by the Taiwan Council for Industrial and Commercial Development (CICD). Taiwanese investment in Liaoning is growing, and the 10th annual Liaoning-Taiwan was held in Dandong in September 2011. Chen Zhenggao’s visit was followed by Vice Minister Jiang Zengwei, who represented Beijing for the first Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee (ECC), held in Chungli (Taoyuan County) on 22 February 2011.
Wang Sanyun 王三运 Anhui Province	18-25 Apr 11	Governor Wang Sanyun led a 2000-member delegation from Anhui to visit Taipei, Hsinchu, Kaohisung, and other locations on Taiwan.
Ma Biao 马飚 Guangxi Autonomous Region	23-30 Apr 11	Guangxi Communist Party Chief Ma Biao spent most of his time in Hualian, where buyers were focused on tea and clam products. Closely following the visit was the seventh Cross-Strait Economic, Trade, and Culture Forum held in Chengdu on 6 May 2011.  Representing Taiwan was KMT Honorary Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung, who met with CCP Secretary General Hu Jintao in Beijing afterwards.  Jia Qinglin, CPPCC Chairman urged the people of Taiwan to "choose the right person" in two upcoming major elections on the island in order to maintain the stable development of the cross-strait relationship.
Jiang Jufeng 蒋巨峰 Sichuan Province	21-26 May 11	Sichuan Governor Jiang Jufeng visited Taiwan for “Taiwan and Sichuan Week.”  The first provincial-level leader to arrive Taiwan via Kaohsiung, Jiang spent most of his time in southern Taiwan and visited areas affected by Typhoon Morakot.  In Taipei, the visit was marked by a scuffle between security at the Grand Hotel and pro-Tibetan protestors. Jiang visited Sichuan pandas at the Taipei zoo.  Until his assignment to Sichuan, Jiang had spent most of his career in Zhejiang.
Zhao Hongzhu 赵洪祝 Zhejiang Province	26 May – 5 Jun 11	Zhejiang Party Secretary Zhao Hongzhu led a delegation of more than 660 people to Taiwan.
Jiang Daming 姜大明 Shandong Province	11-17 Jul 11	Governor Jiang Daming led a delegation from Shandong Province to Taiwan for an economic and trade forum at Taipei's World Trade Center.  Shandong rates fourth after Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Fujian, in level of Taiwanese investment.  Foxconn’s manufacturing plant in Yantai, which employs 80,ooo workers, is Taiwan’s largest single investment in Shandong.  This single factory is said to produce over 10% of Shandong’s exports.
Huang Huahua 黄华华 Guangdong Province	16-22 Aug 11	Guangdong Governor Huang Huahua supposedly pledged to buy more than U.S. $5 billion in agricultural and electronic products.  Huang resigned his position as governor in November 2011, and was replaced by Zhu Xiaodan [朱小丹]. Before his assignment as governor in 2003, Huang had served in senior party positions in Guangdong’s Shaoguan and Meizhou, cities that host PLA Second Artillery ballistic missile brigades oriented toward Taiwan.
Pre-National Election Freeze September 2011 – February 2012
Guo Jinlong 郭金龙 Beijing Municipality	16-21 Feb 12	Beijing Mayor Guo Jinlong led a delegation of more than 100 people and was the first mayor of Beijing to visit Taiwan.
Su Shulin 苏树林 Fujian Province	upcoming	Governor of Fujian Province Su Shulin is scheduled to visit Taiwan the last week of March 2012.   Other visits this Spring are said to include Jiangsu Communist Party Secretary Luo Zhijun [罗志军].  Luo was formerly in charge of the Communist Youth League-managed China Youth Daily and mayor of Nanjing.   Another group from Hubei Province is scheduled to visit Taiwan this Spring.  It had been delayed from last year due to severe flooding of the Yangzi River.

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