THE TAIWAN LINK

Jinan Military Region Leadership Visit to the United States

2011-09-13T08:18:00.001-04:00

A People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military delegation led by General FAN Changlong [范长龙], commander of the Jinan Military Area Command, began an official visit to the United States this weekend. Born in 1947 in Donggang City (Liaoning Province), Gen FAN formerly served as 16th Group Army Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Shenyang Military Region. He’s commanded the Jinan Military Region since 2004.

Other senior members of the delegation include Rear Admiral DU Xiping [杜希平], Deputy Commander of the North China Sea Fleet; Major General (MGen) WU Huijian [吴辉建], Commander, Jinan Military Region Air Force; and MGen MA Yiming [马宜明], Commander, 26th Group Army.

The make up of the delegation indicates a training theme. MGen Ma Yiming is dual hated as 26^th Group Army Commander and Director of the Jinan Military Region’s Weifang Military Training Coordination Zone. The PLA’s premier “Blue Force” joint training complex, Weifang sponsors the Lianhe series of joint training exercises, which includes naval, air, and amphibious landing training. [2]

Obama’s Failing Taiwan Policy

2011-08-02T07:59:00.024-04:00

Recent reports and editorials have highlighted challenges that the Obama administration faces in managing ties with Taiwan. Sensing a failing Taiwan policy. Members of Congress are ratcheting up the pressure. And rightly so. Plagued by an acute case of decidophobia, the Obama administration’s unwillingness to accept and act upon a legitimate request for a follow-on procurement of F-16 fighters symbolizes a broader problem. The problem is creeping abandonment of democratic Taiwan in favor of an increasingly assertive authoritarian People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Not since the Carter administration has an Executive Branch inched so close to casting aside Taiwan in order to placate China for ostensibly strategic reasons. This isn’t just a Republican-Democrat issue. Relatively speaking, the Clinton administration deserves high marks. And the current failings of the Obama administration can, at least in part, be a carry-over from the latter part of the Bush administration. While difficult to pinpoint, one could trace the problem to a select number of senior political appointees close to the President, weak leadership at the senior levels of the Pentagon, and an increasingly sophisticated and effective PRC influence operations campaign.

The Obama Team’s Line Up

One had high hopes for the Obama team as it entered office in January 2009. The administration’s Asia team members included seasoned, strategically-minded veterans, such as Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of Defense LTG (ret) Chip Gregson, and Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Derek Mitchell. The latter two focused much of their time on Central Asia issues, despite having significant “boots on the ground” time in Taiwan. Chip Gregson has departed, and Derek Mitchell has been nominated to serve as Special Representative to Burma. Replacements have yet to be confirmed, including nomination of Mark Lippert as Chip Gregson’s replacement.

Sharp, seasoned Pentagon staffers with years of China/Taiwan policy experience within the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) include retired Navy Captain Joe Skinner and Principal Director Dave Helvey. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense with direct oversight of Taiwan policy is long time Dianne Feinstein staffer Mike Schiffer. Most likely focused on Korea, Japan, and China military-to-military issues, Schiffer has made few public statements indicating strong support for Taiwan’s position. His former boss, Senator Feinstein, has been a leading proponent of China and advocate of U.S.-China relations. At the same time, she has questioned U.S. security assistance to Taiwan (see below).

Highly sensitive to how Taiwan arms sales could affect the U.S.-China military relationship, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Under Secretary of Defense Michelle Flournoy have been less vocal than their predecessors on Taiwan issues. In fact, Secretary Gates was quite sensitive to Chinese concerns regarding arms sales, without much apparent concern for Taiwan. Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Lynn, who served as a senior Raytheon executive for seven years, appears to have recused himself on Taiwan issues. Lynn has announced his departure later this summer or Fall, and a replacement has yet to be named.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Mike Mullen has endorsed Track 2 dialogues between ostensibly retired senior PLA officers and retired Navy Admiral Bill Owens, Joe Prueher, and others who have advocated abandonment of Taiwan. “Abandonment” of Taiwan presumably means amending or revoking the Taiwan Relations Act. Unlike their authoritarian cousins to the west who meet with the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon and in Beijing on a regular basis, Taiwan’s access to senior Pentagon officials remains severely limited. Newly appointed Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, may be more sympathetic to Taiwan, and Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) ADM Robert Willard has been a solid advocate of Taiwan’s defense.

The remainder of the bureaucracy is relatively consistent with the past. Senior representatives of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), such as Bill Stanton, Ray Burghart, Barbara Schrage, and Greg Man offer solid policy advice. Very capable China hands originally included Jeff Bader, President Obama’s senior director for East Asian affairs. Jeff has returned to Brookings, and been replaced by a Korea specialist, Danny Russel. Former RAND analyst Evan Medeiros manages the China/Taiwan portfolio on the National Security Staff. As the sole remaining China hand in the Old Executive Office Building, Evan has demonstrated sympathy to Taiwan in the past, despite reports to the contrary.

This has been a solid line up, and people who should have been able develop creative solutions to balance interests in good China relations while not sacrificing Taiwan. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, presumably under advisement from Kurt Campbell, deserves high marks, as demonstrated by her tough rebukes against Chinese activities in the South China Sea. The remainder of the State Department bureaucracy serves as the bedrock of a principled status quo. These days, principled status quo is good. One should never forget the State Department resisted DoD efforts to re-establish military-to-military relations with China in the wake of the PLA’s bloody crackdown on protestors in June 1989.

Weaknesses

So where is Obama team failing? Even the perception of drift toward abandoning a democracy in favor of an authoritarian Chinese government that relies on implied threats of force to resolve political differences. After all, the objective reality is that the Republic of China (ROC) exists as nation-state, despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations.In addition to weak support at senior levels within the Pentagon, problems may start with the Deputies Committee (DC). First, Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg is said to have been personally invested in the notion of “strategic reassurance” with China, which presumably means accommodation of China (e.g., appeasement). The new buzzword is “strategic mutual trust.” Until his recent departure, Steinberg likely dominated DC meetings that addressed China issues, or Taiwan if ever raised to that level in the past couple of years. Tom Donilon served as Deputy National Security Advisor until last year, when he was appointed as Obama’s National Security Advisor. Donilon’s replacement, Denis McDonough, has no apparent record on Taiwan issues.

Theoretically, DC meetings tee up issues for consideration by the Principals. Secretary of Defense Bill Gates has been weak, and Donilon has no record on Taiwan to speak of. In short, adding to the weakness is a relatively passive Department of Defense, the traditional bedrock of support for Taiwan. Perhaps supporting a policy of strategic reassurance, senior uniformed military officers, such as CJCS Mullen, appear personally invested in a politically-tinged military relationship with counterparts within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Influencing Taiwan Policy from the Outside

Another factor contributing toward the drift in U.S. Taiwan policy may be the role of informal opinion leaders or groups. Beijing understands where to focus its influence – retired senior U.S. military officers with residual connections in the Pentagon, the financial establishment, and other communities of influence. Beijing has actively sought out U.S. friends willing to call for a halt to arms sales, amendment of the Taiwan Relations Act, or abandonment of Taiwan. China and its representatives also has been targeting traditionally conservative groups, such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW).

One forum in particular – the Sanya Initiative - has involved retired four star generals and admirals. Sponsors have included the China Association for International Friendly Contact, C.H Tung’s Hong Kong-based China-US Exchange Foundation, and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. The PLA's Foreign Affairs Office supposedly provided translation support.

In the lead up to the initial meetings in 2008, CJCS Mike Mullen signed a letter to the organizers saying “I specifically endorse the meeting of four U.S. four star officers with their counterparts” in China. Then-PACOM Commander, ADM Tim Keating, also endorsed the dialogue. During the first round from February 19-22, 2008, former Nanjing Military Region Commander, General Zhu Wenquan, requested U.S. participants advocate in favor of a cessation of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, reduction in other forms of military cooperation, and a “review of the Taiwan Relations Act.”

As outlined in the meeting report, U.S. participants assured Chinese counterparts that the PLA's case - presumably including selling out a de facto democratic nation-state - would be made in Washington DC. In March 2008, one U.S. Sanya delegation representative -- a member of the U.S. Defense Policy Board – briefed the board on a proposal for the U.S.-China military relationship to be based on the “Sanya model,” and presented a plan to then-Secretary of Defense Bill Gates to change U.S. China policy. Another U.S. representative, a retired U.S. Marine general, advocated adjustments to DoD senior service school curriculum. Another offered to use channels to lobby the White House.

By September 2009, the organizer, former VCJCS, ADM (ret) Bill Owens, published an op-ed in the Financial Times. He advocated a halt to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and revisions to the Taiwan Relations Act, charging that the legislation is outdated and “not in our best interests.” Among other business pursuits, ADM (ret) Owens is a senior executive with AEA Investors, a major financial firm with close connections with former SecState Henry Kissinger and former AIG CEO Hank Greenberg. The latter has been cited as a source of funding for the Sanya Initiative.

The second round of meetings took place in Hawaii from October 16-24, 2009. Participants met with CJCS Mullen (see photo of CJCS with Owens, Xiong Guangkai, and rest of Sanya group above) and PACOM Commander Tim Keating. In recounting the meeting, one of the key Chinese sponsors asserted that “the joint statement issued after the talks said that the (retired) American military leaders unanimously felt that the Taiwan Relations Act needs to be reviewed.” After the Hawaii meetings, the Chinese side proceeded on to Washington, where they met with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Lynn, VCJCS General James Cartwright, and members of Congress. U.S. participants included former PACOM Commander, U.S. Ambassador to China, and Vice Chairman of the National Committee on U.S.- China Relations -- ADM (ret) Joe Prueher. The third round of the Sanya dialogue took place in Hangzhou on October 28-29. 2010, and included a new member to the U.S. group -- former PACOM Commander Tim Keating. The meetings also included U.S. Embassy participation.

Perhaps informed by the series of senior retired officer exchanges, the "abandon Taiwan" theme, ostensibly due to overriding strategic interests in China, appears to have expanded. In February 2010, Owens' replacement as VCJCS -- USAF Gen (ret) Joe Ralston -- published an editorial in the Wall Street Journal citing the freeze of US-China military relations as a result of the January 2010 Congressional notifications on Taiwan arms sales. He then proceeds to outline the overriding national security interests in the US-China military-to-military relationship, and establishing personal counterpart relations (e.g., assuming that PLA counterparts would actually answer a phone during a crisis). The editorial implied that Taiwan arms sales are an obstacle to the US-China military relationship. General (ret) Ralston is Vice Chairman of the Cohen Group, an enterprise with expanding business interests in China.

In June 2010, a senior U.S. senator (Diane Feinstein) stated that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were hurting closer ties with China, and asked Defense Secretary Gates what Beijing would have to do for the Pentagon to reconsider the transfers. By March 2011, retired U.S. Pacific Command commanders Joe Prueher and Tim Keating, both with affiliations with the Sanya initiative, succeeded in getting more than a half dozen signatures on a report published by the University of Virginia Miller Center calling for a review of the Taiwan Relations Act and end to the “vicious circle” caused by U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. In September 2010, another senator, Arlen Specter, argued on the floor that revisions to US arms sales could be warranted In Spring 2011, international relations theorist Charles Glaser joined the growing chorus calling for the abandonment of Taiwan. In May 2011, at the invitation of the Naval War College’s Maritime Studies Institute, one former senior U.S. official advocated U.S. support for Taiwan’s unification with China.

In late May 2011, visiting PLA Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde continued the campaign on Taiwan. During a joint press conference with ADM Mullen, Chen said "since I've arrived in the United States, I've had the opportunity to talk to some members of Congress and some of them told me that they also think that it is time for the United States to review this legislation.” Mullen responded by pointing the audience in the right direction: U.S. Congress should be the ones to initiate abandonment of Taiwan.

Arms Sales Freeze

China’s influence operations campaign appears to be working, at least with the Executive Branch. The F-16 issue, or rather the Obama administration’s refusal to accept and act upon a legitimate request to replace Taiwan’s remaining 60 F-5s, best symbolizes the Obama administration’s policy drift on Taiwan. Before 2001, representatives from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense submitted a list of requests to senior U.S. policy officials in annual face to face meetings, thus ensuring stated requirements were understood and addressed. At the time, Bush administration officials assured counterparts from Taipei that written responses to requests would be provided within a reasonable timeframe (e.g., standard of 60 days).

What makes the F-16 issue so egregious is the refusal to accept formal letters of request (LOR) for price and availability (P&A) data since 2006.In July, the Obama administration is said to have committed to resolve the fighter issue by October 1, 2011. ADM Mullen reiterated the Obama administration’s commitment to make a decision by October 1, 2011. However, observers have noted that the most likely course of action is to retrofit a portion of Taiwan’s existing F-16 fighter fleet with new radar systems and possibly engines. In effect, upgrades would be roughly on a par with F-16 Block 50/52. It remains unclear what configuration would be involved. Based on Defense News reporting from 2009, options likely include replacing APG-66(V)3 radar systems on current airframes with the APG-68(V)9 or perhaps an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. Also included could be upgrades to the mission computer, new color multifunction displays and helmet mounted cueing, air-to-air and maritime interdiction munitions, as well as electronic countermeasure systems. Although likely to send the retrofit price tag through the roof, engine candidates include the General Electric F110-GE-129 and the Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-229, with the latter as a preferable option.

If reporting is correct, release of additional F-16s – the priority – could continue to be held in abeyance. Release of F-16 Block 50/52 capabilities, yet withholding new airframes to replace aging F-5s, appears to be ill-advised. A minimalist decision is likely to draw Beijing’s ire, offer Taiwan’s political and military leadership with little choice but to proceed with the retrofit, force a deferral on replacement fighters for the F-5s, and undercut Taiwan’s leverage in cross-Strait relations. Congress is likely see a minimalist solution as insufficient. Click here for more.

Beyond F-16s

However, the problem goes beyond F-16s. The Executive Branch has in effect had a freeze on new arms sales since 2007. The notifications sent to Congress in October 2008 and January 2010 constituted one of the final administrative steps following policy-level approvals for PATRIOT PAC-3 ground systems and missiles (policy approval in 2001); AH-64D APACHE attack helicopters (policy approval in 2002); and UH-60 BLACKHAWK utility helicopters (policy approval in 2007). The BLACKHAWKs were the last major arms sales to be approved.Perhaps most egregious is a reversal of U.S. policy commitments made in April 2011 to assist Taiwan in its acquisition of diesel electric submarines. In 2007, Taiwan's legislature authorized funding of the first of a two phased program through FMS channels. Unconfirmed rumors exist that senior members of the White House staff recommended to senior counterparts in Taiwan to abandon the program, initially in June 2008.

Since then, the Obama administration has frozen the Congressional notification of Phase I, estimated at U.S. $360 million.The Obama administration also has deferred resumption of trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA) talks. Taiwan’s restrictions on market access for U.S. beef have been cited as one rationale for freezing TIFA talks for the past four years. Unlike Taiwan, the U.S. Trade Representative has included the beef issue in trade negotiations with South Korean counterparts. Other Taiwan-related negotiations, including visa waiver and extradition initiatives, appear stalled. In the meantime, the director of China's State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Wang Yi visited Washington in late July 2011 to lobby senior US officials against arms sales.

The Return of Congress

Since 1979, Congress has played a traditional role in offsetting natural bureaucratic tendencies of the Executive Branch to write Taiwan off. Almost half the Senate signed off on a letter sent to President Obama on 26 May that advocated approval of F-16s. On August 1, 2011, more than 180 members of Congress signed another letter to the President arguing in favor of additional F-16s for Taiwan.

Other actions have been taken. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX), presumably support by fellow members, held up the nomination of Bill Burns for Deputy Secretary of State. Nominations for Mark Lippert as Assistant Secretary of Defense and Wendy Sherman, as undersecretary of state for political affairs, could run into difficulties.

These have been initial shots across the bow. Much more may need needed to get U.S. Asia policy back on track. By enacting a de facto freeze on new major arms sales, deferring renewal of TIFA talks, and unwillingness to actively support Taiwan in its efforts gaining entry into international organizations, such as the ICAO, one could swear that the Obama administration is actively trying to resolve the “Taiwan problem” once and for all, and in a manner amenable to Chinese interests. This probably isn’t intentional. But the effects are the same.

On the low end of the political intensity spectrum, Senate and House staffers could consider introduction of language into FY12 legislation akin to the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act of 1999. Congress also could move to freeze military to military exchanges, using Representative Frank Wolf’s ban on NASA exchanges with Chinese counterparts as a model. An insightful and well-crafted op-ed published last month by a former Pentagon and State Department official highlighted some of the shortcomings of the current military relationship. The op-ed coincided with a vastly different perspective published by CJCS Mullen the same day in the New York Times. ADM Mullen had argued that military relations with China were "vital" to U.S. interests. Fact is, defense policy exchanges with PLA counterparts can be helpful. But not at the cost of fundamental interests in Taiwan. Allies and friends should take priority, given limited theater engagement funding.

At the extreme end, maybe Congress could go beyond a simple review of the Taiwan Relations Act, as friends of the Obama administration have advocated (e.g., Bill Owens, Joe Prueher, etc). Perhaps a review could consider aligning U.S. foreign policy with an objective reality: the existence of Taiwan, under its existing Republic of China (ROC) constitutional framework, as equally deserving of diplomatic status as the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Along these lines, Brookings Institute's Richard Bush offers some very thoughtful insights.

Taipei needs a regular, strong, visible signs of US support. Insecurity created by even the perception of waning U.S. support has historically resulted in radical policies on Taiwan, including development of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery in the wake of the US-China 1972 and 1979 Communiques. Continuation of the on-going de facto freeze on new major arms sales, including deferral of Taiwan’s request for additional F-16s, arguably undermines new cross-Strait initiatives. The connection between past arms sales and subsequent breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations is amorphous, but not insignificant. And the Obama administration’s inaction sends the wrong signal by legitimizing military coercion as a means to resolve territorial and sovereignty disputes around the PRC periphery. It’s also very unfortunate that retired U.S. officials forget basic principles upon which the U.S. was founded, including support for fellow democracies. Fortunately, U.S. Congress has resumed its traditional role in offsetting natural Executive Branch tendencies to write Taiwan off.

END

Coming to Closure on Taiwan's Lafayette Frigate Case

2011-07-20T23:47:00.008-04:00

After 10 years, French courts have ruled in Taiwan's favor on a case linked with the 1991 sale of six LAFAYETTE frigates to the Republic of China (ROC) Navy. The contract explicitly restricted payment of commissions, which French parties seemingly ignored.

The damage caused by this case transcended the tragic death of ROC Navy (ROCN) Captain Yin Chin-feng, loss to Taiwanese taxpayers due to inflated pricing, and wrongful charges against a number of senior ROCN officers. The most lasting effect is what is now known as the "Lafayette Syndrome," a deep-seated aversion within the Ministry of National Defense (MND), and especially the Navy, to assume risk in procurement of modern weapon systems.

Regardless, hats off to the ROCN and MND for clearing the decks on the this issue. Too bad those funds couldn't be applied as seed funding to jump start the submarine program! To make that happen, the Obama administration would need the melt the frozen Congressional notification for the submarine design study, which has been held back at the State Department since late 2007/early 2008

More to come on these issues...

Thales Pays Up In Taiwan Frigate Battle

TAIPEI, Taiwan, July 15 (UPI) -- French defense company Thales ended a decade-long legal battle when it wired a court-ordered fine of $875 million into a Taiwan government bank account, the country's Central News Agency reported.

Earlier this month a Paris Court of Appeals ruling confirmed the May 2010 decision of the International Chamber of Commerce's International Court of Arbitration, which ruled in Taiwan's favor over a major frigate contract.

The case involves a 1991 $2.5 billion agreement that Thales made with Taiwan for providing six Lafayette-class frigates.

Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense took the case to the ICC in 2001 for resolution.

The Paris Court of Appeals confirmed the 2010 Court of Arbitration ruling that Thales had violated Article 18 of the Lafayette contract that prohibited payments of commissions to intermediaries.

Immediately after the ruling, a Ministry of Defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Thales must pay arbitration and litigation expenses, a CNA report said.

"We will continue resorting to legal procedures and require the firm to fulfill its obligation," said the official.

Thales, also after the ruling, said in a statement that it had made provisions to pay its 27.46 percent share of the penalty of about $247 million, with the French government responsible for the remainder.

Thales now has paid up, Ministry of National Defense spokesman Lo Shao-ho said. The money, which is in an account owned by the MND, soon will be transferred to the state treasury.

Also, the "commercial dispute" won't affect military cooperation between France and Taiwan, he said.

In the deal, in which the French government played a crucial role, Taiwan's navy bought six Lafayette-class frigates from Thomson-CSF, which became Thales, and the state-owned shipbuilder DCN for $460 million each, nearly double the original budget.

Concern over the deal began in December 1993 when the body of the leader of procurement for the Taiwanese navy, Capt. Yin Ching-feng, was found floating in the sea off the coast of Taiwan. A corruption investigation was started and eventually six former naval officers, including a vice admiral, were indicted in connection with the affair.

In 2001, the Taiwanese authorities filed a complaint alleging that the anti-corruption clauses in the contract had been breached.

French prosecutors investigated claims that bribes were paid in the deal but they were unable to say who might have benefited.

Millions of dollars in illegal kickbacks are believed to be in frozen Swiss bank accounts held by Thomson-CSF's agent at the time, Andrew Wang, who fled Taiwan after the discovery of Yin's body.

Yin is believed to have been ready to blow the whistle on colleagues who allegedly received kickbacks from the Lafayette deal, the CNA report said.

Wang also remains wanted in Taiwan on a charge of killing Yin.

2011 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved

Taiwan’s Sanya Initiative: The PLA Targeting Retired Senior ROC Military Officers

2010-08-31T09:56:00.012-04:00

Yesterday’s China Times carried an interesting article regarding growing U.S. and Ma administration wariness over exchanges between retired military officers on both sides of the Taiwan Strait (click here for an English version).

Note: See Michael Turton's excellent 31 Aug 10 View from Taiwan write up on the retired officer exchanges.

Indeed, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) appears to be courting a new partner. As authorities in Beijing keep military-to-military exchanges with the United States in a deep freeze in protest over U.S. arms sales, formalized contacts between “retired” PLA military officers and counterparts on Taiwan have rapidly filled the vacuum. The PLA, using the so-called “Sanya Initiative” as a vehicle, seems to have learned just how effective retired senior U.S. military officers can be in influencing policymakers in Washington.

Since November 2009, the PLA has placed retired military officer exchanges on the front burner as an integral component of a broader influence operations campaign on Taiwan. The target appears to be a key faction within the KMT representing veterans and their families, perhaps as well as Taiwan's defense establishment via informal links between retired and active duty general and flag officers. The recent media reporting from Taiwan indicates that President Ma Ying-jeou and his administration is casting a leery eye over the brisk pace of exchanges over the last several months.

Cross-Strait Academic Conferences

Retired military officers from the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan have visited birthplaces and extended family members in China since the 1980s. However, the PLA’s direct leveraging of senior retired military officers on Taiwan for political purposes seems to be a relatively new phenomenon. During cross-Strait academic conferences in November 2009, Chinese interlocutors presumably linked with PLA planners pro-offered the concept of retired military officer exchanges as an intermediate step toward establishing a “military confidence building mechanism.” In November 2009, two such meetings took place, one during the Sunzi Conference in Beijing and another in Taipei, hosted by the Pacific Cultural Foundation. During these exchanges, retired PLA officers were alleged to have cited the Ma administration as pursuing “peaceful independence.”

While Taipei may view confidence building as a means to reduce the chances of misunderstandings or accidents that could lead toward conflict, Beijing views “confidence building” as limiting Taiwan’s future international options. Or perhaps even to lock the KMT and the Ma administration into Beijing’s definition of “One China.”

Organized and led by former General Political Warfare Department Director General Hsu Li-nung [许历农; b. Anhui, 1921], at least 18 retired general and flag-rank officers visited Beijing in April 2010.In order to help in “building mutual political trust,” Chinese hosts granted the delegation “unprecedented access” to senior civilian and military leaders in Beijing, such as Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi. While reporting is inconsistent, indications exist that the delegation also spent time with senior PLA leaders. The delegation also visited China’s “Space City” and chatted with Shenzhou astronauts. Hsu Li-nung is associated with the New Alliance Association [新同盟会] and the New Party.

Retired ROC military officer participants included Cheng Kuo-chih [程国治], former Army CINCs Gen Chen Ting-chung [陈廷宠] and Gen Li Chen-lin [李桢林; b. Shandong, 1933], former Political Warfare Department Director Gen Tsao Wen-sheng [曹文生; b. Hunan, 1943], former Navy CINC ADM Miao Yung-ching [苗永庆; b. Shanxi, 1941], and former Navy Vice CINC and MND Vice Chief of General Staff ADM Fei Hong-po [费鸿波; b. Shandong, 1944]. A key theme in discussions was the need to build trust between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Reviving the Whampoa Spirit

The April visits were followed by a larger two-day “Zhongshan Whampoa Cross-Strait Relations Forum" [中山·黄埔·两岸情论坛] in May 2010 in Taipei’s Sunworld Dynasty Hotel. The event, cast as a reunion of Whampoa Military Academy alumni and their descendants, was attended by over 140 retired officers and other dignitaries, including Zhou Bingde, niece of Zhou Enlai.

In his opening remarks, KMT Honorary Chairman Wu Po-hsiung highlighted the importance of military confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a precursor to a cross-Strait peace agreement. Noting the difficulties in formal political dialogue, Wu suggested that sensitive political and military issues could be addressed through academic channels. Former Deputy Minister of Defense Wang Wen-hsieh (王文燮; b. Shandong, 1932) was quoted as saying “as long as political issues are solved, mainland China will withdraw all its missiles aimed at Taiwan.” Wu Po-hsiung paid homage to the former site of the Whampoa Military Academy during a visit to Guangdong in July 2010.

In June 2010, China’s Whampoa Association Chairman Zhu Jingguang [朱京光] led a mainland delegation to Taiwan. At least 20 retired military officers have been invited to attend another Whampoa Forum scheduled for late August in Nanjing.

Golfing for Peace in the People’s Republic

Activities also have included annual golf tournaments that bring together retired military officers from both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The first event, held in Xiamen in 2009, included 37 participants. The second was in late May 2010. Among PRC participants included former Deputy Chiefs of Staff Gen Xiong Guangkai and Qian Shugen. Taiwan participants include former Army CINC Huang Hsing-chiang [黄幸强; b. 1931, Hunan], former Army CINC Chen Ting-chung [陈廷宠; b. 1931, Jiangsu], and former ROCAF Deputy CINC Shiah Ying-jou [夏瀛洲; b. 1939, Shandong].

Where Is It All Leading?

On the surface, exchanges between retired military officers appear harmless. Generally, general and flag rank officers have a three year "cooling off" period after retirement before legally able to visit China. It’s natural for aging or bored soldiers, sailors, and airmen to want to come to closure with an old enemy, or perhaps make some contribution to a larger cause. The general and flag officers participating in these cross-Strait exchanges have dedicated much of their lives to defend the ROC against Communist Chinese aggression. At the personal level, participation in these exchanges indicates that the Civil War is over, at least for them.

However, there may be more to the story. One could also conclude that the PLA has launched an ambitious influence operations campaign to woo an powerful interest group within the KMT as a means to promote its “peaceful development” of cross-Strait relations. Retired military officers form a relatively significant interest group within the KMT - the Huang Fu Hsing Faction [黄复兴党部]. Retired Army Generals Hsu Li-nung, Li Chen-lin, and Wang Wen-hsieh are former Huang Fu Hsing chairmen. In May 2010, President Ma Ying-jeou publicly called upon new Huang Fu Hsing Chairman King En-chin [金恩慶; b. 1943, Jiangxi] to maintain loyalty to the KMT in the run-up to the November 2010 special municipality elections. China’s Whampoa Association Chairman, Zhu Jingguang, also heads the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (CCPPR). In fact, the two organizations share the same address and phone number.

In short, while participants from Taiwan may have no malign intent, the same can't be said for the China side. The participation and presence of Xiong Guangkai by itself should give a hint. Xiong serves as Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS). CIISS is subordinate to the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) Second Department (intelligence). CIISS serve as an interface between the military intelligence establishment, experts in Taiwan and elsewhere, with regular interactions both at home and abroad."Xiong served as head of the PLA's intelligence community before moving to direct CIISS. As a member of the Taiwan Affairs Leading Group, Xiong also has been a key player in leading the charge for Taiwan's annexation. LTG (ret) Xiong Guangkai also is former deputy chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.

Confidence Building: Intended for Beijing, Not Taipei

Confidence building measures (CBMs), such as hotlines, transparency initiatives, and military exchanges, are intended to reduce tensions and increase trust between two or more parties. CBMs are also intended to reduce the risks of miscalculations and accidents that could escalate into armed conflict. However, the PRC’s continued reliance on military instruments of national power to dissuade and coerce Taiwan into a political settlement on its terms is likely to limit the degree of confidence that could be built. Other limiting factors include asymmetries in transparency due to differing political systems, and internal political divisions in Beijing and Taipei.

“Political trust” and CBMs have become themes of cross-Strait and other international academic exchanges, albeit at a much more measure pace than that the retired military officer engagements. At a conference in Taipei in November 2009, Taiwanese scholars outlined the difficulties associated with military CBMs without political trust.

Trilateral exchanges also have addressed CBMs. European academics initiated a Track 2 forum with counterparts from Taiwan and China, in large part geared toward addressing confidence building. Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has a similar program, and conducted its latest round of discussions in Taipei in July 2010. Participants included former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) ADM Timothy Keating, Bonnie Glaser, and Alan Romberg.

Beijing’s aggressive courting of retired military officers from Taiwan is likely to backfire, as media reporting already suggests. PLA influence operations targeting retired ROC military officers has parallels in the United States with the so-called “Sanya Initiative” (Click here and here and here for background).

Obama White House Denies Taiwan Additional F-16 Fighters

2010-08-19T06:40:00.010-04:00

President Ma Ying-jeou and his administration have been stepping up Taiwan's campaign to procure an additional 66 F-16s to replace the Republic of China (ROC) Air Force's aging fleet of F-5 E/F fighters (see report below). The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), passed by the U.S. Congress in 1979, requires the United States "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character."

Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) first submitted a formal letter of request (LOR) for price and availability (P&A) for an additional 66 F-16 fighters as early as March 2006. To date, two successive administrations have refused to acknowledge or act upon the LOR due to fear of Chinese retribution. Released by President George Bush in 1992, the ROC Air Force currently has 146 F-16s in its active inventory. A former senior U.S. Air Force official said in a July 2010 Reuters interview that a positive Obama administration decision on moving forward on an F-16 deal is "way past due."

Concerned over how the China issue could affect re-election prospects in 2012, opposition to release of additional F-16s to Taiwan is said to be concentrated within a small circle of pro-Beijing political advisors around President Obama. As a fully fledged democracy, the ROC on Taiwan has municipal elections scheduled for later this year, and with Presidential elections slated for March 2012.

"Taiwan seeks F-16s to boost defence"

Thursday 19th August, 2010 (IANS)

Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou called Thursday on the US to sell F-16s to Taipei to boost the island's defences after the Pentagon said this week that China is gaining military superiority over Taiwan.

'Taiwan people's top concern is Taiwan's security,' Ma said. 'I hope the US can cautiously consider selling F-16C/Ds to Taiwan as the balance of cross-Strait military power is tipping in China's favour.'

Ma made the comment while receiving visiting US Senator Roland Burris. It is the third time this month that Ma had raised the F-16 purchase while receiving US visitors.

Taiwan ordered 150 F-16A/Bs from the US in 1992 but is seeking to buy 66 F-16C/Ds to replace the outdated models.

The US is evaluating Taipei's request after Beijing asked Washington to end arms sales to Taiwan, calling them an obstacle to Taiwan-China unification.

China regards Taiwan as a breakaway province, to be brought back into the motherland one day, by force if necessary.

Taiwan Arms Sales: Temporary Hold or Freeze?

2010-07-14T07:51:00.014-04:00

Today's Taipei Times covered an interesting Washington Times editorial penned by Randy Schriver. Randy is former Senior Country Director for China and Taiwan for the Secretary of Defense, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for China/Taiwan affairs during the Bush administration. He currently presides over the Project 2049 Institute and is an associate with Armitage International.

The editorial and Taipei Times' reporter William Lowther's summary, coming in the wake of the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), is a useful reminder of an often ignored fact. Despite expanding cross-Strait economic links, China still relies on implicit or explicit threats of military force to resolve political differences with the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan).

Taiwan Link commentary is in blue (NOTE: Image courtesy of the Washington Times)

US may be considering Asia-Pacific policy shift

BY WILLIAM LOWTHER

STAFF REPORTER IN WASHINGTON

Wednesday, Jul 14, 2010, Page 1

Former US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia Randy Schriver said that US President Barack Obama's administration may be “on the verge” of changing its policies toward Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

COMMENT: Guided by a coherent strategy and US legal statutes, policies should shift along with the dynamic nature of cross-Strait relations, China, Taiwan, and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. However, a policy that is grounded upon the so-called "status quo" is doomed to be reactive in nature. The lack of a coherent Obama administration strategy, juxtaposed against well-defined Chinese goals, exacerbates the problem. Instead of actively advancing positive foreign policy goals, such as a Chinese renunciation of use of force, a "status quo" policy emphasizes negatives. Setting the bar as low as possible, success is defined by no PRC use of force. However, real success is Chinese abandonment of the military instrument as a means to resolve an inherently political problem.

While not spelling out the possible change in detail, Schriver strongly hinted that it could result in a Taiwan arms sale freeze.

COMMENT: One could argue that a freeze on release of new systems has been in place since the Obama administration assumed control of the Executive Branch in January 2009. The Congressional notification package submitted in January 2010 was a final step in a long process that began with Bush administration policy decisions made years ago. The Bush administration committed to release the systems. The January 2010 Congressional notifications constituted the remaining second half of a package that the Bush administration should have forwarded in October 2008. President Barack Obama and his small group of political advisers have yet to approve and notify Congress of any new sale of major defense articles to Taiwan.

There may be a belief that a freeze on any new arms sales to Taiwan will reap benefits from Beijing, such as cooperation on North Korea, exchange rate adjustment, war on terrorism, Iran, etc. Or that the political costs of freezing new arms sales to Taiwan are and will be minimal, at least compared to the political pain that Obama's political advisers perceive China could dish out. And having committed to a "no trouble making" policy, the Ma administration is unlikely to push too hard on any US policy issue, economic, military, or otherwise. However, in bowing to Chinese pressure without any sign of direct reciprocation in the form of a substantive missile pull-back, the Obama administration is implicitly giving credence to China's reliance on military coercion as an instrument of national policy.

And furthermore, the Obama administration has reversed a policy decision made by President Bush in April 2001: diesel electric submarines. However, in fairness, there's plenty of responsibility to go around for failure to execute the submarine program. The ROC Navy earns low marks for creativity for placing the program in the hands of a conservative US Navy that never wanted to manage the program in the first place. The ROC Navy could have easily assumed programmatic responsibility and entrusted Taiwan's own shipbuilding industry.

Presidents Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou could have directed the ROC Navy to pursue alternative acquisition paths. However, sources close to both the Bush and Obama White House allege thatWhite House officials strongly suggested that the new Ma administration abandon Taiwan's 40-year quest for a fleet of 10 submarines. The Obama White House allegedly has repeated the suggestion. As a result, the Ma administration appears to have shelved the ROC Navy's long standing requirement.

In an article published on Monday in the conservative Washington Times, Schriver said that following the signing of the Economic Cooperative Framework Agreement (ECFA) by Taiwan and China, there was further evidence of cross-strait rapprochement.

“Curiously,” he wrote, the Chinese military buildup opposite Taiwan continues, with analysts saying that about 1,500 ballistic missiles are pointed at Taiwan.

COMMENT: This is where one should exercise caution. Bean counting of ballistic missiles has long been a metric of Chinese intent. Detractors could argue that there is little hard evidence that the 1500 number is valid, and that the growth has leveled off. But one has to define what class of ballistic missile one is referring to and elaborate upon the estimate's basis.

The ballistic missiles that are unambiguously dedicated toward Taiwan and have political and strategic significance are the short range ballistic missiles subordinate to the Second Artillery's 52 Base. An additional two 300 kilometer-range DF-11 brigades are subordinate to the Nanjing Military Region and provide tactical support for landing operations, rather than those under the Second Artillery that carry strategic significance. Furthermore, brigades equipped with nuclear-capable medium range ballistic missiles have a more diverse set of targets, and therefore could not necessarily be described as "targeted against Taiwan." The same goes for PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Navy (PLAN) assets assigned to the Nanjing Military Region.

Therefore, the units that could best be classified as dedicated toward Taiwan are the five Second Artillery SRBM brigades that have been established for over five years. As in most military organizations, a standard table of equipment likely exists with a set number of missile assigned to each brigade. A standard number is set to match the logistical capacity of the units to which the missiles are assigned. Once the table has been filled, that's it. To continue an expansion, a new brigade with another logistical infrastructure should be formed.

If the 1500 number is based upon cumulative estimates of SRBMs manufactured and delivered, then one explanation is that new SRBM variants are replacing older variants. Older variants are likely retired. Solid rocket motors generally have a shelf life of around seven years, the point when cracks in the propellent significantly reduce the reliability and safety of the missile. Advanced storage and refurbishment technologies can serve to extend the shelf life. As new guidance, navigation, and control technologies become available, the entire design of a missile changes, foreclosing options for refurbishment.

Therefore, a plausible case could be made that the growth reflects production of replacement missiles rather than an expansion of the overall SRBM inventory (NOTE: Some have speculated that the PLA could attempt to get political credit for retiring older missile variants. However, political credit should be granted only for a true reduction in capabilities).

But could there be a new SRBM brigade, in addition to production of new variants to replace missiles in existing brigades? There is a new brigade being formed under the 52 Base. The question is whether or not the new brigade is being equipped with SRBMs or medium range ballistic missiles.

“Why have we not seen even a modest, symbolic step on China’s part, commensurate with improvements in the economic and political spheres, to reduce the military intimidation it imposes on the people of Taiwan?” Schriver asked.

“Understanding why the buildup continues, informs policy decisions the Obama administration must face,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Very good point. Mr. Schriver continues below.

There are four possible explanations for the continuing Chinese military buildup, he wrote.

The first is that China has “no intent whatsoever to diminish the tools of intimidation and coercion in which so much investment has been made.”

Rather, Chinese leaders “are forced to conclude that they must retain the military threat to keep Taiwan in check,” he wrote.

Yes, indeed! In general, the PLA has an organizational and bureaucratic interest in whipping up the Taiwan independence "threat." They likely argue that maintenance or expansion of the force posture is needed to deter independence advocates. These arguments are questionable on many grounds. However, the most relevant is that China's military posture may be the single-most important factor in alienating a large portion of Taiwan's domestic polity and has the reverse effect.

Second, civilian leaders in China may be unwilling — or perhaps even unable — to challenge the People's Liberation Army (PLA) leadership. In turn, the PLA knows that if it pulls back on Taiwan, its budget — and justification for its continued growth — could be cut, Schriver wrote.

The third possible explanation for the military buildup opposite Taiwan, he said, was it is really designed to threaten other US allies such as Japan.

COMMENT: Certainly. If Taiwan independence no longer became the justification, a new basis would be needed for military expenditures. But an overt preparations for a possible Japan contingency would undercut the PRC "peaceful development" image that the propaganda machine wants to project.

“Finally, a fourth possible explanation is that China might be willing to pull back missiles and reduce the threat — but is waiting for the right time and the right deal,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Just what would that deal be? One theory is that the PRC may want to deal with the US, rather than Taiwan on military-related issues, including confidence building measures (CBMs) that could relate to Taiwan (e.g., cross-Strait CBMs are kind of silly since Beijing's goal is to minimize Taiwan's confidence). The deal that Jiang Zemin allegedly tabled in 2002 was a missile withdrawal in exchange for agreement for halting or setting a timetable for halting arms sales.

The basic premise of such a bargain has merit and is at the foundation of the 1982 Communique. However, explicit bargaining is neither wise or justifiable. The basis for US arms sales is and should be the nature of the military challenge that China poses to Taiwan. The current PRC posture warrants a wide open door for the release of defense articles that the democratically elected government of Ma Ying-jeou deems necessary. Of course the US should make decisions to approve, disapprove, or defer based on its own interests. But as long as China refuses to significantly reduce its military posture opposite Taiwan, then arms sales should be routine and forthcoming.

Sources close the Obama administration have stated that a small group of former US government officials, senior retired flag officers, and foreign policy specialists have an on-going program with counterparts in Beijing designed to examine an "arms sales for force reductions" bargain under the auspices of a confidence building measures dialogue. The Sanya Initiative, spearheaded by retired Vice Admiral Bill Owens, has been similar, and one with explicit written blessing of Obama administration officials. A separate initiative for discussion of CBMs involves former US officials, including a former PACOM Commander. The next round of CBM talks is scheduled to take place in Beijing within the next week or two."

“If the PLA military buildup opposite Taiwan continues apace, the need to provide Taiwan with weapons for self-defense also continues. This should be manageable if Washington doesn’t lose its nerve,” he wrote.

COMMENT: But the Obama administration never had a nerve to lose. There has been no release and notifications of any new systems to Taiwan. The three notifications reported as being frozen in a June 2010 Defense News article are not even major defense items.

“The US approach over the course of many years has been to make weapons available to Taiwan so that Taipei’s leaders have the confidence to go to the negotiating table with Beijing. This approach is paying off, but some would have us abandon it just when benefits are being reaped,” he wrote.

COMMENT: Indeed. However, the ECFA is a functional, technical agreement and its political significance is overblown. It is necessary for economic reasons. The real negotiations would be those that address the permanent resolution of political differences in a manner amenable to Taiwan's democratic system of government. Negotiations would work toward a defining the international personality of the ROC or Taiwan, and the nature of its political relationship with the PRC. However, the Ma administration's position continues that of its predecessors. No political negotiations under conditions of military coercion. It has rightfully decided to make withdrawal of missiles directed against Taiwan a precondition for preliminary political negotiations that could lead toward some form of peace agreement.

He said that either through “willful misdirection” or through “naivete,” the Obama administration appears to be ready to change the long-standing policy of providing weapons to Taiwan.

“The Obama administration has gone to great lengths to deny a Taiwan arms-sales freeze is in place, perhaps protesting a bit too much,” he wrote.

COMMENT: There indeed are pretty solid signs that that senior political advisers to President Obama have recommended sidelining Taiwan issues, including a conscious decision to defer any further Congressional notifications for Taiwan arms sales for the remainder of the year. Other sources allege that after the January 2010 notifications, assurances were provided to Chinese interlocutors that there would no more arms sales in the near term, without specifying for how long.

Regardless, principled, professional Asia/China hands on the NSC staff, and within State Department and the Pentagon know better, and of course will rush to reassure the public audience that there is no freeze. But the real test will be in the next few months. If the three minor notifications that President Obama has decided to hold aren't unfrozen in the next few months, then political pressure likely will mount, especially should the Republicans do well in the November elections.

However, a key driver that may put any further notifications on ice for the rest of the year could be the invitation that President Obama issued to Chinese President Hu Jintao last month for an official state visit, which most likely would occur shortly after Congressional elections in November 2010.

“Why does the administration continue a fiction that Taiwan has not formally requested more F-16[C/D] fighters? Why do mid and junior-level officials within the Obama administration allude to instructions from ‘senior leadership’ to hold congressional notifications on Taiwan arms sales and not to expect another major sale in 2010?” he asked.

COMMENT: See above. Under normal circumstances, release of additional F-16s should be a no-brainer. Taiwan already has F-16s, and additional airframes are replacements for old F-5s that are at the end of their useful service life. With Block 20 F-16s no longer in production, the Block 50/52 C/D version is the least capable variant available. Block 60 F-16 C/Ds would be a jump, as would the F-35B, which most analysts would agree is best suited for Taiwan's unique operating environment. If the F-16 issue isn't resolved by the end of this issue, the ROC Air Force (ROCAF), Ministry of National Defense (MND), and the Ma administration would be well-advised to submit a letter of request (LOR) for price and availability (P&A) data for 66 F-35B fighters to the Obama administration. And send a copy to the key staffers on the Hill to make sure they know that an LOR has been submitted.

“Even after [the] ECFA, a strong and capable Taiwan remains a key ingredient to security in the region,” he wrote.

China’s Missile Defense Interceptor Program: An Independent Chinese Analysis

2010-01-17T00:34:00.009-05:00

China’s successful exo-atmospheric interception of a ballistic missile on January 11, 2010 marked a major milestone in a long term program with roots in the 1980s. Taking place three years to the day after the successful intercept of an aging satellite in low earth orbit, details of the recent test are scarce and likely will be for some time.

However, a well regarded independent Chinese military-technical analyst, known as KKTT, published a detailed analysis on a national bulletin board site (BBS) site the day following the announcement of the test. In an article entitled “A Preliminary Analysis of China’s Ground-Based Mid-Course Missile Defense Interceptor Technology Test” (我国“陆基中段反导拦截技术试验”初步分析), the author appears to be not only informing his domestic audience what the test represents and what it doesn’t, but also communicating an implicit message to foreign audiences: the test is modest, legitimate, and not necessarily containing a political message. Following is a summary of the article, which appears to be the most detailed assessment of China’s missile defense program to date.

The Rationale for Missile Defense

The author begins with an assessment of four drivers or characteristics of a missile defense program scaled to protect against ballistic missiles with a range of 3500 kilometers or less:

Neutral Effect on Strategic Stability. A missile defense system is not intended to affect strategic stability with the United States and Russia. An ability to undercut the ballistic missile capabilities of the major nuclear powers is unrealistic. According to the author, an assured second strike capability will remain the bedrock of China’s nuclear deterrent.

Defense against Small Nuclear States With Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles. A missile defense capability would be reasonable as a hedge against smaller nuclear powers, such as India. Citing the Agni III program, the author asserts that India has linked ballistic missile development programs with China.

Support for Local Conventional Warfare. If Taiwan develops ballistic missiles, and with “independence elements” threatening to strike the Three Gorges Dam, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, then missile defenses are needed.

Point Defense Against Conventional Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles. The author cites discussions in the U.S. to field a conventionally armed submarine launched ballistic missile intended to go after hard buried targets, such as command centers.

While advocating defenses against ballistic missiles with a range of 3500 kilometers or less, KKTT acknowledges the possibility of fielding a system capable of intercepting ICBMs operating at higher velocities over the longer term.

Roots in the 640 Program and U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative

After a general discussion regarding basic missile defense technologies, the author caveats that his analysis is pieced together from publicly available sources within China and its accuracy not guaranteed.

With China’s efforts to develop a missile defense interceptor and ASAT in the 1960s establishing a foundation, preliminary research on a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) began in the wake of the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) announcement in March 1983. As China’s answer to the SDI, the 863 Program “advanced defense” focus area included direct ascent ASAT and missile defense interceptor programs (specifically 863-409). [NOTE: The earlier effort was known as the 640 Program, which was cancelled in the 1970s. Other focus areas within the 863-4XX series include high power laser and high powered microwave].

The program remained in the preliminary research phase of the research and development (R&D) cycle until the mid-1990s. The specific basic technologies included a digital closed loop fiber optic gyroscope, binary optical/mid-wave infrared seeker, restartable attitude/orbital control system, and “thrust precision control.” The Second Academy overcame a technical bottleneck in 1999 when it did its first “suspension” (悬浮) test of the KKV, the second country in the world to do so.

When the 863 Program was restructured in 2002, the KT-409 interceptor project transitioned from the preliminary research to the R&D phase in 2002. R&D was divided into two focus areas: 863-801 and 863-805, with the latter including an ASAT test as an intermediate milestone in the KKV program.

The author asserts that the KKV weighes 35 kilograms, as compared to 60kg for the U.S. Ground Based Interceptor and 18kg for Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). The PLA General Armaments Department (GAD) is said to have awarded a prize to designers of the 35kg KKV in 2000 for overcoming technical obstacles. {NOTE: While not explicit, a possible connection may exist between the 35kg KKV and China’s microsatellite and nanosatellite buses.}

Testing

The author indicates that testing on sub-systems began as early as 2003. The China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) 066 Base and Sixth Academy were responsible for developing the solid rocket motors for a three-stage solid launch vehicle to be used in ASAT and missile defense interceptor tests. The 066 Base is said to have overseen the first test of a modified solid rocket motor in 2003. {NOTE: Under normal circumstances, the CASIC Sixth Academy is responsible for solid motors with a diameter less than 2 meters. Other sources indicate that the solid motor used in the missile defense interceptor is a variant of DF-21’s FG-05 (FG-5D). The FG-05D supposedly uses a lighter weight composite material in the motor casing, thus increasing its strength to weight ratio.}

Integrated ASAT flight tests were conducted from the Jiuquan Space Launch Center on July 7, 2005 and February 6, 2006. With these first two tests proving unsuccessful, a third test from Xichang space launch center on January 11, 2007 intercepted its intended target. Members of the Central Military Commission (CMC) visited Xichang and awarded the designers with one of China’s highest technical honors. After the ASAT test, the Second Academy conducted a strategy review session, redesignated the KT-409 interceptor as the HQ-19, and began plans for testing against a ballistic missile target.

The author asserts that preparations for the missile defense test appeared to be underway since early December 2009, with no connection with Taiwan arms sales-related contract announcements. The author assesses the target missile – DF-3 or DF-21 – was launched from Taiyuan Space Launch Center. The interceptor was launched from the Korla area in Xinjiang, with impact in the vicinity of the Gansu-Xinjiang border. The flight profile of the target was basic and more increasingly stressful testing is to be expected. The test allegedly was supported by a new phased array radar in the Korla area (+41° 38' 28.17", +86° 14' 11.98"), which was under construction in 2004. The Korla radar is said to support the PLA General Armaments Department (GAD) 20 Base. {NOTE: See Google Earth image of the new Korla radar above.}

The Missile Defense/ASAT Senior Design Team

The author assesses that Chen Dingchang (陈定昌) serves as chief designer of the ASAT/missile defense system. Born in Shanghai in 1937, Chen Dingchang is a graduate of the Tsinghua University and was trained briefly in the former Soviet Union. Leading the Second Academy’s design department when the 863 Program began, Chen was promoted to the Second Academy directorship in 1990. He subsequently directed the China Aerospace Mechanical and Electronics Corporation (CAMEC) (now CASIC). In addition to serving as a member of CASIC’s S&T Committee, Chen directs the General Armaments Department (GAD) Precision Guidance Expert Group (总装备部精确制导专业组). {Click here for more background on Chen Dingchang.}

Zhang Yiqun (张奕群) is said to be the deputy chief designer for the KKV sub-system. Zhang is from the Second Academy’s Second Design Department. A senior designer from the CASIC Fourth Academy’s Fourth Design Department, Zheng Chenghuo (郑盛火), is said to be leading the development of the solid launch vehicle sub-system.

KKTT concludes with an assertion that the interceptor is only one part of a broader system, including space surveillance and tracking and national and operational-level command and control systems. The PLA Air Force has been pressing on the need to integrate air and space defense, but no decision has been made regarding subordination of a missile defense system.

China's Nuclear Warhead Modernization and Stewardship: The Man Behind the Scenes

2009-12-28T13:14:00.014-05:00

In a recent dinner table discussion, a youthful family member asked who makes China's nuclear weapons. The question is intriguing: which individual is most responsible for designing, developing, and manufacturing the nuclear weapons that China now has in its inventory? Since China has a small but real inventory of nuclear weapons that factor into U.S. policymaking with regards to Taiwan, it would be good to know the man behind China's second generation of nukes.

Once a decision has been made to invest resources in a major program, the traditional practice of China’s senior political and military leadership has been to assign a chief designer (总设计师) to manage the research and development (R&D) process. John Lewis and Xue Litai’s China Builds the Bomb offers an outstanding overview of the humans behind China’s first generation nuclear device, including chief designer Li Jue. However, that was a long time ago and the PLA Second Artillery’s stockpile now includes a new generation of miniaturized warheads.

Xu Zhilei: The Man Behind China’s Second Generation of Nuclear Warheads

The individual credited with leading the effort to design and develop China’s second generation of nuclear warheads has modest roots in Ningbo, Zhejiang province (for examples of sources, click here and here). Born in 1930, Xu Zhilei (徐志磊) graduated from Shanghai's Datong University in 1952 and served as a precision machining specialist in the Shanghai Machine Tool Factory (上海机床厂) for the next 10 years. In August 1963, he was recruited into the Ninth Academy’s design department to work on China’s first nuclear device. Among his specialties was hydrogen embrittlement, structural engineering, and component design. He was said to be a leading figure in four ground tests and two flight tests of China’s first generation nuclear weapons. In 1987 and again in 1989, Xu was a recipient of one of China’s highest prizes for defense S&T achievement for design and manufacturing on the fissile core of a nuclear device, known as the “pit.”

In the 1980s, Xu was appointed as chief designer for the miniaturized warhead sub-system on two new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Concurrently, Xu functioned as deputy chief designer for the DF-31 program. In this position, Xu oversaw the technical aspects of 10 nuclear tests. In heading up the warhead sub-system of the DF-31, Xu Zhilei ostensibly would have supported Wang Yongzhi (王永志) and Liu Baoyong (刘宝镛), who have been cited as the chief designers of the missile system (presumably the DF-31 and DF-31A respectively). Wang and Liu are both from the China Academy of Launch Technology's First Design Department. Other key DF-31 sub-systems include solid rocket motors, which unsubstantiated reporting refers to as the FG-6 and FG-7. Passing reference is made to Xu’s involvement in a neutron bomb (中子弹) program.

Nuclear Warhead Stockpile Reliability

So Xu Zhilei could be viewed as the father of China's second generation of nuclear warheads. However, since finalization of the miniaturized design, he also has been cited as a key player in ensuring the reliability of China’s existing stockpile of nuclear warheads. Authoritative writings indicate that he and the China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) have supported a “certain base” of the Second Artillery to upgrade its storage, inspection, and transportation support systems for second generation warheads. Assisting Xu in the stockpile stewardship program included Peng Xianjue (彭先觉), Tang Xisheng (唐西生), and Liu Senlin (刘森林) from the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE).

Reliability and safety of nuclear warheads have become sensitive issues in Chinese politics. Veterans from four units associated with testing, storage, and maintenance of nuclear warheads in the 1960s and 1970s have submitted legal claims to the Chongqing city government related to radiation-linked health problems. The specific warhead storage units were all under the former Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) 22 Base, which was an outgrowth of a security regiment known as the 8322 Unit. The warhead storage, transportation, and maintenance function was resubordinated to the Second Artillery in the late 1970s.

One of the 22 Base entities – the 89902 Unit – was headquartered in Shangwuzhuang’s Nabucang (纳卜藏) village, around 50 kilometers northwest of Xining, Qinghai province. While it's unclear what role these facilities play today, the old 89002 unit administrative compound can still be seen on Google Earth. Unverified references indicate the current presence of regimental-level support elements subordinate to the 56 Base. Elements that appear to be linked with the Nabucang administrative facility can be seen along the roads stretching out from the compound and into some pretty desolate territory.

Stockpile stewardship programs and technologies have become increasingly important in the wake of China’s signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. However, legislative bodies in both China and the United States have yet to ratify the CTBT. While maintaining a moratorium on nuclear tests, Beijing authorities have asserted the need to continue to evaluate the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons. Further detail on the Second Artillery’s nuclear warhead storage and handling system can wait for another time. But as a starter, it’s good to know that Xu Zhilei not only led the design and development effort for China’s second generation of nuclear warheads, but also has been a leading figure in ensuring the safety of China's existing warhead inventory.

END

The PLA Air Force Over the Horizon Radar Brigade

2009-12-24T19:28:00.019-05:00

Over the last year, there has been substantial interest in China’s development of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). When deployed, its strategic goal would likely be to influence Taiwan’s domestic polity and manipulate the cost-benefit calculus of U.S. policymakers.

The ballistic missile program itself – the DF-21D – has been the primary focus. However, the cueing and surveillance architecture that would support an ASBM capability remains somewhat of a mystery. An integrated sensor network would be needed for initial situational awareness of maritime activity in the Western Pacific Ocean and to cue an ASBM before launch. A key element is believed to be a skywave over the horizon (OTH) radar. In November 2008, Sean O'Connor posted a great analysis of the OTH radar system and its role in an ASBM program on his IMINT & Analysis website, including the Google Earth image above. Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang (Naval War College and RAND), Mark Stokes (Project 2049 Institute), Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin (China Security), and Tony Capaccio (Bloomberg) also have addressed the OTH radar cueing issue. However, limited information exists on specific capabilities and how an OTH radar system would fit in to a broader architecture.

One interesting insight is its subordination. A Chinese blogger posted an article in November 2007 that highlighted a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) “Skywave Brigade” (天波旅). The post first appeared on the Wangchao bulletin board website and has been reposted hundreds of times since then. The author asserts that the brigade operates China’s first strategic early warning system in over 20 years, when a brigade operated a missile early warning system in the area of Xuanhua, north of Beijing. The missile early warning radar has been dismantled. The author, careful to avoid censors, uses Pinyin abbreviations for locations of the transmitter and receiver and names of the commander and political commissar of the PLAAF radar brigade. He/she also notes a requirement for additional sites in Fujian and presumably other locations along the east coast for measuring the ionosphere.

Taiwan Link research confirms much of the Chinese author’s analysis. A relatively new PLA Air Force radar brigade – the 95980 Unit – operates the OTH radar system. The PLAAF “Skywave Brigade" is situated in the southern edge of Xiangfan [襄樊], Hubei province, or specifically in Yingpan Village in the Xiangcheng District. On Google Earth, a guarded underground facility can be seen to the east of the village. While not confirmed, the mountain complex could house the OTH surveillance and warning system.

The PLAAF radar brigade has at least six subordinate elements (fendui). Two are near Xiangfan: the 52^nd Element in the Zaoyang Municipal District and the 53^rd in Nanzhang County. The blog poster notes that the OTH transmitter is in “ZY” and receiver is in “NZ.” The OTH receiver array that Sean O’Connor discovered on Google Earth indeed is in Nanzhang county. The coastal sites subordinate to the OTH brigade are:

-- 61^st Element based near Xitangqiao Village [西塘桥镇];

-- 64^th Element located near Fuqing [福清],

-- 66^th Element near Jinjiang [晋江], Fujian province Sanshan Village [三山镇]; and

-- 67^th Element near Wenlin City Shitang Village [石塘镇].

Most likely subordinate to the Guangzhou Military Region Air Force (GMRAF), the radar brigade's priority probably is air activity. Maritime tracks that the system generates could be filtered off to PLA Navy watch centers for tagging and correlation. More analysis would have to be done to figure out the command and control and service coordination arrangements.

END

Sanya Initiative: PLA Sends Team to Hawaii for Second Meeting with Retired US Flag/General Officers

2009-11-25T08:07:00.031-05:00

As a follow-on to the previous post on Bill Owens' Financial Times e ditorial, the Hawaii-based Star Bulletin has reported that the second corporate-sponsored meeting of retired U.S. and Chinese flag/general officers took place on 17-18 October 2009 in Honolulu, Hawaii. Known as the Sanya Initiative, the Financial Times reported last year that the dialogue is funded by Bill Owens' parent company, AEA Investors (Vincent Mai), as well as C.V. Starr (Maurice "Hank" Greenberg), and the China-U.S. Exchange Foundation. Another report, apparently a formal report to funders, also credited the Carnegie Corporation and National Committee on U.S.-China Relations for helping to fund the event.

The eight day visit of the Chinese delegation also included stops in New York City and Washington DC for meetings with the Secretary of State and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The delegation's visit preceded the visit of Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission GEN Xu Caihou.

Access and Influence: Financial Executive Opens Doors in Washington for the PLA

The Chinese delegation was led by Xiong Guangkai, former head of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) intelligence community. Xiong currently serves as director of an elite PLA intelligence analytical unit. The Chinese delegation also included five retired senior military officers. Leading and organizing the U.S. side was AEA Investors' Bill Owens, who served as Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Clinton administration.

After meetings in Hawaii, Owens leveraged connections in the Obama administration, and escorted Xiong and the rest of the Chinese delegation for meetings in Washington D.C. with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Mike Mullins (click here for Financial Times reporting). Both ADM Mullins and former Commander, Pacific Command Tim Keating endorsed the initiative in writing (see pages 19 and 20 of the formal report).

Reflecting the views of his Chinese colleagues, Bill Owens is a critic of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Owens was quoted as saying "we look to be a model for active-duty military where the relationship is officially not very good.” Indeed, Owens and his Chinese colleagues do appear to be trying to influence DoD's views regarding the TRA and arms sales. Before departing New York City, Xiong led the entourage in singing "The More We Get Together." {NOTE: No joke here. Read the Financial Times article hyperlinked above. Inquiring minds want to know if Xiong Guangkai, perhaps reflecting on his successes, peered into Owens' eyes while singing "and your friends are my friends"}.

The Star-Bulletin reported that the China Association for International Friendly Contact "coordinated" the trip for the Chinese side. Administratively subordinate to the PRC Ministry of Civil Affairs, the China Association for International Friendly Contact [youlianhui; 友联会] is also known as the International Liaison Department of the PLA General Political Department (GPD). According to Ann Marie Brady in Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic, the Association targets "friendly personages" or "foreign leftists," and reports up the chain to the PLA GPD and presumably beyond.

Members of the U.S. team for the talks in Hawaii were:

Bill Owens. AEA Investors (Asia). ADM (ret) William Owens also is former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See previous post for more details on Owens and his company.

Ron Fogleman. CEO, Alliant Techsystems (ATK); Vice President, Projects International. Gen Ronald Fogleman also is former chief of staff of the Air Force.

Charles E. Wilhelm. Board of directors, OmniPerception; adviser, Battelle Science & Technology, International; former member of advisory board, Lucent Technologies; member of board of advisers, M.I.C.. Industries.Retired four star general and former commander of U.S. Southern Command; and mentor to Joint Forces Command. Gen (ret, USMC) Charles Wilhelm also is former Commander, Southern Command.

Denny Reimer. Director, DFI Government Services (now Detica), a subsidiary of defense contractor BAE Systems. Detica specialises in "collecting, managing and exploiting information to reveal actionable intelligence." He also serves as advisor, VirtualAgility. Gen (ret) Dennis Reimer also is former Army chief of staff.

Chinese delegation members were:

Xiong Guangkai. Xiong serves as Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS). CIISS is subordinate to the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) Second Department (intelligence). As Bates Gill and James Mulvenon noted in a 2002 China Quarterly article, CIISS is "an important interface between the military intelligence apparatus and foreign experts, with regular interactions both at home and abroad."

CIISS houses both active duty and retired military officers, including what Michael Swaine notes in the Gill/Mulvenon article as "some of the best military analysts from the intelligence department." Xiong served as head of the PLA's intelligence community before moving to direct CIISS. As a member of the Taiwan Affairs Leading Group, Xiong also has been a key player in leading the charge for Taiwan's annexation. LTG (ret) Xiong Guangkai also is former deputy chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.

Yu Zhenwu. GEN (ret) Yu Zhenwu is former commander of the PLA Air Force. Beijing cut his visit to the United States while he was PLAAF Commander in May 1995 to protest the visit of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to the United States. Fogleman was his counterpart at the time.

Li Qianyuan. GEN (ret) Li Qianyuan is former commander of the Lanzhou Military Area Command. He also served as commander, 1st Group Army in the Nanjing Military Region, which is a key Taiwan-related position.

Pei Huailiang. GEN (ret) Pei Huailiang is former president of the PLA National Defense University. Pei also has been viewed as a Taiwan specialist in light of extensive experience in planning and operational positions in the Nanjing Military Region, as well as Jinan Military Region.

Zhao Guojun. VADM (ret) Zhao Guojun is former commander of the East Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy.

Retired PLA generals who participated in the initial meeting in Sanya, Hainan Island, but not the more recent one include GEN (ret) Zhu Wenquan, former Commander, Nanjing Military Region; and GEN (ret) Yang Deqing, former Political Commissar, Guangzhou Military Region.

Financial Executive and Former Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Bill Owens Advocates Selling Out Taiwan

2009-11-24T12:52:00.014-05:00

{UPDATE: Yesterday's Nelson Report covered the Owens/Taiwan issue as well, with astute commentary by Eric McVadon. Chris Nelson reports that "the reaction across Washington has been shock and dismay at what is seen as a stunning lack of political sophistication. Chris adds "his long-standing affiliation with a PRC-sponsored talk-shop might be clouding both his political and strategic judgment."}

Last week, a prominent and influential American businessman based in Hong Kong published an editorial in the Financial Times that should have caused quite a stir in Taiwan.

The author, AEA Investors executive and former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Bill Owens, calls for abrogation of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and a halt to arms sales. On the surface, the bulk of the editorial appears innocent. A retired senior U.S. military officer advocates friendship with China in a financial newspaper. Not a big deal, at least at first glance.

However, the author, who he represents, and what he is advocating, are worth a detailed examination. Operating at the nexus of high finance, high tech, and high level military, Owens is a very powerful and influential man. As Malcolm Gladwell argues in The Tipping Point, only a handful of people in the world are capable of initiating infectious ideas. And Owens is certainly one. His ideas are worthy of debate. But what makes his editorial alarming is that his views on the TRA and arms sales, whether intentional or not, support a broader PRC campaign to solve the “Taiwan problem,” once and for all.

Consciously or unconsciously adopting Beijing’s position, Owens fails to recognize the obstacle to solving the so-called “Taiwan issue” is the PRC’s refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve differences with Taiwan and making tangible reductions in its force posture arrayed against the island.

A Businessman and Former Senior Official Calls for Abandonment of Taiwan

In his 17 Nov 09 Financial Times editorial, Bill Owens advocates a major shift in U.S. policy. The centerpiece of his argument is what he refers to as a “thoughtful review” of the Taiwan Relations Act. Describing it as “outdated” and without offering an alternative, however, Owens implies that the legislation should be scrapped in its entirety. According to Owens, a “thoughtful” review of the TRA “would be viewed by China as a genuine attempt to set a new course for a relationship that can develop into openness, trust and even friendship.”

A “thoughtful” TRA review would focus on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, a process that Owens deems as as “not in our best interest.” He adds:

The first step to halting arms sales might be to observe that the Chinese have stopped the short range missile build-up across the Taiwan Straits (I believe this is true). The US could then stop selling arms to Taiwan unless that build-up was renewed. We must always protect the democracy and freedoms Taiwan has developed – but weapons sales do not do this.

Owens also cautions that if current trends continue, China’s military could rival or surpass those of the United States, offering allies in the region a choice between China and the United States. He calls for a shift in how we view China from a national security perspective:

It is often politically expedient to paint China as an adversary, or worse, a future enemy. Our national security apparatus is aiming to continue the present level of defence spending and emphasising 30-year-old legislation that is doing more harm than good.

He argues: “The solution is to approach the US/China relationship not with hedging, competition or watchfulness, but with co-operation, openness and trust.” Finally, he outlines an agenda for a new China relationship:

Following Mr Obama’s visit to Beijing, I hope we see the following kinds of military initiatives: an agreement to a thoughtful review of the implementation of TRA and other outdated legislation; a commitment to true military-to-military engagement across all levels including academic exchanges between military academies; a partnership in fighting terrorism and addressing, as partners, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (including North Korea and Iran); and an approach to addressing the increasing threat of cyberattack, perhaps with a “no first use of cyberattack” policy.

The “other outdated legislation” presumably would be the 1989 Tiananmen sanctions and Section 1201 of the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) restricting U.S-China military-to-military relations.

Owens argues that “many think the Chinese are unable or unwilling to accept such a progressive and innovative agenda. We will never know unless we try.”

From China’s perspective, what is there not to like about such a “progressive and innovative agenda?” Does retired ADM Owens think that the Chinese would be unable or unwilling to accept U.S. abandonment of Taiwan, halt to all arms sales, and overturning other legislation that places restrictions on our relations with the PRC? Academic exchanges already take place between PRC and U.S. military establishments. If he means letting PRC students attend our military academies, then we would have to discontinue admission of ROC students. Which of course is what he is advocating, along with the TRA review and halt to all defense assistance to Taiwan.

The rest of his agenda is harmless and even valid. We should partner with China, and others for that matter, in fighting terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and addressing issues associated with cyberattack. In another editorial for Carnegie, Owens proposed a U.S.-China space-based global transparency initiative. One could outline an even more aggressive bilateral agenda that would be in both PRC and U.S. interests, assuming our interests in Taiwan were not sacrificed in the process.

PRC “Stopping” Missile Deployments: Justification for a Halt in U.S. Arms Sales?

AEA Investors’ Bill Owens calls for a thoughtful review of the Taiwan Relations Act and a halt to arms sales. A halt to arms sales is justified in part by what he views as a freeze in PRC deployment of short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) opposite Taiwan. He doesn’t cite his sources in making this assertion. But let’s assume his sources are credible, particularly since Owens is well connected in Beijing and U.S. policy and intelligence circles.

Why would the PRC stop deployment of ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan? Because the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) have already filled PLA production orders to satisfy out a planned force structure of seven SRBM units. Five or perhaps six are under the Second Artillery, and one or perhaps two are organic to the Nanjing Military Region. Let’s look at the Second Artillery 52 Base order of battle (in probable order of establishment):

96165 Unit (Leping)

96167 Unit (Yong’an)

96169 Unit (Meizhou)

96162 Unit (Ganzhou)

96164 Unit (Jinhua)

96166 Unit (Chizhou, in same vicinity as DF-21 unit)

Each of these brigades has as many as six battalions, each equipped with a certain number of launchers and a standardized table of organization and equipment inventory of SRBMs. It’s not clear what this standard number is, but there likely is a ceiling unless a decision is made to add another SRBM brigade under the 52 Base. The 2009 DoD Report to Congress on PRC Military Power asserted that as of September 2008 the PLA had as many as 1150 SRBMs and was “increasing” its inventory at a rate of over 100 missiles per year.

If Owens is correct, then the PLA Second Artillery 52 Base is no longer increasing its inventory. The last SRBM brigade under the 52 Base likely is the 96166 Unit in Chizhou. Does this mean that the DF-15 production facility in Beijing (211 Factory) and DF-11 factory in Hubei (the 066 Base) have stopped assembling new DF-11s and DF-15s? According to Owens, maybe the blanket order for new SRBMs has been satisfied and units have filled out their table of organization and equipment. However, filling out the final SRBM unit does not necessarily indicate peaceful intent with regards to Taiwan. It indicates that the Second Artillery 52 Base is prepared and mission ready. It is very likely that R&D and production of sub-systems, such as solid rocket motors and guidance, navigation, and control systems, would continue.

If Owens is looking for a sign of peaceful intent, he should be looking for dismantlement of SRBM brigades and their supporting infrastructure, and not a stop in new missile deployments. Furthermore, PRC military capabilities based on a Taiwan scenario go far beyond SRBMs. Land attack cruise missiles, medium range ballistic missiles, conventional fixed wing aircraft, electronic warfare assets, surface combatants, submarines, and a range of ground combat systems are important as well.

In short, a PLA judgment that it has sufficient numbers of SRBMs to fulfill its operational mission does not justify a halt to U.S. arms sales. The only justification for curtailing arms sales to Taiwan would be a PRC renunciation of use of force to resolve its differences with Taiwan, and a tangible reduction in the military capabilities that could be brought to bear against the ROC and its democratically elected leadership.

Abandonment of the TRA: What Would It Mean

Yet to Bill Owens, a halt is a halt. The Taiwan Relations Act and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are impediments to U.S-China friendship. Therefore, Owens believes that a review and reversal of this outdated legislation is warranted. Owens is implicitly advocating removing the legal basis for U.S. relations with Taiwan, and acquiescence of the PRC’s "one country, two systems" approach to resolving its differences with Taiwan. Without the TRA, there would be no American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). Taiwan would be treated as a province of the PRC, which has longed viewed the TRA as an unwarranted intrusion by the United States into the internal affairs of China. Without the TRA, Taiwan’s democracy likely would collapse, perhaps only after a major upheaval on the island in reaction to what would be perhaps the only peaceful abandonment of a democracy to an authoritarian power in U.S. history.

Arms sales are the most visible manifestation of the U.S. recognition of the ROC’s unresolved international status. Besides ensuring that the cost of PRC use of force would be sufficiently high so as to deter such a course of action, the TRA and U.S. provision of defense articles and services provide an atmosphere in which Taiwan’s democratically elected leadership can negotiate with counterparts in Beijing with confidence. Taiwan’s difficult transition to a democracy, which coincides with its economic miracle that continues until today, is a possible model for democracy advocates in China. The ROC's existence as a defacto independent state is perhaps the only impetus for the PRC to transition into a multi-party system. Democracies are not as efficient in mobilizing resources as authoritarian one-party states. But they are certainly are more conducive to giving citizens greater say in how they are governed and in a more peaceful international environment.

China’s Access and Influence

Owens’ editorial is interesting from another perspective. Because it echoes a theme that the PRC has long represented, one has to examine Owens, his company, and his network as witting or unwitting channels of access and influence. One new channel with close links to Owens is a well-endowed Hong Kong non-profit entity (China-U.S. Exchange Foundation; 中美交流基金会) and a new dialogue – the so-called Sanya Initiative -- that Owens and this new foundation established last year.

The Foundation’s governing board consists of leading figures in Hong Kong who facilitated its reversion back to China, members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CCPCC), avid supporters of China’s one-country, two systems formula for annexing Taiwan, and elite in doing big business in China. These include former governor C.H. Tung (董建華), his brother C.C. Tung, Payson Cha, Ronnie Chan, Daniel Fung, Elsie Leung, Liu Changle, Peter Woo, and Gordon Wu. Its honorary advisors include Henry Kissinger, Hank Greenberg, Xu Kuangdi, and Tang Jiaxuan. It has cross-links with the newly established China Center of International Economic Exchanges (CCIEE) in Beijing and One Country, Two Systems Research Institute in Hong Kong. U.S. financial powerhouse AIG and the Starr Foundation are prominently listed as counselors.

The website claims the Foundation’s funding “is presently derived from the support of individuals and corporations in Hong Kong who share the Foundation's commitment to fostering stronger relations between China and the United States.” No corporations are listed, but private funders include: Chao Sze Kwong George; Ms. Vivien W. W. Chen; Mr. Kenneth Fang; Mr. Timothy Fok; Dr. Stanley Ho; Mr. Albert Hung; Dr. Lee Shau Kee; Dr. K.S. Lo; Mr. Robert Ng; Dr. Charles Yeung. Li Ka-shing’s son, Richard Li, is listed as a counselor.

All that’s missing is the precise nature of its relationship with what elements of the government in Beijing, and a direct linkage likely won’t be found barring some major investigative journalism by the likes of Jimmy Lai. However, it’s worth noting that Beijing’s use of Hong Kong-based cut outs for influencing political views in Washington has precedents. The PRC –specifically the PLA – attempted to contribute at least U.S. $300,000 to the Democratic Party in 1996 using the daughter of a senior PLA general (Liu Chaoying)and a China Aerospace Corporation subsidiary as the (China Aerospace International Holdings, Ltd) as the white glove. PLA General Ji Shengde, the predecessor of Xiong Guangkai and responsible for foreign relations and intelligence, led the operation. For reporting, click here. However, the Republicans also received questionable funding from a Hong Kong source with links in China, although somewhat different. Young Brothers Development Ltd loaned around U.S. $1 million to a RNC cut out, although there is no evidence that the funds originated in China or were on behalf of China.

Having learned lessons from the past, Beijing’s use of a Hong Kong-based think tank as an agent of and funding source for influence in Washington and at the state level is fair game. The goal is to enhance bilateral relations, but the Taiwan angle should not be forgotten. Its influence operations should be watched carefully. Hong Kong is part of the PRC, and many of the Foundation’s leaders have formal PRC government positions within the CCPCC. Other initiatives have or will include funded travel for U.S. journalists, state officials, including lieutenant governors and state legislators.

The China-US Exchange Foundation is no simple philanthropically-oriented institution. It has retained high powered lobbying firms, including Brown Lloyd James and Fontheim International, as part of its influence operations mission. Fontheim has registered with the Senate to lobby on behalf the the Foundation.

The Sanya Initiative: Working the U.S. Military Old Boy Network

One of the first orders of business for the China-US Exchange Foundation was support for a new dialogue between retired senior U.S. military officers and counterparts from the PLA. Funding support was provided not only by the Foundation, but also Owens’ company, AEA Investors and CV Starr (click here for pre-Sanya meeting coverage in the Financial Times). The dialogue, termed the Sanya Initiative, included five senior PLA general officers led by retired General Xiong Guangkai. The four retired U.S. officers include Bill Owens and General Ronald R. Fogleman, former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. In addition to consulting for Boeing, Fogleman has been Senior Vice Chairman, Projects International, a company that has close ties in Beijing through its founder, Chas Freeman. Fogleman was just recently appointed as CEO of a major defense firm, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. Other participants include General John M. Keane, and General Charles E. Wilhelm. Wives were invited along as well.

The meeting in Sanya took place on February 21 in order to commemorate the anniversary of former U.S. president Richard Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972 to meet with Chairman Mao Zedong. Immediately preceding the dialogue, Owens’ published his first editorial in the Financial Times with similar themes as last week's, minus the Taiwan-related issues.

The participants pledged after the February 2008 dialogue to maintain “continuous communication through various channels such as personal letters, bi-monthly telecommunications, and a second meeting to be convened later this year.” The group also allegedly committed to launching a strategic media campaign to correct U.S. misperceptions of the Chinese military.

All are honorable and served their country with distinction while in uniform, and continue to contribute where they can. However, all four of these officers also settled in to lucrative corporate positions after taking off their uniforms, with the leader of this well-connected U.S. team – Bill Owens – having the clearest and most significant business interests in China.

A Retired Admiral Turns Businessman

After stepping down as Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (the second highest ranking uniformed officer in the military), Bill Owens aggressively entered the business world. He started in the defense industry (SAIC), moved to Teledesic, then to Nortel, a major telecommunications company with significant business interests in China. Observers note Owens’ demanded a substantial severance package after only just over a year with Nortel. After his brief stint as CEO of the troubled Nortel, Bill Owens moved to spearhead the China investment arm of the U.S. private equity firm AEA, which includes clients or partners such as AIG, C.V. Starr, and JPMorgan Chase. It’s here where paths cross with the political-economic godfathers of the U.S.-China relationship, such as Henry Kissinger, Hank Greenberg, and Gen (ret) Al Haig.

Owens also has or is serving on the corporate boards of Teledesic, LLC, Polycom, Viasat, Microvision, TIBCO, Symantec, Metal Storm LLC, Telstra, Nortel Corp. Ltd., BAT, Cray, and Biolase. He has served on the boards of Carnegie Foundation, Brookings Institute, Harvard Kennedy School, and the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board.

Regardless, China has grown quite adept at leveraging the business interests of former senior U.S. officials in order to further its own political agenda. And getting the U.S. to break on its relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan), particularly arms sales, is perhaps the highest priority. The China-U.S. Exchange Foundation and its recruitment of these four flag/general officers is an example of how sophisticated China’s influence operations have become. The targeting of senior retired U.S. military officers appears to be the Foundation’s first order of business, with the Sanya Initiative taking place less than a month after being established (28 January 2008). It also was two months before Taiwan’s presidential elections and nine before before the U.S. presidential elections.

As a final note, Owens’ advocacy on making China a friend coincides with some major financial business dealings that are unclear at this point. Owens’ firm, AEA Investors, has been making a run to buy a portion of PLA-affiliated Huawei. Media reporting noted that Owens was the brains and muscle behind making it to the short list. One report noted that Huawei’s intent in opening up to foreign investors is to gain a foothold in the U.S. and overcome political opposition from Congress. Media reporting also indicates that Owens had aggressively sought out a strategic alliance between Nortel and Huawei while he served as Nortel CEO.

In short, while ADM (ret) Owens probably had noble motives in calling for the abandonment of Taiwan, his ideas should be brought into proper context. This story is still unfolding, and there’s likely more to come.

END

Andrew Yang Appointed as Taiwan's Deputy Minister of Defense

2009-09-18T08:27:00.008-04:00

Taipei Times yesterday covered the appointment of Dr. Andrew Yang (楊念祖) to serve as Deputy Minister of Defense. In this position, Andrew will be responsible to newly appointed Minister of Defense Kao Hua-chu for defense policy and execution. He replaces Chang Liang-jen (張良任), who had been in the position since September 2008.

The Taipei Times report quoted a former military official saying Andrew “was unlikely to last long, as he — like Chang — has no military background.” To the contrary, Andrew Yang is one of Taiwan's foremost authorities on PRC military affairs, and has the strategic perspective that is needed within the Ministry of National Defense (MND). Since the establishment of this second-most senior position within MND in 2000, all appointees have been civilian. Peter Chen (Chen Pi-chao; 陳必照) was the first, and was followed by Kang Ning-hsiang (康寧祥), Lin Chong-pin (林中斌), Michael Tsai (蔡明憲), and Ko Chen-heng (柯承亨).

Andrew served as Secretary General of the Chinese Council for Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), a Taipei-based think tank that has focused on security and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) studies for more than a decade. In this position, Andrew has earned the respect and admiration from PLA watchers on both sides of the political spectrum in Washington D.C. In addition to being a frequent commentator in local and U.S. media, including Defense News, Andrew has been teaching at the Sun Yat-Sen University in Kaohsiung over the last several years.

His links in Washington are extensive. In addition to a long standing relationship with RAND and its alumni, Carnegie Endowment, and National Defense University, Andrew has been an active member of the Project 2049 Institute International Advisory Council. He was last in Washington D.C. in July 2009 for a conference the “China Faces the Future” conference co-hosted by the Brookings Institution and National Chengchi University’s Institute Of International Relations

Issues that Andrew most likely will be facing:

-- Force modernization in a resource-constrained environment;

-- Transition toward an all-volunteer force;

-- Integration of natural disaster warning, response, and recovery into defense strategy;

-- Cross-Strait confidence building measures;

-- Civil-military relations and inter-service rivalry;

-- U.S.-Taiwan defense relations.

He has a difficult job ahead of him, but will do very well.

CV Chen on Military's Role in Disaster Relief

2009-08-10T20:08:00.006-04:00

China Times carried an editorial yesterday authored by prominent lawyer and Taiwan Red Cross Director Chen Chang-wen (CV Chen). He argues that Pingtung County authorities are critical of the slow Ministry of National Defense (MND) response to Typhoon Morakot. He also argues that for every NT $100 paid in taxes, NT $20 goes toward defense. Yet over the last 20 years, few deaths have resulted from armed conflict while Taiwan suffers the ravages of natural disasters each year.

He's critical of the Ma administration for not listing disaster warning, recovery, and response as a key mission of the armed services, particularly as cross-Strait relations have improved. Chen argues that Japan's Self-Defense Forces have been recognized for their involvement in emergency preparedness. He closes by asking if it's the PLA or natural disasters that pose the greatest threat to Taiwan.

An open advocate of cross-Strait unification, albeit without foreclosing the option of independence, CV Chen often is overly critical of MND. On this particular issue regarding military missions, he has a point. The facts on where lapses occurred in this most recent disaster aren't out yet. But as a general principle, Taiwan's senior civilian and military leadership should be examining the utility of an "all-hazards" defense strategy. All national emergencies -- pandemics, typhoons, earthquakes, terrorist attacks, and use of military force -- share commonalities in command and control, demand for survivable communications, rapid response, mobility, and situational awareness.

No other society must cope with the type of military challenge that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) poses to Taiwan. The severity of the PRC military threat to Taiwan is matched only by the challenges posed by natural disasters. As highlighted in the World Bank’s March 2005 report, Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis, “Taiwan may be the place on Earth most vulnerable to natural hazards, with 73 percent of its land and population exposed to three or more hazards.” Where else can one sit on a major fault line with powerful earthquakes and potential volcanic activity; in the path of a growing number of typhoons that are increasing in strength due to rising ocean temperatures in the Pacific; a geography characterized by some of the highest mountains in the Asia-Pacific region and a sharp drop to the ocean that creates rapid runoffs of rain water to create floods in the alluvial plains on the west side of the island?

An "all hazards" approach involves adjusting the operational requirements documentation process to include consideration of other national emergencies, and perhaps even scientific research. Oftentimes there is no fit -- an F-16 or PATRIOT would have utility in only one type of emergency. Yet other times, there are systems that could be of use across the entire spectrum of disaster warning, recovery, and response. Take the examples of a broadband communications satellite, remote sensing satellite, (e.g., FORMOSAT 2 Follow-on), unmanned aerial vehicles, HF/VHF/UHF radio systems, maritime surveillance, undersea surveillance, and a range of command and control systems. In the case of the two satellite systems, a strong argument could be made that these programs would be alive and well if the primary rationale for their procurement would have been disaster warning, response, and recovery, rather than pure military. Ditto for the radio systems and undersea surveillance.

Just a thought for the day...

UPDATE (August 11, 2009). Central News Agency published a report yesterday that outlined the significant role that Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) is playing in disaster relief. According to a press release, the ministry has deployed 8,235 soldiers over the past three days to assist local governments in typhoon rescue operations. According to an MND, statement, the military has evacuated 2,868 people, as well as deployed 101 amphibious vehicles, 214 trucks, 168 armored vehicles, 166 Humvees, 243 other tactical vehicles, 166 rafts, and 12 back up power generators.

More Chinese Netizen Commentary on Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Program

2009-06-23T20:22:00.012-04:00

A reader directed my attention toward another source of chatter from the Chinese bulletin board system (BBS) regarding China’s anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) program. I had excluded it in the previous post on the subject simply because it seems to be a mix of hyperbole and aspiration. However, even with the hyperbole and aspiration, the article could offer some insights when matched against authoritative sources. Because the article has been so widely proliferated around Chinese cyberspace, including on official government sites, it may be worth attention.

Post by "Marine Major" (陆战队少校), the original article seems to have first appeared on iFeng BBS on August 14, 2008. In the following weeks, it spread to other major BBS sites (Huanqiu, Tiexue, Chnqiang, etc), including onto the Xinhua network, the official government news agency. The article continues to be reposted on major BBS sites until today. Interestingly enough, the same article appeared on the Lianyungang city government website for a period of time until it was removed. It’s unclear if the author is the original source.

The article alleges that China has completed R&D on a new variant of the ASBM, referred to as the DF-25B. Presumably because the DF-25 didn’t have sufficient missile defense countermeasures, the PLA put forth the upgrade requirement in 2006. The author describes the new DF-25 variant as flying a depressed trajectory at an altitude of 20-30 kilometers. The “mother body,” presumably a third stage, houses multiple independently guided warheads. The third stage itself has a reserve propellant tank and incorporates electronic countermeasures as it bears down on a carrier at hypersonic speed.

Specifics in this particular BBS article should be taken with a grain of salt. However, as pointed out in the previous post, authoritative industry sources do indicate that significant R&D is being carried out into a boost-glide capability, and there is significant interest into developing a range of flight vehicles that operate in the upper atmosphere between 20-100 kilometers in altitude. The chart to the right shows one relatively basic glide control concept from an industry source (the DF-21D reference appears to be added on later by the BBS service that posted the industry article).

The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) First Academy (China Academy of Launch Technology) stood up a new research institute in late 2008 that focuses on nothing but upper atmosphere flight vehicles (sources available upon request). In addition, authoritative publications indicate an interest in a submarine-launch ASBM.

Keeping in the mind that some of the technical terms are challenging, below is a rough paraphrased translation of the article. I posted the Chinese as well for interested readers:

China’s New Aircraft Carrier Killer Revealed

中国最新航母克星“航母末日” 嚗光

August 14, 2008
http://blog.ifeng.com/article/1643766.html

弹道导弹打航母的构想大约是出自1996年台海危机。当时，美国派２个航母战斗群部署在台海周围以军事吓阻我们处理“两国论”引发的台海危机的军事行动。

The concept for an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) comes from the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. At that time, the US deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups off the coast of Taiwan as a means to deter our military operations intended to manage Taiwan’s “two states theory.”

当时我军只拥有歼－7、歼－8等二代战机和从俄罗斯进口的第一批26架苏－27。而美军航母即使按中等威胁区实施威慑的态势，其F-14A“雄猫”战斗机（现在已经退役，被Ｆ－18Ｅ／Ｆ取代）2个中队24架、F／A-18A“大黄蜂”战斗／攻击队24架，加起来也有近50架三代战机。就是说一艘航母的三代战机已经是当时我们所拥有三代战机总和的2倍！

At that time, our military had only two types of second generation fighters – the F-7 and F-8, as well as 26 Russian Su-27s. But United States military was able to assemble two squadrons of F-14As (already retired and replaced by F-18s), and a squadron of F/A-18As for a total of nearly 50 aircraft. This is about double the number of our third generation aircraft.

中国海军建立了以空潜快炮为主的海防体系，然而共和国的决策者们在海湾战争后猛然发现，苦心孤诣40年的心血已经无法继续信任下去，世纪末战争中美国海军以射程1000海里的巡航导弹告诉全世界，你们的海岸——不设防。如果说海湾战争对中国军队还只是震撼，96年的台海冲突则给了我们切肤之痛。没有远洋打击力量，更不具备远海防御能力，堂堂三百万人民解放军竟然无法对抗美国海军的两个航母战斗群。近海防御海军的窘迫就在于无法脱离陆地独立行动，不具备远洋攻防作战体系，不能构筑海上钢铁长城御敌于国门之外，只能作为陆军的附属保卫区区十二海里领海线。

The PLA Navy established an air and sub-surface maritime defense system, but decision makers suddenly realized that after 40 years of devoting resources to the military, there’s no defense against U.S. 1000-kilometer range cruise missiles – “your coastal defense sucks” (to paraphrase). If one would characterize the Gulf War as a shock, then the 1996 crisis was hari-kari (meaning extremely painful). Our coastal Navy couldn’t get away from the land or establish a long range interdiction and defensive operational system, and only could come up with an Army-affiliated 12 nautical mile defense zone.

可以说，美国人调集了两个航母编队，极大地刺激了改革开放以来一直让“军队要忍耐”的中国政府。所以，中国提出了一套新的理论，这就是99年的超限战理论。“弹道导弹打航母”便是其中之一。

One could say that the deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups marked the end of the Chinese government’s policy of military restraint since the reform and opening of China.

最新研制成功的东风－25弹道导弹，可以运载一个或几个分导弹头，弹头内装有被动红外导引装置。弹头重返大气层后，可以进行机动以精确对准目标。

The DF-25 missile has been successfully researched and developed, is able to launch one or a number of warheads that are equipped with passive infrared terminal guidance. After warheads reenter the atmosphere, they are able to maneuver accurately toward the target.

但是美国海军计划对所有装备“宙斯盾”系统的62艘驱逐舰和22艘巡洋舰进行升级，使其具备弹道导弹防御能力。根据美军计划，到2009年美国海军将拥有18艘装备“弹道导弹防御型宙斯盾”系统的战舰，其中包括15艘驱逐舰和3艘巡洋舰。五角大楼水面战委员会主席维克托•吉尔罗伊少将15日表示，18艘反导宙斯盾舰远不够用，因此计划首先对所有的“阿利•伯克”级导弹驱逐舰进行升级，使其具备拦截弹道导弹的能力。随后22艘导弹巡洋舰的升级也将被列上日程。这对地区和平、尤其是东亚和台海安全构成了严重威胁。

But the U.S. Navy planned to upgrade Aegis system, including 62 destroyers and 22 cruisers for missile defense. According to the Navy plans, it will have 18 sea-based missile defense equipped ships, including 15 destroyers and 3 cruisers. A U.S. Navy committee argued that all Arleigh Burke’s should be upgraded. This presents a serious threat to regional peace, especially for security in East Asia and the Taiwan Strait.

从理论上说，如果美国全部宙斯盾战舰作战系统都升级为“导弹防御型宙斯盾”，这样一支反导舰队集中部署在一个方向，将可以同时拦截500枚以上的中程弹道导弹。

Theoretically speaking, if America assembled all its Aegis assets together, they could intercept more than 500 medium range ballistic missiles at one time.

从拦截区域上看，海基拦截系统覆盖面积是“爱国者-3”反导系统的100倍；从技术成熟度上来看，目前海基拦截系统是美国所有能拦截中程弹道导弹的反导系统中拦截成功率最高的一种。
From the perspective of defended area, sea-based missile defenses cover an area 100 times larger than that of PAC-3. In terms of technology, sea-based missile defenses have had the highest success rates.

所以，东风－25弹道导弹采用了“隐形战术弹头”概念，以减少弹头在实施分导开始阶段的“雷达反应红外线” 特征，使得东风25导弹更加难以拦击。但要确保突破宙斯盾反导系统从而达到击沉航母的目的，还是有很大难度的。

Therefore, the DF-25 incorporates a “tactical stealth warhead” concept in order to reduce the “radar reaction infrared” (awkward wording in Chinese that is hard to translate), when the warhead is in the initial phase of payload separation, and make the DF-25 hard to intercept. But it’s still difficult to ensure the ability of missile to penetrate the Aegis missile defense system and destroy the carrier target.

故中国人民解放军在2006年提出了进一步研制新型弹道导弹，争取在3年内装备3种新型弹（目前定型为：东风25乙东风26甲东风26乙三型）。要求采用低轨分导式，既导弹升空后保持在20千米至30千米的低轨道飞行，不必重返大气层，使美军装备的“宙斯盾”海基拦截系统没有充足的反应拦截时间。

In accordance with a 2006 PLA proposal, R&D began on new ballistic missiles to be finished within three years (finalized designs include the DF-25B, DF-26A, and DF-26B). The requirement is to adopt a low trajectory with separable warheads, maintain a 20-30 kilometer altitude in order to not give Aegis destroyers sufficient time to respond.

{{Note: In a version posted on Sina.com a few days after the iFeng article, the language stresses a DF-26 sea-launch variant, rather than the surface-launched DF-25:

其中东风25乙为路基型，东风26甲为海基型，东风26乙的具体情况还不太清楚。

Roughly translated, “the DF-25B is ground-launched, the DF-26A is sea-launched, and specific details of the DF-26B aren’t clear.” }}

野战陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航母导弹系统（即东风25乙）的部分性能指标：

Following is a general description for the ground-based, depressed trajectory, multiple warhead, “carrier killer” (literally “final days of the aircraft carrier”) ASBM system (specifically the DF-25B):

1.弹头数量：6枚分弹头

1. Number of warheads: Six

2.导弹飞行高度：20千米至30千米低轨机动飞行

2. Missile flight altitude: 20-30 kilometers, maneuvering, depressed trajectory

3.导弹射程：1300千米__1800千米

3. Missile range: 1300-1800 kilometers

4.机动发射准备时间：小于9分钟

4. Mobile launcher preparation time: Less than nine minutes

5.每枚弹头当量：450千克黑索今 (相当于1100千克TNT当量)

5. Individual warhead weight: 450kg explosive (equivalent to 1100kgs of TNT)

6.导弹飞行速度：8马赫__12马赫

6. Missile flight speed: Mach 8-12

7.弹头攻击角度：60度__90度俯冲攻击

7. Warhead angle of attack: Between 60-90 degrees diving attack

8.弹头飞行速度：6马赫__8马赫小动量变轨飞行

8. Warhead flight speed: Mach 6-8 with minor maneuvering

9. 弹头制导方式：红外; 自备激光群发; 可视电视; 图像记忆

9. Warhead Guidance: Infrared, self-equipped lasing (this is a tough one to translate); electro-optical; imaging

10. 弹头攻击方式：穿甲; 延时自爆

10. Warhead Attack Method: Armor piercing; delayed fuse

11. 弹头飞行距离：60千米

11. Warhead flight range: 60 kilometers

野战陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航母导弹（东风25乙）具备隐身和超强抗各种干扰能力，发射准备阶段和距离航母舰队500千米前，利用GPS、北斗系统、低轨侦察卫星、天波雷达、地面监听站等设备对航母舰队进行连续跟踪，以保证飞行方向。距离航母舰队500千米时，弹载雷达设备自动寻的，对目标方位进行修正、定位。

Using stealth and ECCM, the ground-launched “carrier killer” ASBM (DF-25B) relies on GPS, Beidou, LEO satellites, OTH-B, and SIGINT sites to establish a continuous track during the launch preparation stage and up to 500 kilometers from the aircraft carrier group. At a range of 500 kilometers, the missile-borne radar starts its autonomous search for the target, and adjusting its direction and position in relation to the target.

其它性能：

Other Characteristics:

1．导弹母体在飞行中敌方雷达可探测距离小于100千米。

1. Enemy radars can detect the main missile body at a range of less than 100 kilometers.

2．导弹母体在释放出分弹头后，可在战区上空盘旋，为分弹头提供制导，并对航母舰队进行强电磁、电子压制。

2. After the main missile body releases warheads, it can loiter within the theater and provide warheads with guidance as well as conduct electronic countermeasures against the aircraft carrier battle group.

3．导弹母体保持200秒以上盘旋时间。

The main missile body can loiter for more than 200 seconds.

4．导弹母体保持200秒以上盘旋时间后，携带预留高燃剂以10马赫速度、90度直角俯冲攻击航空母舰。

4. After loitering for more than 200 seconds, the missile body can carry a reserve high energy propellant in order to achieve a speed of Mach 10 and dive toward the carrier at a 90 degree angle of attack.

5．导弹母体俯冲攻击航空母舰兼磁爆效应。

5．As it dives, it can have an electromagnetic explosive effect (difficult to translate).

另外，野战陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航弹道母导弹（东风25乙）备有多种弹头

In addition, the ASBM (DF-25B) has several types of warheads:

1．高爆穿甲弹

High-explosive armor piercing shell

2．电磁炸弹

EMP Bomb

3．高爆穿甲燃烧弹

Highly explosive armor piercing incendiary shell

4．高爆子母弹

High explosive submunitions

5．声波弹

Acoustic warhead

6．诱饵弹

Decoys

前段时间国防大学军事专家张教授提出我国目前并不急于建造航空母舰的建议，原因很可能是知道反航母弹道导弹“航母末日”既将问世。

At previous times, NDU Professor Zhang raised that China shouldn’t rush to build aircraft carriers, because perhaps the “final days of the aircraft carrier” are going to become public.

陆基型低轨分导式“航母末日”可有效地将航空母舰阻挡在海岸线1000千米——1500千米外，并对进入“航母末日”有效射程范围内的敌舰予以毁灭性的打击。

Ground-based low trajectory, separable warhead ASBM could effectively prevent the aircraft carrier from crossing a 1000-1500 kilometer line. And also the ASBM will effectively enable us to destroy vessels that come within this range.

{{Note: In the Sina.com version, the final two paragraphs are substituted with the following discussion of the sub-launched DF-26 variant and a torpedo-like payload without any additional detail:

另外具可靠消息透露,中国军方正加紧开发新型“航母末日”专用超高速潜水高爆火箭弹头,取名“龙啸”。预计“龙啸”脱离母弹入水后的速度为500千米，水下航程80千米，爆炸当量达到900千克TNT.

In addition, according to reliable sources, the PLA is developing a special use underwater warhead referred to as the “Longxiao.” It’s estimated that the Longxiao would separate from the main missile body and enter the water at a range of 500 kilometers (Chinese says “speed” though), have an underwater range of 80 kilometers, and have 900kg of explosives.

美军方分析，因潜射型低轨分导式“航母末日”反航弹道母导弹弹体偏大，目前中方只有094型战略导弹核潜艇和在研的095型核攻击潜艇、096型战略导弹核潜艇能够搭载。由于094型、096型战略导弹核潜艇的定位不同，携带“航母末日”的数量在3枚以内；095型核攻击潜艇可携带“航母末日”的数量在8——10枚左右.

American sources claim that because the size of a sub-launched ASBM structure is large, only the 094 submarine, 095 submarine that’s in development, and the 096 submarine could serve as launch platforms. Because the positions of the 094 and the 096 subs aren’t the same, they can only carry three missiles or less. The 095 should be able to carry 8-10 missiles.

END

Wild Strawberries in Washington DC

2009-06-23T08:48:00.005-04:00

Reliable sources indicate that a handful of activists from Taiwan’s Wild Strawberry movement are in Washington DC for a two week visit. Sponsored by the Formosa Foundation, the activists are part of the foundation's annual Ambassador Program.

As a student movement, the Wild Strawberries jumped onto Taiwan's national scene in November 2008, when students launched a sit-in movement against what they perceived to be a heavy handed government approach to restricting the right to protest during the visit to Taiwan of Chen Yunlin, director of China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS).

Regardless of specific cause, it’s heartening to see activism in an era of global complacency and apathy. This is not to say that Taiwan is an apathetic democracy. Reflecting a sense of public civic duty, Taiwan’s turnout rate for national elections has been quite high since its first president election in 1996. In that year, the voter turnout was a remarkable 76%. Four years later, in the first peaceful transition of power, the voter turnout increased to nearly 83%. In 2004, it was 80%. In the March 2008 election that marked the second peaceful transfer of power in Taiwan’s history, voter turnout was 76%. In marked contrast, the United States has averaged a voter turnout of 50-55%. And in China, voter turnout was…well…0%. A high turnout is generally seen as evidence of the legitimacy of the current system.

Taiwan’s nascent democracy certainly has plenty of room for improvement, just as in our own system. One area in particular where youthful idealism can make a contribution is envisioning the future. Perhaps in part due to traditional passive resignation to fate, what sometimes seems to be lacking in Taiwan society is confidence in the ability to shape one’s future. Shaping the future starts with a clear long term vision, a net assessment of challenges and opportunities, and a detailed strategy broken down by focus area, goals, objectives, and specific actions. But it starts with defining an ideal future, and youth tend to be the best equipped for the necessary idealism. In a competitive environment, the side with a clear long term vision of what it wants and a detailed, measurable plan on how to get there will tend to be most successful.

Visit of Taiwan Chief of General Staff

2009-06-22T09:14:00.007-04:00

A highlight of this week’s Next Magazine is/was the visit of ROC Chief of General Staff (CGS) Admiral Lin Chen-i (林鎮夷) to the United States. Nadia Tsao from Liberty Times picked it up as well.

The reporting notes that ADM Lin’s main goals are/were to persuade the Obama administration to release F-16 C/D fighters, explore bilateral industrial cooperation and assembly of diesel electric submarines in Taiwan, and gain U.S. approval for the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) to take the lead for the second stage of the POSHENG C4ISR system. The POSHENG follow-on is referred to as the “AN-SHUN program” (安訊專案). The report notes concerns regarding Taiwan’s inability to develop a viable C4ISR system without U.S. support.

If reporting is accurate, the visit would have coincided with the HANGUANG 25 exercise in Taiwan and preceded the U.S. visit of PRC State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi. Taiwan media reporting has highlighted that the HANKUANG 25 exercise includes a continuity of government scenario as well as a U.S. observer team headed by a retired U.S. admiral.

The last CGS to visit the U.S. (July 13-21, 2007) was Gen Huoh Shou-yueh.

Taiwan and China's Commercial Aviation Program

2009-06-22T08:14:00.008-04:00

AP and Forbes reported today that Taiwan’s Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC) is seeking a deal with the China Commercial Aviation Corporation (COMAC):

Taiwanese defense company seeks China deal

Associated Press, 06.22.09, 05:34 AM EDT

TAIPEI, Taiwan -- Taiwan's state-owned defense company said Monday it is discussing cooperation on building commercial aircraft with a Chinese company.
Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation spokesman Li Shih-chang said his company met with China's state-owned Commercial Aircraft Corporation during a Shanghai air show in May, but the sides have yet to reach a deal. News of the talks comes amid steadily improving ties between Taiwan and the mainland. AIDC made Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Fighter jets, and is now responsible for IDF maintenance.

Defense News’ Wendell Minnick first reported on AIDC’s interest in serving as a COMAC supplier last summer.

This latest reporting should be put into the proper context. State-owned or not, AIDC has to be profitable in order to survive. With the fixation on defense procurement through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) channels, AIDC probably isn’t seeing a lot of growth on its radar scope. It’s not clear yet what Boeing has worked out to satisfy its offset requirement for the APACHE program. If and when the Congressional notification for UH-60 BLACKHAWK utility helicopters goes through, Sikorsky likely will also have a significant offset obligation as well. However, history has shown that most companies incurring offset obligations in Taiwan satisfy them via indirect means. In other words, it's unclear at this point if AIDC would see much offset business from the APACHE and BLACKHAWK FMS programs. In addition, recent reporting regarding AIDC's role in a joint Taiwan-Russian very short take off and landing (VSTOL) fighter development program is interesting but open to question.

Like dozens of companies around the world, AIDC has an interest in playing a role in China’s long term, multi-billion dollar program to field a jumbo jet (click here for background, as well as here). Goal is to start flight tests in 2014 and have the first aircraft enter China’s commercial aviation fleet by 2016. With COMAC in the lead, China’s goal is to field a internationally certified commercial airliner. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) opened up an office in Shanghai a couple years ago to assist COMAC and other aviation authorities in the certification process. Over the next 20 years, Chinese airlines are expected to spend U.S. $340 billion on 3,400 new airplanes, of which 1400 are large-sized “jumbo jet” aircraft.

Major U.S. defense companies, such as Boeing, Sikorsky, Lockheed, and Raytheon, have done business in China, with the latter two mostly involved in air traffic control. Other major U.S. defense contractors, such as Rockwell Collins, Honeywell, and General Electric (GE), have been involved in China’s commercial aviation programs. COMAC is said to be in the process of awarding 17-19 supplier contracts. Like AIDC, American and European firms that are involved in both commercial and defense business are competing to play a role in what is probably the fastest growing aviation market in the world.

China's Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Program: Checkmate for Taiwan?

2009-06-17T07:16:00.044-04:00

{{UPDATE: Follow-on report posted on 23 Jun 09. Also see the excellent Project 2049 piece by Ian Easton on China's ASAT program; and Andrew Erickson's superb new Jamestown Foundation China Brief on the knowns and unknowns about China's ASBM program. Also see the Dec 09 Taiwan Link post on the PLA Air Force OTH radar system }}

The Taipei Times ran an article earlier this year highlighting that the number of Chinese conventional ballistic missiles “pointed at Taiwan” has reached 1500. Since first entering the inventory of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in first half of the 1990s, short range ballistic missiles have been one of China’s most effective tools of political and military coercion. As a symbolic metric of intent, China’s expanding arsenal of conventional ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan is intended to deter political support in Taiwan for de jure independence and coerce the island’s population to support unification with China on Beijing’s terms. Beijing has made conventional ballistic missiles a visible and central element of its Taiwan strategy.

However, it appears that leaders in Beijing are expanding their strategy. Showering Taiwan with economic carrots, Beijing’s military stick is increasingly being pointed at the United States. The reason is that the center of gravity for final resolution of the Taiwan issue may lie here in Washington D.C. rather than in Taipei. Confident of America’s military backing, Taiwan’s political leadership is able to deal with counterparts in Beijing from a position of confidence and strength. From Beijing’s perspective, U.S. arms sales and the U.S. naval presence in the western Pacific – best symbolized in the form of an aircraft carrier – have been the most important factors in preventing the unification of Taiwan with the motherland. A demonstrated capability to strike the most visible symbol of American power would be intended to create a perception in the minds of Taiwan people that their future is with China, rather than in de jure independence, indefinite separation from mainland China, or a virtual alliance with the United States.

The demonstration and deployment of a new conventional ballistic missile capability that complicates U.S. military assistance to Taiwan could coerce the island’s democratically elected leaders into capitulation much faster than expected. In an excellent article entitled "On the Verge of a Game Changer" published in the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings last month, authors Andrew Erickson and David Yang highlight the emergence of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) that “could alter the rules in the Pacific and place U.S. Navy carrier strike groups in jeopardy.” The authors note “even the perception” that the PLA is equipped with an ASBM could have “profound consequences for deterrence, military operations, and the balance of power in the Western Pacific” (see below for details on the ASBM).

But this chess game may not stop with deployment of an ASBM. Authoritative Chinese aerospace journals indicate more than a passing interest in precision strike capabilities that could enable the PLA to neutralize U.S. Air Force and Navy runways, logistics facilities, and command and control targets on Guam. Further in the decade, there could be a more capable follow-on. Subsequent modifications to existing ballistic (or even land attack cruise) missiles appear to be mirroring the U.S. Prompt Global Strike program, which is centered on the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) that could strike targets anywhere in the world within hours. China’s success in fielding a global precision strike capability could extend the threat envelope to military facilities in Hawaii, and perhaps even space-related and other military facilities in the continental United States that are directly involved in a Taiwan-related contingency.

As time goes on, the United States may need to re-examine priorities and rely more on smaller ships, a greater number of affordable submarines able to operate in littoral areas, long range unmanned combat air platforms, and hardening of U.S. military bases facilities throughout the region, including Kadena Airbase on Okinawa and facilities on Guam and Hawaii.

An ASBM as a “Game Changer:” What It Could Mean for Taiwan

An ASBM is most relevant in a future scenario involving U.S. intervention in the event of Chinese use of force against Taiwan. As the title of the Proceedings article implies, China’s deployment of ASBMs could change the nature of the game. Beijing appears to have absorbing lessons from its launching of ballistic missiles into zones off the coast of Keelung and Kaohsiung in the run-up to Taiwan’s first direct presidential elections in March 1996. The deployment of not only one but two U.S. aircraft carriers to the east of the island provided a tremendous psychological boost to Taiwan’s population in the face of Chinese intimidation. Now, more than 13 years later, a new ability to keep US aircraft carriers away from the area of operations – way away -- could reduce confidence in the minds of Taiwan’s domestic polity in America’s ability and willingness to intervene militarily in a future crisis.

If this problem is as serious as many say it is, a “game changer” could mean “game over,” at least for Taiwan’s confidence in U.S. security assurances. Beijing appears increasingly confident of its ability to deny U.S. carrier battle groups the ability to intervene efficiently, effectively, and safely.

The prospect of an anti-ship ballistic missile and other maritime capabilities already is affecting DoD investment decisions. Chief of Naval Operations ADM Gary Roughhead testified before Senator McCain and the Senate Armed Services Committee a few days ago. Concerns over the ASBM played a major role a decision to curtail the Navy’s DDG-1000 program. Defense News had reported on the effect that this potential ASBM is having on DoD in August 2008:

One source familiar with (a U.S. Navy) classified briefing said that while anti-ship cruise missiles and other threats were known to exist, "those aren't the worst." The new threat, which "didn't exist a couple years ago," is a "land-launched ballistic missile that converts to a cruise missile." Other sources confirmed that a new, classified missile threat is being briefed at very high levels. One admiral, said another source, was told his ships should simply "stay away. There are no options."

With “no options” in defending against this new threat, the relevance of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) should increase. Most focus on the arms sales provisions of the TRA. However, the act also has another key requirement: "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan." Could it be time for a new Congressional requirement for a report to Congress on the capacity to resist use of force against Taiwan?

China and Its Evolutionary Path to an ASBM

China’s effort to field a system capable of striking moving targets at sea is an evolution of its overall ballistic missile program. Since deployment of its first ballistic missile in the 1960s, the PLA and China’s aerospace industry have taken constant incremental steps toward greater range, survivability, accuracy, and effectiveness against a broader range of targets. China’s ASBM program is part of a broader effort to field the means to detect, track, and strike fixed and mobile targets at sea with precision throughout the Asia-Pacific region. According to the March 2009 Report to Congress on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China:

China is developing an ASBM based on a variant of the CSS-5 MRBM as a part of its anti-access strategy. The missile has a range in excess of 1,500 km, is armed with a maneuverable warhead, and when incorporated into a sophisticated command and control system, is intended to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships at sea, including aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean.

The CSS-5 is the DF-21, a solid fueled medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) that began development in the 1960s but introduced into the PLA Second Artillery in the early 1990s. The latest variant of this MRBM is the 1750 kilometer range DF-21C, which is said to be modeled after the terminally-guided U.S. Pershing II ballistic missile. The DF-21C is reported to have a CEP of around 50 meters or better. This DF-21C would be bad news against Taiwan ,and the ability of the island’s new PATRIOT PAC-3 to defend against this longer range ballistic missile hasn’t been discussed much.

The ASBM most likely would be an evolution of the DF-21C, and has been referred to as the DF-21D. For a great overview, see arms controller Dr. Jeffrey Lewis’ posts here and here. Rick Fisher did an excellent write up of China’s new generation of conventional ballistic missiles in a July 2007 piece for the International Assessment and Strategy Center (IASC). It has a great picture of a DF-15 (NATO designation of CSS-6) equipped with a biconic re-entry vehicle, implying a terminal guidance capability.

It’s not unusual to take a precision strike system that was originally developed to go after ground targets and modify it for the maritime environment -- the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) are a couple of examples. However, given its flight characteristics, it’s not so easy to modify a ballistic missile to go after moving targets at sea. Yet Chinese engineers seem pretty confident they can do it. To make matters more complicated, the ballistic missile is only one component of a “system of systems” that also would include space-based, airborne, and surface-based sensor architectures.

While not authoritative, China’s blogosphere, bulletin board systems, and popular media may offer hints into what this capability entails. Given government control over the domestic cyberspace, articles indicate how Beijing authorities would like the world – and especially Taiwan – to perceive its emerging military capabilities. Chinese cyberspace is filled with commentary regarding the ASBM. However much of it can be traced to common sources – a pair of sharp, young journalists and a technically competent blogger with a call sign of KKTT.

The authors may not have 100% situational awareness regarding the ASBM program. But on the surface, the analysis seems credible enough to warrant attention, particularly since the subject matter expertise hints at links with China’s defense industry. It’s worth remembering that as China’s economy becomes increasingly competitive, its defense industry is following suit. As the authors note, moving an ASBM program into production could be pretty expensive, as would the integrated sensor network needed to support it. As testimony to how popular the ASBM program is among the general population, China’s Ku6 social networking site has a film clip of the ASBM, put together by a fan of the program.

Qiu Zhenwei and Long Haiyan: An Operational ASBM Scenario

A pair of writers linked with the magazine Modern Ships (现代舰船) -- Qiu Weizhen (邱玮贞) and Long Haiyan (龙海燕) --published a two part analysis in the monthly journal in December 2006 and January 2007. Qiu, switching the two characters of his first name (玮贞 to 贞玮), re-published the analysis in two blog entries (中国反舰弹道导弹发展探讨) and (中国反舰弹道导弹作战过程). These were were cited in major U.S. Navy-related blogs (click here for one example and here for another) and the Proceedings article discussed above. Qiu presumably switched the position of the characters in his first name for his blog possibly for copyright reasons, and one shouldn’t rule out the possibility of the names being pseudonyms. Regardless, the authors cite authoritative industry sources for technical background, which is commendable. In one comment, Qiu makes a plea for the world’s media to better understand the ASBM.

The articles and related blog posts are long but well worth the read. Qiu and Long note that the main impetus behind the ASBM program was China’s inability to counter U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996. Shortly afterwards, the China Aerospace Science and Technology (CASC) First Academy began conceptual design work.

While not stated, CASC First Academy's competitor -- the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) Fourth Academy -- likely was awarded the ASBM research and development (R&D) contract after completion of proof of concept work in 2002. The CASIC Fourth Academy (航天科工集团第四研究院; or 航天科工四院 for short) has been responsible for DF-21-related R&D, probably including the ASAT vehicle that was successfully tested in January 2007 and the Kaituozhe (KT) family of commercial launch vehicles for small satellites. The CASIC Fourth Academy was formed in 2002 as part of a major CASIC reorganization.

{{NOTE: One senior Chinese space engineer with direct access to details on both the ASAT and ASBM programs commented in a brief media interview that the ASAT and ASBM guidance and control packages share the same technologies. At least one funding source for ASAT guidance and control research during the late 1990s and earlier this decade appears to be the 863-409 program (and possibly the 863-706 program). Presumably, common technologies include passive imaging infrared (IIR) terminal guidance and automated target recognition (ATR) software. Among the research entities involved during the initial R&D on an ASAT kinetic kill vehicle -- euphemistically referred to as a space interceptor (空间拦截器) - was the Harbin Institute of Technology.}}

Qiu and Long note that the ASBM system builds on the DF-21C program. Inherited technologies include a sophisticated onboard computer, pneumatic control for mid-course and terminal phase maneuvering, terminal guidance, and ATR technology. ATR matches images collected through radar and infrared sensors on the missile with images collected from strategic cueing sensors and stored in the warhead's onboard computer. The most expensive portion of an ASBM would be the onboard radar, which the authors believe is as sophisticated and costly as the AN/APG-77 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. The authors estimate that the unit cost of an ASBM plus launcher would U.S. $5-10.5 million.

In terms of the missile’s operational capabilities, their main source is a CASC study published in 2000, which they believe captures results of a CASC proof of concept. Citing previous work done on a DF-15C terminally-guided ballistic missile, the pair highlights one of the study’s authors – Xin Wanqing – as leading the proof of concept work for the CASC First Academy’s design department (see this 2003 article discussing his work). Qiu and Long note China’s accelerating its program to deploy for an architecture of electro-optical (EO) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites to coincide with the initial deployment of the first generation ASBM in 2009. Bear in mind that the analysis, which would have taken considerable time to develop, is from almost three years ago.

Cueing Systems. To counter an aircraft carrier with a 1500-kilometer strike range, China must have a 2000 kilometer range search and tracking system for ASBM cueing that covers both the western Pacific and South China Sea, down to Singapore. A system would include not only space-based EO and SAR sensors, but also electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites and a new generation of high altitude, long endurance unmanned aerial vehicles. Also included would be an over-the-horizon backscatter (OTH-B) radar system that extends out to at least 2000 kilometers (see Sean O’Connor’s excellent summary of the ASBM and OTH-B programs). The system would include automatic identification system (AIS) technology to distinguish between commercial shipping and military targets.

Missile Defense Countermeasures. Citing a Northwest Polytechnical University and other studies, Qiu and Long believe that the ASBM would adopt sophisticated missile defense countermeasures against U.S. sea-based missile defenses, including masking of the ASBM solid fueled motor’s signature, mid-course maneuvering, decoys, coatings to reduce the warhead’s radar cross section (RCS), and on-board jamming. Equipped with a hybrid solid and liquid fueled third stage, mid-course maneuvering would involve a boost-glide or hopping trajectory concept (跳跃式弹道方案). The missile would incorporate a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) linked with inertial navigation for autonomous mid-course guidance, as well as a possible SAR/millimeter wave radar with passive infrared seeker for terminal guidance. At various stages of flight, the ASBM would adopt speed maneuvers, and means to manage blackout periods due to ionization of the atmosphere above certain re-entry speeds.

Countering U.S. Missile Defense Surveillance and Tracking. In their detailed ASBM vs. sea-based missile defense scenario, the analysis goes through the SBIRS alert process, arguing that SBIRS would not be able to establish an impact prediction point and thus could fail to provide cueing for sea-based missile defense radar systems. They make an argument that Ground Based Radar (GBR) systems in Korea and Japan likely would be unable to establish a track. The analysis also addresses possible attempts by the U.S. High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) in Alaska could fail to jam China’s OTH-B system, implying the system has a military role.

Order of Battle Issues. Finally, Qiu and Long assert that two DF-21 anti-ship capable brigades will be deployed, with six battalions each with a total of 17 launchers. It’s not clear if new conventional DF-21 brigades would be established, or if the ASBM DF-21 variants would be upgrades to existing brigades. At the current time, the PLA Second Artillery is said to have three DF-21 brigades in eastern China. Two are subordinate to the 52 Base, the army-level Second Artillery organization opposite Taiwan. These are the 96163 Unit, aka the 811 Brigade based in the Qimen area in Anhui; and the 96161 Unit, aka 807 Brigade in Chizhou area in Jiangxi province. Another relatively new unit subordinate to the 51 Base (the 96117 Unit, aka the 822 Brigade based in Laiwu, Shandong province). It could be assumed that the Second Artillery wouldn’t mix nuclear and conventional DF-21 variants in the same brigade. {{NOTE: Reliable Chinese references indicate that a standard DF-15 SRBM brigade has six battalions with two companies per battalion. While not yet clear, it appears that existing DF-21 MRBM brigades still consist of only three battalions. These may be the units with nuclear missions. As conventional DF-21 brigades are established, it's possible that they could be organized similar to DF-15 brigades}}.

KKTT: China’s Extended Range Precision Strike Capability

Qiu Zhenwei and Long Haiyan’s analysis is only one example. Another observer who appears to be closely following the program goes by the call sign of “KKTT.” Under normal circumstances, bulletin board system (BBS) postings should be taken with a grain of salt. However, when observers cite their research and analysis with credible sources, then they may be worth paying attention to. In his main analysis published in April 2009 (China’s Development Concept for Theater Missile Strike Power; or 我国区域常规打击力量建设设想), KKTT argues that an ASBM program entails three phases.

The author implies that China has already developed a 1700-2000 kilometer range DF-21D. However key technologies needed for precision strike against a sea target are still under development. The three systems under development are: the DF-25; the DF-26; and the DF-27. (NOTE: One commentator of unknown reliability notes that the DF-26 and DF-27 are being developed separately by CASIC and CASC and only one will be downselected). Other sources claim that the DF-26 is a developmental sea-launched conventional ballistic missile). The author notes that a sea-launched variant of the DH-10 land attack cruise missile with a range of 3000 kilometers is under development. Cruise missile designers have been advocating that China’s extended range LACMs be adapted for counter-carrier operations. According to KKTT’s analysis, all four systems are supposed to be tested and fielded before 2015.

A second phase would involve development of sophisticated aerodynamic maneuvering capability that not only would enhance a missile's ability to penetrate missile defenses but also extend its range. Currently in its preliminary research stage, a boost-glide missile (助推-滑翔式导弹), based on part on 1930s technology developed by German V-2 missile engineers, would move to the R&D stage only after 2015 with deployment before 2020. A final phase, deployed before 2025, would be a hypersonic cruise vehicle for global operations.

Concluding Comments: Bring It Back to Taiwan

In short, sufficient evidence exists that China is serious about fielding a capability that could undercut the capacity of the United States to assist Taiwan in a conflict against China. However, what we do not know is if China’s aerospace industry will be successful in making an anti-ship ballistic missile available to the PLA, or when. One sign would be an ASBM demonstration -- a test that U.S. surveillance systems could detect. However, China has surprised us time and time again. One scenario is for China to conduct separate tests for the guidance package, flight vehicle, and attitude control system. Chinese references note the possibility of using hardware in the loop or other simulation systems to test an ASBM guidance package. However, PLA authorities probably would want to have a high degree of confidence that the system works before giving the aerospace industry the green to begin production. As Qiu and Long indicate, the ASBM could be pretty expensive.

Aerospace industry authorities may be ready to test anytime. The sooner the PLA customer can certify the system, the sooner China’s defense industry can lock in a production contract. And if Qiu and Long’s estimate is close, U.S. $5-10.5 million per missile is pretty good business, especially if there’s an order for a couple hundred. CASIC and/or CASC probably aren’t that concerned about the political implications.

However, a more likely scenario is for China’s civilian leaders to wait for a propitious time to approve a full, integrated flight test. The year 2011 -- a year before Taiwan’s presidential elections in March 2012 – could be a propitious time. After a successful test, it probably would take a while for word to leak out from the U.S. intelligence community. But the timing of a test could be intended to influence popular perception in Taiwan in the run-up to the March 2012 elections. The 1995-1996 tests were threatening to that portion of Taiwan’s population that doesn’t take brute force demonstrations very well. However, an ASBM test likely would be subtle, with no need for an official declaration or acknowledgement. Yet it could be cast in the U.S., Taiwan, and Chinese media as directed against aircraft carriers. Tests would not be directed against Chinese compatriots on Taiwan, so nothing to worry about, or so the line could go.

Regardless, the primary driver for an ASBM is Taiwan. From Beijing’s perspective, the goal is to create the conditions for cross-Strait unification on terms favorable to Beijing. The United States is viewed as the principle remaining roadblock to unification. Along these lines, a goal could be to create the perception within Taiwan of U.S. weakness and vulnerability, as well as a real capability to complicate America’s capacity to intervene on behalf of Taiwan in a future crisis.

Visible deployment of a growing arsenal of ballistic missiles is intended to create a sense of vulnerability and psychological pressure among the majority of Taiwan’s population who may be inclined toward supporting political movements and leaders associated with Taiwan independence. However, much of that public sense of vulnerability is mitigated through popular confidence in American willingness and ability to intervene on behalf of Taiwan in a crisis situation.

The next opportunity for Taiwanese to express support for dejure independence or an illusive status quo through the election of political leaders at the national level is 2012, and therefore may serve as a milestone for demonstrating a capability.

In short, Beijing appears to be placing a premium on undercutting Taiwan’s confidence in the U.S. as a reliable security guarantor by demonstrating military capabilities that could derail military intervention. And a demonstrated ASBM capability, without a clear and visible sign of American ability to deal with it, could indeed serve as a game changer.

China's State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Director Visit to Washington DC

2009-06-04T18:05:00.044-04:00

Reliable sources indicate that Ambassador Wang Yi (王毅), head of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), is scheduled to visit Washington DC the week of June 22nd. The TAO (国台办) is an administrative, ministry-level institution in charge of Taiwan affairs under the State Council – China's cabinet. Wang’s visit, one year after assuming the position as TAO Director, comes closely on the heels of the highly publicized visit of KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung to China, a major follow-on round of SEF-ARATS talks in Nanjing, and unsubstantiated reports of meetings between Taiwan National Security Council (NSC) Secretary General Su Chi and officials in Washington DC.

Background

Born in 1953, Wang Yi is a professional diplomat, former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, and former ambassador to Japan. Wang Yi’s wife is said to be the daughter of Qian Jiadong, foreign affairs secretary to Zhou Enlai and PRC Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva. During his tenure as Vice Foreign Minister between 2001 and 2004, Wang was intimately involved in the North Korea Six Party Talks and frequently traveled to Washington. Hu Jintao’s appointment of Wang Yi to serve as ambassador to Japan was viewed as a significant upgrade in Beijing’s relations with Japan, given the fact that Vice Minister-level authorities are normally assigned to countries sitting on the UN Security Council. His assignment to lead the Taiwan Affairs Office a year ago also has been viewed as a sign of Hu Jintao’s desire to avoid problems on his watch, particularly in managing Taiwan’s maneuvering for greater international space.

In June 2008, Wang replaced Chen Yunlin, who had been in the position for more than a decade. Chen was appointed as the chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). TAO visits abroad are a standard aspect of China’s diplomatic initiative to bring the world around to its way of thinking. They also offer an opportunity for U.S. officials to express their views regarding Taiwan and cross-Strait relations. Wang Yi’s predecessor, Director Chen Yunlin, is said to have visited Washington, D.C. in February 2004, January 2005, and September 2006, and April 2007. TAO deputy director and ARATS vice chairman Sun Yafu is said to have visited New York and San Francisco in January 2007. TAO deputy director Li Bingcai visited Los Angeles in July 2006; and Deputy Director Wang Zaixi visited Japan in April 2006 and New York in November 2005.

Wang himself is no stranger to Washington. From August 1997 to February 1998, Wang was a visiting scholar at Georgetown University and he visited a number of occasions to discuss North Korea-related issues while Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Wang Agenda

Assuming rumors of his visit are true, what could be on Ambassador Wang Yi’s agenda? Most obvious would be to safeguard Beijing’s interpretation of the “one China” framework, brief senior officials in Washington on positive trends in cross-Strait relations, and influence the views of new Obama administration appointees in the run up to a possible Taiwan policy review. Wang’s talking points likely will cover U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, specifically the issue of a potential follow-on sale of F-16 C/D aircraft as well as the unresolved submarine and UH-60 BLACKHAWK Congressional notifications. With his leadership in Beijing increasingly confident in its relative position in the bilateral relationship, one shouldn’t discount a putting a marker down that outlines consequences of any further arms sales.

A Taiwan Policy Review: Past and Present

Ambassador Wang’s visit also will be taking place as senior officials get settled in to their new positions and start to develop an interagency consensus on cross-Strait policies. Taipei Times carried an article in April saying "Washington may soon launch a new Taiwan Policy Review that could have an enormous impact on bilateral relations." Senior Congressional sources were noted as saying that a "formal review is being considered by the Obama administration but that no decision has been made." The article also highlights a Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) piece in which China specialist David Shambaugh asserts that there is a “growing discussion” in Washington of the need to undertake a thorough Taiwan Policy Review “given the dramatic and positive changes in cross-strait relations.” The article notes that a policy review was conducted in 1979 and again 15 years later in 1994. Then by extension, another 15 years down the road, it's time for another one.

A Taiwan policy review -- or a China policy review with Taiwan as a subordinate issue -- is normal with a changeover in political power in Washington. Reviews took place in 1961 with the new Kennedy administration, in 1969 with the incoming Republican administration under Richard Nixon, in 1977 with new Carter administration, 1981 with the incoming Republican administration, 1993 with the Democrat administration, 2001 with the Bush administration, and probably with the new Obama administration. In most cases, key issues for interagency review include the form and substance of relations with both the PRC and Taiwan, with a heavy emphasis on defense relations, including arms sales.

-- Kennedy Administration. In 1961, the new Kennedy administration evaluated dual diplomatic recognition of the ROC and the PRC;

-- Nixon Administration. Less than two weeks after his inauguration in January 1969, President Nixon signed National Security Study Memorandum 14 (NSSM-14), which directed an interagency policy review of US policy toward the Republic of China (ROC) and the PRC be completed by 10 March 1969. This review established the groundwork for the opening of relations with the PRC and the President's visit to China in February 1972;

-- Carter Administration. A policy review initiated in June 1977 culminated in the 1979 switch in diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) to the PRC, abrogation of the 1954 US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, and implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA);

-- Reagan Administration. During its first 18 months, President Reagan's interagency team appears to have been absorbed with China issues. An initial initiative appears to have been an interagency review on arms sales policy toward China, which was the key deliverable during the first principal-level visit to Beijing in June 1981. Eventually, the Taiwan arms sales issue came to a head and was temporarily resolved with the 1982 Communique. In 1982, the U.S. and ROC began annual Arms Sales Talks in which Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense presented its list of requested items for U.S. review;

-- Clinton Administration. The Clinton administration is said to have initiated an interagency Taiwan policy review about two months after inauguration. Eighteen months later, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord proclaimed that the "lengthy, detailed interagency policy review that we have conducted is the first of its kind launched by any administration of either political party since we shifted recognition to Beijing in 1979." The reality, however, is that the review was more cosmetic than substantive, presumably to ward off Taiwan supporters in Congress as the administration began to restore military to military relations with the PLA. The Clinton administration raised the cap on US government officials able to visit Taiwan, including a relaxation on military officer travel, and also changed the name of Taiwan's representative office in Washington;

-- Bush Administration. In 2001, a Taiwan policy review resulted in the release of a number of key weapon systems, elimination of the annual arms sales talks, and a general deepening and broadening of defense relations. Instead of submitting requests for defense articles and services through the annual arms sales talks forum, Taiwan MND was able to send letters of request at any time of the year.

The Obama Administration Taiwan Team

An Obama administration Taiwan policy review would likely be centered at the Assistant Secretary level, overseen by Kurt Campbell at the State Department, LTG (ret) Chip Gregson at DoD, and Jeff Bader on the National Security Council staff (see previous post for background info). Kurt's nomination was announced on April 24, 2009, while LTG (ret) Gregson's was announced on April 20th. Yesterday's (4 June) Nelson Report indicated that Kurt's Senate Foreign Relations Committee Asia Subcommittee hearing is set for 9 June, and that a full committee vote could come as soon as 16 or 17 June.

At the Pentagon, Derek Mitchell serves as Gregson's principle deputy, although his specific portfolio isn’t clear yet. Given the fact that Afghanistan may absorb a significant portion of LTG (ret) Gregson’s time, one could speculate that Mitchell may play a more active role on China/Taiwan issues than his predecessors.

Michael Schiffer has assumed the position as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for East Asia. Under the guidance of LTG (ret) Gregson and Derek Mitchell, he'll be directly overseeing the development and execution of defense policy toward Taiwan, as well as the PRC, Japan, and the Korean peninsula. Since 2004, Michael has been at the Stanley Foundation. From 1995 to 2004, Schiffer was a senior staffer for US Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA). He was most recently in Taiwan in December 2008 for a conference co-hosted by the Washington DC-based Brookings Institute and Taiwan's Epoch Foundation. Michael Turton did an excellent write up of the event, as did J. Michael Cole.

Other positions likely to have an input on Taiwan issues include Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OSD/AT&L) Ashton Carter. Together with former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, Kurt Campbell, and others, Ash Carter has been involved in Stanford-Harvard Preventative Defense Project and was in Taiwan last year just after the inauguration of President Ma Ying-jeou. Evan Medeiros is rumored to be the pick to serve as deputy for China/Taiwan under Jeff Bader on the National Security Council staff. For trade issues, Tim Stratford remains the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for China (and Taiwan) Affairs at the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). Who will fill the AIT Taipei Director position remains an open question, although Bill Stanton, currently the DCM at the US Embassy in Seoul has been rumored to be one candidate.

Final Ramblings on the Triangular Relationship

Neither Ambassador Wang’s visit nor a Taiwan/China policy review is likely to come up with much new in the triangular relationship. However, it could be interesting to “liberate thinking,” as Beijing is fond of saying, and assess how a more active U.S. cross-Strait policy could make a difference. An enduring resolution of cross-Strait political differences is unlikely barring Beijing’s acceptance of Taiwan’s nascent democracy, including the prospect of a return to power of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and accepting the principles upon which it was founded. Beijing seems to fear the re-emergence of a Taiwan-centric political party, like the DPP, during national elections on the island in 2012 or 2016. Beijing’s subtle cross-Strait and foreign policy seems to be geared toward strengthening the KMT’s position in its domestic political competition. If this is an accurate assessment, it seems pretty shortsighted. Beijing could try to internalize its own propaganda regarding innovation and “liberal thinking.”

The most enduring solution could be for key opinion leaders within Beijing’s hardline camp and key opinion leaders with Taiwan’s independence movement to take a trip to Palau, exchange bottles of Kaoliang and Maotai, crack them open over a private dinner, come up with mutually acceptable arrangement, then hit an upscale KTV to top off the evening. I’m only half-joking here. But there are an infinite number of creative solutions that the two sides could come up with, if the two sides really wanted to resolve their differences. Or maybe it’s that the two sides can’t because of domestic political dynamics. This is where the U.S. may have a role to play. The Obama administration could help to create an environment in which more liberal thinking could take place, especially in Beijing.

U.S. policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, has helped to keep the peace for 30 years. With this in mind, the attitude seems to be “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” However, let’s look at it in a different way. Significant portions of the annual defense budgets of the United States (U.S. $515 billion in 2009), the PRC (declared budget of U.S. $70 billion in 2009), and Taiwan (U.S. $10 billion) are driven by planning scenarios involving possible PRC use of force against Taiwan. When significant resources have to be dedicated to prevent a crisis, then something is broken. Put simply, the so-called status quo carries a significant price tag. But it seems to be a price that mainstream, status quo-bound political leaders in Washington, Beijing, and Taipei are willing to accept.

To sum up, will Ambassador Wang Yi’s visit resolve anything? The answer is probably no. But it’s fun to liberate one’s thinking sometimes and consider the possibilities.

Satellite Radio: Will It Bring Taiwan to the World and the World to Taiwan?

2009-05-25T05:42:00.021-04:00

The Chinese government television network (CCTV) carried a brief article today on the upcoming Golden Melody awards. The Golden Melody awards, hosted by Taiwan, are intended to recognize the world's best in Chinese popular music, or Mandopop, over the course of a given year. As usual, Taiwanese musicians dominate the list of nominees. Since the days of Teresa Teng (鄧麗君), Taiwanese music has perhaps the most unique cultural trademark that the island offers to Chinese speakers around the world, especially in China itself. Although its soap operas are popular also, it's hard to find a mall, local pub, or KTV in China in which most of the music isn't from Taiwan. In fact, to much of China's 1.3 billion people, Taiwanese music is Taiwan.

{{NOTE: Click here for an overview of Taiwan's cultural influence in China, here for another perspective posted in April 2009 in the Shanghaiist, and here for a perspective that's resentful or skeptical of Taiwan's hold on China's music scene.}}

Despite Taiwan's dominance over the Chinese music market, XM and Sirius satellite radio's international counterpart -- Worldspace -- wouldn't bring Taiwan into its global broadcasting network. Partially owned and licensed by XM Radio, Worldspace wouldn't even market its music lineup in Taiwan. In fact, for those of us living in Taiwan and wanting XM Radio music, getting a Worldspace radio and subscription was extremely difficult. Worldspace's Asia-wide marketing office in Singapore wouldn't sell to listeners in Taiwan, and eventually one had to go through a circuitous route in the UAE.

Why wouldn't Worldspace touch Taiwan? Because senior management didn't want to do anything that could detract from winning Chinese government approval for broadcasting Worldspace satellite radio to the mass Chinese market. As part of its market entry efforts, Worldspace's uplink station for ASIASTAR's main beam for the Asia-Pacific region was located in Beijing, and Beijing's ChinaSat allegedly had rights to all content for listeners in the satellite's northeast beam. Worldspace's contract manufacturer for its best receivers has been Xian-based Tongshi Data, Ltd. Its receivers were adequate, but certainly no match for the ones that Taiwan's Wistron NeWeb manufactures for Sirius XM.

What was the end result of the company's refusal to bring Taiwan in to its network? The greater Washington DC-based Worldspace (actually called "1Worldspace" since July 2008) filed for bankruptcy in November 2008. In March 2009, U.S. courts approved the sale of Worldspace's assets for a paltry U.S. $28 million. Presumably, this includes ASIASTAR, Worldspace/XM's satellite that hovers above the Asia-Pacific region. The ASIASTAR satellite, which operates in a portion of the frequency spectrum often preferred by military users (L-Band), went into operation in 2000 and has a 12-15 year life expectancy (out to 2012-2015). ASIASTAR was up for auction, with bids due on January 26, 2009. It's not clear yet if ASIASTAR was included in that March 2009 court announcement. The satellite still has three to five years of life left.

Worldspace's Darker Side

Worldspace's delusional hunger for the China market and inability to see how Taiwan could have enabled access to the China shouldn't be a surprise. In fact, it's probably best that Worldspace kept its lips locked onto Beijing's rear end, and stayed away from Taiwan. Allegations of Al Qaida links had long hounded Worldspace since its initial public offering in the 1990s. A major shareholder in the entity that bought Worldspace's remaining assets in March 2009, the Singapore-based Yenura Pte Ltd, owned the pharmaceutical factory in Sudan that was allegedly manufacturing chemical weapons. The Clinton administration used cruise missiles to put the factory out of business in 1999.

The Other Side of Worldspace: Satellite Radio and Emergency Response

These allegations aside, Worldspace was much more than music. Maybe this partially explains why Beijing frowned upon Worldspace bringing Taiwan into its network. Media reporting in 2005 indicated that Worldspace partner XM Radio was teamed with a major Pentagon contractor to offer disaster warning, recovery and response (DWRR) services to military and civilian emergency responders around the world. This included links to an earthquake warning system to warn populations along coastlines of possible tsunamis. People often forget that before 2004, Taiwan had the record for most lives lost in the Asia-Pacific region due to a 19th century tsunami.

Under a related but separate program, Worldspace was a player in the Pentagon's Mobile Enhanced Situational Awareness (MESA) initiative, which offered a cost effective means of communicating globally in areas where no communications infrastructure exists or when national communications systems have failed. MESA also has been viewed as a cost effective means of beaming educational material, such as standardized English teaching curricula, to classrooms around the world. The system also is ideal for emergency broadcasting for fishing boats and other ships at sea, and has been tested and adopted for use on United and other airlines that cross the Pacific Ocean.

As an aside, Worldspace's website still reflects William Schneider as one of the few remaining members of its board of directors. Schneider served as chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Science Board under the Bush administration.

It's no wonder that satellite radio is very attractive for users in areas with limited communications, areas where there is a serious risk of communciations failures, or where music choices or emergency broadcasting are limited. Once you got your hands on it, Worldspace satellite radio was easy to use and easily proliferated. All one needed was a Tongshi receiver that was barely larger than your hand, an unobstructed view toward the south (from Taiwan), a U.S. $8.00 a month subscription, and line to some speakers or headsets. A terrestrial repeater network, either independent or overlayed onto existing networks, offers a redundant communications pathway.

Satellite Radio, Worldspace, and Taiwan: Good Idea But Bad Partner

So Worldspace wasn't the wisest choice as a partner for XM Radio, the Pentagon, or U.S. defense industry. Allegations of ties with Al Qaida, its zeal for the China market, and the fact that a Chinese state-owned company controlled Worldspace's ASIASTAR Northeast beam should have offered some clues.

This still doesn't negate the fact that satellite radio and Taiwan are made for each other. With Worldspace and its Chinese partnerships presumably out of the picture, maybe now is the time that the Ma administration or the private sector in Taiwan take a close look at satellite radio. Here are four reasons why:

Bring the World to Taiwan. Taiwan needs more international radio broadcasting. There is only one English radio station on the island -- ICRT. There is no Japanese station as far as I know, despite the island having more Japanese speakers than anywhere else outside of Japan (click here for a list of Taiwan's current radio stations). ICRT is OK, but there could be alot more for the 6000+ foreign English teachers on the island and other expats who may want some good rock, hip hop, or even country in their local bar or for partying at home. Countless Taiwanese may want more variety in music and news broadcasting, including NPR, BBC, Bloomberg, CNN, etc, etc. Even Taiwan's growing Indian population may enjoy Sirius XM's Indian content. Sure, you can get Sirius XM through the internet. But the buffering is a problem sometimes, and there's just something magical about a "voice from the sky" when listening to American radio beaming down from a satellite to a small receiver hanging on a balcony looking out toward the mountains of central Taiwan.

Bringing it back down to earth, an opportunity exists for ICRT, Kiss, UFO, or any station to add another dimension to its terrestrial broadcasting, and make a case to Taiwan's National Communications Commission (NCC) to license satellite digital audio broadcasting. For funding sources, one possibility could be to leverage the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) Industrial Cooperation Program (ICP). With billions of dollars in arms sales contracts being signed in the wake of the Congressional notifications that went forward last Fall, U.S. defense industry may be looking for ideas on how to satisfy their offset obligations that MOEA manages.

Bring Taiwan to the World. Taiwan dominates the global Chinese-speaking music industry. Worldspace could have leveraged the artistic and entrepreneurial talent in Taiwan, and used it as a platform for regional expansion instead of trying to go direct to China and shutting Taiwan out. Taiwan needs to share itself with the world, and satellite radio is an opportunity. So what did Worldspace have in mind in terms of its content to broadcast to audiences in China? According to Worldspace's annual report for 2008, only China National Radio, China Radio International, SEEC Media Group, Ltd. (HK based company with exclusive rights granted by authorities in Beijing to broadcast in China), and Hunan Radio & TV would able to provide content. Woo-hoo! That sounds like a really exciting menu after more than eight years of fruitless Worldspace negotiations with the Chinese government. Even Jaw Shao-kang's UFO network would have been threatening to Chinese authorities in Beijing.

Add Resilience to Taiwan's Communications Infrastructure. Taiwan is prone to earthquakes, typhoons, and other natural disasters and communications are sometimes taken for granted. However, the reality is that Taiwan's communications links with the outside world are pretty tenuous. There are two ways that communications get in and out -- undersea cable and satellite. Its current satellite communications rely on a small number of fixed ground stations, which then hook into the island's main telecommunications switching network. Taiwan has a half dozen or so undersea cables that are small spurs from major undersea trunk lines that by-pass the island. A rupture of one or two of these cables, such as what happened during the December 2006 earthquake off the coast of Kaohsiung, can have major effects on international communications, including internet access. The World Bank in 2005 assessed Taiwan to be one of the most dangerous places on earth, at least when it comes to natural disasters. And satellite radio is a good, cost effective way to make sure you're hooked up with the world when all else fails.

This doesn't even begin to address what would happen when someone or a group of people such as the PLA make it a point to take out Taiwan's fixed SATCOM sites and small number of undersea spurs. Nothing beats small, individual satellite radio receivers as a survivable, last resort means of communications. This, and the fact that it's really cheap, is why the Pentagon likes satellite radio. Maybe Taiwan could follow their lead...

Get Traction for Procurement of Taiwan's Own Communications Satellite. Taiwan has had a plan to procure a broadband communications satellite since at least 1999. There's a good military rationale for the satellite, as well as for homeland security. However, what's been lacking is a good business argument in which there could be at least some return on investment. Worldspace, backed by XM Radio, made the business investment into a satellite to cover the Asia-Pacific region. Having made some bad business decisions, Worldspace went bankrupt. However, one could be assured that Taiwan's entrepreneurial spirit, augmented by both ROC and U.S. government support, would lead to better results. Taiwan currently rents a single transponder on Singapore's ST-1 satellite, and plans for a second satellite deal on ST-2 appear to be on track, with launched scheduled for 4Q 2010. However, if the ST-2 satellite consists of only C- and Ku-band transponders, its uses for disaster relief and homeland security likely would be limited due to the requirement for large antenna dishes. ST-1 probably will hear its last transmission next year.

As an aside, other broadband satellites in the region that are used for homeland security and disaster relief purposes include Japan's Ka-Band KIZUNA satellite. Its high speed and large bandwidth enable "super high speed" internet-via-satellite, basically taking the WiFi capability one has a Starbucks and applying to a region as a whole. With a 45 centimeter antenna, internet downlink speeds of up to 155Mbps have been reported.

In short, goodbye to Worldspace. Its experience should be a lesson to American businesses. Doing business in China is OK. But the way to do it is via Taiwan. Beyond this, the Bush administration is lucky word never leaked that the Pentagon was using a satellite communications network that was partially controlled by China (the ASIASTAR northeast beam). With prominent figures in authoritative positions in the Pentagon serving on the Worldspace board of directors, senior Bush administration officials should have known better.

Taiwan and China Deepen Cooperation in the Aviation Sector

2009-05-14T21:37:00.002-04:00

Flightglobal carried an interesting article today regarding another facet of cross-Strait relations. China's aviation administration is looking toward Taiwan to help fill pilot shortages on domestic Chinese airlines. Moving beyond the issue of direct flights between Chinese and Taiwanese cities, the aviation sector appears to be the latest area of cross-Strait cooperation:

China's Shenzhen Airlines to employ 25 Taiwanese pilots

By Leithen Francis

China's Shenzhen Airlines plans to receive 25 Taiwanese pilots as part of a Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) initiative to help China overcome its pilot shortage problem.

A Shenzhen Airlines spokeswoman in Shenzhen says the CAAC has allocated Shenzhen Airlines 25 Taiwanese pilots.

She says the CAAC is recruiting 80 Taiwanese pilots in total and allocating them to different airlines around China.

Another Shenzhen official, who is directly involved in pilot recruitment, confirms to ATI that the carrier is to receive 25 Taiwanese pilots allocated by the CAAC.

He says Shenzhen has about 77 aircraft - a mix of Airbus A320s, Boeing 737s and Embraer 190s - and needs more pilots because it has aircraft on order. CAAC officials in Beijing were unavailable for comment today.

China has recruited Taiwanese pilots before. In late 2005 Sichuan Airlines became the first carrier in China to recruit pilots from Taiwan. Taiwanese pilots are popular because of their Chinese language skills.

Besides lending of pilots, Taiwan's state-owned AIDC is apparently looking to play a role in the multi-billion dollar China's jumbo jet program (see here for an overview published by the Project 2049 Institute). It's worth recalling a famous quote from Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who loved aviation:

Of all the inventions that have helped to unify China perhaps the airplane is the most outstanding. Its ability to annihilate distance has been in direct proportion to its achievements in assisting to annihilate suspicion and misunderstanding among provincial officials far removed from one another or from the officials at the seat of government.

US Army Continues to Implement Taiwan PATRIOT Contract

2009-01-29T07:16:00.007-05:00

This title would be more appropriate than the sensational media reporting that is making a routine US Army announcement much more than it really is. Admittedly, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process can be complicated, but it can be learned. Most important to know is that approval of Taiwan's price and availability (P&A) requests, which implies a US approval to release a system, and forwarding of Congressional notifications, which clears the way for a government-to-government contract, are the critical decision points. The Taipei Times, my favorite Taiwan paper, has one report that is worth comments:

Raytheon Welcomes PAC-3 Deal

(COMMENT: PAC-3 is a missile. There hasn't been a PAC-3 deal yet because there hasn't been a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) signed between U.S. and Taiwan government authorities that addresses the sale of PAC-3 missiles. Besides, from a business perspective, Raytheon should only be concerned about the ground systems needed to support the PAC-3 missile, and not the PAC-3 itself. The missile is a Lockheed product, with a Boeing seeker and Aerojet motor.

By William Lowther

STAFF REPORTER IN WASHINGTON

Thursday, Jan 29, 2009, Page 2

“Upgrading Patriot fire units from Configuration-2 to Configuration-3 will provide Taiwan with enhanced system capabilities to meet current and emerging threats.”— Sanjay Kapoor, vice president for Patriot Programs at Raytheon

The US has approved a US$154 million contract to allow Raytheon Company to further upgrade Taiwan’s Patriot Air and Missile Defense System.

COMMENT: The real contract -- a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) -- would between AIT and TECRO (on behalf of the Ministry of National Defense and the US Army) to upgrade Taiwan's existing three PATRIOT fire units to the latest US Army configuration. This particular contract worth US $154 million would be between the US Army and a contractor -- Raytheon -- for support in implementing the LOA. The November 2007 Congressional notification, which is the enabler for signing an LOA, indicated that the contract would be as much as US $939 million. In addition, it's interesting that the release appears to have been generated by Raytheon via PR Newswire, a service that corporations employ to get the message out to the public. As of yet, the original DoD contract award notification can't be found. The 26 January PR Newswire release came two days before Raytheon's 4th quarter earnings statement, in which executives had the unfortunate task of telling shareholders that earnings were down.

It is the first positive indication of how the administration of US President Barack Obama will handle military requests from Taipei. There had been fears that the new president might neglect Taiwanese defense as he pushed for better relations with China.

COMMENT: This is the part that is dangerous and needs to be corrected. Because this US Army contract award to Raytheon is only implementing a Bush administration policy decision that was made in November 2007, it is unlikely that the US Army would have felt it necessary to seek policy clearance from the new Obama administration for this specific contract. This is simply implementing an on-going program. Is there symbolism in every single DoD contract that is awarded to US industry to implement Taiwan-related programs? Probably. But only a few -- ones involving a Presidential-or at least Principal-level decision - are truly significant.

In short, this contract award is far from being a "positive indication" of how the new Obama administration will handle Taiwan's requests. That's because senior officials likely had no clue about it. And even they did, stopping it would have been not only a significant departure from established policy, but also an international legal dispute since an LOA has already been signed.

But the new contract has won White House support in the wake of a major policy paper from Beijing that said blocking formal Taiwanese independence and stopping US arms sales to Taiwan were the chief concerns of the Chinese military.

COMMENT: Won White House support in the wake of a major policy paper from Beijing? As noted above, the premise that there was "White House support" is flawed. And the linkage with China's annual defense white paper is probably even further afield. The US Army is just trying to do their job, and the contracting process probably started well before the Chinese White Paper came out.

The Patriot contract was issued by the US Army Aviation and Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, on Monday. It is not part of the US$6.5 billion arms sale to Taiwan that was approved by former US president George Bush last October.

COMMENT: Exactly.

Rather, it is a totally separate deal that follows two other awards Raytheon received last year for Taiwan Patriot support, one in March for upgrades and another in April for technical services.

COMMENT: At risk of confusing things, there is a relationship between the Congressional notification last October for the additional fire units and PAC-3 missiles, and these ground system upgrades. The upgrades, with a total potential value of almost US $1 billion, are necessary for the existing three fire units to be able to fire the PAC-3 missile. They do have some value on their own, such as expanding the range of the existing three radar systems, greater target discrimination, better communications, and maybe an interface with Link 16. Whether or not the upgrades are worth the $1 billion without the PAC-3 missile is another question. From a simple business perspective, hats off to Raytheon for pulling off the delinkage. Caveat emptor...

Under the new contract Raytheon will upgrade Taiwan’s Patriots from “Configuration-2” to “Configuration-3,” bringing them to the same state-of-the-art level as the US Army’s own Patriot system. This means that Taiwan can use Lockheed’s PAC-3 missiles and allows missile launchers to be placed miles in front of the radar that controls the system.

CAPABILITY

The upgraded Patriots are believed to be capable of intercepting and destroying many — if not most — incoming missiles fired in an enemy attack. But the Patriot is not foolproof and in the case of a large-scale attack involving dozens of enemy missiles all being fired at once at a variety of targets, some would be nearly certain to get through.

COMMENT: The first sentence is problematic. The radar upgrades themselves seem like they would only offer a marginal improvement -- even if that -- in the PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missile's ability to engage China's short and medium range ballistic missiles. Because of China's intense efforts over the last 15 years to develop missle defense countermeasures, it's not clear how effective the radar upgrades and even the PAC-3 missile would be against PRC ballistic missiles. These aren't SCUDs. The PATRIOT radar system can only handle so many missiles at once - it is said to have a relatively low saturation point. But if the PRC launched a small number of ballistic missiles against Taiwan at one time -- say five to 10 -- then a PATRIOT ground system and PAC-3 missiles should perform OK.

But when trying to counter a large scale salvo involving multi-axis strikes, a mix of low flying aircraft/UAVs and ballistic targets, HARPY anti-radiation missiles intended to kill the PATRIOT radar, jammers on board re-entry vehicles, maneuvering re-entry vehicles, and longer range ballistic missiles with a reentry speed that precludes the ability of PAC-3 to intercept them, then it becomes really hard. In short, the upgraded PATRIOT ground systems and the PAC-3 missiles, if and when a deal is ever reached, would offer an ability to defend against a limited number of Chinese short range ballistic missiles. And a limited strike, as part of a coercive campaign intended to achieve limited political objectives, is the most likely scenario for use of PRC ballistic missiles against Taiwan.

As part of the new contract Raytheon — the world’s largest missile maker — will provide upgrade kits for radar and command and control components, a radar refurbishment and related engineering and technical services.

Under last October’s arms sales agreement, Taiwan will get 330 of the Lockheed Martin built PAC-3 missiles valued at US$3.1 billion. Bonnie Glaser, a senior associate at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, predicted earlier this month that cooperation between Beijing and Washington would not come at Taiwan’s expense. “The US will seek to create an environment in which Taiwan feels secure. Arms sales will remain under consideration, especially new fighter jets. China’s military posture toward Taiwan will be the critical variable in any arms sale decision, along with Taiwan’s requests for defensive weapons to defend itself against a Chinese attack,” she said. China has more than 1,400 missiles pointed at Taiwan and has said repeatedly that it would achieve unification by force if needed.

COMMENT: Again, there was no agreement last October. There was only a Bush administration notification to Congress outlining its intent to conclude an agreement with the Taiwan government. There is no indication that this agreement has been signed. In fact, there may be problems. The reduction in the number of missiles that the Bush administration decided to include at this point in time is said to have affected the unit cost associated with production of the missiles. And the haggling goes on. At this point, one could argue that Taiwan almost has to follow through with the PAC-3 missile procurement. It's already sunk almost $1 billion in laying the necessary groundwork (no pun intended).

WHITE PAPER

Indeed, China’s latest national defense White Paper indicates that Taiwan remains the focus of China’s current military buildup.The Associated Press reported a few days ago that Beijing was keeping this year’s spending figures for its 2.3 million-strong armed forces secret. But last year China announced a military budget of US$59 billion, up nearly 18 percent over the previous year.It was the 18th year of double-digit growth in military spending in the last 19 years.

END

Envisioning Taiwan's Future: A Public Call

2009-01-25T11:29:00.002-05:00

The article below announces an innovative approach to public policy. It solicits the public for ideas on a vision for Taiwan’s future. Having a positive vision for the future is a key enabler for improving the quality of life in a society, and something that has been missing in government for quite some time. Good move, and it even leverages Taiwan’s internationally acclaimed e-government capability:

CNA: Web Site Devoted To Discussing Visions For Taiwan To Be Launched Soon

Taipei Central News Agency in English 1230 GMT 25 Jan 09

[By Maubo Chang]

Taipei, Jan. 25 (CNA) -- What should Taiwan be in ten years' time? Will marriage still be defined as a sexual union between a man and a woman by 2019?

A Web site that's being sponsored by the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission of the Executive Yuan will soon invite the public to share their visions for the country in regard to the above two issues and eight other issues. Jiang Yi-huah, the minister heading the commission, said the Web site will be launched after the Chinese New Year holiday and will seek public opinion on issues of public concern.

Minister Jiang said special attention will be given to the views of young people because they are expected to lead society in ten years' time.

Jiang said his commission is searching for ten leaders of public opinion to preside over the discussion of the issues, with each of the ten in charge of one issue.

Other notable issues to be discussed include how to encourage innovations in society, and how Taiwanese citizens can get along well with Chinese citizens.

Jiang says all visions are welcome as long as they can broaden the public's horizons, drive them to think deeper and to produce more creative ideas.

The discussions will help the public reach a consensus on these issues and provide valuable reference material for the Executive Yuan in formulating its policy, said Jiang.

Each discussion leader is supposed to summarize the public's opinions six months after the Web site is set up, Jiang said.

The Obama Taiwan Team Starting to Shape Up

2009-01-10T22:47:00.036-05:00

For those interested in U.S.-Taiwan relations, get ready for a breath of fresh air. The Nelson Report and other publications have been offering glimpses into who could be directing U.S. policy towards Taiwan and the rest of the Asia-Pacific region. If some of the key names being floated turn out to be true, then the Obama administration’s Taiwan policy team could be almost as strong as the one that opened the Bush administration.

Kurt Campbell. The stars center on Dr. Kurt Campbell as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Kurt has been one of the strongest supporters of U.S.-Taiwan relations, and is the father of the transformation in bilateral defense relations in the late 1990s. He’s traveled to Taiwan on numerous occasions, and understands the issues and the people. He was an occasional contributor to the Taipei Times. During his four year tenure in the Pentagon’s top Asia job, Kurt often was viewed as the strongest Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense since the legendary Richard Armitage served in the position in the 1980s. After having to coordinate the U.S. response during the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, Kurt made it his mission to deepen and broaden U.S.-Taiwan defense relations, including opening new avenues of dialogue between the two defense establishments.

Brilliant, passionate, and creative, Kurt knows how to heal an organization from the ills of bureaucratic inertia. And since the departure of Deputy Secretary Armitage, Assistant Secretary James Kelly, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Randy Schriver in 2005, the Department of State (and Taiwan) has needed someone like Dr. Campbell. As an aside, his spousal unit is Lael Brainard, who is rumored to be a candidate for a senior economic position at State or the Office of the US Trade Representative.

After leaving the Pentagon in 2000, Kurt assumed a senior position at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In February 2007, he and Michele Flournoy, who has been announced as the Obama administration’s Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, started up the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). The all-star cast making up the CNAS board of directors and advisory board includes Bill Perry, Madeleine Albright, Rich Armitage, Bill Lynn (Deputy SecDef designate), Richard Danzig (see below), ADM (ret) Denny Blair (Director, National Intelligence designate), LTG (ret) Chip Gregson (see below), John Podesta, Randy Schriver, Jim Steinberg (see below), Ash Carter, Jim Thomas, and Michael Green among others. With so many CNASers heading back into government, it’s unclear what form the organization will take in the future.

Jim Steinberg. Kurt will be working for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Deputy Secretary Jim Steinberg. While Hillary doesn’t have much experience in Taiwan, Steinberg was involved in a number of Taiwan-related policy issues during his time as Deputy National Security Advisor from 1996 to 2000, and has maintained channels of communications with interlocutors from Taiwan since leaving government. Since 2006, Steinberg has headed Texas University’s LBJ School of Public Policy and seems to have a soft spot for the underdogs. The other key position will be the Deputy Assistant Secretary responsible for China/Taiwan affairs, which likely would go to a career State Department foreign service officer.

Chip Gregson. At Department of Defense (DoD), the State Department bureaucracy has been in charge of managing defense policy toward China and Taiwan since the departure of Richard Lawless in 2006. As a result, Taiwan has been relegated to the back benches over the last couple of years. However, the appointment of LTG (ret) Wallace “Chip” Gregson as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian & Pacific Affairs would be almost certain to restore dignity in the U.S.-Taiwan defense relationship. In overseeing the defense component of the bilateral relationship that has traditionally figured prominently, a Campbell-Gregson combo would be powerful. LTG Gregson served as Kurt Campbell’s director for Asia-Pacific Affairs between 1998 and 2000. In that position, he cleared the path for a number of Taiwan-related Pentagon initiatives.

Marine Commandant Jim Jones (designated as Obama’s National Security Advisor) brought LTG Gregson back to the Marines to serve as a division commander then III MEF Commander in Okinawa, and finally as Marine Forces Pacific Commander. Since retirement, he is said to have maintained links with Taiwan’s defense establishment as an informal advisor, along with ADM (ret) Denny Blair. A Naval Academy grad (class of ’68), Gregson did a brief stint with the U.S. Olympic Committee after retirement from the Marine Corps in 2005.

Richard Bush. Another leading figure should be (hopefully) Richard Bush. As one of the few true American Taiwan academic specialists, Richard would be ideal to serve as AIT Director. No word yet if this is the case or not. But if the post in Taipei needs to be filled, Richard’s the man. Quiet and thoughtful, he previously served as AIT Chairman in Washington (actually Rossyln, VA) from 1997 until 2002, a position in which he worked with Dr. Campbell, Jeff Bader, LTG Gregson, and Derek Mitchell, and performed with distinction and finesse. Before his AIT service, he was National Intelligence Officer for East Asia. He also supported Rep Steve Solarz' campaign for Taiwan democracy in the 1980s. Richard’s Untying the Knot is one of the best books ever written on Taiwan’s political environment, cross-Strait relations, and U.S. interests in Taiwan. He’s currently senior fellow and director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.

Having said all this, hats are off to Steve Young for his outstanding work at AIT Taipei. He’s been a saving grace in a Bush administration that seemed inclined toward throwing Taiwan under the bus. Steve has been an advocate for fairness, and a promoter of U.S. interests in Taiwan’s democratic consolidation.

Derek Mitchell. Rounding out the Obama Taiwan team could – should – be Derek Mitchell. Shaped by his experience as a Ted Kennedy staffer, Mr. Mitchell was active in Taiwan democracy issues as a young man, and worked for Dr. Campbell and LTG Gregson as a strategic planner and senior country director for China/Taiwan. At CSIS for the last eight years, he traveled to Taiwan on a frequent basis, and managed a highly successful annual seminar for Taiwan military officers, similar in nature to the general officer CAPSTONE course. Before joining the Campbell team in the Pentagon in 1997, he promoted democracy programs for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in Washington, D.C. Derek spent 1989 working in Taiwan as an editor of a local English-language newspaper, and is married to the beautiful Min Lee, who grew up in Taiwan.

Jeff Bader. Senior coordinator for Taiwan-related interagency policy development is said to be Jeff Bader. He’s been named to replace Dennis Wilder as the Senior Director for Asian Affairs on the NSC Staff. A career State Department officer and former NSC Asia Director under Sandra Kristoff and Ken Lieberthal in the 1998-2000 timeframe, Bader has been the Obama campaign’s Asia coordinator. He’s been strong on Tibetan issues, and presumably should be a proponent of Taiwan’s democratic consolidation. Regardless, he should bring stability and consistency to the table. Bader also has served as ambassador to Namibia and as a senior USTR official, he led the negotiations with China and Taiwan for WTO membership. He’s been Brookings’ China Initiative director over the last few years. He holds a PhD from Columbia in European history.

Others who played a role in the Obama campaign and thus possible candidates for Asia positions could Richard Danzig, Frank Januzzi, Mike Lampton, Evan Medeiros, Frank Levine, Bob Kapp, and Kevin Nealer. At one time, Danzig was touted as a candidate for Deputy Secretary of Defense. After stepping down as Secretary of the Navy, Danzig made a beeline for Taiwan, where he was given a intensive week-long course. Another potential candidate for a senior political-military position in the future, and one well known and respected in China/Taiwan circles, is LTG Karl Eikenberry. Senior country director for China/Taiwan under Kurt Campbell until 1997, Defense Attaché in Beijing, PACOM J-5, and Commander, Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan, LTG Eikenberry is currently Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.

In short, there’s reason for optimism with the new Taiwan policy team. One should not expect moves toward revival of the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, a push for U.N. recognition, or sudden jump in arms sales. On the former, officials in the Obama administration will find that programs they started eight years ago – such as the large phased array UHF radar (Surveillance Radar Program) and Link-16 (aka “Posheng”) – are still on-going after eight years. Congressional notifications for two major multi-billion dollar programs – UH-60 BLACKHAWK utility helicopters and initial design study for a diesel electric submarine program – are still frozen and unresolved. Letters of offer and acceptance (LOAs) on systems that were notified last year – PAC-3 in particular – are held up due to unexpected and sudden rise in the U.S. price, and the US Navy has yet to get the ball rolling with the refurbishment of Taiwan’s P-3C maritime patrol aircraft So with so many unresolved issues connected with on-going programs, one shouldn't expect a lot of enthusiasm for approving a follow-on buy of F-16s. Now working with Taiwan on the transfer of a very short take off and landing (VSTOL) design for a cooperative industrial project or examination of release of a VSTOL variant of the F-35 down the road? May be a different story…More on this another time.

Regardless, the new team will bring stability and respect to a U.S.-Taiwan relationship that has suffered from neglect over the last four years. The results may not manifest themselves easily to the outside world, and are likely to be nuanced. And the inner workings of the machinery are likely to run much smoother than has been the case over the last four years.

Taiwan World Games 2009: Time to Buy Tickets

2009-01-08T07:35:00.005-05:00

As Beijing and the world recover from the kitschy summer 2008 Olympic extravaganza, preparations are underway for a more subdued yet pivotal international event in Taiwan. Leave to Taiwan to go for substance and modesty over symbolism and glitter.

This summer, Taiwan will host its largest international event in its 50 year history – the 2009 World Games. Scheduled for 16-26 July 2009 in Kaohsiung, the World Games are held every four years, the alter ego to the Olympics. In fact, these are the “Taiwan Olympics.” The World Games features 31 events that aren't represented in Olympic competition, but could eventually qualify (click here for the official Kaohsiung World Games web site). And in many cases, the games include sports that many of us can related to better than the Olympics – water skiing, bowling, tug of war, sumo wrestling, squash, and pool. The World Games have been celebrated every four years since 1981, when the first event was hosted by the Californian city of Santa Clara. Organizers expect the Kaohsiung World Games to involve more than 3,000 athletes from 90 nations (click here for Reuters reporting). Below is an introductory overview from Youtube:

For a country like Taiwan, being able to host an international event – any event – is a big deal. And yes Virginia, Taiwan is a country. This is despite its lack of recognition by an international community that fears a China with some serious insecurity issues.

The games are the second-largest international multi-sports event, trailing only the Olympics. The International World Games Association (IWGA) awarded Kaohsiung the honor of hosting the eighth games in June 2004, during former presidential candidate Frank Hsieh’s term as mayor. Since that time, Kaohsiung city officials, including mayor Chen Chu, Kaohsiung Organizing Committee Chief Executive Office Emily Hsu, and Managing Director Liu Shyh-fang, have gone all out in preparation for the World Games.

After the announcement, then-Kaohsiung mayor Frank Hsieh asserted "hopefully Taiwan will obtain worldwide attention from the international media because of this grand sporting event and will have more opportunities to join in the international affairs." However, the attention just doesn’t seem to be there. The lack of a coordinated national-level publicity campaign from the central government is interesting, since it seems like Taiwan’s time to shine internationally. A July 13, 2008 China Post article covered the event, and highlighted the less-than-arousing marketing campaign for the games.

One impressive preparation is the giant 55,000 person solar-powered stadium. The Japanese-designed facility is alleged to be the largest solar powered structure in the world. On days when no competitions are taking place, the electricity generated is fed into the main city grid. The project leader is Delta Electronics. Kaohsiung also recently completed its new subway system, an investment valued at over U.S. $6 billion. The city has also been busy with its beautification efforts, cleaning up the once-not-so-lovely Love River. Artificial lakes that will serve water sports have been cleaned, and boardwalks also have been built along the banks.

“We haven’t done as well promoting this as they would overseas,” one observer notes. A Taipei Times report noted that Taiwan came close to losing the games last year due to the slow pace of construction of sports facilities.

Organizers are looking for foreign English-speaking volunteers for the World Games, particularly those able to also speak Arabic, French, German, Italian, Russian or Spanish. And of course, Chinese Mandarin or Taiwanese is a big plus. Point of contact is Conrado Piccin (conrado.piccin@worldgames2009.tw).

In addition, organizers, assisted by AIT Kaohsiung, have been highlighting business opportunities associated with the games, looking in particular for security-related help. See a short video below:

Taiwan PAC-3 Sale Delayed: Reduction of Ballistic Missile Deployment Opposite Taiwan Imminent?

2009-01-04T22:17:00.012-05:00

According to a Reuters newswire, MND's spokesperson MGen Lisa Chih announced that the People's Republic of China (PRC) may begin a gradual reduction in its short range ballistic missile (SRBM) deployments opposite Taiwan. No confirmation, but it's an interesting announcement. If true, such a move would be largely symbolic given the large number of launchers and missiles that are already in place, and in light of PRC deployments of land attack cruise missiles (LACMs).

The timing of a symbolic freeze or reduction of conventional ballistic missiles also could be interesting. First, the inauguration of President-elect Obama is just over two weeks away, and a goodwill gesture could be an attempt to cast China in a positive light as the new administration settles in.

The announcement also follows a series of public statements on both sides of the Taiwan Strait regarding prospects for cross-Strait military talks. The Ma administration's decision to scale back its annual Hankuang military exercise, holding it once every two years vice yearly. President Ma also made a public statement that hinted at the strong possibility of initiation of peace talks in the near future. Premier Liu Chao-hsuan also told the press that travel restrictions on active duty military personnel may be relaxed, ostensibly a requirement for MND personnel to be able to participate in meetings in the PRC.

The notion of a peace accord, which a reduction in the PRC's force posture theoretically could lead to, is nothing new. In an October 2007 New York Times interview, President Ma discussed the conditions under which he would engage his Chinese counterparts and enter into a "peace accord:"

We have always welcomed the idea of signing a peace accord with China and have been talking about this for the past seven or eight years. We have continued to appeal to China's leaders and government to sit down and have a dialogue on the establishment of a framework for peace and stability. Should a consensus be reached, we could then sign a peace accord and other related agreements. However, we oppose any preconditions or framework being set and any conclusions being reached prior to discussing an agreement. We are even more opposed to missile threats or the use of non-peaceful means or military force to coerce any party into signing a peace accord.

I detailed this concept in my 2000 inaugural address, when I said that as long as China does not intend to use force against Taiwan, then I would honor my "Four Noes" pledge. But today, the international community only pays attention to the proposal made by Hu Jintao regarding a peace agreement, and overlooks the precondition that Hu laid out--that such an agreement would be possible only if it was signed within the "one China" framework.

One, China must openly renounce the use of force against Taiwan. To this end, it must remove the 988 ballistic missiles it has deployed along its southeast coast targeted at Taiwan. Two, China must repeal its so-called "anti-secession law," which represents an attempt to lay a legal basis for a future invasion of Taiwan. Three, and most important, China must give up this notion of the "one China" framework it has insisted upon. In this light, it is very clear now that if we were to sign such a peace treaty under the framework of the "one China" principle, then I think this would mean, for the 23 million people of Taiwan, a treaty of surrender.

Of course, this statement may be pre-election rhetoric, and conditions for entering into negotiations may have evolved since October 2007. However, in his 2009 New Year's address commemorating the 30th anniversary of the PRC's January 1979 Message to Compatriots on Taiwan, Chinese President Hu Jintao echoed Ma's call for initiation of talks that could lead toward some form of peace agreement.

Finally, a symbolic freeze or reduction of ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan coincides with a delay in consummating a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) for procurement of PAC-3 missiles and additional PATRIOT fire units. The Bush administration notified Congress of its intent to sell as many as 330 PAC-3 missiles and four additional fire units in October last year. The total value, if all options were to be exercised, is as high as U.S. $3.1 billion. Since October, a jump in unit cost for the PAC-3 missile is said to be holding up a signed LOA, which ultimately could lead to a reduced procurement. In an 8 Dec 08 Taipei Times editorial, John Tkasic noted Legislative Yuan members citing as much as an additional US $800 million has been added into the draft LOA, a major jump above previous quotes. Other sources have noted that PAC-3 unit cost has risen to as much as US $5.9 million, a significant jump from previous years. The rationales given for the higher price tag include "research and development" costs and "non-recurring engineering."

Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, headquartered in Dallas, Texas, is the prime contractor for the missile. Its Camden, Arkansas manufacturing facility (formerly under Loral Vought Systems), employing over 450 people, is responsible for missile integration and assembly. Boeing’s Air & Missile Defense System in Huntsville Alabama, supported by its Anaheim, CA facility for program management and design support and its El Paso facility for circuit cards, is responsible for the missile seekers. Aerojet, headquartered in California and with facilities in Virginia and Arkansas, produces both the solid rocket motor for the missile boost and the individual attitude control motors for homing guidance maneuvers during flight.

Raytheon is the prime contractor for PATRIOT ground systems, as well as the 200 some odd PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEMs) that Taiwan currently has in its inventory. In 2007, Raytheon captured a program valued at between US $500 and $900 million to upgrade Taiwan's existing three PATRIOT fire units in the greater Taipei area. Raytheon also is supporting the US Air Force's Electronic Systems Command (ESC) in the development, manufacturing, and installation of a large UHF phased array array radar for early warning of ballistic missile attacks, as well as monitoring of air activity in the Taiwan Strait. However, the radar program, which the USG approved in 2000 and contracted in 2005, has experienced significant delays.

Should disagreements over PAC-3 unit costs continue, there could be an indefinite delay in concluding an LOA. The Ma administration, and/or a Democratic administration that has long been skeptical about missile defenses, may be thinking about ways to reciprocate for China's symbolic gesture. PAC-3 missiles could be the bargaining chips.

However, MGen Chih asserted that "we would look favorably at this development (in China), but we need to work on our own safety and not rely on someone else's goodwill." She added "we won't relax our own preparations."

More commentary on this later...

Taiwan Submarines: At the Crossroads

2008-10-30T09:06:00.026-04:00

The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan is said to be approaching a crossroads in its 40-year quest for a fleet of modern diesel electric submarines. With the delay in the Bush administration's Congressional notification of a three year, $360 million design program through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) channels, senior ROC political and military leaders have at least three choices:

Advocate for the Bush administration to notify Congress of its intent to implement the FMS program as planned;

Give up the 40 year quest for conventional submarines that former Defense Minister and President, Chiang Ching-kuo, began in 1969; or

Direct the ROC's domestic industry to take the lead, with U.S. and other foreign assistance, in designing, developing, manufacturing diesel electric submarines.

At the current time, the Ma administration's intent is uncertain. Option 2 -- abandon the 40 year quest right when the likelihood of success appears greatest ever -- may be the prefered path. Such a decision is well within the right of the ROC's democratically elected leadership. However, such a decision could be influenced by PRC pressure and interest groups that do not have in mind broader U.S. interests and U.S. legal requirements under the Taiwan Relations Act. A Ma administration decision in the coming weeks to call off the 40-year quest may be irreversible. Yet the delay in the notification may also present opportunities to keep options open, and explore alternative acquisition paths.

Background: The ROC's 40-Year Quest for Submarines

Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) and the Ministry of Defense leadership initiated the quest in October 1969, when the issue was first raised formally in discussions with senior U.S. political and military officials. The request for 10-12 submarines reflected a desire for greater self-reliance in the wake of U.S. drawdown in forces in the region under the Nixon Doctrine. Initially refused, the U.S. released two submarines in April 1971 as a consolation prize for supporting the PRC's entry in the United Nations at the expense of the ROC.

Between 1972 and 2001, however, U.S. policy, influenced in large part by the U.S. Navy nuclear submarine community, was steadfast in opposing any form of support for Taiwan's vision of a 12-boat fleet of submarines, including related components. As a result, between 1972 and 2001, the ROC scoured the world to fulfill CCK’s submarine dream, playing a cat and mouse game with the PRC, which had feared submarines more than any other capability that the ROC could possess.

The ROC Looks to Europe. The ROC's first breakthrough came with the Netherlands. Taiwan signed a U.S. $370 million contract for procurement of two Dutch Sea Dragon submarines, with deliveries in 1987. However in 1988, the PRC coerced the Dutch government into signing an agreement to restrict further arms sales. As an alternative, the ROC requested the licensed production of RDM Walrus-class submarines in Taiwan and through an intermediate country (Netherlands Antilles). However, again, the Dutch government denied the license for licensed production, as well as procurement of additional two submarines in 1992. In the late 1980s, Germany's HDW initiated discussions with Taiwan for possible sale of submarines. However, the Kohl government, under PRC pressure, denied export licenses in 1992 and 1993.

The Domestic U.S. Submarine Debate: The Nuclear Navy Shows Its Strength. In the meantime, the U.S. Congress began to review export policies related to the export of conventional submarines to foreign customers. In November 1991, Public Law 102-172, including in the 1992 Defense Appropriations Bill, mandated that DoD and military services take no action to “prohibit, impede, or otherwise interfere with construction of conventionally powered submarines by non-public owned and operated ship construction and repair entities in the U.S. for sales to foreign nations, providing that DoD may make recommendations to State Department regarding national security implications of proposed foreign sale." In response to the Congressional requirement, a Secretary of Navy Report to Congress, submitted in May 1992 in response to PL 102-190, Sec 1014, outlined issues that would have to be taken into account and criteria to be used for recommending granting of licenses for the export of submarine constructed in the United States. The report recommended minimal U.S. government involvement.

The ROC Looks to America. With U.S. appearing more relaxed, 1994 saw Taiwan's first formal request since 1978 for U.S. assistance in its acquisition of diesel electric submarines. However, still on the defensive from the 1991 attempt by Congress to force the U.S. Navy to relax its submarine policy, the ROC request was denied on grounds that submarines were “offensive.” To deflect continued ROC pressure on the U.S. for submarines, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the U.S. Navy conduct an assessment of Taiwan’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operational requirements. However, the 1995 assessment is said to have excluded any examination of a submarine requirement, and recommend that Taiwan rely on new maritime patrol aircraft to meet its ASW requirements. By 1998, however, the Clinton administration agreed to examine Taiwan's operational requirement for submarines in an earnest manner. Two assessments concluded in 2000, one carried out by the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the other by a hybrid team of Navy ASW experts, validated the ROC Navy's requirement. As a result, the stage was set for a shift in U.S. submarine policy.

Shift in U.S. Policy. In 2001, in the opening months of the Bush administration, U.S. policy changed. In April of that year, the Bush administration reversed long standing U.S. opposition and announced its intent to assist Taiwan in its acquisition of diesel electric submarines as part of an integrated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) architecture. In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the decision was based upon the judgment of military authorities - two USN operational teams that validated the requirement - and with Taiwan's self-defense in mind. There were concerns over risks to U.S. naval forces operating in the western Pacific in a contingency, such as fratricide and waterspace management. However, because the dominant factor was Taiwan's self-defense rather than interoperability, waterspace management issues were assessed as manageable.

Because the agreement was principled in nature, the specific form of U.S. assistance to Taiwan's acquisition of submarines was left open. DoD Public Affairs statements made after the Bush decision, and other reporting, indicates that the intent was for the program to be carried out through direct commercial sales (DCS) channels, with licences to be release on a case-by-case basis. Up to that time, U.S. industry license requests associated with ROC submarines, including components for a potential domestic program, had been denied. Precedents for such an approach included a number of programs that were managed through DCS channels in the 1980s, including the Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF), the PFG-2 frigate, Tienkung air defense systems just to name a few. U.S. Navy evaluation of licenses would be guided by the 1992 Secretary of the Navy Report to Congress on Criteria to Be Used for Export License Requests. The Report to Congress outlined the policy position of the U.S. Navy that remains valid until today - it had no desire to sponsor a diesel electric submarine through FMS channels.

Chen Shui-bian Meets Rickover's Revenge. Nevertheless, the Chen administration's submission of a letter of request for price and availability (P&A) in June 2001 for eight submarines formally placed the program in the hands of an institution that was ambivalent at best toward diesel electric submarines. In submitting its letter, the ROC request the program be managed through FMS channels, despite the U.S. Navy's policy position. Since the Chen adminstration's insistence that the program be carried out through FMS channels, the program has encountered obstacle after obstacle up until the present time. Among these obstacles has been a worst case cost estimate of almost U.S. $12 billion - almost double the anticipated cost. Another was initial U.S. Navy insistence that Taiwan attain legislative authorization of the full cost of the program. Navy program managers welcomed Taiwan's insistence that a proven design is needed, only attainable from a third party - the chance of obtaining an export license from the Dutch, German, Spanish, and other third party governments was rated as minimal.

The U.S. Navy's suggestion that the ROCN required at least a 2000-ton boat, questionably more than what could be required for legitimate self-defense, has been said to have been a purposeful move by the Rickover nuclear navy community to jack up costs. In its guidance to the contractors responsible for developing the Independent Cost Estimate (ICE), the US Navy's submarine program office wanted to "maximize risk," meaning gold plate the figures in a way to ensure sticker shock when the $11.7 billion was first briefed to the ROC Navy in December 2002. US Navy was said to be basing its program approach and costing on a similar basis as a Virginia, or other nuclear program. Without details on design and definition, Taiwan legislators across party lines rejected this approach, citing the exorbitant costs as compared with other diesel electric submarine projects around the world. Independent contractors in the United States challenged figures in ICE, and passed their own estimates of between US $3.5-5 billion.

Taiwan's Legislative Demands for an Indigenous Role. In 2002, more than 130 members – more than half – of the Legislative Yuan signed letters to the Chen Shui-bian administration asserting that if Taiwan is not given substantial workshare of submarine program, then funding would not be appropriated. The DPP administration responded that a domestic program would raise the total cost by at least 20%, or an additional US $400-800 million. Nevertheless, as the debates ranged, Taiwan press reporting (United Daily News, 29 Sep 02) highlighted the possibility of mini-submarine in lieu of larger 2000-ton submarines.

In January 2003, DPP Vice Premier Lin Hsing-yi established an interagency working group to begin plans for domestic construction. It included the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Finance, Navy Ship Design Center, United Ship Design and Development Center (USDDC), and China Shipbuilding (CSBC). CSBC’s proposal, known as "2-2-2-2" plan, called for a partnership with a U.S. industrial counterpart in the development and production of the eight diesel-powered submarines. The “2+2+2+2 plan” would be a phased effort beginning with the first two submarines being built in a U.S. shipyard or elsewhere abroad with CSBC engineers participating; the second phase would be for CSBC to construct one-third of the third and fourth subs in Taiwan; in the third phase, CSBC would construct two-thirds of the fifth and sixth subs; and then CSBC would construct the final two submarines in entirety in Kaohsiung. Among the various other studies, Vice President Annette Lu, working in conjunction with MND technical staffers, oversaw a working group to evaluate alternative avenues rather than US Navy. Her study, allegedly in favor of shifting the program to domestic channels, was reportedly shelved. In 2003, Taiwan submitted a letter of request to the Bush administration for information on possible refurbished options for submarines. The U.S. Navy also torpedoed this option as well.

Nevertheless, despite the numerous studies and working groups, the Chen administration maintained that the only viable option was via U.S. government channels. The domestic production faction lost steam. As debate raged in the LY over the Chen administration's refusal to integrate Taiwan's domestic industry into the program, and with an explicit LY threat to not authorize funding if there was no business for Taiwan industry, the U.S. Navy saw an opportunity - entange the program in the quagmire of Taiwan domestic politics and announce a policy that would forbid any role for Taiwan industry in the manufacturing of the submarines. Furthermore, the U.S. Navy would retain the intellectual property rights to any design that the ROC would fund. In November 2004, the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) is said to have developed alternative proposal for fully domestic submarine program to President Chen Shui-bian's office, but to no avail. The design was to be a smaller coastal submarine, although specifics are unknown. Various options were considered, including one involving a 1000 ton design with a estimated cost of US $4 billion.

In November 2005, as Taiwan continued to struggle domestically over the submarine and other programs, the Pacific Command Commander, ADM Fallon, was alleged to have discouraged Taiwan from going forward with the submarine program, though later publicly denied such a position. By February 2006, Janes Defense reported that Taiwan was claiming that the US Navy was subverting its plans to acquire US-built SSKs to protect its nuclear-powered submarine capability. As one source noted, "putting a diesel electric submarine programme in the hands of the US Navy is like putting an alcoholic in a brewery – the outcome won’t be good."

So Close, Yet so Far. Despite the U.S. nuclear navy's best efforts to kill the program, there has been progress. Under pressure from Connecticut and Rhode Island Congressional representatives, DoD relaxed its insistence that Taiwan's legislature authorize the full estimated cost. Then, in 2007, Taiwan's legislature finally authorized funding of the first of a two phased program through FMS channels. The final step in getting the program underway was Congressional notification of the U.S. Navy's intent to enter into a formal agreement with Taiwan. After a prolonged delay, the Bush administration last month forwarded six of eight Congressional notifications, yet continued to hold two that had been part of the pile -- diesel electric submarines and UH-60 Blackhawks. Because there appears to be a general consensus that the ROC Army needs a new fleet of utility helicopters, one should expect that this requirement will be met eventually. So how the submarine will be managed remains an open issue.

With so much criticism and skepticism regarding Taiwan's potential acquisition of eight diesel electric submarines, and a glaring lack of enthusiasm from the Ma administration, the Bush administration's decision to defer Congressional notification was regretable yet understandable. A program that could cost Taiwan taxpayers up to U.S. $11.7 billion or even more, and with no return on investment for up to 10 years, does deserve closer scrutiny. Some observers, such as the Naval War College's Bill Murray and Chris Nelson of the Nelson Report, have argued against Taiwan's acquisition of diesel electric submarines, implying that President Bush's decision in April 2001 was misguided and ill-informed. Murray argues that the subs Taiwan would operate would be operationally ineffective and destabilizing. Nelson echoes Murray's assessment, and highlights the cost, timeline, and sourcing issue.

William Murray on Taiwan’s Defense Strategy: Submarines Can Be Lethal…Except for Taiwan

With the program on the cusp of moving forward, the U.S. Navy wasn't finished yet. In a Naval War College Review article published this summer (click here for link), entitled "Revisiting Taiwan's Defense Strategy," William S. Murray, a retired nuclear submarine officer, argues that submarines are operationally ineffective and destabilizing. In an attempt to discourage the ROC from its 40-year quest, LCDR (ret) Murray, backed by academics, policy officials, and U.S. Navy officers, wrote a Naval War College Review with the intent to kill Taiwan’s submarine program once and for all.

The reality is that diesel submarines by themselves, as Murray notes, may be of limited utility. But submarines, like any other capability, aren't intended to operate in isolation. If part of a broader architecture, most observers would agree that submarines can be a lethal asset, especially for a smaller navy. The PRC and others wouldn't fear Taiwan's acquisition of submarines if they weren't operationally and strategically effective. Submarines were a priority of Chiang Ching-kuo and his KMT successors since 1969. They are a centerpiece of at least 39 navies around the world. A submarine capability, a stealthy underwater presence in Taiwan's coastal waters, could be the most effective investment that Taiwan could make for self-defense.

Coastal Defense. Most people tend to think of subs in a deterrent context, thus the claims that they're "offensive." The coastal defense value, however, is perhaps even more important. A viable fleet of at least 10-12 subs, linked with survivable architecture of sensors and comms, could deny the PLA uncontested control of the waters surrounding Taiwan. There is no other capability that could ensure the PLA would fail in an attempt to enforce a maritime blockade. This includes ASW and ASuW missions, including patrols or pickets to defend ships trying to get out to international waters from Kaohsiung and Keelong. Basically, subs would be positioned to guard a narrow one or two kilometer wide route. In an invasion scenario, larger 2500 ton subs could also hold amphibious ships at risk coming down from Zhejiang and up from Guangdong. Smaller coastal submarines, perhaps 750-1000 tons could operate in the Strait itself to interdict troop transports and landing craft, especially at the disembarkation point about 30kms off the coast.

Coastal subs and artillery, supported by survivable C4ISR assets, could bring lethality from both above and below in a way that would raise the cost of an invasion attempt to an unacceptable level. Contrary to assertions made in Murray's article, subs are a stealthy "force in being" that could withstand a PLA first strike. It's hard to think of any other capability, with the exception of hardened bunkers, that are as survivable as subs. The logistical tail would need to be addressed, but it is addressable, contrary to Murray's assertions.

Other Missions. Subs also would be a valuable addition to a maritime and coastal surveillance network. This is not just for military purposes. They also would be useful for monitoring fishing activities of neighbors, counter-trafficking and smuggling, and other border control missions. Subs also are critical for ASW training, scientific research, undersea resource exploitation, SOF missions, and stealthy resupply missions. For example, media reporting indicates that the Australian Customs Service has been pursuing the procurement of as many as five small submarines for stealthy coastal and harbor patrols.

The Domestic Option: Back to the Basics?

If senior-level political and military leaders are resolved to acquire a submarine capability, and senior political leaders in the United States stand by the commitment to assist Taiwan in its acquisition of diesel electric submarines, then there is no reason why the ROC’s 40-year quest for a viable submarine capability can’t be successful. However, critics may be right - if one uses the FMS route, the cost is very high and timeline is long. However, while there are advantages to the current FMS path, other options have existed since the shift in U.S. policy in 2001.

Are the cost, timeline, and sourcing obstacles so great as to render a Taiwan program infeasible? Assuming the will exists and with at least tacit U.S. political support, the ROC Navy is perfectly capable of acquiring a cost effective submarine capability within a reasonable timeframe. Then why all the problems? There are many reasons. But based on significant delays and cost overruns associated with the on-going Posheng and the SRP programs, one could argue that the DoD acquisition system is not optimized for executing complex design and developmental programs in support of FMS.

Media reports indicate that the original Bush administation decision to assist Taiwan in its acquisition of diesel electric submarine was premised on the assumption that the ROC would bear the responsibility of managing its own acquisition. Long standing U.S. Navy policy had been to discourage the U.S. FMS system from playing a major role in any conventional submarine program on U.S. soil. The 1992 SecNav Report to Congress established the U.S. Navy policy: "To prevent the inadvertent transfer of submarine technology and to reduce the overall cost to the U.S. Government, U.S. Government involvement must be minimized." Such a policy is what guided the U.S. Navy's 2001 input into President Bush's decision, which was to pose no objections if assistance were through DCS channels and consistent with the 1992 SecNav Report to Congress.

A number of U.S. observers familiar with the U.S. Navy -- as well as the U.S. Navy itself -- have advocated that Taiwan itself assume responsibility for the program. The National War College’s Bud Cole, a retired U.S. Navy officer, advocated a domestic program. Professor Cole was quoted as saying that "I would encourage Taiwan to begin an indigenous program to begin producing conventional-powered submarines." He added, "given the advanced state of Taiwan's electronics industry and its shipbuilding industry, I find it hard to believe that over the course of eight to ten years that Taiwan cannot produce an operational submarine." Bud also added, "many elements would have to be imported, such as periscopes and battery technology, but I believe that technology is available on world markets.”

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and Senior Country Director for PRC and Taiwan for the Secretary of Defense, Randy Schriver, advocated that Taiwan's legislature "should approve funding for research and development of the submarine program. It should also introduce the notion, either in legislative language, or in associated public statements, that Taiwan should consider an indigenous program to produce diesel electric submarines. Doing so would be consistent with the aforementioned Article 22 and would give new momentum to a program stalled because of uncertainties surrounding foreign procurement of design. An indigenous program could produce a scaled-down -- in terms of gross tonnage -- cheaper and multi-purpose submarine. And the US industry need not fret -- an indigenous program would still involve very significant opportunities for US contracts."

Acquisition of refurbished subs has been an option. There are legitimate logistics support issues, but these could be addressed just as well as the ROCN has addressed their current four subs. But the most viable option has been to go back to the original plan - design, develop, manufacture, and support the subs indigenously, with US industry assistance based on the guidelines established in the 1992 SecNav Report to Congress. Design is usually believed to be the main stumbling block. It doesn't have to be. If the ROCN requirement is for a proven design, then the option with the least risk is to rely on the Sea Dragon maintenance technical data package. Computer aided design tools, such as those used by U.S. commercial and military submarine builders could offer the fidelity needed for a production TDP.

With a more open minded approach, a smaller, more simple design with a spiral acquisition approach that could plan for phased improvements could be an option. Smaller coastal submarines, many of which are based on the older German Type-206, are now becoming more popular among international navies. French DCN's SMX-23 and Sweden's Kockum's Sea Dagger and Challenger are marketed toward smaller coastal subs. While these companies are unlikely to be able to obtain an export license, European engineers, working as independent consultants, generally have no problems with deemed export laws. Similarly, Indian submarine engineers are positioned to help as well.

If Columbian Drug Runners Are Able to Build Submarines, Can Taiwan? If Taiwan's senior political and military leadership believes the a valid requirement exists for diesel electric submarines, then a strong argument could be made that the most viable acquisition route is one that places responsibility squarely on the shoulders of Taiwan itself. There is no inherent reason reason why the ROC can not design, develop, and manufacture diesel electric submarines on its own, with U.S. and other industries providing licensed technical assistance. Since the first modern submarine came off the production line in 1899, dozens of shipbuilders with much less skill than those in Taiwan have produced seaworthy boats. If the former Yugoslavia, universities, and even amateurs can design and build submarines, then there's a pretty good chance that Taiwan could as well. Even Columbian drug runners have operated mini-submarines, and were engaged in a larger submarine design and production program before being caught! The question is not whether or not can Taiwan's shipbuilders design and build a submarine. The question is how sophisticated a submarine could be designed and built.

Cost Factors of a Domestic Program. Arguments have been made that costs would go up if the program were domestic. Such assertions are questionable for a number of reasons. First, use of the FMS system by itself entails a range of fees and projected cost of offsets, which by some estimates could run as high as 15-20%. Therefore, a domestic program could see these cost savings. Secondly, capital investment into manufacturing facilities likely would be necessary whether or not the subs were manufactured or assembly in Taiwan or the United States. Thirdly, labor rates tend to be less in Taiwan than they are in the United States. Finally, it is difficult to compare the overall economic burden of a domestic submarine program since a large proportion of expenditures would be remain within Taiwan itself, including the creation of jobs, money that would cycle through the local economy (including the supply chain that likely would cover a wide swath of the island), as well as technology spin-offs that could enhance Taiwan's industrial competitiveness in other areas.

Export Licensing Issues: Commercial Yes, Nuke Builders Maybe. The other issue would be how the United States would manage the review of export licenses. The 1992 SecNav Report to Congress provides an idea of the basic policies that would guide the technology licensing. The basic rule of thumb may be that the farther one is away from organizations and individuals involved in the design and manufacturing of U.S. nuclear submarines, particularly the hull, the easier it would be to have licenses approved. This is not to say that General Dynamics Electric Boat and Northrop Grumman would be non-players. They could -- and should. However, licenses likely would be closely scrutinized, and there likely would be calls for USG technology safeguards. Bottom line is that no one knows until they try.

In a worst case scenario, and there is a need for a U.S. shipbuilder to be involved, then there are commercial submarine companies in the United States. Two of the most prominent include Kokes Marine Technologies and U.S. Submarines. Submarine designers include the Southwest Research Institute and American Systems Corporation.